At a time when much of Sinology remains narrowly focused on thick description and/or deep analysis of greater China, it is refreshing to review an innovative effort at cross-national comparison with an elegant conceptual framework.
On the surface of it, a book pairing Mao Zedong and Jawaharlal Nehru may seem curious. Beyond the obvious parallel that both men launched Asian countries into new orbits from a heretofore Eurocentric planet, what is the basis for the comparison? The logic, according to Andrew Kennedy, is that two of the most remarkably “bold” national leaders of the mid-20th century provide ideal initial cases upon which to test a new theoretical framework. The author introduces the concept of “efficacy beliefs” and identifies two analytically distinct types: “martial” and “moral.” According to Kennedy, while both leaders chose to pursue “costly” national strategies (pp. 10–11), each adopted a different approach on the basis of their contrasting belief systems. Mao had a “great sense of martial efficacy and a weak sense of moral efficacy, Nehru was just the reverse” (p. 5).
Kennedy makes excellent use of both primary and secondary sources, notably untapped archival materials in four countries (China, India, the UK and the United States). Particularly useful for his purposes are the private correspondence of Nehru and numerous telegrams and directives drafted by Mao.
The book opens with two preliminary chapters outlining the purpose and layout of the book and its methodological framework. Then the focus shifts to three chapters on Mao. The first chapter compares Mao's belief system with that of one of his key lieutenants, Liu Shaoqi, to demonstrate that Mao held views and values quite different to some of his key comrades. The second chapter examines how Mao's belief system influenced Chinese actions on Korea confirming what a number of other studies have concluded: that Mao was the prime advocate of military intervention in Korea and that without the Chairman's vigorous and sustained insistence, it is very likely that Beijing would not have dispatched troops across the Yalu River in October 1950. The third China chapter offers an illuminating discussion of Mao's approach to diplomacy. Mao was not at all interested in pursuing a negotiated solution on Korea in January 1950 or arms control talks in the 1960s. What these case studies highlight, according to Kennedy, is Mao's “weak sense of moral efficacy” (p. 96).
The next section of the book is comprised of chapters on Nehru which parallel those on Mao. Each Nehru chapter examines his belief system and compares it with that of a key Indian contemporary. One chapter analyses Nehru's approach on Kashmir. In contrast to Mao's eagerness to resort to military means, Nehru believed India's best course of action on this disputed territory was negotiation. He sought United Nations adjudication rather than resort to hard power. The distinction between Nehru and Mao becomes particularly clear in a separate chapter examining the Indian leader's diplomatic initiatives. Kennedy outlines Nehru's approach to nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, China's absorption of Tibet (then a quasi-Indian protectorate), and the rising tensions over a complicated Sino-Indian territorial dispute all of which serve to underscore the Indian prime minister's persistent efforts to find negotiated solutions. But the contrast is starkest when Kennedy analyses escalation to the 1962 border war. Nehru continued to believe that negotiation was the only way forward, insisting that Indian military forces should take a largely defensive posture. Mao believed otherwise and Nehru was genuinely shocked when Chinese forces initiated attacks against Indian units on the frontier. When the Indian military performed very poorly Nehru feared deeper Chinese penetrations and even invasion. The prime minister was alarmed to the point that he requested security assistance from the United States.
Arguably these are the paradigmatic cases for Kennedy's theory: Mao could be the poster child for the most war-prone national leader of the second half of the 21st century; Nehru, meanwhile, is the epitome of a national leader convinced of the transcendent power of idealism in international relations. But how might the moral/martial efficacy approach stand up to cases in which a senior leader is not so dominant and/or where the moral/martial dichotomy is far fuzzier? Take, for example, the cases of Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao. Further application of the analytic framework – which the author himself advocates in his concluding chapter – will either underscore considerable limitations or provide the opportunity for additional refinement and enhanced utility.
This book both broadens and advances the fields of elite and foreign policy studies in China as well as serving as an inspirational example of how China scholars can pursue bigger-picture topics in methodologically innovative ways.
