Since the 1990s, village elections have drawn increasing attention for both their practical and theoretical implications about China's democratization. Even though a trend to move towards more open and competitive elections and peasant empowerment seems clear to many scholars and observers, disagreement remains as to the nature, impact and implications of elections. This article joins the debate through the case of competitive elections in a northern village. By highlighting the contradictions between villagers and cadres, and between village elite, this study aims at advancing a fresh perspective and new knowledge about rural political participation and democratization.

Methodological and Theoretical Argument

A lively debate has been going on since the mid-1990s on China's rural political participation and democratization, with scholars adopting either an economic or a political approach. Those who adopt the former try to identify certain crucial relationships between economic development and rural political participation. While based on a well-known social mobilization theory that economic development leads to democracy, researches on China's rural elections have discovered a more complex picture. Kevin O'Brien is the first to suggest that relatively well-off villages with a history of good leadership are more likely to implement competitive elections.Footnote ¹ Susan Lawrence differs in her case study of a Hebei village by arguing that mismanaged and poor villages are more prone to democratic change.Footnote ² More recently, scholars have challenged both views. In their study of 120 villages in five provinces, Jean Oi and Scott Rozelle find a negative relationship between the level of economic development and competitiveness of village elections: the wealthy and industrialized villages are less likely than poorer, agricultural villages to have competitive elections.Footnote ³ Following Amy Epstein, however, Tianjin Shi and others identify a curvilinear relationship between economic development and interest in political participation, that is, neither rich nor poor, but middle-income villages tend to have competitive elections.Footnote ⁴

One thing to be learned from these studies is that cadres and villagers from different types of villages with different levels of economic development have different attitudes and behaviour towards political participation. Yet, the inconclusive debate suggests that no agreed causal, let alone determining, relationships exist between economic development and political participation, at least not at this stage of economic development in rural China. It is clear that other paths of inquiry need to be explored to understand the connections between economics and rural political participation.

The political approach to the study of rural political participation focuses on the electoral process and its impact. While many have discovered a link between increasingly more open and competitive elections and their impact on political participation and village governance (empowerment), some stress flawed processes and negative effects resulting from local cadres' control and manipulation (disempowerment).Footnote ⁵ Both sides generally confine their study to the electoral processes, making generalizations from survey data about the attitudes and behaviour of local cadres and villagers. As it seldom explores beyond the political realm for other causes and effects of rural political participation, the political approach falls short in reflecting the complex realities of village politics.

In contrast to both approaches' macro studies, case studies involve first-hand observations of individual villages to learn – through open-ended and in-depth interviews – about their election processes and specific conditions and problems. The knowledge thus gathered can better reveal the causes and effects of rural political participation and the dynamics of village politics.

The village I studied (I call it West Village) is a large agrarian village on the periphery of Beijing. It can be categorized as a dysfunctional and badly governed village. Before free elections, corruption and bad governance by the old leadership had seriously eroded the collective property and harmed the villagers' economic interests. Largely because of this poor state of affairs and active opposition by elite members, the last two elections in 2004 and 2007 were very competitive and resulted in a change of leadership. A new problem – strong factionalism – developed between elite members during the free elections and has been carried into post-election politics and the new leadership. As problems of public concern remain unresolved, popular discontent towards the new leadership is on the rise.

Based on the problems exposed in the elections, I identified two interrelated contradictions in the village: one between villagers and village officials; the other between the elite members including those in power and those seeking power. In contrast to most studies, I find it necessary to make a distinction between ordinary villagers and elite members who are not in power, because they do not share common interests and goals in village politics, except for their dissatisfaction with the incumbents. For villagers, elections are the means to select moral and capable leaders who will protect and enhance their interests. For the village elite seeking power, elections are means to gain political power and other benefits.

The contradictions between villagers and village officials have evolved over time. That between villagers and the old leadership in West Village focuses on their corruption and bad governance, which had led to serious erosion and unfair distribution of collective property. The contradiction between villagers and the new leadership lies in the latter's failure to address the problems left by the old leadership. Both led to popular discontent and fuelled political participation.

The contradiction between the elite members seeking power and those in power is stimulated by free elections, which give the former opportunities and legitimate means to compete for power and other benefits. In the 2004 election and its aftermath, the opposition elite mobilized villagers to remove the old village chief and then the old Party chief. The factions and factionalism formed during the election have been carried into post-election politics and the new leadership. They have since become a salient feature in village politics.

