This book is the English version of a collection of recent articles authored by Yu Keping, who is famous for having declared in 2005, as a Chinese within-the-ruling-system political scholar, that “democracy is a good thing.” One decade later, this new book, prefaced in 2015 and published in 2016, is best regarded as a further elaboration and clarification of Yu's previous argument.
Given outside observers’ fragmentary knowledge of contemporary China, Yu's book is both ambitious and helpful in providing a systematic, inclusive and well-balanced outline of post-1978 Chinese politics and society. Given his fellow scholars’ prevailing avoidance or rejection of human rights terminology and universal values discourse, Yu's book is both unique and compelling for inviting readers to consider a democratic possibility of China and a Chinese defence of democracy and human rights.
Although the book is titled after its second chapter on democracy, the chapters worthy of more attention are those on governance (part two) and globalization (part three). Given that performance legitimacy has virtually become the only source of the normative legitimacy of China's government, while communist ideologies and the highly politicized totalitarian system have gradually disintegrated post-Cultural Revolution, Yu's focus on social governance (chapters five, six and seven) and the meritocratic principles in CCP's cadre selection and education (chapter eight) is pertinent and important. And considering that globalization acts as a shaping force in both the economic development and the social injustice of a changing China, Yu's exposition of the China model (chapter ten) and the citizenship issue in China's new migration movement (chapter eleven) is timely and inspirational.
The main argument of this book remains underlying but coherent: democracy is desirable; China is a democracy or at least a quasi-democracy with good performance and Chinese characteristics, so China's government, ruling party and political system are all legitimate. Yu's defences of democracy and “Chinese-style democracy” (for the usage of this term, see especially pp. 23–25) are also compatible with his analysis of governance and globalization. Unfortunately, neither premise of this syllogism has been well justified or described, not only within this book but also throughout all his published works. This also means that the first four chapters are the least persuasive and the most misleading: Yu's normative justifications for democracy in general are rather simple and weak, and his empirical analyses of Chinese-style democracy are often in conflict with facts or everyday observations.
Apparently, there exists a tension or even a struggle between Yu's ideal beliefs in democracy and his characterizations of Chinese democracy as well as within the latter. He argues that democracy is a “trend that cannot be impeded” (p. 57) and that it is one of the “many accepted truths regarding political life” that “democracy is the best political system we have” (p. 3). He draws on human rights (chapter one) and “long-lasting” well-ordered rule (chapter two) as his two main justifications for democracy. He also asserts that China needs “a rational road map for political reform” in order to realize and enhance democracy from a “base” level to a “upper” level, as well as from an “intra-party” version to a “social” version (pp. 59–60). Meanwhile, as soon as he returns to the history of post-1978 China, he insists that “Chinese democracy,” which can be a “non-liberal form of democracy” (p. 18) and can be distinctively “growing out of Chinese tradition and society,” is exclusively the political system that will on the one hand remain democratic and on the other hand “bring good fortune” to Chinese people and “contribute greatly to the advancement of democratic theory and practice for all mankind” (p. 25).
Yu fails to clarify how distinctive and how democratic the “Chinese democracy” he defends could be, because he stays ambiguous about the actual features of this “non-liberal” but still just or decent democratic reform that arises from diverse, competing Chinese cultural traditions and political legacies. Accordingly, his descriptions and expectations of governance (part two) are inclined to risk pragmatic exploitation of social capital by the totalitarian or authoritarian ruling power. His analyses of the relationship between globalization and China (part three) ignore the government's moral role as a responsible major power in terms of global justice as well as domestic distributive justice.
Since Yu's book can be confusing in its normative and descriptive aspects, the potential audience is recommended to first gain a brief knowledge of both the contemporary political philosophy and the history of the CCP and the PRC. However, in this sense, this book can also be used as a travel guide into China's issues. Furthermore, all of Yu's published works are best read as invitations to, or initiations of, genuine discussion, rather than as precise conclusions about China's governance or the alleged China model. On the other side of the coin, every living and working Chinese scholar needs more time to digest the existing theories and to comprehend the ever-changing reality; after all, patient readers will benefit from the framework of Yu's narratives.
