Introduction
This article focuses on perhaps the greatest smuggling scandal in Polish sporting history. In April 1970 two Legia Warsaw footballers and Polish internationals, Władysław Grotyński and Janusz Żmijewski, were caught smuggling dollars out of Poland. After an investigation, the Polish state handed the pair relatively minor monetary fines. Worse was, however, soon to come. In February 1971 Legia Warsaw basketball players were caught smuggling gold into Poland while returning from Italy. As a result, an investigation was launched which eventually led to ten months of interrogations of Legia Warsaw players, staff and various black marketeers, finishing in a February 1972 trial. The trial led to prison sentences for seven Legia Warsaw players in addition to considerable financial punishments.
The Legia Warsaw smuggling incident opens up previously unexplored questions about the role of athletes in Poland and the Eastern bloc. This article has two main arguments. Firstly, it argues that Eastern bloc states expected athletes to be societal role models and upstanding citizens, but they were often disappointed by athletes failing to adhere to the standards that the state set for them. Secondly, it argues that athletes turning to smuggling is a clear example of sports stars asserting agency in the face of strict state expectations.
The article's central analytical focus builds on the approaches of Robert Edelman and Sylvain Dufraisse to understand the actions of the Polish state and athletes surrounding the smuggling incident. Edelman underlines the ‘serious’ nature of sport to the communist states of the region, as in the way states and parties sought to use sports and athletes for the establishment of domestic norms of behaviour and its geopolitical propaganda aims. This attitude did not, however, leave much room for human agency for athletes.Footnote 1 Dufraisse, on the other hand, shows how, despite this, athletes often asserted agency by disregarding the strictly controlled boundaries of state sports policies by smuggling goods in and out of the Soviet Union.Footnote 2 My work adapts their approaches to the Legia Warsaw smuggling case and argues that the incident highlights the tension between state plans for athletes and athletes seeking to assert their agency.
This article focuses on the Polish sporting world in the PRL and specifically on football and basketball. The two sports were both popular in the PRL, but football was the most popular of all. As a result, when Polish football teams did well internationally, they received copious amounts of media attention. The 1970s and 1980s were Polish football's golden age, when both domestic clubs and the Polish national side were successful. Polish players such as Kazimierz Deyna and Zbigniew Boniek became household names. Basketball was not as popular, but the Polish national team achieved relative international success between 1961 and 1975. The Polish state sought to harness these accomplishments to legitimate their power at home.Footnote 3
The club this article focuses on, Legia Warsaw, was that of the Polish military and an important part of the Polish communist sporting world. The club was successful across a number of different disciplines, including football and basketball. Legia's football side's greatest success occurred in the year of the smuggling scandal, when it reached the European Cup semi-final, and it represented Poland in European competitions every year between 1968 and 1975. Legia's basketball section was also successful domestically and internationally between 1956 and 1971, winning the Polish championship seven times and reaching four European Cup quarter-finals. In addition, both Legia's football and basketball sides contained many Polish national team players. All this meant Legia were a central part of the Polish sporting establishment and punishing their players was not a decision taken lightly, especially due to the importance of sport in the state's propaganda aims.
This article draws on previously unused archival material from the central military archive in Rembertów to reconstruct the story of the Legia Warsaw smuggling case. The archive contains in-depth information about the investigation and the trials themselves. These sources illustrate the plans, desires and choices of the athletes in carrying out smuggling, but also what behaviour the state expected from them. They thus show both the seriousness of the role that states expected athletes to play and how athlete agency contested this via smuggling. For press sources, it accesses a wide selection of both sporting and non-sporting newspapers and magazines. Due to strict censorship in the PRL, these sources are important in presenting official state narratives regarding athletes. Very rarely were the athletes allowed to express their own points of view.
Athletes and the State in Communist Eastern Europe
This article contributes to the growing literature on athletes in the communist East by illustrating the tension between state plans for athletes and athletes seeking to assert agency. First, it is important to note that Stalinist Eastern bloc sporting systems were copied root and branch from the Soviet Union.Footnote 4 Although sporting governance did liberalise after Stalin's death, certain fundamentals remained the same until the end of the Cold War.Footnote 5
Within the Eastern bloc athletes were assigned a very specific role. Edelman explains how from the second half of the 1920s athletes in the Soviet Union were considered ‘shock workers’ who would inspire the masses to greater efforts.Footnote 6 In the Soviet Union athletes were to be role models reflecting the state's image of itself and its aims: ‘elite athletes were to be heroic role models for their fellow citizens, who would learn lessons of discipline, orderliness, honesty, fitness, patriotism and respect for authority’.Footnote 7 Evelyn Merrit has also underlined the importance of athletes as role models, and their use by Soviet propaganda to not just establish domestic societal norms but also as representatives of the Soviet Union abroad – so called ‘diplomats in tracksuits’ – as well as illustrating the socialist system's strength by their feats in international competitions.Footnote 8
As befitting their important role, athletes were treated better than the common citizen. They could travel abroad regularly, they earned above average wages (despite being officially amateurs) and could access goods which the majority of people had to wait a considerable time for. Many athletes therefore led a relatively comfortable existence if they accepted the state's proposed role for them, something Johanna Mellis calls ‘cooperation’.Footnote 9 There were, however, limits to the beneficence of the state, with certain actions being considered beyond the pale. These actions can be seen as athletes exhibiting agency, and states often reacted fiercely to these attempts. Polish sporting authorities’ attitude was: ‘a sporting champion had to be a role model to young people in every way, if not, we will not use their services regardless of their results and sporting level’.Footnote 10