My study of the main contradictions in West Village challenges the two aforementioned approaches on how they frame the issue of rural political participation. Contrary to the economic approach which aims at identifying certain crucial relationships between the level of economic development and democratization, my findings indicate that it is not so much the level of economic development as whether collective property and its benefits are fairly distributed among villagers that motivates their political participation. In contrast to the political approach, my study demonstrates that it is necessary to go beyond the political realm into accumulated problems and contradictions to understand the causes and effects of rural political participation.

My findings also disagree with both sides of the political approach. In contrast to the disempowerment theory, the entrenched cadres in West Village proved unable, despite their efforts, to control and manipulate open elections. Free elections empowered villagers and elite members in opposition in deposing the old cadres. Contrary to the empowerment theory, however, free elections have not significantly improved the village governance because they have not empowered villagers beyond the elections into the process of decision making and management. As a result, the problems that villagers are most concerned with have not been addressed and the contradictions between villagers and cadres continue.

Village Background and Research Questions

West Village is located about 50 miles to the north-east of Beijing with a population of over 2,200 and cultivated land of around 4,300 mu. The village's economy is based mainly on household farming in grain production. The two private enterprises of some scale – a book-binding workshop and a garment shop – had been struggling for years and finally shut down in 2007. The rest are two dozen or so small family businesses including grain processing, convenience stores, restaurants and other services such as a clinic and repair shops. What is left of the collective economy after distribution of food and contract land to individual households is a few hundred mu of land, comprising farm land, an orchard, a few fish ponds and pieces of woodland, and a few housing compounds. They are leased to village and outside entrepreneurs. Two ambitious projects by the village leadership in the 1990s to build joint ventures had failed, and no further attempts have been made.

Based on extensive interviews among the elite and ordinary villagers during my three visits from 2005 to 2007,Footnote ⁶ I will reconstruct the story of the three elections in West Village from 2001 to 2007. More importantly, I will go beyond the story to explore the following three sets of questions. How did the competitive elections take place and what was their impact on village politics? What are the major problems in the village and what caused them? And why has the discontent of the villagers persisted and how can the problems concerning them be resolved?

The 2001 and 2004 Elections: From Compromise to Conflict

The major players in this section are as follows. First, RW, a Party member who had served in various posts in the village. In contrast with most village cadres of his generation, RW did not join the military or engage in private business. He was promoted through hard work and good character. Before the 2001 election he had been appointed as a temporary replacement in the village committee in charge of the village's agricultural production. He competed with the old village chief in the 2004 election and won. Second, MB, the old village chief. He held that post from 1990 to the 2004 election and was subsequently a member of the Party branch committee. Third, CQ, the Party chief from 1990 to 2005. And finally, XM, an entrepreneur.

Both Chinese and Western scholars identify 1998, the year the Organic Law of Village Committees was formally promulgated, as a landmark for the accelerated spread of free village elections.Footnote ⁷ This new development came to affect West Village in 2001, the year its villagers identified as the beginning of “genuine elections” because, unlike the previous elections, they could for the first time practise haixuan 海选 – free and direct elections.

In the primary election of 2001, RW, a village committee member in charge of agricultural production, got about 200 more votes out of the total of about 1,400 than MB, the village chief, who was the second nominee. According to the rules, the two would compete for the office of village chief in the formal election. Yet RW felt uncertain about what to do because this was the first time the village had practised free and direct elections and he had no idea what it would entail. Besides, MB, his boss, was a formidable rival: he had served as village chief for over ten years and had CQ, the Party chief and the most powerful man in the village, as his ally. While he was hesitating, RW was approached by XM, a village entrepreneur who was respected for his financial success and connections with local officials. As he was a friend of both candidates and the Party chief, and enjoyed playing a role in village politics, XM was asked by CQ to serve as a broker between the two competitors. Through XM's mediation, a secret gentleman's agreement was reached: RW would drop his race for village chief this time. In exchange, MB promised not to seek re-election for the same office in the next election. With this compromise, the first free election of the village committee went peaceably or, one may say, aborted halfway: MB, as the non-contested nominee for office, was re-elected the village chief and RW was formally elected as a village committee member. Thus, the political status quo of the village was kept and the formal legitimacy of the village committee was gained through a popular election.

