Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-d8cs5 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-10T21:37:34.991Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Anti-corruption Efforts, Corruption Perception and Public Evaluation of Local Governments in China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Zhou Zhou ,
Yangxuan Zhou ,
Meng Yuan  and
Anni Tang
Zhou Zhou
Affiliation:
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China
Yangxuan Zhou
Affiliation:
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China
Meng Yuan*
Affiliation:
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China
Anni Tang
Affiliation:
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China
*
Corresponding author: Meng Yuan; Email: xgbb0203@126.com
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

China has taken significant steps to combat corruption since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, whether and how the anti-corruption efforts influence the public's evaluation of local government performance remain understudied. Using multiple data sources, including panel survey data taken from the China Family Panel Studies from 2010 to 2018, this research examines how anti-corruption efforts improve evaluations of local government performance by reducing public perception of existing corruption. Additional analysis reveals that anti-corruption efforts reduce perceived corruption primarily when the public trusts officials or has had positive experiences with them. The positive impact on local government evaluations has been more pronounced in provinces with high levels of pre-existing corruption and since the 18th CCP National Congress in 2012. Moreover, the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts has remained consistent across all time periods since 2012.

摘要

摘要

自中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会以来，中国在反腐败方面做出了显著努力。然而，反腐败努力是否以及如何影响地方政府绩效评价仍未得到充分研究。通过利用 2010 年至 2018 年中国家庭追踪调查（CFPS）在内的多种数据来源，本研究考察了反腐败工作如何通过减少公众所感知的现存腐败程度来提升公众对地方政府绩效的评价。本研究的进一步分析表明，当公众信任官员或与他们有积极互动时，反腐败努力减少了公众感知的现存腐败程度。在腐败程度较高的省份以及 2012 年中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会之后，反腐败努力对地方政府评价的正面影响更为显著。此外，反腐败努力的有效性在 2012 年以后的所有时间段内保持一致。

Keywords

anti-corruption effortspublic evaluationpublic perception of corruptionpolicy feedback effectpublic opinion反腐败努力公众评价公众腐败感知政策反馈效应公共舆论
Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , First View , pp. 1 - 20
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London

Corruption threatens the sustainability of political and administrative institutions as well as the enforcement of the rule of law. Previous research has consistently demonstrated that corruption can diminish public support for and trust in the ruling party and government,Footnote 1 and reduce electoral support for individual politicians, particularly in developing countries.Footnote 2 It also jeopardizes the political legitimacy of a regime.Footnote 3 Cognizant of the undesirable consequences of corruption and the global trend for anti-corruption initiatives, the Chinese government has substantively intensified its efforts in investigating official corruption since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on 8 November 2012.Footnote 4 According to one corruption control index, the World Bank's Global Governance Indicators project, China's score has improved, from -0.44 in 2012 to 0.05 in 2021, indicating that the country's anti-corruption efforts have made progress.Footnote 5 From 2012 to June 2021, 3.85 million corruption cases were opened, 4.089 million people were investigated or dealt with, and 3.742 million people were subject to Party disciplinary and governmental sanctions.Footnote 6

How do anti-corruption efforts influence public attitudes towards corruption and the government? Existing research focusing on political trust or public support for central government suggests that anti-corruption policies and efforts can yield both positive and negative feedback effects within the political system.Footnote 7 Anti-corruption efforts have been found to increase political trust in state government in the USFootnote 8 and trust in central government in China,Footnote 9 reduce public perceptions of corruption,Footnote 10 and strengthen public support for political leadership at the central government level.Footnote 11 Yuhua Wang and Bruce Dickson, however, find that anti-corruption campaigns have reduced public support for the central government and the CCP by altering the public's beliefs about public officials.Footnote 12 Jiangnan Zhu, Huang Huang and Dong Zhang find that anti-corruption efforts in the field of real estate increases public trust in central government but not in provincial governments.Footnote 13 Moreover, the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies can be undermined or interfered with by trust deficits.Footnote 14 Anti-corruption efforts and policies may also have other unforeseen consequences, such as marginalizing the role of legal institutions.Footnote 15

Mixed research findings can be attributed to the interpretive effects of anti-corruption efforts and policies. Policy scholars using policy feedback theory have proposed that public policies can influence political attitudes through two mechanisms: resource effects and interpretive effects. Resource effects occur when policy provides material and incentive benefits, while interpretive effects occur when the policy implementation shapes individuals’ normative views and their cognitive perceptions of policies, themselves and others.Footnote 16 Interpretive effects may also occur through informational framing and communication.Footnote 17 Information disclosure may enhance the public's evaluation of the government, but it can also expose flawed policies to the general public and generate criticism,Footnote 18 especially through informal information sources.Footnote 19 Previous research on anti-corruption efforts has also suggested that the subjective perceptions of both corruption and anti-corruption measures can influence public attitudes.Footnote 20 In summary, while intensified government anti-corruption efforts may increase the political salience of the fight against corruption, individuals may perceive the same “fact” of anti-corruption efforts in different ways, leading to varied public attitudes towards the government.

