Yongshun Cai's new book discusses agent management by focusing on the political rationale behind the state's use of selective or differentiated discipline. In order for the government to menace officials and contain rampant corruption while reducing costs, the state authority uses selective or differentiated discipline to balance the need for, and the difficulties in, disciplining agents. What kinds of officials are “selected” as targets? The criteria for punishment are based on (1) the severity of the consequences of the official's failure in performing his or her duties, and (2) his or her role or responsibility in the failure. Cai also argues that the state's tolerance varies depending on the type of malfeasance. The state authority is more likely to tolerate duty-related malfeasance, especially cases with less severe consequences or cases that are not directly caused by government officials. Although some agents have been exempted or given less serious punishment, whether a particular agent will be held liable may not be predetermined. Inconsistency in the disciplining of erring agents implies uncertainty. When the party-state decides to mete out punishment, the penalty can be harsh and career ending. For this reason, state agents in China are strongly motivated to avoid blame and punishment by adopting various strategies, from covering up their malfeasance to seeking help through personal connections.

Cai assesses the CCP's effort to build an efficient and functional government through structural reform, including comprehensive ways of assessing the cadres' performance based on qualification, loyalty and performance. In the cadre evaluation system, the Party authority is responsible for the selection, promotion, transfer and removal of cadres using criteria such as qualification, loyalty and performance. In order to put themselves in good positions for promotion, officials who are assigned multiple responsibilities assume discretion in prioritizing their responsibilities in light of their careers or personal interests, resulting in selective policy implementation. Local officials tend to avoid serious political risk by playing safe, which leads them to ignore certain low-priority policies. This helps explain why the government's ability to ensure the accountability of its agents is inconsistent.

There is confusion in Cai's book regarding how corruption cases are handled and how corrupt officials are punished. The author states that “cases involving lower-ranking officials are normally forwarded to lower-level state authorities to handle” and the investigation of important local officials is decided by local leaders (pp. 114–15). In the 1950s, it was true that local leaders were in charge of cases involving lower-ranking officials. But in the reform era, local disciplinary agencies were established to handle corruption cases; in 1979, for example, 98 per cent of counties, prefectures and provinces in China had their own disciplinary agencies. Since the 1990s, local disciplinary agencies have been under the dual leadership of local Party leadership and upper-level disciplinary agencies. Thus, cases involving lower-ranking officials are not handled by local leaders alone. The book also says that the Central Discipline Inspection Commission normally needs to obtain the agreement of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee and requires the approval of the politburo meeting to investigate an official with the administrative rank of vice minister (p. 114). In fact, in determining whether a central-level party official such as a member of the Politburo should be investigated, influential retired leaders such as Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji and Qiao Shi often play a crucial role.

Cai argues that the state authority's leniency toward duty-related malfeasance contributes to the cost that the party-state suffers because “the government relies on its agents instead electoral support to stay in power and to govern” (p. 3). In fact, the state authority's leniency toward duty-related malfeasance comes mainly from its inability to face the strong resistance of local Party and government organizations. Official publications reveal that there has been growing lenience towards duty-related malfeasance in China's court system, as shown in the case of the early 2000s, when the percentage of those exempt from criminal punishment and probation increased from 52.6 per cent in 2001 to 82.83 per cent in 2005 (Jiancha ribao, 23 March 2009). Although the economic damage caused by duty-related malfeasance has been on average more than 17 times that caused by corruption per case (Xinhua wang, 23 May 2007), punishment against cadres for duty-related malfeasance has been highly unpopular. When a case is established under the legal system, it always faces the so-called “three difficulties and one strong [resistance]” (sannan yida): difficult to discover, difficult to obtain evidence, difficult to convict (cadres of duty-related malfeasance), and strong resistance.

The reasons for the dominant leniency are complicated. One of them is that in cases of duty-related malfeasance, the officials are widely viewed sympathetically as having “good intentions which turn into bad results” (haoxin banle huaishi) and, thus, they cannot be morally blamed. As far as the officials and the general public are concerned, these duty-related malfeasances often take place with the cooperation of government organizations, and work for the interests of the “public” instead of the official(s). Because the money stolen through corruption serves the interests of the organizations instead of the officials themselves, they should not receive severe punishment. Similarly, the public believe officials should not be punished severely for losing government money or damaging organizations if their intention was to pursue the interests of those organizations.

Overall, the book shows serious scholarship and makes a significant contribution to the research on Chinese state and how it disciplines government officials. It is well written and highly informative. The book has lots of data and in-depth discussions on the issues that will appeal to experts and policy makers. At the same time, the essays are very readable and provide enough background to make this book accessible to members of the general public.