INTRODUCTION
The latter half of the twentieth century was one of fundamental change in the American polity. In the 1950s, there were landmark Supreme Court decisions. In the 1960s, the Civil Rights Act (1964), the Voting Rights Act (1965), and fair housing legislation (1968) marked the national political landscape. These policies typically centered on procedural equality and equality of opportunity while, at the same time, the “War on Poverty” focused on economic equality. Furthermore, this period brought the enactment of major immigration legislation (1965) as well the beginnings of policies based on racial/ethnic criteria such as “affirmative action” and what came to be called “multicultural” policies, including bilingual education (1967) and bilingual election ballots (1975), in which racial/ethnic or language minorities were the primary focus.2
The term multicultural is used throughout the article to refer to policies that address the inclusion, accommodation, and recognition of cultural, ethnic, and racial minorities. In many ways, the term is vernacular, having been adopted in the United States to refer to policies as diverse as affirmative action and the inclusion of Latino history in educational curricula. However, we recognize that, outside of the United States, multicultural policies often refers to much more specific policies of recognition and even practices and institutions that call for some “separation.” Given our focus, and the common use of the term in the context under investigation, the broader definition is our reference.
A common thread influencing support for civil rights and minority rights, and for more expansive immigration policy, was the impact of a lack of domestic civil and political equity while America attempted to place itself as a defender and advocate of equality within the context of the Cold War (Klinkner and Smith, 1999; Skrentny 2002). The point has been summarized thus:
As much as Cold War competition created new imperatives for ending the U.S. government's long silence on Black civil rights, it raised equally compelling concerns about the explicit ethnic and racial biases in national immigration policy (Tichenor 2002, p. 178; emphases added).
The implication is that the civil and minority rights policies of the 1960s, and their subsequent (partial) reconciliation of egalitarian ideals and practice in the United States were as much a function of structural forces as a product of a national disposition toward those egalitarian ideals themselves.
Nevertheless, civil rights and related policies, along with other events of the 1960s and 1970s, were important in fostering additional policy initiatives (e.g., bilingual education), and they also facilitated further social and demographic change, including the growth of minority populations, especially Latinos and Asians, through both internal demographic factors and immigration. In turn, those altered circumstances gave rise to a new set of concerns, such as “race-specific” and “multicultural” policies, some of which spurred yet another round of governmental actions regarding, for example, the extent to which immigrants should be granted access to welfare benefits. For many significant elements of these policies, subnational jurisdictions (primarily the states) pursued their own policy preferences. Thus, while the minority rights revolution at the national level may have been influenced greatly by the structural determinant of the Cold War, subnational policies addressing subsequent racial/ethnic minority group policies were allowed to vary outside, and perhaps as an extension of, an egalitarian tradition within each state.
The present study examines the interconnections of equality/inclusion and related policies as shaped by an egalitarian tradition from the 1960s and manifested in American state policies focusing on basic civil rights, language or multicultural “accommodations,” and immigrants' eligibility for welfare policy benefits. These policies have important differences, but they would also appear to have in common broad connotations regarding orientations toward equality and inclusion. They have generally, but not exclusively, followed each other chronologically, with civil rights policies predating multicultural accommodations and immigrant welfare provisions (Skrentny 2002). To examine the extent of and the explanations for interconnections, we address several major questions.
Is there a discernible tradition evident in U.S. state policies between the civil rights policies (1960s) and multicultural policies and dispositions (1970s through the early 2000s), and immigrant-related welfare policies (mid-1990s to the early 2000s)? Did states that had developed strong(er) civil rights orientations (as evident in policies of the 1960s) follow, or not follow, certain “multicultural” policies and immigrant welfare policy decisions of later periods? Is there continuity or “tradition” in the behavior of the American states regarding this range of policies? Are (were) there differences in the “minority rights revolution” as it played out and evolved through the federal structure and across the states of the United States, or is (was) there a more singular pattern, as is presumed by general, nationally focused studies?
To answer these questions, we examine the relationship between state-level civil rights policies of the 1960s and state policies from subsequent periods regarding multicultural accommodation and immigrant eligibility for welfare benefits. We recognize that states' policy proclivities in the decades prior to the 1960s influenced the evolution of policy in these arenas, but we believe that the civil rights era and the subsequent “racialization” of major policies (Gilens 2003), as well as the nationality backgrounds of new (post-1960s) immigrants (heavily Latin American and Asian) suggest that the 1960s are an especially appropriate starting point, given the purposes and goals of our analysis. [Additionally, we consider other factors, such as states' “political culture” and levels of “social capital,” which would seem to serve as reasonable proxies for social and policy orientations of the 1900–1960 era; Elazar (1984), Putnam (2000)]. Using a cross-sectional analysis of several periods, the findings reveal that an egalitarian (or inegalitarian) tradition does explain at least part of the variation in state-level adoption of racial/ethnic and immigrant policies. The results provide further evidence of continuity between the policies, but also indicate that there is variation across subnational governments, thus pointing away from a singular national pattern of minority policy orientations.
AN EGALITARIAN TRADITION
Civil rights, voting rights, and fair housing legislation of the 1960s (as well as before and after this period) were intended to eliminate discrimination against racial minorities, especially Blacks. These efforts provided or extended basic procedural equality and rights, most often focusing on the removal or prohibition of certain negatively discriminatory behaviors. That is, these policies involved the nondiscriminatory access to, and nondiscriminatory enforcement of, the traditional civil and political rights of citizenship for all, with specific attention to the members of racial/ethnic minority groups. These policies did not have explicit redistributive goals as such, although, in light of long-standing conditions, the substantive goals and implications of the policies were enormous—both symbolically and substantively. One important example is that prior to when various judicial decrees of the 1960s required the eligibility of Blacks for policy benefits, “some states, particularly those in the Deep South, administered welfare programs almost solely for Whites” (Albritton 1990, p. 422). Thus, through assuring nondiscriminatory treatment of minorities, access to existing policy benefits (from which they had previously been excluded) was increased. The relatively larger—both real and perceived—presence of Blacks among welfare recipients subsequently generated strong negative reactions from Whites, thus racializing welfare policy to an unprecedented degree (Gilens 2003).