This research aims to make the following contributions on four aspects. First, public opinion and policy researchers have long debated whether political attitudes are built on policy outcomes and performanceFootnote 21 or unthinking emotional response.Footnote 22 Previous research, whether using survey experimentsFootnote 23 or short-term panel surveys,Footnote 24 suggests that anti-corruption policies may trigger negative emotional responses and thereby jeopardize support for the regime and trust in central government. However, long-standing existing policies can affect macropolitical attention,Footnote 25 which can generate issue publics who are more knowledgeable about public issues and policies and more likely to rationalize their evaluations based on policy performance. By examining the relatively long-term effect of objectively measured anti-corruption efforts, spanning from 2010 to 2018, we can contribute to this debate by answering whether long-term and ongoing anti-corruption efforts might produce different effects on the public's evaluation of local government by influencing the public's opinion of policy outputs, i.e. the perceived level of existing corruption in our case. Moreover, by focusing on the public's evaluation of local government, we address a gap in the research, as most studies concentrate on central-level political trust.Footnote 26 Local-level evaluations may show different patterns and have distinct causes compared to attitudes towards the central government. Yet changes in the public's evaluation of local government can impact broader political trust and regime support.Footnote 27

Second, our research is among the first to apply policy feedback theory to hypothesize why anti-corruption efforts can generate positive resource effects and subsequently transform these effects into interpretive outcomes by influencing perceptions of policy performance and outputs. While we consider that the interpretive effects of anti-corruption efforts can occur through the communication of anti-corruption information,Footnote 28 our research extends beyond merely examining the effect of information on public attitudes.

Third, we expand the policy areas examined in previous policy feedback research to include anti-corruption policies. Existing research on policy feedback effects mainly focuses on social policiesFootnote 29 or regulatory policies that are highly tangible and visible for both target groups and the general public.Footnote 30 However, anti-corruption policies may have both resource and interpretive effects on the general public as a whole, rather than targeting a specific beneficial group. More importantly, while existing policy feedback research has conceptualized interpretive effects in terms of political efficacy, trust, policy support and understanding of target groups,Footnote 31 our focus on the mediating role of public perception of existing corruption offers an alternative pathway for understanding the interpretive effects of anti-corruption efforts – namely, through perceived policy performance and outputs.

Finally, our additional analysis examines how anti-corruption efforts affect the public's perception of and evaluation of local government across different time periods and groups with varying levels of trust and perceptions of pre-existing corruption. This analysis not only strengthens and complements our basic models but also contributes to the growing body of scholarship on conditional policy feedback models by providing new insights into the moderating roles of time and pre-existing perceptions at both aggregate and individual levels.Footnote 32

Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses

Public perception of corruption

The public's perception of corruption derives from individuals’ subjective evaluation of the level and degree of existing corruption, based on the corrupt behaviour of governments.Footnote 33 It is shaped by the process of coming into contact with, acquiring, accepting and learning from corruption-related information.Footnote 34 It is also influenced by personal experience of corruption,Footnote 35 the state of economic and social development,Footnote 36 and demographic factors.Footnote 37 When the general public is aware that corruption is widespread in a country, public perception of existing corruption tends to be high. Consequently, the general public may hold a belief that the government and the whole political system are unreliableFootnote 38 and incompetent,Footnote 39 and thus will be reluctant to participate in public issues.Footnote 40

Some studies focus on the effects of the perception of corruption and find that an increased perception of corruption can negatively impact political trust by lowering the public's evaluation of government performance, although such effects may vary according to the level of government.Footnote 41 A heightened perception of existing corruption can also negatively influence public attitudes regarding anti-corruption effortsFootnote 42 and regime support.Footnote 43 Building on this research, this paper focuses on whether anti-corruption efforts, by influencing the public perception of corruption, can affect the public's evaluation of local government performance.