Athletes demonstrated agency in several ways during real socialism. My article builds on Dufraisse's article on athletes engaged in smuggling in the Soviet Union as to date it is the only work illustrating these mechanisms in the Eastern bloc. Dufraisse shows how athletes played an important role in importing goods which were scarce due to the centrally planned economy. Soviet athletes smuggled out of the country goods which were sought after abroad, including vodka, caviar, icons, watches and cameras. They then traded these goods and smuggled in-demand items into the Soviet Union, mostly fashionable scarves and ladies’ blouses. Information on what to smuggle in and out of the Soviet Union was passed between athletes informally.Footnote 11
Dufraisse explains that, until the 1960s, Soviet athletes’ personal possessions were rarely checked by customs agents. This changed considerably after 1967 when harsher checks were introduced, but athletes found ways to circumvent these measures. This included a customs loophole stating that goods could be brought into the Soviet Union if they were for ‘personal use’ and in small quantities. This meant that items were often divided amongst members of travelling parties, to avoid unpleasant situations.Footnote 12 In terms of punishment, Dufraisse shows that athletes were treated less harshly than other attempted smugglers, including sailors and tourists, as they often received state protection. The Soviet Union regularly gave second chances to athletes caught smuggling.Footnote 13
The Legia Warsaw smuggling incident exhibits many similarities to Duffraise's case study. In both situations athletes asserted agency by taking part in smuggling. The big difference was that Legia Warsaw athletes went further than those in the Soviet Union. Instead of simply smuggling goods out and deficiency items in, they crossed the line into deeper criminality by smuggling foreign currencies out of Poland and gold back into the country. This made it more difficult for state authorities to ignore their crimes.
Athletes in real socialism exhibited agency in other ways apart from smuggling – one example was by escaping to the West. Braun and Weise show East German athletes’ attempts to escape and state measures to discipline them. These included show trials of those that assisted escapees, pressure on family members to get athletes to return and slandering athletes in the press.Footnote 14 Mellis also illustrates a similar situation for Hungarian athletes during the Stalinist period. The Hungarian international footballer Sándor Szűcs attempted to escape in March 1951, was caught and eventually executed. The Hungarian regime used the case to scare other potential escapees.Footnote 15 In addition, the Polish communist press slandered those athletes who escaped to the West, although the attacks were most severe during Polish Stalinism.Footnote 16
Although athletes were often punished for their indiscretions, Eastern bloc states weighed up the relative merits of punishment, ignoring offences or even at times publicly defending athletes’ actions.Footnote 17 Generally the more talented the offender was, the more lenient were state punishments, as successful athletes were extremely useful for propaganda aims and demonstrating the superiority of the socialist system. Mellis shows how Hungary welcomed home their star water polo player Dezső Gyarmati who had defected in 1957. Gyarmati went on to win medals at the next two Summer Olympics.Footnote 18 Athlete returns from the West were also chances for Eastern bloc states to trumpet socialist supremacy. This was normally done via interviews with athletes where they reflected on their mistakes and praised the Eastern bloc system. This can be seen when tennis player Władysław Skonecki returned to Poland in 1956 after defecting in 1951.Footnote 19
Athlete Smuggling and Trade Tourism in the PRL
Athlete smuggling and trade tourism was part of a wider Polish phenomenon which deepened considerably after the Polish October which marked the end of Polish Stalinism in 1956. Under Władysław Gomułka from 1956 and especially Edward Gierek from 1971, the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza; PZPR) loosened controls over Polish society and permitted more people to travel abroad than ever before. While the country was mostly closed off during Polish Stalinism, in 1967, for example, 900,000 citizens left Poland on trips.Footnote 20 Most of these trips were not normal holidays but rather similar to the trade tourism outlined by Dufraisse as many Poles sought to make profits by taking goods in and out of the country. Some Poles even set up extensive illegal trading networks.Footnote 21
My article shows how, alongside trade tourism, Legia Warsaw athletes also smuggled dollars out of Poland and gold into the country. The smuggling of foreign currencies (especially the dollar) and gold represented the most ambitious attempts to profit from cross-border activity in the PRL. Why did Poles smuggle foreign currencies out of the country? For a simple reason: the Polish złoty was non-convertible and could not be used abroad.Footnote 22 Taking currencies abroad thus meant you could purchase goods without having to sell anything first. In terms of gold, it was a precious item as the PRL restricted its import into the country. The high demand for gold and the fact that Polish black market prices were far higher than normal prices in the West meant the potential for large profits.Footnote 23
Dollar and gold smuggling changed considerably during the PRL. In Polish Stalinism, the state criminalised the ownership and trading of foreign currencies and gold.Footnote 24 From 1956 onwards, however, the state liberalised its policies towards both foreign currencies and gold, with the first foreign currency accounts appearing in 1958. Despite this, only from 15 April 1970 could foreign currencies be taken out of the country, and only then when they came from documented sources or had been in bank accounts for a three year period.Footnote 25 This did not stop smuggling, as smugglers bought black market dollars and took them across the border. From 1971 onwards the state considerably reduced customs duty on imported gold. Again, this did not restrain smugglers – customs duty paid on gold only went up marginally after 1971.Footnote 26 The Legia Warsaw players this article discusses thus certainly knew they were committing criminal acts.