When the next election came in the spring of 2004, MB broke his promise and declared he would seek re-election. Unable to persuade MB to keep his word, XM, the entrepreneur, decided to support RW, who was running for the office of village chief this time. The Party chief, CQ, was on the side of MB, his ally for years. Four former friends thus became rivals. The two political alliances they had formed would harden into two major factions and shape village politics to this day.

In the primary election, what had happened in the previous election repeated itself: RW surpassed MB by about 150 votes. Before the formal election, the village chief's staff began to use illegal means to buy votes with cash and dinners. In the formal election, MB surpassed RW by about 60 votes. RW's supporters, however, did not accept this result and accused MB of election fraud. Besides the acts of soliciting votes with cash and dinners that many had witnessed, it was rumoured that the Party chief himself tried to doctor the election result.

As MB was still eight votes short of the required 50 per cent of the votes, a run-off election was scheduled. By this time, however, the situation was getting out of control. Big character posters were put up accusing the village chief of election fraud, demanding an investigation and change of the election committee. The demands for investigation, in fact, went beyond the alleged election fraud, pointing to a series of questionable financial deals by the village leadership in recent years. On the day of the run-off election, a group of RW's supporters blocked the entrance to the polling station in the courtyard of the village government, making voting impossible.

This was reported to the township leadership, and a work team led by the vice-Party secretary of the township was sent to diffuse the crisis and to supervise the election. The vice-Party secretary tried to persuade RW's supporters to resume the election, but to no avail. The protesters insisted that the work team investigate the election fraud and other problems of the village leadership. When their demands were not met, RW's supporters continued to block the entrance to the polling station. Altogether they frustrated another four attempts to resume the election despite repeated cajoling and threats by township and county officials.

Eventually the township leadership offered a compromise: it would investigate the election fraud immediately, but the other issues concerning villagers would wait until after the election. With the help of key members of RW's support group like XM, the protesters accepted the offer. A hasty investigation by the township Party disciplinary committee found no hard evidence to implicate anyone for bribery and cheating.

With the stand-off that had lasted three-and-a-half months coming to an end, a new primary was held on 15 October. By this time, elections in other counties of the Beijing region had long been over, and the pressure on the village, township and county leadership to do it right was enormous. In the new primary, the gap between the two candidates narrowed, with RW leading MB by about two dozen votes. The formal election took place on 19 October, and RW gained another two dozen votes. Yet he was still shy of the required 50 per cent. For fear of more irregularities if there was a long wait, the township election committee decided to have the run-off the next day. As it turned out, RW gained another 20 or so votes, surpassing MB by over 60 votes, and he was duly declared the winner. From the beginning to the end, it took four months and ten elections, counting the aborted ones, for the election drama in West Village to be finally over.

Or was it? After the election, the township Party committee did not, as they had promised, investigate the problems of the old leadership that the villagers had raised during the election. And the villagers had not forgotten that promise. Several active opposition members went to the township Party committee a number of times with a petition for investigation they claimed was signed by over two-thirds of the villager representatives and over half the Party members. Their target was really the Party chief who was more responsible for these problems.

Within the village, the tension and conflict triggered by the election continued. Refusing to “go back home to plough the fields in the event of losing the election” as he had openly vowed, MB insisted on going to work in the villagers' committee as before. That his desk had been thrown out by the new village chief's supporters did not deter him. He continued to go to the village government, and behave as a village official, if not the chief. Indeed he still is, as one of the three members of the village Party branch committee, part of the village leadership. Unwilling to confront opposition activists who demanded an explanation for the questionable financial deals, CQ stopped coming to work for over three months after the election. For the same reason not a single meeting of Party members had been held since the election, a violation of the rules of the Party constitution. Indeed opposition activists would use this effectively against CQ in their petition. In the meantime, nobody in the village leadership was paid. The reason CQ gave for the suspension of salary was that the village government was broke. By the time of my first visit in June 2005, nine months after the election, the leadership was in paralysis and villagers' dissatisfaction was on the rise.