Developments of the late 1960s and 1970s included policies based on language and ethnic criteria, what may be viewed as multicultural-type policies. It has been argued that adoption of such policies was linked to more general orientations toward basic civil rights and, as such, the policies were perceived as extensions of and/or implementation mechanisms for civil rights (Skrentny 2002, 1996). Policies such as bilingual education were initially viewed as being intended to strengthen human capital and, as “opportunity-enhancing” rather than “outcome-directed” policies, were thus not particularly objectionable in their early years (Bobo 2000), although this changed over time in the cases of some observers. An additional change in American society over time was the increasingly large size of the Hispanic and Asian populations. In 1970, Whites comprised 84% of the U.S. population, Blacks 11%, Hispanics 4.5%, and Asians 0.8%. By 2004, only 67% were White, the Black population had grown slowly to 12.2%, while Hispanics and Asians had risen dramatically to 14% and 4%, respectively. Does (did) the actual behavior and policies of states support the claims that multicultural dispositions emerged from civil rights orientations, that these policies were connected, indeed compatible (cf. Skrentny 2002)? And, was an egalitarian tradition established early on in the minority rights revolution that has continued to affect policies aimed at ensuring equality for, and inclusion of, racial and cultural minority groups?
We begin with the assumption, based on Dye (1969), that racial composition and economic development had the strongest influence on states' adoption of civil rights policies. However, civil rights policy influences multicultural-type outlooks (positively) because both might be rooted in broadly similar orientations of egalitarianism in a state (including beliefs about racial/ethnic equality). In this case, the latter set of policies is seen as something of an extension of the former. And, in general, it seems rather unlikely that a state that was not particularly supportive of basic nondiscrimination and civil rights would later be supportive of ostensibly more expansive policies, other important factors being equal. Responses to the Black civil rights movement “created a … repertoire of policy models that could be extended again and again to deal with the problems of groups other than Black Americans” (Skrentny 2002, p. 8). And language and immigrant-related policies might thus arguably be legacies and reflect a similar policy inclination vis-à-vis states' civil rights orientation (Skrentny 2002; Tichenor 2002). In sum, in this scenario, cultural policies, as well as those affecting immigrants, would be expected to be more open and inclusive primarily in states where civil rights policies had been more open and inclusive. We refer to this as the egalitarian tradition thesis.
In many ways, the argument that cultural orientations play a role in explaining policy variation across states is not new. Elazar's (1984) famous political culture argument places states into moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic categories, with cultural attitudes toward governmental roles and policies stemming from prominent orientations reflective of their citizens' cultural heritage. And, of course, culture as an explanation for policy variation is implied in any study which controls for regional differences. A cultural strand vested in a belief in racial hierarchy has been identified as a prominent component of American politics (King and Smith, 2005; Lieberman 2002, 2003). Here we argue that there are distinct policy cultures, aside from larger orientations, that provide continuity in similar policy decisions across time. An egalitarian tradition is just one type of policy tradition.
Examining policy traditions across the American states provides a degree of empirical leverage that is not possible in a national study comprising only one governmental entity. The states have differed considerably in their policies on civil rights as well as on policies that go “beyond” civil rights, both substantively and temporally. Moreover, the extensive “devolution revolution” in American federalism provided even greater flexibility to the states, in policies that particularly affect cultural minorities, including the eligibility of immigrants in welfare programs. Since the United States does not have an official policy of multiculturalism at the national level, state variation in both early civil rights policies, as well as variation in subsequent policies aimed at equity and inclusion, provides an attractive opportunity to test the egalitarian-tradition hypothesis.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Do civil rights, multicultural, and immigrant welfare policies share underlying explanatory factors that might either bolster or undermine the egalitarian-tradition thesis? Below we briefly summarize some studies of these policies (or examples of policies) that provide a basic list of linkages which have been most often tied to race, culture, and/or ideology.
Civil Rights
One prominent early study examined adoption of civil rights policies by the states in the 1960s. According to Dye (1969, p. 1097), the civil rights policies of the states—measured by state laws regarding fair employment, fair housing and open accommodations, and related enforcement legislation—were “closely linked to higher levels of economic development,” positively, and to racial composition, negatively. Larger Black populations were associated with less extensive civil rights policy adoptions. Others have pointed to the importance of racial diversity, while also signaling the importance of other factors, such as “political culture.” Regarding state antidiscrimination laws of the early 1960s, Elazar argues that
it was a combination of the moralistic political culture plus the existence of a high degree of ethnic diversity that led to this kind of legislation. The affected ethnics, in effect, challenge the majority to live up to the demand of their political culture and virtually embarrass them into doing so (Elazar 1984, pp. 168–169).
While Elazar's tone seems quite assertive in this claim, the actual evidence offered was impressionistic and did not include a full and systematic assessment of civil rights and political culture; furthermore, this claim also overlooks considerable evidence that there were (and are) very few states with the “moralistic political culture plus the existence of a high degree of ethnic diversity” (Elazar 1984, p. 135; Hero 1998). In short, it seems that ethnic diversity, rather than the broad categories proposed by Elazar, lies at the heart of many civil rights policies (Hero 1998).