Where did athletes fit into the PRL's smuggling and trade tourism universe? Firstly, athletes were part of a privileged group who, from the beginning of People's Poland, could travel both to the Eastern bloc and the capitalist West. They could thus access goods the average Pole could not. Secondly, especially regarding elite club and national sides, athletes had a higher social status and profile, making it difficult for government hierarchies to punish them. Athletes were thus ideal middle men for criminals seeking to smuggle, but even without this, regular foreign trips were excellent opportunities to supplement personal incomes.Footnote 27 Athlete smuggling is clearly an example of the agency underlined by Dufraisse as it went against state expectations to be upstanding socialist citizens and role models.
It was very common for athletes, coaches and staff to participate in trade tourism and smuggling during the PRL. Just as in the Soviet Union, Polish athletes learned from peers what to smuggle in and out of the country. The Polonia Bytom footballer Kazimierz Trampisz mentions how in the early 1950s the former national team player Mieczysław Gracz was the leader of the traders. Before the national team went abroad Gracz informed teammates which items could be purchased to make a profit.Footnote 28
The most common smuggling method was to take goods across the border which could be exchanged to purchase other items. This was necessary as Polish athletes received very low daily foreign currency allowances – in the late 1960s this was just two dollars a day, a low sum even compared to other Eastern bloc countries.Footnote 29 Items commonly smuggled out included crystals, vodka and cameras. Athletes either smuggled to purchase goods for personal use or to sell when back in Poland, with one of the most common items being ladies’ waterproof coats.Footnote 30 By the mid-1960s smuggling by athletes was endemic; in 1965 the public prosecutor general informed the Polish PM Józef Cyrankiewicz that if all athletes were punished for smuggling, national teams would be decimated. The prosecutor thus recommended that these smuggling cases should be covered up to avoid public outrage.Footnote 31
Despite this, several athletes were punished for smuggling. In August 1959 several Polish cyclists and sports officials were caught smuggling during a tour of Yugoslavia and East Germany. One of the cyclists was suspended until the end of 1960 for entering West Germany to smuggle.Footnote 32 In 1971 two athletes and a coach did not travel to the European Athletics Championships in Helsinki as they had attempted to smuggle foreign currency out of Poland. In April 1972, several GKS Jastrzębie ice hockey players attempted to smuggle bed linen and wool curtains out of the country, leading to them being expelled from the club.Footnote 33 Finally, the highest profile case occurred in 1973, as a court tried Polish cross country skiers, including the coach and former Olympic skier Stefania Biegun. Biegun was found to have smuggled a massive 25 kgs of gold bars, 300 gold coins, 4 kgs of jewellery, 47 kgs of silver and $53,000.Footnote 34
Every foreign trip was therefore a chance for Eastern Bloc athletes to smuggle, supplement their income and exhibit agency, something that clearly went against state expectations. In many cases Polish athletes behaved similarly to their Soviet counterparts, smuggling goods out of the country and smuggling other items in. However, in the case of Biegun and her cross country skiers, Polish athletes went to more extreme lengths, turning to extensive criminality. The article's next section will analyse the case of Legia Warsaw athletes who followed a similar path to Biegun, asserting their agency against the state via criminal smuggling activities.
The Dollar Smuggling Incident of April 1970 and Its Consequences
In 1969 Legia Warsaw's football section won their first Polish title in thirteen years, which meant they qualified for the European Cup. In the 1969–70 competition, Legia made their way to a semi-final against the Dutch champions Feyenoord in April 1970. In the first match on 1 April 1970 Legia drew 0–0 in Warsaw, before a second leg to be held in Rotterdam on 15 April 1970. To prepare for this match Legia flew to East Berlin on 9 April to play a friendly match with Vorwärts Berlin, the East German side which Feyenoord had previously eliminated.Footnote 35
As Legia Warsaw went through customs in Warsaw on 9 April 1970, customs officers found two packages on Janusz Żmijewski's and Władysław Grotyński's persons. The players were called into a separate room and revealed the foreign currency they were carrying – Żmijewski had approximately US$2,000 and Grotyński carried around $200 in his coat.Footnote 36 Despite being caught smuggling foreign currency, the players joined their team mates on the plane and travelled to Berlin. When they got there a depressed Żmijewski apparently told the Legia club doctor Henryk Soroczko that ‘he was ruined’. Grotyński, on the other hand, seemed to be calm and in relatively good spirits.Footnote 37 Both players played in the match vs Feyenoord, but Legia performed poorly in a 2–0 loss, meaning they exited the competition.Footnote 38
While the Polish press commented on Legia's journey to Berlin and their stay in both East Germany and the Netherlands, the customs incident hardly made it into the press. It is important to note here the presence of strong state censorship in People's Poland. The PZPR firmly controlled what could and what could not be published.Footnote 39 In the early stages of the scandal, the only newspaper which mentioned the incident was the government-friendly Catholic daily Słowo Powszechne. On 21 April 1970, in an article about the match in Rotterdam, an author using the pseudonym ‘Żuk’ opined: ‘some people say that Legia did not play at full strength as they were hit hard by customs officers and they lost the first encounter with them. That kind of defeat in the run up to a match can knock even the best side off their stride’.Footnote 40 Apart from this, the incident was kept out of the press until September 1970.