The Villagers' Views of the Problems of the Old Leadership

How did the villagers – both elite and commoners – interpret the election crisis and the crisis in village politics? Most of those I interviewed blamed the old leadership for the deteriorating governance and sociopolitical order in the village. What struck me were the specific problems they identified with the old leaders, particularly the Party chief rather than the old village chief, whom they considered merely his “gun.” These problems clearly indicate a deep contradiction between villagers and the old leadership. It should be noted that a significant minority, most of whom I randomly interviewed on the street, seemed to be seriously alienated from and disillusioned with village politics. Some were so cynical as to think that free elections to select their own leaders made no difference, because “whoever is in power is bound to grab for himself (tan 贪).” Others, though considering free elections better than appointment, distrusted the elected officials as much as they did the old leaders. The majority, however, welcomed opportunities to select their own leaders even if they have little confidence in the elected officials.

The problems that village elite members and ordinary villagers raised against the old leadership were concentrated in two areas: first, their problematic leadership and governing style; and second, their questionable financial transactions. Several Party members criticized the older leadership's governing style as “undemocratic” and “authoritarian,” pointing out that their decision-making lacked “transparency” and public consultation. They also faulted the Party chief for playing factionalism and favouritism in village politics. In order to hold on to power, he exercised tight control over Party membership and recruited only from among his followers.Footnote ⁸ A member of the village elite told me that he could not join the Party because of his outspokenness, despite repeated applications in the past eleven years. This articulate man seems to have the necessary credentials, experience and popular support: he had served at various posts in the village since he graduated from primary school at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution; his family was recently elected as one of the model families in the village; and he was elected the head of the finance monitoring group by both sides in a recent election. According to him and other sources, there were people who joined the Party without even writing an application. One former village cadre characterized the work style of the Party chief as “divide and rule.” Another pointed out his manipulation of the result of the Party branch committee election shortly before the election of the village committee.

For many villagers, stronger discontent focused on questionable financial transactions by the old leadership and those areas of governance that seriously hurt their economic interests. They were suspicious that the old leadership gave some contractors and themselves lucrative deals at the expense of collective property. One case that everyone mentioned was a failed joint venture in the village's chicken farm. As the outside partner breached his contract in 1999, he was supposed to compensate as much as 80,000 yuan annually to the village. But the case has not been resolved after six years. The newly elected village committee could not get hold of the contract, which the Party chief declared missing. There were rumours that the partner had donated money to the school attended by the Party chief's daughter. The villagers also wanted to investigate the Party chief's and the old village chief's private business ventures: each owned a big truck and took sand from the dried river bed belonging to the village or the state to sell outside. They considered it a flagrant encroachment on collective property and a bad example for other villagers.

Origins and Causes of the Crisis in West Village Politics

My interviews clearly indicate that many villagers had completely lost confidence in the old leadership, in particular the Party chief whom they believed to be mainly responsible for the village's political and financial problems. The election crisis, triggered by the incumbents' illegal acts to hold on to power, exposed a profound leadership crisis: the contradictions between the old leadership and the majority of the villagers had increased to breaking point. The root of these contradictions lay in the old leadership's poor governance, corruption and misappropriation of collective property, which directly harmed villagers' economic interests. This is the major cause of the popular discontent and the driving force for villagers' political participation.

The Party chief and the old village chief are typical middle-aged village officials who have been beneficiaries of both Mao's system and Deng's reform. Under Mao, their good class backgrounds helped them to join the military and then the Party. Young, educated and with an experience of the outside world, they were sought after for village leadership roles after being demobilized. Many village and local officials of their generation share their profiles. After returning to the village in 1977, the old village chief was recruited for various posts until becoming village chief in 1990.

The Party chief had similar experience and a more illustrious record. After graduating from senior middle school in 1974, he joined the navy and was stationed in Shanghai. While in the navy he won a Merit Citation Class III. Partly because of this honour, he did not return to the village but was assigned a job in an auto-repair factory in the county seat. Riding the tide of economic reform, he took out a loan to start his own business, a transportation company. He told me that by 1986 he had earned more money than anybody else in the village. It was then, at the age of 32, that he was noticed and recruited by the township leadership for the position of the village chief in the hope that he could bring prosperity to the village. Two years later he was promoted to Party chief and had stayed in that position ever since. According to most of my interviewees he was competent and well connected, and was recognized for completing a number of village improvement projects in the 1990s, including cement roads, street lights and running water.