Multicultural Dispositions
State activities regarding various language and education policies during the 1960s and 1970s are suggestive of multicultural orientations, which, some have argued, were often viewed as a means to administer civil rights policy and, indeed, were sometimes viewed as synonymous with civil rights policy (Skrentny 2002). However, in the 1980s there was a reconsideration of such policies; the adoption of “Official English” (or “English Only”) policies is a leading example of that reconsideration and well understood in terms of empirical analysis by political scientists (Citrin et al., 1990; Preuhs 2005; Tatalovich 1995; Schildkraut 2001). “Official English” laws suggested a reaction against a stream of federal and state laws, judicial decisions, and administrative regulations that had been largely supportive of “language rights” from the late 1960s into the 1970s. The 1967 Bilingual Education Act (BEA) was a pivotal element in this earlier movement toward a more multicultural approach to language, but it later became the “main catalyst for opposition” for critics of multiculturalism. While supporters viewed bilingual education as a means to the integration or assimilation of non-English speakers into society, what other observers took to be the BEA's ostensible emphasis on “cultural maintenance” (rather than on “learning English”) symbolically “repudiated the ‘melting pot’ as a normative ideal in favor of a ‘multiculturalism’ conception” (Citrin et al., 1990, p. 537). To the English-speaking majority in the mass public, bicultural education apparently implied a diminished respect for American culture as a whole (Citrin et al., 1990).
In states with substantial language-minority populations, resistance by minorities played an important role in preventing passage of Official English laws by state legislatures, despite often widespread public support in the majority community. Nevertheless, conservative states and those states which allowed for mechanisms of direct democracy generally adopted such laws (Citrin et al., 1990; Preuhs 2005). Some research, such as Citrin et al. (1990), attributed the adoption of Official English primarily to “ideological” and institutional factors. However, the concept “ideological” as used in this instance by Citrin might be read to emphasize “cultural” concerns about unity and diversity as much and perhaps more than liberal/conservative beliefs (this unity/diversity vs. liberal/conservative distinction may be an important one, as will be explained below).
Other arguments assert that Official English enactments were most closely tied to White resentment of racial/ethnic minority groups, particularly foreign-born populations (Tatalovich 1995; Schildkraut 2001). In another study, however, Preuhs (2005) demonstrates that the backlash was not aimed at the foreign-born population broadly conceived; instead, Latino populations were the specific target of the backlash. But whether states' actions on multicultural policies, including Official English measures, are traceable to their earlier civil rights policy proclivities has not been considered previously.
Welfare Policy
A sizeable body of research also attests to the ongoing and current significance of race for welfare policy in the American states, often finding that larger racial minority group presence is consistently associated with less generous welfare policies (Albritton 1990; Fellowes and Rowe, 2004; Johnson 2001, 2003; Keiser et al., 2004; Soss et al., 2001). The evidence indicates that this was so under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, the long-standing major welfare policy (Johnson 2001, 2003; Keiser et al., 2004), and continued under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program after the welfare reforms of 1996 (Fellowes and Rowe, 2004; Soss et al., 2001).
The general importance of the size of Black populations on these dimensions of the welfare reform policy is clear, and similar patterns extend to the presence of Latino populations as well. In short, these findings confirm the strong role of race in welfare policy, which in turn provides a clear link between the politics underlying both civil rights policies and redistributive policies. Another important aspect of TANF prohibited federal welfare funds from being given to recent immigrants, but allowed states to fund a variety of these components with their own resources. This change led once again to wide variation in policies that seem to echo the considerations made during early civil rights legislation, particularly decisions regarding the inclusion of Blacks in welfare programs prior to federal court intervention (Albritton 1990). Yet, there have been no systematic empirical studies that address the explanatory factors for this variation—a void we hope to address as we test the egalitarian-tradition argument.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
To examine possible interconnections of these issues and, hence, of an egalitarian tradition, we consider the relationship of these broadly similar yet also distinct public policy issues. The policies concern fundamental equality for Blacks and other racial minorities (civil rights), which serves as a baseline proxy for an orientation toward equality and inclusion, a race-specific but arguably distributive policy (multicultural disposition), and certain aspects of a redistributive policy (immigrant welfare eligibility). If the type of policy determines the politics of the issues (Lowi 1979), we would anticipate some differences in the relevant influences on those policies. Furthermore, the policies appear more or less directly relevant to Blacks, to Latinos/Hispanics, and Asians, and to immigrants (who are primarily of Hispanic or Asian background). Thus, we might expect other primary factors to explain variation in multicultural orientations and inclusive immigrant welfare policies.
Ideology
Another theoretical possibility is that the adoption of cultural or race-tinged multicultural policy is viewed as “going too far,” as an inappropriate and unfair governmental intrusion, i.e., as actually contrary or antithetical to civil rights policy and in violation of broader liberal-democratic principles (cf. Skrentny 2002; Sniderman et al., 2000). In this scenario, a negative relationship between civil rights and multicultural policies would be expected. We would also expect that states with a more “conservative” ideology would be less likely to extend welfare to immigrants or to adopt extensive multicultural policies, as these types of policies extend beyond the basic equitable provision of governmental services. In short, in this instance multicultural policies are not seen as an extension of civil rights or legitimate augmentation or implementation of procedural equality or equality of opportunity (cf. Barry 2001; Sniderman et al., 2000). We measure ideology in two ways. First, citizen ideology is Erikson et al.'s (1993) aggregate state-level, self-reported liberal-conservative ideology score. The second is Berry et al.'s (1998) government ideology, which is a measure of the liberalism of state-elected officials.