At the end of April 1970, the Internal Military Service (Wojskowa Służba Wewnętrzna; WSW) started an investigation into the smuggling case and the first witnesses were questioned. Despite this, the case was not a high priority for the Polish state because Żmijewski and Grotyński were not questioned until 23 June 1970. The reason for this delay is clear: the players were allowed to finish the football league season. Grotyński and Żmijewski were almost ever-present for Legia in a season in which they won the Polish championship. They were also high-profile players at one of Poland's leading football clubs; thus dealing with their case must have been sensitive.
Legia also did not treat the case very seriously. The WSW aimed to question several Legia players on 6–7 July 1970, but Legia's General Secretary Edward Potorejko informed the WSW that this would not be possible until 13 July 1970 due to a club trip. On that date, when the players concerned still did not appear for questioning, the WSW rang Legia and were informed that several Legia players were in Moscow playing for the Polish national team and could not appear until 20 July 1970. The WSW expressed anger at Legia's behaviour.Footnote 41 The case continued to be treated quite light heartedly. When it finally made it to court in early October 1970 both Żmijewski and Grotyński appeared in civilian clothes despite the fact they were army officers. The public prosecutor of the Warsaw military district expressed his disappointment at this.Footnote 42
The case was not a complicated one. Żmijewski and Grotyński were questioned about their actions and several Legia players were asked to corroborate their stories. Żmijewski said he possessed $1,500 from various foreign trips with Legia and the Polish national side – the dollars had not been declared at customs when returning to Poland. Żmijewski explained he had purchased the remaining $500 from illegal foreign currency traders before the trip to Holland. To buy those dollars, he'd borrowed 80,000 Polish złotys from team mates. Żmijewski's aim was to ‘legalise’ the dollars to buy a car in Poland. Thus, he planned to transfer the dollars to his General Savings Bank (Powszechna Kasa Oszczędności; PKO) account from Holland and, once back in Poland, purchase a car. By transferring the money from outside of Poland, he believed fewer questions would be asked about the money's origins.Footnote 43
When Żmijewski smuggled the dollars out of Poland, the PRL had just passed a law facilitating the possession of foreign currency bank accounts.Footnote 44 According to that law, only foreign currencies from documented sources could be withdrawn from Polish bank accounts and used legally. However, when money was sent from abroad the same rules did not apply – they were thus legal immediately. Grotyński explained that the foreign currency he had brought abroad had, just as in Żmijewski's case, been collected on several foreign trips. Grotyński had planned to buy two car windows for his Ford Mustang with the money he had smuggled out of Poland.Footnote 45
Although Legia did not take the case seriously at first, between the questioning of their players and the October 1970 trial, the club decided to suspend Żmijewski for a year and ban him from travelling abroad.Footnote 46 The news broke in September 1970, with a Polish Press Agency (Polska Agencja Prasowa; PAP) press release explaining that Żmijewski had broken customs laws but due to his ‘impeccable’ record his punishment would not be harsh.Footnote 47 Apart from this press release, Żmijewski's suspension was hardly commented on in Polish newspapers. The only paper that discussed it was the Legia club publication Nasza Legia which expressed disappointment about Żmijewski's actions:
He was suspended for attempting to break the customs laws. It's going to be a long time before we get to shout ‘Januszek! Januszek’! again. It would be good if Żmijewski drew the right conclusions from the affair, it would be even better if all of our athletes (not just at Legia) reminded themselves of the saying ‘every action has its consequences in the future’.Footnote 48
In the build-up to the trial, the Legia club hierarchy and the club section of the Polish Union of Socialist Youth (Związek Młodzieży Socjalisticznej; ZMS) wrote letters to the Warsaw military district court in Warsaw which was to try Żmijewski and Grotyński. Legia asked for the ‘indulgence and generosity’ of the court due to the players’ clean past records and that they would make sure they would not reoffend. The ZMS also asked for leniency and stated that they would take special care of Żmijewski and Grotyński, including giving advice about appropriate behaviour.Footnote 49
The trial itself, which took place on 1 and 2 October 1970, was a simple affair. Żmijewski had already confessed; the only slight issue concerned Grotyński, who tried to explain that, as the money belonged to him, he could take it out of the country. The judge refuted this, stating that Grotyński knew he could not take foreign currency out of the country and had signed customs forms informing him of this. The court sentence was as follows: Żmijewski and Grotyński were fined 15,000 and 5,000 złotys respectively and both players had the money they had tried to smuggle abroad confiscated. The judge explained that the sentences were more lenient due to the players’ clean records and that Żmijewski had already been suspended by Legia. Żmijewski was punished more harshly than Grotyński due to the larger sums he smuggled but the judge also explained that Żmijewski could have deposited the money into his Polish dollar account and waited until the money was legitimate. When reading the sentence the judge explained why the players had let their country and society down:
The accused are exactly the kind of people who are expected to follow the laws of the country which they represent. Their social position means that they should always set an example to others in terms of discipline and honesty, even more so because the sporting youth of this country regards them as role models.Footnote 50
This statement clearly underlines that athletes fulfilled a crucial purpose as socialist role models. More was expected from them than the average Polish citizen and their actions had damaged the public image of athletes as upstanding societal figures.