Recently, however, the Party chief had begun to work increasingly for himself rather than the collective. He and his brother-in-law hired labourers to dig sand from the river bed outside the village and sell it to construction companies. Although the sand belonged to the collective, they did not give it proper compensation. This set a bad example: a few village toughs have continued this venture after the two village cadres stopped, following orders from above. With his accumulated wealth, the Party chief bought a set of apartments at the county seat and moved in with his family. The car belonging to the village government was exclusively for his own use and he did not pay for petrol and maintenance. Every villager had witnessed the ever-widening gap between the Party chief's living standard and theirs; none of his sources of income seemed legitimate because of their ambiguous relationship to the collective property under his control.

To a lesser degree, similar corruption can be found with the old village chief, who complained in our interview about “the jealousy of villagers of his improved living conditions and of his ability to do some sideline production.” But why did the accumulated contradictions between the cadres and villagers in West Village develop into a conflict in 2004? One reason was the gradual change in villagers' knowledge and expectations in the era of economic liberalization. The household farming system had made them more independent and better aware of their rights and interests, so that they realized they had a claim to and a stake in the village's collective property, which was only supposed to be managed by the village cadres. Another reason was the introduction of free and direct elections in the village in 2001 and the existence of a viable alternative. Previously, however discontented they were with the old leaders' abuse of power and corruption, the villagers had not been empowered to remove them. Free elections could translate their discontent into political action. In their nomination of RW as the new village chief in 2001, villagers expressed loud and clear their desire to reject the old leadership. Although he had been part of the old leadership since the early 1990s, RW had proved himself to be honest and clean, and not part of the corrupt alliance between the Party chief and the old village chief. In contrast to the authoritarian style of the old village chief, his modest manner also enhanced his popularity. But RW's withdrawal from the race left no viable alternative. In the 2004 election, when he decided to compete in the election, RW could rally a majority, build a coalition of the opposition and defeat the incumbent.

Ongoing Contradictions in the Village: Post-2004 Election Politics

A new character in this section is CF, an entrepreneur who became the interim Party chief in 2005 and was formally elected in 2007.

In the aftermath of the 2004 election in West Village, contradictions and conflicts continued between elite members in the deeply divided new leadership, and in the petitions by opposition activists against the Party chief. As a result of their efforts, the Party chief was finally removed in 2005. However, to the chagrin of the new village chief and the opposition activists, the position of interim Party chief went to CF, an entrepreneur and protégé of the old Party chief. He formed an alliance with MB, the old village chief, thus isolating and undermining RW, the new village chief.

RW was confronted with a formidable legacy after the 2004 election: a deeply divided leadership, an old village chief who had turned into a deadly enemy and refused to stay away, and a Party chief who did not co-operate and seldom turned up. Without the ability to remove the Party chief, who was the highest authority in the village leadership, the newly elected village chief felt that his hands were tied over dealing with important issues of public concern, let alone any investigation of alleged corruption by the Party chief himself. Although the new village chief's dilemma was real, his inaction would disappoint his supporters and cost him dearly at the next election.

Five active members of the opposition, all Party members, had no illusion that the Party chief would co-operate in a process that could lead to his own downfall. The most outspoken one was a retired worker from Beijing; the most resourceful one used to be a village cadre in charge of agricultural production. After the 2004 election they went several times to the township and county Party leadership, petitioning to investigate the problems exposed by the election. They did not want to wait to remove the Party chief until the next election of the village Party branch committee in March 2007. Either unwilling to wait so long for fear of losing momentum, or uncertain if they could rally a majority, the opposition activists decided to continue petitioning.

On 25 July 2005, nine months after the election, the same five Party members began a new round of petitions. This time they had the good luck to be received by an important official from the township Party committee and then by one from the county organization department. In contrast to previous petitions, they now shifted their focus from the Party chief's alleged financial corruption to a political failing – the fact that the village Party branch had held no meetings for about ten months since the election. Timing made this charge of dereliction of duty by the Party chief more serious: he had just failed to organize Party members to study an important Central Committee document and to elect model Party members on the occasion of the Party's birthday, 1 July. “Do we or do we not still stick to Party leadership in the village?” they asked rhetorically and emphatically. A piece of good luck for them was the recent transfer of a new vice-secretary in charge of personnel and organization into the township Party committee. This official, who had no connection with the Party chief, took their report very seriously and promised to handle the problem immediately.