Anti-corruption policies, public perception of corruption and public evaluation of local government performance

Public policy can be influenced by the political system and, in turn, can influence politics. Since Elmer Eric Schattschneider first proposed that existing policies can shape politics and policymaking, much literature has found that existing policies can affect public attitudes and behaviour through two mechanisms: resource effect, in which policies stimulate public support for specific policies by increasing the resources and material benefits for the beneficiaries, and interpretive effect (or cognitive effect), whereby policies can influence political attitudes and behaviour by influencing the cognitive process of social actors and shaping the public's views of society and government.Footnote 44

Anti-corruption policies, as regulatory policies, can also influence public opinion through the two pathways mentioned above. First, anti-corruption actions can affect the public's interests and capacities and thus create a positive resource effect. On a macro or societal level, anti-corruption measures can safeguard public interests by addressing the inequitable distribution of social resources and promoting the effective and efficient allocation of resources,Footnote 45 which may help to establish a positive policy image, lower the public perception of existing corruption levels and improve the public's evaluation of government. On a micro level, personal experiences with corruption can lower the public perception of existing corruption and enhance the public's evaluation of government performance.Footnote 46 Anti-corruption efforts can also strengthen the self-discipline of, and institutional restraints on, government officials,Footnote 47 thereby reducing people's chances of encountering government corruption and thus fostering a more positive perception and evaluation of government.

Second, positive resource effects can shape public opinion by influencing cognitions of governments, policies and individuals,Footnote 48 leading to positive interpretive effects when policies enhance the perceived value and significance of individuals’ own citizenship.Footnote 49 Therefore, the resource effects of anti-corruption efforts can shift the meaning of citizenship by signalling that the government prioritizes the public's interests over those of public officials. Relatedly, signalling theory suggests that government disclosures can turn invisible capabilities into observable signals for the public.Footnote 50 By disclosing more anti-corruption cases, the government communicates its intentionFootnote 51 to address corruption and provides information about the quality of its efforts,Footnote 52 leading to a more positive perception of policy outputs – namely, a perceived lower level of existing corruption.

Moreover, interpretive effects can also arise from informational communication, whether through news media or interpersonal interactions.Footnote 53 Typically, the public has limited access to information about government officials’ corruption levels. Disclosures of anti-corruption cases, often via social media, can make this information more visible.Footnote 54 However, divergent informational sources, types of information and framing of anti-corruption efforts can have mixed effects on public attitudes towards existing corruption and political trustFootnote 55 and change public expectations in unforeseen ways.Footnote 56 Economic growth in China has increased public awareness of rightsFootnote 57 and critical thinking.Footnote 58 This rise in critical citizenship may reduce trust in local governments,Footnote 59 potentially leading to negative feedback from anti-corruption disclosures.

However, we expect a positive impact from anti-corruption information disclosure in China for three reasons. First, negative feedback effects in mass politics often arise when citizens are more sensitive to policy losses than to gains,Footnote 60 or when policies are framed as loss-imposing by opponents.Footnote 61 However, in China, the combination of the one-party system, elite cohesion and political control over news limits the diversity of political information and restricts public access to such frames.Footnote 62 When the Chinese government releases anti-corruption information, it uses selective disclosure and standard language to minimize negative effects.Footnote 63 While journalists are permitted to report on corruption cases, they must avoid commenting on politically sensitive and legal cases.Footnote 64

Second, another factor that may influence the general public's interpretation of anti-corruption information is the informational source. Jiangnan Zhu, Jie Lu and Tianjian Shi find that formal media can reduce perceptions of corruption, whereas grapevine information can increase them.Footnote 65 However, we argue that the effect of grapevine information can be limited in China owing to the restricted access to unofficial media sources. People seek divergent informational sources only when they feel free to do so.Footnote 66 Chinese citizens face barriers and both economic and political costs to accessing alternative information, which reduces their motivation – in comparison to citizens in democracies – to seek divergent views.Footnote 67 Furthermore, the Chinese public tends to rely on official media to understand the government's stance on political events.Footnote 68

Third, members of the public are more likely to evaluate policy performance and output when they have sufficient information to link their interests to political outcomes,Footnote 69 rather than relying on unthinking emotional responses.Footnote 70 Our research observes a relatively long-term effect of anti-corruption efforts spanning from 2010 to 2018. While a negative emotional response to rampant corruption cases may initially prevail, continuous efforts and disclosure of related information may enhance political awareness and stimulate conscious deliberation. This process can create a more informed and attentive public that links political values and empowerment with anti-corruption efforts, leading to lower perceived corruption and higher evaluations of local governments.

In summary, we propose the following hypothesis:

Anti-corruption efforts will increase the public's positive evaluation of local government performance by decreasing perception of existing corruption.