This seemed to be the end of the matter. Żmijewski was suspended and Grotyński continued to play for Legia regularly. However, in November 1970 an event occurred which illustrates how lightly Polish authorities treated the smuggling incident at the time. At the beginning of November, Legia Warsaw were suffering an injury crisis before their European Cup tie vs the Belgian champions Standard Liège. In the first match, Legia had lost 1–0 and were struggling to put a full team together. On 3 November the largest Communist Party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, reported that Legia were considering playing Żmijewski, despite his suspension, due to the need for a result.Footnote 51 On 4 November Żmijewski indeed played and scored one of the goals, allowing Legia to advance. On 5 November 1970, an article in the Warsaw-based newspaper Express Wieczorny suggested Żmijewski had played as the Legia branch of the ZMS believed that he deserved another chance.Footnote 52
On the one hand, Żmijewski's inclusion before serving his suspension suggests that smuggling was not considered particularly important. In this way, it corresponds to other cases regarding how athletes were dealt with earlier in this article, i.e. they were treated more leniently than other members of society. On the other hand, there were voices of disapproval regarding Żmijewski being permitted to play. The sports daily Przegląd Sportowy on 5 November 1970 criticised an article appearing in Słowo Powszechne which proposed that Legia should play Żmijewski, stating that it would: ‘in one fell swoop ruin the moral authority of the club. The football side would be strengthened but at what cost?’ In an addendum added to the article after the match had taken place, the author expressed surprise that Legia had actually taken Słowo Powszechne's proposal seriously.Footnote 53 Furthermore, an article by the same author in Przegląd Sportowy at the end of November 1970 criticised the lackadaisical moral attitude of Legia and other Polish clubs. The article railed at the way that Polish clubs treated players who broke various laws, explaining how athletes knew they would not be punished because:
Those that are supposed to care for the moral fibre of clubs, those that stand at the top of sporting hierarchies, too often turn into fans blinded by passion. Fans for which no price is too high to ensure the victory of their team. The overblown personal ambitions of certain sports officials combined with a misunderstood sense of club patriotism lead to amoral decisions.Footnote 54
These quotes illustrate that there was a lack of agreement in People's Poland regarding the treatment of offending athletes. On the one hand, there was a belief that athletes should be punished as they had harmed the ‘serious’ aims the state had for them, to be disciplined, respectable role models. On the other hand, clubs needed these athletes to achieve sporting success and so were prepared to forgive offences. These two different positions often clashed with the result that they undermined each other.
The Gold Smuggling Incident of February 1971 and Its Consequences
Legia Warsaw's basketball section won the 1970 Polish Cup and thus qualified to play in FIBA's European Cup Winners’ Cup in the 1970–1 season. Legia made their way to the quarter-final of the competition, where they played Italy's Fides Napoli. Legia were easily beaten by Fides and exited the Cup in February 1971. The second leg was played in Italy on 11 February 1971 and Legia returned to Poland via train. As the train carrying Legia crossed the border into Poland on 12 February, Polish customs officers discovered approximately 5.5 kg of gold jewellery which Legia players and staff had attempted to smuggle into the country. Members of the Legia party had hidden the jewellery in lamps attached to the train's ceiling.Footnote 55
Poland's military authorities and Legia itself took the incident far more seriously than the case concerning Żmijewski and Grotyński and immediately launched an investigation. The resulting inquiry led to ten months of interrogations of Legia players, staff, black marketeers and civilians connected to the accused. Why was it taken seriously by the Polish state when they had been lenient towards Żmijewski and Grotyński? The first and most obvious reason was this was the second major smuggling incident at Legia in the space of a year. Another explanation could be found in PZPR First Secretary Edward Gierek's 1971 crackdown operations on the black market to stabilise his rule. As part of this, Operation ‘Order’ targeted currency dealers, gold traders and smugglers and Operation ‘Rubin’ focused on moneychangers and gold traders. These operations meant communist security services were especially alert and ready to punish any smuggling.Footnote 56 Other explanations from players affected by the case include a personal vendetta against Legia by the then Minister of National Defence Wojciech JaruzelskiFootnote 57 and an attempt by Gierek to install his people in the army.Footnote 58
Whatever the reasons for the change of attitude, the case certainly was pursued far more vigorously. In addition to the initiation of the investigation, a PAP press release appeared on 18 February in all Polish newspapers, stating that Legia Warsaw basketball players had broken customs laws on their way back from Italy. Due to this the Legia board decided to hand out a life ban to their national team player Włodzimierz Trams. The public were informed that Legia had also sacked the club basketball coach Stefan Majer for his failure to prevent disreputable actions and several members of the coaching and administrative staff were also suspended. Furthermore, Legia explained they would hand out additional fines when the incident had been fully investigated.Footnote 59
In addition to this, on 24 February 1971 several Polish newspapers carried reports of a General Meeting at Legia where the customs offences of Legia's basketball players were condemned.Footnote 60 By far the largest report of the meeting was in the Polish military newspaper Żołnierz Wolności. The newspaper relayed a speech by General Zygmunt Huszcza, the Legia Warsaw chairman. Huszcza was very firm about issues at the club – he said that Legia players were not just sporting role models but also were supposed to represent the socialist motherland with dignity. He continued:
We’ve never tolerated and no member of WKS Legia can count on indulgence regarding infringements of the rules establishing order in our country. Every official, employee and player of the club was shocked to hear about the transgressions committed by certain basketball players on their trip to Naples. We especially condemn the crime carried out by our ex player Trams, who, by his actions, has undermined his achievements for the club over the years and showed a lack of respect. Due to this, he deserved to be excluded from our ranks.
