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INTERPRETATIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S VIEWS ON POLITICS - (T.) Lockwood, (T.) Samaras (edd.) Aristotle's Politics. A Critical Guide. Pp. x + 259. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Cased, £64.99, US$99.99. ISBN: 978-1-107-05270-3.

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(T.) Lockwood, (T.) Samaras (edd.) Aristotle's Politics. A Critical Guide. Pp. x + 259. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Cased, £64.99, US$99.99. ISBN: 978-1-107-05270-3.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2017

Kleanthis Mantzouranis*
Affiliation:
University of St Andrews
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Abstract

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Reviews
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 2017 

Following the publication of a collection of essays on the Nicomachean Ethics (J. Miller [ed.], Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. A Critical Guide [2011]), the Cambridge Critical Guides series complements the study of what Aristotle described as ‘the philosophy of human affairs’ (EN 1181b15–16) with the publication of twelve previously unpublished essays on Aristotle's seminal work of political philosophy. As the editors themselves acknowledge (p. 2), diversity in opinion and approach is characteristic of this volume, as the contributors employ a range of methodological perspectives (Classics, political theory, philosophy, ancient history) to explore selected tenets of Aristotle's political theory. Without offering a book-by-book commentary, the essays span the entire breadth of the Politics and provide illuminating and thought-provoking discussions on a range of key topics, from Aristotle's views on the deliberative faculty of women to the nature of his ‘mixed regime’ and his thoughts on political innovation and the improvement of political institutions.

After a useful introduction, which succinctly summarises the content of the contributions, J. Frank (Chapter 1) examines the relationship between two famous Aristotelian claims, namely that human beings are ‘logos beings’ and also ‘political animals’. Frank interprets logos as ‘speech’, rather than ‘reason’, and argues that a similar model of persuasion through logos, what she calls ‘middle voice persuasion’, operates both intra-personally (between different parts of the human soul) and inter-personally (in city speech). Her illuminating reading of the ending of Aeschylus’ Eumenides illustrates how persuasion in the city is achieved not through commands or threats to obedience, but through a kind of persuasion achieved when the audience actively give their trust to the speaker responding to the speaker's good character, good sense and goodwill towards them. Aristotle's formulation that ‘man is by nature a political animal’ is also examined by P. Pellegrin (Chapter 2), who shows that the naturalness of the polis and of human political character, though explained through a scheme deployed in the biological sciences, does not turn politics into a kind of natural science.

Another famous, or rather infamous, Aristotelian position, namely his remarks on the deliberative faculty of women and on the nature of male rule over women (‘political’ or ‘aristocratic’?) is examined by M. Deslaurier (Chapter 3). By stressing the ‘sameness’ and difference between men and women in their political status and deliberative faculty, Deslaurier convincingly explains the women's role in the household: being both free and adult, women participate in deliberation, by evaluating proposals related to household affairs, but not in decision making, as it is men who have the final say upon those proposals. L. (Chapter 4) challenges traditional readings of Politics 2, which view this book merely as an Aristotelian critique of theoretical and existing constitutions, and argues that the book offers substantive political theorising and self-reflectively problematises the very concepts of political critique and political innovation.

Chapters 5–8 revolve around the issue of civic participation and the different forms of constitution. This sequence of chapters duly begins with J. Mulhern's historical and linguistic survey of the word politeia itself (Chapter 5), which alerts us to the fact that Aristotle was using the word in four distinct but interrelated senses, namely ‘citizenship’, ‘citizen-body’, ‘constitution’ or ‘arrangement of offices’ and ‘regime’. R. Balot (Chapter 6) examines politeia in its particular sense, that is, the correct form of constitution where ‘the many’ rule with a view to the common good. Far from being a hotchpotch of democracy and oligarchy, Aristotle's ‘mixed regime’ or ‘polity’ is carefully designed by the lawgiver to negotiate the claims of diverse social groups and promote a life of stability and civic friendship. As such, the ‘mixed regime’, though not the ideally best regime of Pol. 7–8, emerges as the best practicable ideal for most ordinary cities. Balot's thorough analysis of the virtues and limitations of polity is appositely complemented by S.’s exploration of the composition of ‘the many’ that make up Aristotle's polity (Chapter 7). As S. convincingly argues, the polity's many are not the same group as ‘the many’ in a democracy, that is, all free-born, native, adult males, but a smaller ‘middling’ group, a propertied class of those sufficiently rich to serve as hoplites. C. Bobonich (Chapter 8) approaches ‘the many’ from a different angle and considers Aristotle's famous but vexed claim that the many, when gathered together, may judge political matters better than the virtuous few (Pol. 3.11). Bobonich examines the analogies that Aristotle provides to support this claim and concludes that they all fail to provide a convincing account of how collective deliberation can work to overcome the ethical and intellectual deficiencies of the many.

The following chapters grapple with a well-known tension inherent in the Politics: does Aristotle promote the realisation of an ideal state with virtue as the primary criterion for political participation (delineated in Books 7–8), or does he prioritise the idea of political stability, even at the expense of virtue, as seems to be the case in his discussion of existing constitutions (Books 4–6)? E. Schütrumpf (Chapter 9) offers a thought-provoking analysis of Pol. 3.9–11, according to which Aristotle recognises the legitimacy of the claims of the many for a share in political life and the dangers of their political disenfranchisement, and thus ‘moves away from a constitution that gives political privileges forever to an elite to one that allows the great number to participate in political decision making’ (p. 181). Given Bobonich's earlier conclusions on the fragility of ‘the many thesis’, these two chapters show that there is ample scope for further exploration of Aristotle's apparently pro-democratic statements.

Political stability is the subject of A. Saxonhouse's essay (Chapter 10), which identifies resentment caused by injustice in the distribution of honours and political power as the underlying principle of constitutional change. Given the difficulty in establishing universally acceptable criteria of distribution, the task of the statesman is to soften the – inevitable – resentment of those who feel excluded from honours and to ensure the continued existence of the regime within the network of inter-polis relations. P. Destrée (Chapter 11) attempts to resolve the tension between Aristotle's apparently conflicting aims (political stability vs improvement to a more virtuous regime) by promoting the idea of stability through improvement. Since deviant constitutions, such as oligarchy or democracy, may be prone to instability due to the resentment they generate to those they exclude, the aim of stability could be achieved by improving those constitutions towards better forms of constitution, in particular by bringing them closer to a ‘middle’ constitution or polity. In the concluding chapter, J. Ober brings together three major strands of the Politics (natural teleology, historical and empirical evidence, idealistic aspirations) and argues that ‘the best possible polis described in Books VII and VIII is the telos of the natural polis of Book I’ (p. 224). The regime of this polis is a mixed regime based on aristocracy, as it promotes the cultivation of virtue, but with a strong democratic bend as it regards as actual citizens all native males who hold a cultural expectation and an innate capacity to exercise citizenship.

This collection of essays is not, and does not aim to be, an introduction to Aristotle's Politics. Nonetheless, the variety of topics and approaches employed by the contributors conveys even to the novice student of the Politics an idea of the diverse questions Aristotle asks, the different approaches he employs to answer them, and the challenges that the structure and content of the work itself poses to the reader. The volume repays careful study, as some of the contributions challenge current orthodoxies on particular issues, while others overlap and complement each other, thus deepening our understanding of particular topics. If, in the end, we are left not only with answers but also with stimulating questions about Aristotle's Politics, the volume achieves the goals set out by its editors and significantly promotes the study of Aristotle's political thought.