Banking on Beijing is the outcome of almost a decade's painstaking work by its authors since the AidData project was launched in April 2013 in Washington. While initially based on mass media data, the authors have improved the methodology by conducting triangular checks on project level data in great detail, teasing out unreliable data or double counting, to create a comprehensive, decent quality project level database (especially its version 2.0) covering 13,427 Chinese ODA- and OOF-financed projects in 165 countries between 2000–2017. Each project has at least ten informative features or variables, including its starting and completing dates, types, level of concessionality, sources of finance and amount of finance. The work led by the authors has greatly promoted transparency, accountability and governance, and has enabled better coordination and knowledge dissemination across governments, international organizations, think tanks and researchers. This open data work is indispensable.

The book presents a balanced picture of China's overseas development cooperation activities, concluding that China is “neither hero nor villain.” In chapter seven, the authors point out “there are several reasons why Chinese development projects might be equally effective as – or even more effective than – development projects from OECD-DAC aid agencies and multilateral development banks” (p. 197) and that the empirical evidence “shows that irrespective of political bias, Chinese development projects improve socioeconomic outcomes at both national and subnational scales” (p. 228). The authors also note that “socioeconomic impacts of Chinese development projects are comparable with, if not superior to those generated by the World Bank. However, Chinese development projects may also have negative externalities, such as corruption, political instability, and environmental degradation” (p. 228). This work, among several other empirical studies, debunks the claims among Western countries and media that China practises so-called “rogue” activities and “debt trap diplomacy.”

Having said that, the book leaves much to be desired, especially from the point of view of the Global South. First, despite the availability of rich data, the book does not address the desires for structural transformation, diversification and releasing infrastructural bottlenecks in the Global South. Why is it that after 70 years of development aid and investment, millions of people in low-income countries still do not have access to electricity and clean water, roads and telecoms? Why do most host countries welcome China's development projects, especially in the infrastructure sectors? Both the “push” and “pull” factors should be analysed. One of the pull factors is that demands from the Global South have not been met by existing international finance institutions due to the dominance of neoliberal economic policies which for example promoted capital account liberalization and left countries vulnerable to capital flight and financial crises. And that is why countries have turned to China. With South–South development cooperation, China can, and has, effectively addressed demands for structural transformation.

According to my recent analysis with Justin Yifu Lin using AidData's database, 80 per cent of China's development finance has focused on infrastructure and export-enabling sectors such as energy, transport and storage, and banking and financial services. Of completed projects, 78 per cent have addressed bottlenecks in hard infrastructure such as electricity, water, transport and telecoms, while 74 per cent have addressed soft infrastructure bottlenecks in education, health, environment and governance (“Economic Transformation in Africa and How Best China can Support” in China and Africa in the 21st Century, edited by Albert Zeufack and Shuilin Wang, forthcoming). Completed projects form public sector assets, generating jobs, income and government revenues, and providing a safety net in times of crisis. China's role in financing and constructing global public goods should not be neglected, however, China can and should do better in terms of transparency, accountability and upholding international labour and environmental standards.

Second, the book has, in some cases, made comparisons between South–South cooperation and North–South aid without controlling per capita income levels of source countries. North–South aid, “has been based on the obligation of developed countries to assist developing countries because the former has much more resources and have also benefited from their former colonies” (Martin Khor, “China's New South–South Funds – a Global Game Changer?” IPS Inter Press Service New Agency, 16 November 2015). China does not act out of this “guilt,” rather, when China started its development cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s, the average per capita income was as low as one-third of the African average. Even now, China's per capita income (at a little over $10,000) is one-fifth that of the United States.

The nature of China's development finance should be considered South–South development cooperation, which is defined as the exchange of resources, technology, knowledge and expertise between developing countries. It is based on the principles of solidarity, mutual respect, mutual benefit and non-interference in domestic affairs. The book seems to have attempted a narrative of using North–South aid to frame China's overseas activities, which is a mischaracterization of China's South–South development cooperation.

South–South cooperation combines trade, aid and investment and can be more effective than North–South aid. In fact, even ignoring investment activities, China's trade alone with the Global South is mutually beneficial, as China is at a different development stage than Global North countries and its comparative advantages are complementary to those of other Global South countries. China is now the largest trade partner for over 120 countries; trade alone has mutually beneficial effects on global development. Adding trade, aid and investment activities together, China's engagement with the Global South is for sure a win-win – good for world peace and prosperity.

Third, the book's postscript shows that chapters one to nine were based on the AidData version 1.0, which has lower quality than version 2.0. I am not able to discuss technical issues here due to the space limit. So, I would advise readers to take the regression results (without controlling for per capita income) with a grain of salt.