Huszcza ended by saying that Legia would not tolerate such offenses as they had in some cases previously.Footnote 61 Huszcza's statements once more confirm that the PRL saw athletes as role models and that there were certain lines that could not be crossed. By breaking the country's laws, athletes had tarnished the respectable image they were supposed to portray.
The questioning of suspects in the February 1971 case had an interesting dynamic. The WSW focused on those in the carriages in which the gold had been found. The main suspect quickly became Włodzimierz Trams, who had made 118 appearances for the Polish national team and was considered one of the most talented Polish players. Although Trams initially denied all wrongdoing, by 21 February 1971 he made his first confession regarding his smuggling activities, which were not limited to the events of February 1971. Trams also spoke of widespread smuggling practices at Legia and mentioned the names of other basketball players and staff who had smuggled as well as Grotyński and Żmijewski.Footnote 62 Trams's confession meant that the WSW questioned a whole host of people in relation to smuggling, including the two formerly punished Legia players.Footnote 63
The WSW already had reason to expect considerable illegal activities from Grotyński based on Trams's allegations. It quickly became clear as they questioned Grotyński that he was the second major figure in terms of endemic smuggling at Legia. Just like Trams, Grotyński initially denied that he was guilty but made his first confession on 5 July 1971.Footnote 64 As the case progressed Grotyński gradually revealed more people he had worked with. This, in turn, brought further players under suspicion at the club and further interrogations.Footnote 65
From the interrogations and the trial that followed, the general pattern of Legia Warsaw's smuggling operations was as follows. Firstly, every trip abroad was an opportunity to smuggle, whether it was a friendly or a competitive match. Before travelling abroad, many players attempted to acquire foreign currency (normally dollars) – this was done by a mixture of borrowing Polish money from friends, team mates or family members or using their own savings to buy foreign currencies on the black market.Footnote 66 Some players already possessed dollars which they had brought into Poland after trips to the United States in 1969 which had not been declared at customs.Footnote 67 When players or staff left the country they either bought gold jewellery at local shopsFootnote 68 or purchased gold bars from banksFootnote 69 when they had scheduled free time. After smuggling the gold into Poland, players and staff normally used their links in the Warsaw black market to sell the acquired gold on for a considerable profit.Footnote 70
It is important to note that not all players and staff smuggled dollars and gold, but almost everyone participated in some form of trade tourism. Players’ actions displayed in their testimonies open up a world of athlete agency, where they took part in activities which were completely opposed to the ‘serious’ aims the state had for them.
The most extreme example of smuggling at Legia can be seen in the actions of Włodzimierz Trams. Trams first brought dollars abroad while playing for Poland at the 1967 European Basketball Championships in Finland. In this case, Trams took $300 abroad which he had bought from black market traders and proceeded to buy various goods with the money. In September 1969 Trams made his first entry into the gold smuggling world. He bought $200 from Ryszard Necław, a waiter at the Grand Hotel in Warsaw, and, while in Italy during the European Basketball Championships, purchased four gold bracelets. He then smuggled them across into Poland and sold them to an acquaintance.
In February 1970 Trams worked together with Żmijewski, who was travelling to Belgium to play for Legia, Trams gave Żmijewski $360 with which Żmijewski bought three gold bars. Żmijewski smuggled the gold across the border and passed the gold onto Trams, who paid him for his troubles.Footnote 71 Trams's smuggling activities continued throughout 1970. The pattern was the same each time: Trams bought dollars off Necław, smuggled them across the border, bought gold and then smuggled it into Poland.Footnote 72
The investigation and trial give an interesting insight into the motivations behind smuggling at Legia. The testimonies illustrate how players ignored the state's role for them, instead asserting their agency. Firstly, many players explained that there was a smuggling/trading culture at the club and that almost everyone was taking part. Żmijewski, for example, described during the trial how before foreign trips players discussed in the dressing room what they should take out of the country and what should be brought back in. The most common items which Legia players took abroad were caviar, alcohol and crystals, which could be sold to bring goods back to Poland.Footnote 73 Grotyński stated that officials at the club knew that these smuggling activities were happening, and no-one did anything to prevent them. This was how Grotyński himself learned how to smuggle.Footnote 74 These actions were, however, just entry level trade tourism and the players punished during the 1972 trial went on to worse transgressions.