Social Capital
The “social capital” thesis and research (Putnam 2000) does not specifically speak to or provide guidance as to what to expect regarding a relationship to issues such as multicultural policies and welfare eligibility of immigrants. We nonetheless bring this concept into the analysis because it has become so influential and popular, among other theoretically justified reasons. For one, higher levels of social capital have been found to significantly and positively affect “civic and economic equality” as well as a variety of “good” social outcomes in the American states (Putnam 2000); these broad connections to equality and salutary social outcomes suggest that some (positive) relationship to actual policies might be anticipated. Similarly, social capital's ostensible association with ideas of community, social tolerance, inclusiveness, and the like would seem to suggest a potential link. Another reason to consider this is that a closely related concept, political culture, was claimed to be an important factor in explaining states' civil rights policies in the 1960s (Elazar 1984, Putnam 2000). Hence, because we are assessing whether earlier civil rights orientations may explain multicultural dispositions and immigrant welfare eligibility decisions—and because political culture (and perhaps social capital) allegedly explained civil rights—it seems reasonable and appropriate to consider social capital. Moreover, social capital and political culture are said to be deeply rooted and to have an enduring or at least substantially long-term significance for a host of state political proclivities (Putnam 2000; Elazar 1984). Putnam's social capital index (2000) is used to tap this concept.
Racial Diversity
Among the most likely other factors that might explain the policies is one that has already been emphasized—racial diversity, or the size of minority populations (cf. Hero 1998). Civil rights policies removed legal barriers to the political participation and mobilization of racial/ethnic minorities. Because of that, and assuming that it resulted in at least a modicum of subsequent political mobilization, as minority populations grew larger, there would presumably be a larger constituency to advocate for multicultural policies, potentially increasing enactment of further policies. On the other hand, larger minority constituencies might raise more intense concern or perceived “threat” among the nonminority population, thus leading the nonminority population to be more intense and mobilize more strongly, creating a “backlash” against multicultural policy (Radcliff and Saiz, 1995). Another possibility is that it is not only (or primarily) the size of the minority population, but its growth that affects policy decisions. Another complication about these points should be mentioned. Sidanius et al. (2000) argue that ideology is itself substantially explained by race (also see Hero 1998, pp. 52–57), which is why our research design accounts for both race and ideology.
Other Factors
States' formal policy dispositions toward civil rights, multicultural legislation, and immigrant welfare eligibility may also be affected by yet other factors that have been identified in previous research. In addition to socioeconomic factors such as economic development, which has been shown to influence many state-policy choices [including civil rights (Dye 1969)], political party competition has been shown to increase policy “responsiveness” to less advantaged, “have-not” populations, and so it is also examined (Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993; Key 1949).
DATA AND EVIDENCE
Our analysis focuses on the (possible) interconnection of three types or sets of policies. We first delineate the civil rights policies of the states; we then identify a set of multicultural policies and examine those in relation to the civil rights policies that preceded them (to assess the egalitarian-tradition hypothesis), along with other indicators focusing on ideology, racial diversity, social capital, and a set of potentially confounding factors. Finally, we examine state decisions to provide welfare benefits to immigrants in relation to the preceding civil rights policies (again, to assess the “tradition” interpretation) along with ideology, diversity, social capital, and other factors.
Civil Rights Policies
To conceptualize and measure civil rights policy during the civil rights era, we recreated a score based on data from Dye's study of “Inequality and Civil Rights Policy in the States” (1969). Dye created these scores, drawing on data from Lockard (1968), from a list of state laws regarding fair employment, fair housing, and open accommodations as of July 1966 (Dye 1969, p. 1089; Lockard 1968, pp. 21–22). States were given a point for each policy area if they had a statutory provision, and another point for each area if a commission was established to adjudicate claims. The scale ranges from 0, for states having none of the policies enacted and which did not establish commissions, to 6, for states with all three civil rights policies enacted and commissions for each. It should be recalled that Dye found that racial diversity (percentage Black) and economic development were the strongest predictors of civil rights policy. Therefore, a variant of one of the important variables considered in the analysis of multicultural policies and welfare eligibility decisions, i.e., race (as represented by percentage Black, percentage Latino, and percentage Asian; and, to capture immigration effects, the percentage foreign-born) is implicated at the outset, along with economic indicators.
Multicultural Disposition
To gauge a state's policy disposition toward language, ethnic, and immigrant groups, a set of state policies is used to construct a “multicultural disposition” (MCD) scale. This factor scale of nine policies is examined as the first dependent variable relative to the states' civil rights scale constructed by Dye. Higher values on this scale reflect a more “open,” or multicultural, disposition.
The policies constituting the MCD scale fall within two broad categories. Education-related indicators include the presence of limited English proficiency (LEP) programs established by state statute, funding for those programs, and certification for English as a Second Language and bilingual curriculum instructors. Additionally, states were coded for whether they allowed undocumented immigrants to qualify for resident tuition at state-sponsored institutions of higher education. Another category of “multicultural disposition” policies is more general, and includes policies such as Official English laws and an official César Chávez Day, among others, e.g., allowing undocumented immigrants to apply for a state driver's license and state-funded naturalization programs. In all, the indicators of state MCD cover a wide and meaningful set of policies from which to measure the disposition of a state's policies toward language and ethnic groups.3
The factor analysis revealed that there was one primary factor underlying these policies. The eigenvalue for the first factor is 2.23, while the second factor's eigenvalue was 0.67, well below the general cutoff of 1 for a significant factor. The additional factors' eigenvalues tailed off toward zero. The first factor also explained 82% of the variation in the component variables. Finally, the score created from the first factor maintains a high degree of interitem reliability as demonstrated by a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.70.