On their next visit on 2 August, the township vice-Party secretary revealed to them that the leadership had decided to ask the Party chief to resign “to save him his face.” Another decision was to appoint, according to procedure, RW, the new village chief, as the interim Party chief till the next election. After deliberation, the five petitioners decided to bypass the new village chief and to promote one of their own to be interim Party chief. They then went to the township Party committee for a third time to recommend their candidate. (Here we are witnessing the emergence of a third faction and their first bid for the Party leadership in the village. Their next bid was in the Party branch committee election in March 2007.) Yet when the Party chief's resignation was officially announced at the township Party committee meeting on 27 August, neither the new village chief nor the petitioners' candidate was declared the interim Party chief. It was not until almost two months later, on 20 October, that cadres from the township Party committee came to West Village to hold a Party member meeting, and asked them to vote for CF, a candidate they had chosen for interim Party chief. According to members of the opposition, the township Party committee had not given prior notice of this election and fewer than half the Party members were present. Both were violations of the proper procedural rules.

In his early 40s, CF, the new interim Party chief, is regarded as one of the most successful entrepreneurs in the village. After graduation from high school in the early 1980s, he took the opportunity offered by economic reform and began work in a construction business outside the village. In the late 1990s, he became a subcontractor and head of a construction team which hired about 30 of his fellow villagers. He also joined the Party around this time. Recently, however, his business has not been going well. This may have much to do with his decision to try politics. Unlike most old and new members of the leadership who have “good class backgrounds” and experience in the military, CF came from a rich peasant family. His good fortune first in business and then in village politics is a telling example of fundamental change since Mao's time and the emergence of a new and more pluralistic village elite.

Why did the township leadership choose CF to be the interim Party chief, even at the risk of drawing criticism for violating procedural rules? According to my interviewees, CF was a protégé of the old Party chief who had contracted him a profitable job in the construction of the village irrigation system, a transaction of over 100,000 yuan. The Party chief's recommendation of CF to be his successor was generally regarded as his last-ditch effort to save his skin and to maintain his influence in village politics. Either of the others – the new village chief or the opposition activists' candidate – if appointed or elected, would probably pursue investigation of the old Party chief's financial problems. The appointment of CF was also in the interests of the township and county leaderships because exposure of the old Party chief's financial corruption might implicate and embarrass them. That concern could well be behind their decision not to send auditors to investigate the old Party chief's alleged financial problems despite repeated petitions by the opposition activists.

CF was said to have been hesitant when he was first approached for the job. For whatever reasons, he quickly changed his mind and began to lobby actively among Party members for their support. That was not very hard, for he was popular, had a good reputation for integrity among the villagers and the solid power base of the old Party chief. Eight months after he had assumed the office, even some former critics of the old Party chief had good words to say about him. He was praised for building a small park with gym facilities in the village, a project long delayed under the old Party chief. The deadlock issue of the chicken farm – how the village should be compensated by an outside entrepreneur for breaching the contract – was resolved in a manner acceptable to the majority of Party members and villager representatives. Most importantly, despite some continued distrust from the opposition, he won legitimacy by being formally elected with the most votes at the Party branch committee elections in March 2007.

The 2007 Village Election: The Rise of the CF and MB Faction and the Decline of RW

New characters in this section are, first, RL, one of the older generation active in village politics. He competed in the 2007 primary for the office of village chief and was defeated.

And second, SL, who is about the same age as CF. A dark horse in the 2007 election, SL was elected as village chief. He joined the CF and MB faction because of their support for his election.

While CF, the new Party chief, strengthened his position after taking up his job, RW, the village chief elected in 2004, did not fare so well. In March 2007 he failed to be re-elected to the Party branch committee (at the same time as the old village chief, his deadly enemy, was re-elected as a member of the committee). That showed his lack of support among Party members, but his support among villagers had also been eroded. Although it was well-known that his authority had been limited by the arrangement of the village power structure as well as by a severely divided leadership, villagers still expected him to be firm and strong in handling matters within his jurisdiction. Two examples were cited as indicating the failure of his leadership. On one occasion, he did not penalize a few villagers who had stolen trees from the collective, and, in addition, failed to insist on selling the recovered trees to the highest bidder at an auction. On another occasion, he failed to collect payments from villagers who had used the collective's mechanical service. These cases had convinced some villagers that the new village chief was not a good guardian of the collective property. Even among his supporters he was known as “too weak.” Decline in popular support was one factor influencing RW's decision not to seek re-election for village chief in 2007.