Research Design

Data sources

We used multiple data sources including the China Statistical Yearbook (CSY), Chinese Procuratorial Yearbook (CPY) and China Family Panel Studies (CFPS). The CFPS is a biennial, nationally representative survey of Chinese communities, families and individuals, initiated in 2010 by Peking University and the University of Michigan. It covers 25 provincial-level administrative units,Footnote 71 representing about 95 per cent of China's population. The CFPS provides detailed geographical data that allow precise matching of individuals’ evaluations of local government and perceived corruption with provincial-level anti-corruption datasets. Additionally, this repeated cross-sectional design offers researchers many benefits, such as maintaining a stable sample sizeFootnote 72 and examining dynamic effects, while avoiding attrition and response bias issues. Longitudinal data also enable us to mitigate endogeneity issues through methods like identifying a quasi-experiment and employing strategies such as lagged dependent variables, split-sample analysis pre- and post-treatment, and difference-in-differences (DID) analysis.

In our study, the dependent variables and key explanatory variables were obtained from the CFPS, 2010–2018. The CFPS contains three categories of questionnaires: village (residence), household and individual questionnaires. We obtained the per capita household income from the household questionnaire, while individual-level variables, such as public evaluation of local government, perception of corruption and demographic factors, come from the individual-level questionnaire. Chinese translations of the selected CFPS survey items appear in Appendix Table A1.

Macro-level variables were obtained from the CSY and CPY in corresponding years from 2010 to 2018. In 1995, China established the General Bureau of Anti-Graft and Bribery, which became the main anti-corruption agency. In 2018, this bureau was merged with the newly created National Supervisory Commission, and since then, prefecture-level procuratorates have stopped releasing corruption data. Given that the earliest available CFPS data are from 2010, we matched data on provincial-level corruption and bribery cases with the CFPS data in 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 in corresponding provinces. To ensure the consistency of the sample, the observations that have missing values in any of the five national surveys were excluded. As a result, our dataset consists of 15,844 valid observations.

Variables

Measurements

More details of our measurements can be found in Appendix Table A2.

  1. (1) Local government evaluation

We measured the public's evaluation of local government using a CFPS survey question asking respondents to rate the municipal or county government's work (from 1=worse than before to 5=a considerable number of good results).

  1. (2) Anti-corruption actions

Two main approaches to measuring anti-corruption actions have been used in previous research: (1) subjective perception of anti-corruption efforts, as measured according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index; the World Bank's Corruption Control Index; the Bribe Payer Index; and the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. However, these subjective measures can be skewed by experts’ cultural backgrounds and ideologies.Footnote 73 Therefore, other studies have adopted (2) objective measurements, which include data on corruption cases, researcher-constructed case databases and case-tracking survey data.

This research chose an objective measurement of anti-corruption efforts for three reasons. First, following previous research,Footnote 74 this straightforward measure is intuitive and makes a clear impression without imposing much cognitive load.Footnote 75 Second, the Chinese government cites the number of anti-corruption cases to highlight its success and gain political support, making this data a key indicator.Footnote 76 Owing to the high degree of control China exerts over media releases regarding anti-corruption information, Chinese citizens are less active in selectively seeking information from diverse media sources,Footnote 77 making government-released data the most accessible information to the public. Third, as Siqin Kang and Jiangnan Zhu note, many of the officials arrested are implicated by their past behaviour. Therefore, the number of investigations and arrests may better reflect anti-corruption efforts rather than the level of corruption.Footnote 78

We calculated the ratio between the number of government officials prosecuted by the procuratorate and the total number of government officials in each province. The number of government officials prosecuted was obtained from the CPY.Footnote 79 The number of government officials in each province was the number of personnel in national institutions, which was obtained from the CSY. Notably, the ratio of government officials prosecuted to the total number of government officials was extremely small (typically <0.005). Following the approach taken by Sheng Xin, Songlin Guo and Xiaochen Chang, we multiplied this ratio by 100 to make the interpretation of the impact of anti-corruption efforts on public evaluation more straightforward and clear.Footnote 80

  1. (3) Perception of corruption level

The question, “How severe do you think the problem of government corruption is in our country?” (from 0–10), was selected to measure the public's perception of government corruption.

  1. (4) Control variables

Taking into account that the public's evaluation of local government performance may be affected by various variables, we controlled for age, gender, education level, marriage status, employment, type of residence, religious belief, CCP membership, internet use and household income.Footnote 81 We also controlled for provincial-level gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.