Immigrant Eligibility for Welfare
One consequence of the new immigration policy adopted in the mid-1960s was a change in the composition of the immigrant population, with a larger proportion coming from Latin American and Asian countries. As one way of grappling with the impact of immigration, the welfare-reform legislation of 1996 provided states considerable discretion in determining immigrants' eligibility for welfare. An indicator of Immigrant Health and Welfare programs is included in the third set of policies examined. Ten policies were studied, ranging from the continuation of welfare benefits to legal immigrants under the 1996 TANF program, to allowing immigrants to participate in state-funded food stamp programs, to coverage for immigrants under state-sponsored health-care programs. States differed substantially in their adoption of these policies. For instance, forty-eight states (96%) extended TANF benefits to immigrants who arrived in the country prior to 1996, but only five states (10%) provided additional funds to substitute for the loss of federal funding for Supplemental Security Income to immigrants. Once again, we constructed a factor scale of these state policies to construct an Immigrant Welfare (IW) Score.4
Similar to the MCD score, the IW score is best reflected by a single factor. Eigenvalues for the first and second factors were 2.66 and 0.68 respectively, with the first factor accounting for 78% of the variation in the variables. Interitem reliability was also high. Cronbach's Alpha for the components of the score is 0.75.
FINDINGS
While we are interested in interconnections, it is useful to focus initially on the civil rights scale alone [read across the horizontal or x axis on Figure 1a; state scores on the civil rights indicator (as of the mid-1960s) and the MCD score are provided in this figure]. The states which had (and tend to still have) relatively large Black/minority populations indeed had the lowest civil rights scores, and a statistical relationship to that effect was affirmed in Dye's analysis (1969). In some ways more intriguing, however, is the variation for states with very small Black/minority populations. Note, for example, that New Hampshire, Oregon, and Minnesota had the maximum score (6) on civil rights policies; on the other hand, however, several states with very small Black/minority populations had quite low scores—North Dakota and South Dakota with values of 1 on the scale, along with Vermont, Montana, and Maine with values of 2.
(a) Civil Rights Law and Multicultural Policy Disposition in the States; (b) Civil Rights Law and Immigrant Welfare Policy in the States
Figure 1a also highlights the bivariate relationship between the civil rights scale and the MCD score. The bivariate regression line and 95% confidence intervals are included in the scatter plot. As predicted by the egalitarian-tradition hypothesis, the relationship is positive and significant (the bivariate regression coefficient is 0.17 and the bivariate correlation coefficient is 0.48—both are significant at p < 0.001). California and Washington scored relatively high on civil rights and on MCPs (upper-right quadrant), and southern states tended to be low on both dimensions (and thus in the lower-left quadrant), but they are not entirely alone in that regard. Texas and Pennsylvania are especially interesting to compare, in that Texas had the lowest possible civil rights score and the highest MCD score, while Pennsylvania displayed a nearly opposite pattern of coordinates.
Figure 1b indicates the relationship of the civil rights scale and the immigrant-welfare score. There is some clustering of states in the lower-left quadrant (i.e., low on each of the two dimensions), as well as in the upper-right quadrant. As indicated by the bivariate regression line and confidence intervals, there is a positive relationship between more egalitarian civil rights policies in the 1960s and more inclusive immigrant welfare policies in the 1990s and 2000s. The bivariate regression coefficient (b = 0.25) and the simple correlation coefficient (r = 0.67) are both positive and significant (p < 0.001 in each case).
The preliminary analysis suggests that there is indeed a tendency for states that had relatively inclusive civil rights policies in the 1960s to follow an egalitarian tradition in public policy in subsequent decades. Indeed, inclusive civil rights policies of the 1960s are positively related to contemporary multicultural policy dispositions and immigrant welfare policies. However, as discussed above, there are a number of additional factors that may explain variation in MCDs and IW policies, including several that may covary to some degree with civil rights policies. To examine the robustness of the bivariate relationships, we now undertake a multiple regression analysis that controls for the alternative explanations discussed above.
First, examining MCDs, we employ as independent variables the civil rights scale, Putnam's (2000) measure of social capital, the average level of racial diversity (percentage Black, percentage Latino, percentage Asian, and percentage foreign-born) from 1970 to 2000, ideological liberalism [both government ideology (Berry et al., 1998) and mass ideology (Erikson et al., 1993)], the average level of per capita income in constant dollars from 1970 to 2000 (as a proxy for economic development), and the average degree of legislative party competition. (Variable descriptions, summary statistics, and sources for all variables used in the analyses are presented in the Data Appendix, Table A3.) Since both immigrant welfare policies and MCDs could be a response or reaction to growth in relative size of the minority group that is the primary beneficiary of these policies, the analysis also includes the percentage change in the foreign-born, Latino, and Asian populations from 1970 to 2000, since increasing population size may also trigger policy enactment.
Table 1 presents the results of a set of regression models based on data for forty-seven states. (Alaska and Hawaii were excluded since a measure of mass ideology is unavailable for these two states, and Nebraska is excluded because of its nonpartisan legislature, which precludes data on party competition.) Model 1A presents the results of the bivariate regression model, including only the civil rights scale as an independent variable. As with evidence reported above, this preliminary analysis provides some support for the egalitarian-tradition hypothesis.