RL, the first declared candidate for the job, had made his intention publicly known long before. Brimming with confidence (some villagers called it “self-important”), he disclosed in our interview in May 2005 his desire to challenge the new village chief in the next election. RL was from the same clan as RW and had worked hard in getting him elected in 2004. Soon after the election, however, RL became his most outspoken critic, calling him “weak and incompetent.” In January 2006, RL prepared a nine-page comprehensive village rejuvenation plan including how to redistribute land and how to develop village economy, both issues of public concern. According to him, two-thirds of the villager representatives endorsed his plan of village rejuvenation (although a few elite members I interviewed called it “empty talk.”) RL was no doubt a strong candidate: six feet tall and in his mid-60s, he looked at least ten years younger. He was also very articulate and a man of the world. He had served as a production team accountant during collective farming, and as a salesman in a commune enterprise. RL began campaigning during the 2007 Chinese New Year, much earlier than other candidates.

His rival was even more formidable: XM, the entrepreneur who had served as the power broker in the 2001 election and had helped to put the new village chief in office in 2004. XM had a similar life experience as most political elite members of his generation. After middle school he joined the navy, but his love of drink and his bad temper affected his career path there. Without Party membership he did not have much chance of being recruited into the village leadership after returning home. But like the old and the new Party chiefs, economic liberalization gave him the opportunity to launch his own business, first in transportation and then in food processing and book binding. In the 1990s he was known to be the wealthiest man in the village. Over the past few years, however, his businesses had closed down one after another. That seemed to be an important reason for his decision to run for political office. Another important reason was to maintain a power balance, or even to gain advantage, in the new leadership by joining RW, his ally, against the growing strength of the new alliance between CF, the new Party chief and MB, the old village chief.

RL and XM shared the same character flaw in the eyes of villagers: both had a large ego and would not even say hello to most ordinary villagers. That arrogance would certainly cost each of them votes in the coming election. Compared with RL, XM had a few advantages: he was 15 years younger and was regarded as a successful businessman. He was well connected, boasting of connections in both the township and county leaderships (his father, now retired, used to be the a bureau chief in the county's police department). He was respected, if not liked, among villagers including the village toughs. Overall, he was regarded as better equipped to satisfy the desire of most villagers for a strong and capable leader who could handle tough issues and tough guys. Although he made public his intention to run for the office of village chief only after the Chinese New Year, XM seemed to have more supporters on the eve of the election. In fact, once he had declared he was running, XM effectively shut the door to new candidates. He had created such a “jumping on the wagon” effect that the only two challengers running against the incumbents for the village committee eagerly allied with him in their campaigning. In addition to the current village chief who was his ally, the new Party chief also promised in private to support him, although this turned out to be a false promise. XM knew very well that the political alliances and promises made in the election were not reliable. He confided in me that he was aware of the trickery played by SL, one of his campaign partners, who had approached his rival to seek votes. Instead of openly confronting him, XM was just playing dumb, while telling his loyalists in secret not to campaign and vote for him. The political manoeuvring among the candidates was truly Machiavellian.

I observed the primary on Saturday 9 June 2007. The voting booths, set up in three rooms of the village government compound, were open from 5 a.m. until 12 noon. Although a few of XM's activists were hanging around from the beginning to put pressure on undecided voters, they were not allowed to block the entrance to the booths which were guarded closely by members of the election committee. The election went more smoothly than in 2004. Besides three township cadres and two security guards, all the candidates were on site most of the time to keep an eye on proceedings. One hour after the booth had been closed, the votes were tallied: of 1,800 eligible voters about 1,200 participated. Between the two men seeking candidacy for the office of village chief, XM got 444 or 37 per cent of the votes while RL got 268 or 22 per cent. Of those competing for the two offices of the village committee, six received over 100 votes. The top three were all incumbents of the current village committee, including RW, the village chief.

