To anyone familiar with Roman Catholic canon law, the name John Coughlin requires no introduction. He enjoys a solid reputation as one who is not only prepared to pose difficult questions but also to provide responses to issues that are calculated to encourage further consideration and evaluation. His training and experience as both a canonical advocate and a civil attorney equip him with the means to embark upon comparative analyses, seeking commonalities and explaining points of divergence. In Canon Law he sets out one example of this technique.

At the outset, Coughlin draws attention to what are not infrequently experienced as two polarised but equally vocal views within the ecclesial community: antinomianism and legalism. Having cited both, he provides a concise and highly accessible distillation of secular jurists (eg Hart, Raz, Rawls and Fuller) in order to give the reader a more precise understanding of the nature of laws, the quality of particular laws and the rule of law. Having done so, he turns to the history of canon law itself. Like the introduction, Chapter 1 is intended to provide the reader with the co-ordinates necessary to journey with the author in his exposition and consideration of the canonical questions that form the target of his inquiry. While a purist might regard the historical overview as selective or incomplete, one needs to keep in mind that the work is intended to challenge those practising in this field (whether as minister, canonist or theologian) to a more comprehensive – not to say informed – understanding of the purpose of canon law and the ends to which its constituent norms are directed. For Coughlin, such an understanding requires an engagement with the intellectus of canon law, a term that might superficially be taken to convey the meaning of the law. However, this would fall considerably short of the mark.

Having adverted to the Thomistic understanding of laws as the ordinance of reason directed for the common good, Coughlin makes clear that his search is more exegetical in character and looks beyond the form of the law, assessing its true character through the accommodation of an understanding of the Church in theological and anthropological terms. It is by this means that the unique character of canon law, and the values it seeks to articulate and give effect to, is to be understood and applied. To illustrate both the need for and justification of his analysis, Coughlin presents the scandal of clerical abuse of minors as, inter alia, an illustration of the attitudinal errors that have impeded the consistent application of canon law within the Church. Thereafter he sets his sights on three discrete areas of the code of canon law: the ownership of property; civil recognition of church structures; and refusal of Holy Communion. Far from being disparate issues, Coughlin deploys each of these practical concerns in order to conduct an evaluation of issues of autonomy, identity and participation, dimensions which he assesses from both antinomian and legalist perspectives.

As the title suggests, the book is intended to be a work of comparison. For this purpose, the comparator broadly comprises not so much the detail of particular laws (procedural or substantive) but the values that have been identified as central to the development of legal theory. It is for this reason that Coughlin concludes his work with an assessment as to whether canon law may properly be considered a system of law at all and, if so, whether, as a system, it adequately accommodates principles and procedures that are consistent with fundamental concerns such as the rule of law. This is a highly readable book. While it assumes some familiarity with legal theory, it will serve as a valuable addition to the bookshelf of any aspiring or established student or practitioner of canon law.

Not infrequently, the most immediate difficulty confronting the student of Roman Catholic canon law is the absence of adequate training in theology. The fundamental and dependent relationship between canon law and theology has been the subject of much academic debate and many learned works of study. However, few are readily available in translation or offer any practical interest save to the most enthusiastic of canonists. In sharp contrast, Coughlin is a highly effective and skilled communicator, who has clearly taken to heart the exhortation of Blessed John Paul II that the rights and duties of those within the Church should be readily accessible and understood.Footnote ⁹

While clearly crafted to the specific, Law, Person, and Community may be seen as the continuation of the work begun in Canon Law. Taken together, they confirm Coughlin's ambition to identify and communicate an understanding of canon law that is authentic to the community which is the Church and to the totality of the Church's teachings concerning the dignity and vocation of each person and their place within the life and mission of the Church.

It is clear that in compiling this work, Coughlin has retained a sharp focus on the first law of the Church: the salvation of souls.Footnote ¹⁰ In the course of his introduction he draws the reader's attention to two characteristics of canon law said not to obtain in the secular law field: the educative purpose to which the law is directed and the reliance upon moral authority, as distinct from coercion or civil modes of compulsion. This he declares to be consistent with the theological understanding of the human person – that is to say of a physical and spiritual creation, qualities that canon law assists in promoting and realising by provision of ecclesial order. Viewed in this way, Coughlin suggests, canon law is the fusion of reason and faith. A central concept to the study is the term ‘anthropology’; this is not a reference to modern social sciences but rather a narrow concept concerned with the study of the human person alone. As Coughlin identifies, the acknowledgement of a nexus between anthropology, strictu sensu, and canon law has potentially profound consequences.

Drawing upon Aristotle and Aquinas, Chapter 1 offers certain anthropological characteristics. These range from ‘human nature’, ‘body’ and ‘soul’ to facets of human expression such as ‘free will’, ‘man as a social being’ and the ends to which the human person is directed. This is no superficial consideration. Coughlin repeatedly posits challenging questions that demand careful philosophical and theological understanding. His purpose for doing so is clear. He seeks to remind lawyers that the law was made for man, not the other way round. The approach is at one and the same time both well-rooted in the teachings of the Church and also radical in its expression. By enabling the reader to engage with what may be termed the true character and vocation of each person, Coughlin lays out (in Chapter 2) an analysis of the relationship between canon law and theology. As in his earlier analysis, he provides the material for uncluttered understanding of both historical origins and more recent perspectives within the Church. While this involves consideration of familiar themes, Coughlin addresses the subject with a freshness and impartiality not always found in others. In doing so, he makes clear that one is not here (as is sometimes suggested) concerned only with ecclesiology. Rather, current understanding must necessarily reflect Christology.

Coughlin transports the reader from considerations of desirability to ecclesial necessity. An important ingredient of this need is, he observes, found in the form of canonical equity. A complete chapter is devoted to this issue. As with earlier chapters, Coughlin provides historical context and expresses his view that canon law is concerned with human reality, perceived within the salvific economy, the currency of which includes evangelic love, compassion and mercy. These are the ingredients of a system of law actuated by a consistent desire and search for justice. He is astute to observe, however, that this justice is not the gift of the law but arises from an anthropological understanding of the human condition as previously identified. In the remaining chapters, Coughlin provides much food for thought as to how justice might find expression in the context of doctrinal matters, Christian understanding of marriage and state regulation.

The work is comprehensively researched and expressed in such a manner that it provides access to many canonists who would otherwise consider themselves ill-equipped to engage with issues of this kind. In common with other writings from the same source, it will serve as a valuable contribution and canonical resource to even the experienced canonist.