Explaining U.S. State Multicultural Dispositions (Dependent Variable: Multicultural Disposition Score)
At this point, we return to the concept of “culture” specifically. Unfortunately, the cross-sectional analysis of only forty-seven states creates a minor problem for including the most common measure of a state's political ideology—Elazar's (1984) moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic typology. Since a large portion of traditionalistic states with their orientation toward a racial hierarchy rated a 0 on the civil rights scale, and these states also tended to have large Black populations, a high degree of collinearity is introduced in the model. However, there may be reasons to drop Elazar's typology and pursue the investigation of an egalitarian tradition over a broader political culture argument. First, while traditionalistic states tended to have the lowest civil rights, MCD, and IW scores, there is no evidence that moralistic states consistently held the highest values on these scores (as would have been expected, given their allegedly positive orientation toward government action). In fact, individualistic states, with a purported orientation toward classical individualism, had the highest mean values for two of the three sets of policies. The respective means for moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic states were 3.82, 4.86, and 0.75 for the civil rights scale; 0.35, 0.17, and −0.44 for MCD; and 1.56, 2.08, and 0.73 for the IW policy set. Nonetheless, a test between our direct measure of civil rights policy traditions and Elazar's typology is warranted.
Model 1B provides the results of a model of MCD with only the civil rights scale and dummy variables for individualistic and traditionalistic states. (A similar model is provided in Table 2 for IW policies). Note that our measure of a civil rights tradition remains positive and significant; also note that neither traditionalistic nor individualistic states differ significantly from moralistic states in this regard. Moreover, political culture does not add to the explained variation relative to the simple bivariate relationship between the civil rights scale and MCDs as presented in Model 1A. Given the possibility of overspecifying models using relatively few cases, and the lack of precision introduced when we do, we proceed from here without the Elazar typology in our models. While still preliminary, it seems clear that a more specific tradition of egalitarianism is at work, while a general conception of political culture is not.
Explaining U.S. State Immigrant Welfare Policies (Dependent Variable: Immigrant Welfare Score)
Models 1C through 1E report the estimated coefficients and standard errors for models of MCDs that include the civil rights scale; the control variables described above; and indicators for the foreign-born, Latino, and Asian populations. Due to a high degree of collinearity between the ethnic minority and immigrant variables, we were not able to include them all in a single model without losing efficiency in the estimates, and for this reason we present three models with each included separately.5
When all six indicators of the population size and change are included in the models, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) reaches a level of 48, well above the accepted value of 10. Moreover, all six coefficients become insignificant, while our main variable of concern, the civil rights scale, remains statistically significant. Given the costs associated with including all six variables, we opt for this approach.
To clarify these results, Model 1F reports the coefficients and standard errors of a model with variables from the previous models that reached a significance level of p < 0.10 in at least two of the specifications, and thus retains the estimates for income and the Black population.6
We use this p < 0.10 standard since we want to be careful not to eliminate variables that may be related to MCDs in constructing a reduced model which would risk an upwards bias in the effects of the civil rights scale.
Including all three population change variables results in a maximum VIF of 10.12. While this approaches cautionary levels, it does reduce the problem of collinearity greatly, relative to the other specifications.
Does the egalitarian-tradition hypothesis hold for IW policies as well? Table 2 presents the results of the analysis employing the IW scale as a dependent variable with a series of specifications that follow the modeling strategy employed in the analysis of states' MCDs. Again, we find that the civil rights scale is positively and significantly related to IW policies (Model 2A), and that Elazar's conception of political culture adds no significant explanatory power (Model 2B). Models 2C through 2E present specifications with the control variables and the foreign-born, Latino, and Asian population indicators, respectively. Our key independent variable remains statistically significant in all three models, and thus the analysis once again supports the egalitarian-tradition hypothesis. We also find that government ideology, party competition, and income are positively and significantly related to the IW score in at least one of the models. Government ideology is the most consistent indicator of IW scores among these three variables. That is, holding all other factors equal, states with a more liberal government ideology and, to varying degrees, more competition between parties in state legislatures, along with higher per capita income, tend to have more inclusive immigrant welfare policies. These models consistently explain between 68% and 69% of the variation in state IW policies.
Model 2F reports the coefficients for the reduced model. All coefficients in the reduced model are significant, and the model continues to explain about 69% of the variation in the IW scale. As with MCD policies, civil rights policies in place in the 1960s are positively related to IW policies thirty years later, even after controlling for other factors. From Model 2F, we estimate that a six-point increase in the civil rights scale equates to about a two-thirds of a standard deviation increase in the IW scale. Thus, our findings across both MCD and IW policies support an egalitarian-tradition interpretation.
Notably, the measures for mass ideology and social capital are not significant in any of the models of the IW score. Thus, social capital, often touted as a major explanation for positive social outcomes and civic and economic equality, apparently has no relevance for the nature of a state's IW policies, nor did social capital affect a state's MCD (Hero 2007, especially Chapter 6). Also conspicuously absent from the group of significant factors are the Latino population indicators. While Latinos are the largest segment of new migrants, and some of the policies included in the IW scale were clearly aimed at undocumented immigrants (the largest segment of which is composed of Latinos), immigrant welfare policies are not affected by Latino population sizes or changes, nor Asian or foreign-born population indicators. This is in clear contrast to the findings regarding a state's MCD.8
For both MCD and IW models, we examined the possibility that White support for these policies may be a nonlinear function of the minority and foreign-born populations, by including squared terms in each model. None of the squared terms, nor their raw terms, was significant in any of the specifications and thus we opt not to report them here. We also tested these models with a measure of noncitizens, since new immigrants, legal or undocumented, have been the focus of recent policy action. This measure was not a significant factor in any of the models for IW and MCD policies.
