The temptation to compare the world's two largest developing countries, China and India, is inescapable to many scholars, not least because in both institutions and outcomes Asia's two giants differ so enticingly. Selina Ho submits to this temptation in Thirsty Cities: Social Contracts and Public Goods Provision in China and India, though through the novel lens of comparing the provision of one particularly important form of public good, urban piped drinking water. What, Ho asks, explains the fact that authoritarian China provides more superior urban drinking water than does democratic India? This question is an important one in light of prevailing theories in political science that are predicated on the existence of built-in incentives in democratic systems to provide public goods. It is not obvious, as Ho reminds us, why an authoritarian system such as China would go to such lengths to provide a public good like drinking water when more liberal regimes in India, Indonesia and elsewhere have been far less successful in doing so.

Instead of undertaking a more conventional institutional comparison between China and India, Ho instead develops an argument based on the social contract. The Chinese Communist Party, Ho argues, provides public goods like drinking water because it satisfies a moral imperative inherent in the traditional Chinese social contract that essentially carries forward the Mandate of Heaven and that is in turn essential for legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people. It is not economic growth, Ho emphasizes, that is central to China's social contract, but rather an underlying moral imperative to provide for the good of the people. In contrast, India's social contract, Ho asserts, is predicated on an inflexible form of socialism and on populism, both of which restrain the ruling elite's ability to provide public goods.

This argument leads Ho to make some important observations regarding China's political economy. Most notably, Ho draws on the work of Vivienne Shue and others to offer a convincing rebuttal of the oft-stated claim that the Party's legitimacy rests primarily on its guarantee of continued economic growth. Instead, Ho stresses, this legitimacy rests on the perception of virtue on the part of the Party's senior leadership and its practice of benevolent rule, as illustrated by the provision of public goods. In furtherance of her argument, Ho presents an excellent overview of municipal water governance and water pricing policies, both of which underpin the successful expansion of municipal piped water supply, especially in the reform era. Perhaps of more general interest to China scholars, Ho also presents a valuable discussion of the fiscal extractive capacity of China's local governments. This, she argues, highlights another important aspect of China's social contract: its emphasis on urban rather than rural populations. This bias, Ho contends, is essential for the Party to maintain its contract-based legitimacy.

Yet while the social contract proves to be a useful lens through which to examine public good provision in China, it is somewhat less compelling as an explanation of cross-national differences between China and India. The great risk of comparative analysis is the misattribution of causal factors which vary so greatly in both number and degree between countries as different as China and India. India is, unlike China, a federal system, and public good provision, especially in water, is largely a state responsibility. Indeed, one of the great advantages of federal systems is their ability (at least in theory) to provide heterogeneous quantities of public goods in accordance with local demand and preferences. One might, therefore, contend that the varying levels of public good provision in India are a feature, not a bug, of its political system. Conversely, one might question if the levels of public goods being provided to China's localities are truly reflective of local preferences as part of a dutiful, reciprocal and efficient social contract, but instead of distributional politics. One is reminded, for example, of the fact that until recently, many localities did not bother to turn on their brand-new, typically centrally-financed wastewater treatment plants, because operating expenses were a local responsibility.

This mild objection should not, however, distract from the value of Selina Ho's thoughtful examination of an important question. Certainly, students of Chinese politics would do well to devote more attention to the issue of public good provision. In particular, the question of what factors underpin demand for public goods, especially from China's rapidly-expanding urban middle class, seems to cry out for further study. Whether or not these demands are met is as important a measure as any of China's future political performance – and stability.