Secondly, the worst offenders felt that Legia was treating them inappropriately financially and smuggling was a way to counteract this. Perhaps the biggest issue in this regard was the fact that Legia were not prepared to accommodate their players’ needs. Both Trams and Grotyński were angry at Legia because they did not provide them with larger flats when they started families.Footnote 75 This situation was exacerbated because players who moved to Legia from other Polish clubs received large flats and sizeable one-off payments to establish themselves in Warsaw.Footnote 76 Legia players also felt mistreated as the board would not give them pay rises, despite salaries at other large Polish clubs being considerably better. Żmijewski explained how players at rival club Górnik Zabrze laughed at him when he told them what he earnt.Footnote 77 In addition, there was the knowledge that Western clubs paid far better wages – something denied to them as they were not permitted by the state to move abroad until the age of thirty.Footnote 78
An illustration of the perceived bad treatment of Legia players was the per diem they received while travelling abroad. Several Legia employees commented on the poor provisions in this regard.Footnote 79 As we have seen, this was a common problem for athletes during the PRL. The basketball player Andrzej Pstrokoński explained that Legia players received far too small a per diem when abroad, meaning they needed to take foreign currency or trade if they wanted to buy anything.Footnote 80 Grotyński was offended by this treatment, and what they had to do to have any spending power in the West:
We were forced to trade. When I got only one dollar fifty a day, I was a pauper abroad. You could only send postcards and buy a coke for that . . . . I'm twenty-six years old and I've visited almost every European country. I got to this place due to hard work and this was a reward for me. We took crystals and caviar abroad to sell so that we could buy stuff. I preferred to take dollars abroad, so I didn't have to trade in crystals, caviar and vodka. I was ashamed of that.Footnote 81
By underlining that he had worked hard to play football at a high level Grotyński showed how badly he felt the state was treating him. The Legia club and the PRL benefited hugely from athletes representing them internationally and expected players to behave responsibly and in a respectable manner. To Grotyński, he was not rewarded appropriately for his work, and smuggling dollars was a way to take advantage of his situation and get revenge.
The last major motivating factor for why Żmijewski, Grotyński and Trams smuggled was a worry about what would happen when they retired. While their salaries were above average by Polish standards, the players did not possess any training outside of sports. As Grotyński admitted: ‘I love sport, but I need to think about the future’.Footnote 82 Trams explained: ‘every player is trying to protect themselves for when they won't be able to play sport at the highest level’.Footnote 83 Żmijewski also stated he was worried about the future and expressed regret that he had not studied harder at school. Żmijewski once more criticised the Legia club hierarchy, saying that it was worse than: ‘at Górnik Zabrze [where] players are educated, a special class has been set up for them. They attend on days when they don't have training sessions. It helps them’.Footnote 84 These comments again illustrate how the players were asserting their agency against what they felt was unfair treatment and the constraints of a time limited football career.
The trial concerning eight Legia Warsaw players and staff was held between 21 February and 17 March 1972 at Warsaw's military district court. The court sentenced seven of the accused and found one not guilty. Włodzimierz Trams received the toughest sentence: he was imprisoned for five years and fined 100,000 złotys, and Władysław Grotyński was sentenced to four years imprisonment and fined 100,000 złotys. Of the three players focused on in this article, Janusz Żmijewski was dealt with most leniently – he received a one year prison sentence and was fined 20,000 złotys. As Żmijewski had been held in custody since July 1971 he was considered to have already served his time and was released. Grotyński eventually served only two years and was released in August 1973. Trams, on the other hand, served almost three and a half years, being released in July 1974.Footnote 85
The court, when justifying the sentences, explained that it did not accept Trams, Grotyński and Żmijewski's claims that they were receiving too low salaries, leading them to carry out criminal acts. The court stated that the players received good salaries, high bonuses and other financial benefits. In addition, they had all received flats and money to establish themselves when they had signed for Legia. Their explanations, therefore, made no sense to the judge, who declared that especially Trams and Grotyński:
Have undertaken large scale criminal activities and have regularly smuggled large amounts of foreign currencies across the border, and the profits they have made by way of criminality indicate not a desire to secure an average existence, but a desire to get rich. The money they earned was spent on various luxury items, drunken binges and card games. An example of this is that Grotyński bought a Ford Mustang, Trams a Fiat 125 and Żmijewski played cards and roulette and lost money betting on horses.Footnote 86
The judge's comments therefore show how the state considered athletes as privileged individuals who had opportunities that other members of society did not possess. In this way, the state could not accept the arguments of Legia's players as in its opinion the players had quite simply broken the law and abused their positions.
The court did accept one mitigating factor in the behaviour of younger Legia players – the improper example that Legia officials and staff had set regarding smuggling. As coaches and officials were also smuggling goods across the Polish border the court stated that they, therefore, had not taken the proper steps to eradicate players’ inappropriate behaviour. This meant that young athletes could not be protected from the influence of people such as Grotyński and Trams who persuaded them to break the law.Footnote 87
There was no press coverage of the trial as it progressed. The press simply informed the public that the trial had started.Footnote 88 Just before and towards the end of the trial, several press articles appeared criticising inappropriate ethical behaviour within the sporting world. One example of this was on 5 February 1972 when a Żołnierz Wolności article explained that coaches who drink vodka with their players, frolic with girls and trade in foreign currencies could not be expected to have a good influence on their players. The article also used the example of Żmijewski playing against Standard Liège in November 1970 as evidence of improper practice: ‘Legia's success was celebrated hugely. But despite this, among thinking people there remained at the end of the day a certain feeling that something was not quite right. Legia were criticised for letting him off too lightly’.Footnote 89 By expressing these opinions, the press was underlining that certain modes of behaviour were not appropriate in the sporting world and that clubs, coaches and athletes were expected to promote appropriate norms and behave respectably.