DISCUSSION
Overall, how do we summarize the findings regarding what factors affect these social policies? We began by relying on previous research (Dye 1969) to assume that racial diversity (negatively) and socioeconomic development (positively) were the leading factors that influenced states' civil rights orientations as of the mid-1960s (i.e., prior to the implementation of federal civil rights policies). Do states' civil rights or broader egalitarian traditions seem to affect subsequent multicultural and immigrant welfare policy? Our response is “yes.” Even after controlling for a number of different factors, with models explaining a good portion of variation in these dependent variables, a state's civil rights orientation, as evident in the 1960s, has a positive and significant association with contemporary policies of recognition and inclusion. Moreover, since the significance of several other independent variables is specific to each policy model, the results seem to suggest that the politics behind MCD and IW policies are rather different. The exception seems to be the influence of an egalitarian tradition that transcends both policy spheres.
There also seems to be some impact of foreign-born populations, in that the change in foreign-born population positively affects a state's MCD. One of the more surprising findings is that mass ideology has a negative effect on MCD; more liberal ideology among the masses is associated with less extensive MCD, when other factors are controlled. Also, rather unexpectedly, the percentage of the Hispanic, Asian, and foreign-born population and/or change in these populations was found to have no impact on IW policies. The significant and positive effects of party competition and government ideology on immigrant welfare policies is not surprising, given previous research that found both to be related to more expansive social welfare policies (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Berry et al., 1998; Erikson et al., 1993; Key 1949; Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993).
Regarding racial diversity, percentage Black had a leading impact on initial civil rights orientations (Dye 1969), but its direct impact on MCD and IW is inconsistent; foreign-born population change is important for MCD, but it has no impact on IW, which is a bit puzzling.9
We recognize that it is difficult to separate the impact of Asian, Latino, and foreign-born population-size change on MCDs. Yet, given the significance of the change variable for foreign-born populations, and the insignificance of the others in the reduced model, we are confident in this interpretation.
Comparing across the two policies—MCD and IW—is also useful. If we consider MCD a distributive (if essentially ethnically “targeted”) policy, it is interesting that the growth of the foreign-born population and the civil rights orientation seem to matter most; the negative impact of mass ideology is especially arresting. The absence of a negative impact of Latino, Asian, and foreign-born population on an aspect of redistributive policy—the eligibility of immigrants for welfare—is particularly notable because we would likely presume such a relationship. The findings of no impact of percentage Latino, Asian, and foreign-born (and percentage Black) stands in stark contrast to evidence that these variables affect other dimensions of state decisions concerning welfare following the major reform legislation of 1996 (Johnson 2003; Keiser et al., 2004; Soss et al., 2001; Fellowes and Rowe, 2004). On the other hand, the positive impact of elites' (government) ideology and per capita income is notable. It seems that these are indeed different policies, shaped by different politics—some ostensible similarities across the policies notwithstanding.
To reiterate, the most consistent finding across models of MCD and IW policies is that civil rights policies from an earlier era are positively and significantly associated with more contemporary inclusionary policies. The absence of any effect of more general political cultural factors (such as Elazar's typology) highlights the uniqueness of the egalitarian tradition as a separate and distinct policy orientation. Tradition matters; but it is a tradition associated with inclusionary policies, not broader conceptions of proper governance as has been suggested by previous scholars (Elazar 1984).
Another Way of Thinking about the Issues
While there are some discernible impacts and patterns noted in the above discussion, it may be useful to think about the several major policies differently, i.e., as policy dimensions relative to each other, with states' consistency of position in various quadrants on the dimensions. This is broadly similar to Tichenor (2002, p. 276), who identified different combinations of attitudes and positions that emerge from immigration policies in the United States. He notes two dimensions: (1) positions on whether more/fewer immigrants should be admitted, and (2) the extensiveness of the rights and benefits that should be extended to immigrants. Those persons and public officials who favor continued or expanded admission policies, and who also favor extensive rights and benefits, are categorized as cosmopolitan. Those who favor strict admissions policies with extensive benefits to those who are admitted are termed nationalist egalitarian. Free market expansionists are those who favor high admissions, with the extension of few benefits or rights; classic exclusionists are those who prefer both low levels of admission and low levels of benefits.
States' orientation on civil rights policies, MCD, and IW might be viewed in ways comparable to Tichenor's framework, and we can explore this by referring back to Figure 1a. We might call those states low on both dimensions (i.e., in the bottom-left quadrant) as the least inclusive historical orientations regarding civil rights and MCD; those states that are high on both dimensions (in the upper-right quadrant) might be viewed as the most inclusive. There are roughly sixteen states in the least inclusive category and about ten to twelve in the most inclusive category; these two groups or quadrants represent states that are arguably the most “consistent” in their policy (recognizing, of course, that there are other factors to think about regarding the positions of these states). Those in the bottom-right quadrant (high on civil rights and low on MCD) might be termed basic civil rights states; there are about eleven states (22%) here, and most had modestly sized Black populations, and, more recently, they only have a modest to small Hispanic population. One would not really expect that states with low civil rights scores would have much of an MCD; and that is generally the case, as there are only five states in that quadrant, with Texas in the extreme segment of the quadrant. Overall, about twenty-six to twenty-eight states (a little more than half) are “consistent” (i.e., either low-low, or high-high), while just under half do not exhibit an interrelationship between civil rights and MCD.
Revisiting Figure 1b, concerning civil rights and IW, we again see that the top-left quadrant (here, low civil rights scores and high IW score) is largely empty; only Maine, Hawaii, and Vermont are found in this area. We again see a clustering in the bottom-left quadrant (low civil rights and low IW) of about the same number and with many, but not all, of the same states that clustered in this quadrant as in Figure 1a; again, this quadrant represents the states whose policies are “least inclusive.” States that were originally high on civil rights (a procedural/basic rights policy) and are subsequently also high on IW (an aspect of a broader redistributive policy) also number about the same as in the similar quadrant in Figure 1b. Thus, again, about half the states seem broadly “consistent” across these two policies and over rather distant points in time (about thirty years), apart from the impact of other social and political forces. There are about nine states that fall in the lower-right quadrant of states with historically high levels of civil rights policies but relatively low levels of IW.