After the primary, XM and his supporters were fully confident of the result in the formal election two weeks later. As if to bear out their prophecy, RL soon revealed that he would withdraw. On hearing the news, SL, one of XM's campaign partners who had secretly approached his opponent for votes, declared that he would challenge XM in the formal election. As he had ranked merely fifth in the primary for the village committee, XM and his supporters did not take this seriously, deeming it an act to release anger and frustration. Yet, to everyone's surprise and for reasons still unknown, SL defeated XM, once considered the strongest candidate, in the formal election and become the new village chief.

How can one explain this dramatic upset? Both of my informants, elite members who had voted for two opposing candidates, attributed it to behind-the-scene operations by three key members of the village political elite. Two were incumbents in the village leadership: CF, the current Party chief, who had promised to support XM, and MB, the old village chief and a current member of the Party branch committee. The third was the old Party chief who remained a man of much influence in village politics, even though he had not lived or worked in the village since his removal from office in 2005. These three feared the election of XM as the new village chief. With a strong personality, an aggressive style, the support of RW and the popular mandate if elected, XM would seriously tip the power balance in the village leadership and even dominate it. This prospect was utterly unacceptable to the two incumbents and they went to the old Party chief for help. The result was their decision and strategy to mobilize all their resources to campaign for SL, a potential ally. In his mid-40s, SL is a small businessman (he owns a meat stall on a market in the county seat) with political ambition. He had held a few positions in the village leadership during collectivization and had unsuccessfully run for the village committee in 2004. SL was related to the old Party chief by being married to his niece and owed him his Party membership, so he could be easily won over to the three-man alliance. He would be doubly indebted to them for their full support, without which his challenge to XM would stand little chance.

How could this new and old elite alliance get enough votes within such a short time? The seemingly impossible task became quite realistic after consideration of the tally in the primary. In the primary for village committee membership, SL had got 207 votes. MB, the old village chief who had not even campaigned for candidacy, got 104 votes, which indicated that he had a considerable following. In addition, both the new Party chief and the old Party chief could rally a large number of votes (the new Party chief had got the most votes in the March Party branch committee election). Further, the withdrawal of RL had left most of his 268 supporters for SL to grab against XM. On the day of the formal election, 23 June 2007, what had seemed impossible happened: the majority of voters put SL's name into the box “name your own candidate,” thus making him the new village chief. Stunned, XM's supporters cried foul and petitioned to the town and the county leaderships. Unlike the 2004 election, however, no crisis resulted since no credible evidence of illegal activities was presented.

Apart from the effectiveness of the gang of three's alliance and their manoeuvres in deciding the result of the 2007 election, the popular will was an equally important factor. The dramatic turnaround in the formal election must be understood in the context of XM's lack of popular support. As well as his well-known arrogance, XM suffered a more serious problem – something which I consider his Achilles' heel – of his delinquency in paying to the village an annual fee of over 20,000 yuan for leasing his factory compound. He was not the only one in violation of a contract with the collective, of course. Since 2003 nearly all villagers, imitating one another, have stopped paying contract dues. Such a tremendous loss of collective property was the priority issue that most villagers want to be addressed. That XM was one of the most glaring offenders in this area had been well-known and his opponents must have used it effectively to undermine his legitimacy as a potential leader. In the formal election the majority of voters cast votes of no confidence in a candidate who had kept silent on this issue. Instead, they opted for an alternative who did not have the same problem.

After the 2007 elections, the village leadership, including the village committee and Party branch committee, was increasingly dominated by the alliance between CF, the Party chief; MB, the old village chief (now a member of the Party branch committee); and SL, the newly elected village chief. RW, the first elected village chief, was elected a member of the village committee, thus further reducing his power after his loss in the Party branch committee election earlier in the year. Yet it is too early to tell whether the dominant faction will maintain the status quo or try to change it. So far they have not begun to deal with the tough issues of public concern including enforcing the construction regulations, collecting contract dues, redistributing land postponed since 1998, and controlling the village toughs who keep digging and selling the sand belonging to the village. These issues are a great challenge and the ultimate test to the new leadership, as they had been for the village chief elected in 2004. To win popular support and re-election, the village leadership must demonstrate that they are, first and foremost, good guardians of the collective property.