In the aftermath of the trial, all the major newspapers printed the sentences given to Legia players and staff.Footnote 90 Very few newspapers, however, commented on what had occurred. Żołnierz Wolności applauded the verdict as it would allow Legia to start afresh. The article also explained that: ‘it's important that clubs initiate wide ranging and thorough educational programmes which will effectively prevent . . . illegal trade and smuggling’.Footnote 91 Once more, the press exhibited a didactic attitude, explaining how clubs should make sure athletes conformed to appropriate norms of respectability. The largest opinion piece on the trial appeared in Trybuna Ludu. It stated that in the past players had sometimes escaped punishment because of their social position, but that this would not occur in the future and that the law should apply equally to everyone. The article also declared that the punishments would only be successful when combined with educational programmes. Finally, it explained its position towards those who had broken the law:
Amongst those punished could be found not just excellent athletes but also people who were trusted to look after players. Both players and staff must understand that society is watching them very carefully. Regarding players, this is because they are role models for young people and in terms of coaches because they hold positions of responsibility.Footnote 92
In this quote we can again observe the press underlining the ‘moral’ nature of sport, that athletes were role models who society was watching closely. As part of this narrative, there simply was no place for the wishes and desires of the athletes themselves. Agency did not exist in this vision; it was instead trumped by ‘serious’ educative aims.
After their various suspensions and prison sentences, Żmijewski, Grotyński and Trams were all allowed to return to top level sport, but none of them played for Legia again. When they eventually returned the only player whose criminal past was mentioned in the press was Grotyński. An article in Przegląd Sportowy in February 1974 focused on his situation. Along with outlining his career to that date, the article showed a considerable amount of sympathy for his actions while emphasising he had deserved to be punished. For Grotyński returning to football was, according to Maciej Polkowski, ‘a return to life, not just on the pitch’. Polkowski explained that Grotyński had lost his way at Legia by taking the easy route to riches instead of focusing on his career:
Certainly, the young sportsman was considerably influenced by his surroundings. An active environment consisting of people with strong characters and wills always enables the overcoming of conflictual situations. However, when someone is surrounded by passive, not even necessarily bad, positions towards consumerism this creates the conditions in which generally accepted and approved norms are transgressed.Footnote 93
By presenting the story of Grotyński as a sinner who had transgressed, had learned from his mistakes and was now on the right path, the article showed the ultimate triumph of the ‘serious’ nature of sport in People's Poland. Grotyński had attempted to assert his agency but had been cowed into submission by the state. All that remained was the state's moral position expecting athletes to follow its rules and be role models for the rest of society.
Conclusions
This article's primary focus is on the dissonance between state aims for athletes and the wishes and desires of the athletes themselves. The PRL, like other countries in the Eastern bloc, expected athletes to be societal role models, demonstrating discipline, honesty and other characteristics which the state held dear. Athletes were also crucial in achieving propaganda successes for the Polish state on the international stage. On the other hand, athletes sought to achieve their objectives, which were often very much in opposition to the plans of the state. The article looks at the example of Legia Warsaw players smuggling within this context.
Athletes were a privileged group in Polish society, who were able with club and national teams to make frequent trips to the capitalist West to play sport. The article shows that, at least regarding the case of Legia Warsaw, a pervasive trading and smuggling culture developed. At Legia the practice of transporting and selling goods when in the West was widespread. This allowed the purchase of souvenirs and goods which were then brought home to families and friends. Some players, including Włodzimierz Trams, Władysław Grotyński and Janusz Żmijewski, feeling mistreated financially by their club, went to further lengths and began to smuggle dollars out of and gold into the country to make money to secure their futures outside of sport. By doing so, Legia players opposed the wishes of the state who saw athletes as role models and transmitters of certain appropriate norms of behaviour.
The case study illustrates the ambiguous attitude of Legia and state authorities regarding smuggling, certainly regarding the first case which was discussed. When Grotyński and Żmijewski were caught smuggling in 1970, Legia moved very slowly to punish them and the fines from the state were relatively lenient. This illustrates the hesitation with which the state approached the punishing of star athletes. By punishing them, the state ran the risk of negatively impacting public opinion, but also negatively impacting the success of Polish sport on the international stage – something seen as fulfilling a very important propaganda function. This explains the ease with which Żmijewski's suspension was forgotten about when Legia needed to progress in the European Cup in the autumn of 1970. When the larger smuggling incident occurred in February 1971, both Legia and the state pursued the case far more vigorously. The precise reasons for this change of attitude are not entirely clear but the state certainly wanted to prevent other athletes from taking part in similar activities in the future. Otherwise they would not have risked angering public opinion by punishing well known athletes who could help them achieve propaganda goals.
The narrative that the courts, Legia and the press developed regarding smuggling was as follows. The players were role models who had committed crimes which negatively affected the way they were seen by young people in Poland and had brought shame to their club. Who was to blame for these crimes according to the official narrative? In the first place were the players who, despite above average salaries and numerous bonuses, desired to get rich and live an easy life. In addition, coaches and club officials were blamed for their lackadaisical approach to ethical and moral tutoring. This official narrative underlined the didactic function that sport played in the Eastern bloc, that athletes were to help in the establishment of certain societal norms. However, when athletes carried out activities which went against the tightly defined roles that were set out for them, the state moved to discipline them. Despite this, even within the heavily censored world of the PRL there were inconsistencies in the official narrative, the clearest of which saw some papers argue for Żmijewski's smuggling suspension to be revoked in November 1970 to assist Legia at a time of need.
This article's principal argument is that athletes fulfilled a specific ‘serious’ function within the Eastern bloc system, to be role models and to achieve propaganda victories on the international stage. However, when athletes transgressed, the state was prepared to punish them and not use their services, although not in all contexts. In the face of the tight roles that were prescribed for them, Legia Warsaw players attempted to assert agency by using their privileged position to smuggle. However, at the end of the day the state held the cards.