Whatever labels (if any) one wishes to use to categorize the position of the states as they are juxtaposed may help to identify states that seem consistent across all the policies, as well as “outliers” on one or more of the policies, which in turn can help in developing and articulating research questions and designs, including the selection of states for more in-depth case study and/or historical/institutional analysis (Lieberman 2005). At minimum, the figures underscore the complexity and suggest change, but then also suggest some continuity regarding major social policies and associated value questions in the American political system. The evidence suggests an (in)egalitarian tradition is generally at play in inclusive/exclusionary policies, but that comprehending why states deviate from this tradition will further our understanding of racial/ethnic minority group politics and policies aimed at addressing an increasingly multiethnic society.
CONCLUSION
This study has examined the question of whether broad policy orientations persist over time, and whether the orientations subsequently affect future policy orientations as they evolve to address new circumstances and populations. Using states as the unit of analysis, and focusing on the effect of early orientations toward civil rights on contemporary policies dealing with inclusion and recognition policies, the evidence suggests that there is indeed a relationship between earlier and later policy decisions. In other words, even after controlling for a number of potentially confounding factors, states tend to display a consistently egalitarian tradition in public policy.
The results are important for a number of reasons. First, we find support for Skrentny's (2002) characterization of civil rights, multiculturalism, and immigration policy as consistent policies that are a part of an overarching pattern. The relationship found between early civil rights and the later MCD and IW policies suggests that there is indeed coherence between these policies. However, given the variation in all three policies across the states, and the inconsistent effects of other predictors (beyond early civil rights policies), our findings also suggest that the several policies may not be driven entirely by the same process. This is one finding that is obscured in previous studies that do not rely on the analytical leverage provided by cross-state comparisons. There is an underlying tradition of (in)egalitarianism that is manifested in subsequent immigration and multicultural policies, but the phenomenon of a broad national minority rights revolution and the consistency of the underlying political causes of variation are not supported by our findings at the state level.
Second, our findings raise an important question regarding the factors that drive a tradition of egalitarianism. How and why is such a tradition sustained? Since our purpose in undertaking this study was to investigate the possibility of a link, we have offered but a few potential answers, which future scholars of race, ethnicity, and/or immigration politics might further pursue. One possible explanation is that “socialization effects” develop after a given policy is implemented; in short, the public comes to accept policy orientations as legitimate—or at least nonthreatening—and when new issues arise which are broadly similar to previously established policies and practices, the public (most likely via government elites) pursues policy prescriptions that echo established policies. Another possible explanation rests on an institutionalist approach to understanding politics. That is, it is quite possible that the egalitarian tradition is less a function of opinion and more a matter of being rooted in the institutional establishment of policy precedents. This mechanism would suggest the establishment of formal institutional and/or more political constraints at the outset. Institutionally, state statutes, court precedents, and even constitutional requirements may establish legal constraints that require states to adopt certain types of policies when they fit established institutional guidelines. Political constraints may be established that provide groups advocating on behalf of new issues (or new groups) with influential rhetorical capital for the expansion of policy orientations to include their constituents in ways that resonate with both the public and decision-making elites (Skrentny 2002). These are some of the promising avenues for future research, and we are certain many other explanations may be proposed as well.
Third, the evidence presented raises doubts about some prominent theoretical explanations and the appropriateness of their application to civil rights and ethnic/immigrant politics in the American context. While liberal elite or government ideology tended to lead to more inclusive immigrant welfare policies, it did not have an effect on multicultural policies or policies aimed at ethnic cultural accommodation. Moreover, citizen or mass liberalism either had no effect (on IW policies), or a surprising negative effect (on MCD) using the policy indicators examined. These findings suggest, at the least, that the unidimensional conception of ideology plays a relatively limited role in explaining racial/ethnic politics in the states (cf. Hero 2003). Also, our analysis does not support a social-capital explanation for inclusion and accommodation policies. Unlike the positive relationships between social capital and indices of equitable social outcomes and tolerance for equality reported by Putnam (2000, pp. 350–363), the social-capital index was not even a marginally significant determinant of our policy indicators. These findings further contribute to a broader critique of the applicability of the social-capital thesis to racial and ethnic group politics (cf. Hero 2007). In short, our findings point to the conclusion that racial/ethnic/cultural policies are distinct from many prominent policies that can be explained quite well by the constructs of ideology and social capital alone (Erikson et al., 1993; Putnam 2000).
There has been rather little research on questions of civil rights and a host of related social policy issues regarding race/ethnicity (and immigration) in the United States, perhaps especially as these pertain to the states. The dearth of research on the politics behind these policies is surprising given: (1) the rise of immigration, both legal and undocumented, over the past several decades; (2) significant policy debates regarding immigration and multiculturalism in the states (and nation); and (3) the devolution of responsibility for a wide variety of cultural and immigration policies to subnational governments. This study has explored some of the major theoretical explanations for state politics, focusing specifically on the possibility of a tradition of egalitarianism. The study has also sought to encourage and provide some basis for further conceptualization and, in turn, research. The knowledge provided informs our understanding, but it also makes apparent many complex phenomena—theoretically intriguing, substantively important, and empirically challenging—that require sustained attention to better comprehend evolving notions of equality and inclusion in American politics.
APPENDIX
Items included in the Multicultural Disposition Scale
Items included in the Immigrant Welfare Scale
Descriptive Statistics and Sources for Data Included in the Analyses Reported in Tables 1 and 2 (N = 47)