Descriptive statistics

Figures 1–3 present the spatiotemporal evolution of anti-corruption efforts, local government evaluation and the perception of corruption levels in each province over the years. Figure 1 shows that provinces such as Chongqing, Fujian, Anhui, Guangxi, Heilongjiang and Liaoning maintained higher levels of anti-corruption efforts over time, while Hunan, Gansu, Zhejiang and Beijing exerted lower levels. Figure 2 reveals that among the provinces with higher levels of anti-corruption efforts, Chongqing consistently received higher scores in local government evaluations, whereas Beijing scored lower in provinces with lower levels of anti-corruption efforts. Notably, Zhejiang stands out, with local government evaluations above 50 per cent, while local government evaluations in other provinces vary across the years. Figure 3 shows that in provinces with high levels of anti-corruption efforts, public perceptions of corruption in Chongqing and Guangxi remained below 50 per cent, while Heilongjiang and Liaoning had perceptions above 50 per cent. Among the provinces with lower anti-corruption efforts, the perceived corruption level in Beijing is always above 50 per cent, while the public perceptions of corruption in other provinces vary across the years. The descriptive statistics, temporal trends of the three key variables and their detailed discussions appear in the online Appendix, Section I 1–3 and 1–4.

Figure 1. Spatiotemporal Evolution of Anti-corruption Efforts across Chinese Provinces, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018.

Figure 2. Spatiotemporal Evolution of Local Government Evaluation across Chinese Provinces, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018.

Figure 3. Spatiotemporal Evolution of Perception of Corruption in Chinese Provinces, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018.

Model specification

Panel regressions were used to test the relationship between anti-corruption efforts, public perceptions of corruption and local government evaluations. Two-year lagged explanatory variables were used to address the endogeneity problem, gain better control over the persistence of anti-corruption efforts and capture the long-term feedback effects of anti-corruption policies over time.Footnote 82 More details are provided in the online Appendix, Section I 1–5.

This research conducted multiple robustness tests to check whether the relationship between anti-corruption efforts and local government evaluations withstands further analyses. Additional analyses examined whether the effects of anti-corruption efforts vary across different groups and time periods.

Results

Panel regression analysis

This study first used a stepwise ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression to analyse the impacts of anti-corruption efforts on evaluations of local government. As shown in column (1) in Table 1, anti-corruption efforts can increase the public's evaluation of local government at the 1 per cent significance level. After incorporating control variables in column (2) in Table 1, the results are in line with our hypothesis, when all other variables are held constant: the public's evaluation of local government increased by 1.038 units for each 1 per cent increase in anti-corruption efforts.

Table 1. Regression of Public Evaluation of Local Government Performance on Anti-corruption Efforts

Notes: Standard error in parentheses; *p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01. The sample size for column (2) was reduced to 51,038 because of missing values for control variables.

The empirical results also show that, when other variables are held constant, the public evaluation of local government performance increased by 0.478 units for each percentage point increase in GDP per capita. Additionally, individuals who were married and used the internet rated local government performance 0.061 and 0.055 units lower compared to others, respectively.

Robustness checks

We used several methods – controlling for omitted variables, using alternative measurements and models, and applying DID strategies – to validate the results in Table 1. The results are consistent with our main findings. More details are given in the online Appendix, Section II.

Mediating effect of public perceptions of corruption

Figure 4 shows how anti-corruption efforts impact public evaluations of local government performance by influencing the perception of existing corruption (see full results in the online Appendix, Table A5). When all other variables are held constant, evaluations of local government decreased by 0.031 for each 1 per cent increase in the perceived level of existing corruption. The evaluation of the local government increased by 1.002 and the perception of existing corruption decreased by 3.777 units for each 1 per cent increase of anti-corruption efforts.

Figure 4. Mediating Effect of Perception of Corruption Level

Notes: Because there is no corruption perception data in the CFPS database for 2010, we excluded all samples in 2010 from the re-regression analysis. The conclusion remained largely unchanged. See Appendix Section IV for further details.

The indirect effects of anti-corruption efforts on the evaluation of local government through public perceptions of corruption are small (0.117 = 3.777×0.031). However, theoretically, our finding highlights how policies can shape public attitudes through perceptions of policy performance. Empirically, the Sobel test reveals a Z statistic of 4.287 (p<0.001) and shows that the mediating effect of public perception accounts for 26.43 per cent of the total effect.Footnote 83 This further validates our hypotheses and indicates a significant reduction in the impact of anti-corruption efforts on evaluations of local government when perceptions of corruption are factored in.

We further include two sets of factors that may influence perceptions of existing corruption as control variables: media environment factors – the internet penetration rate, optical cable construction level and proportion of internet users – as well as existing citizen grievances, measured by two-year lagged local government evaluations.Footnote 84 We did not see any substantive changes in the relationship between anti-corruption efforts and public perception of corruption (see Appendix Table A6).

Additional analyses

In recent years, policy and public opinion scholars have begun to build conditional policy feedback models considering the personal, institutional and contextual factors that can moderate the relationships between policies and political attitudes.Footnote 85 Therefore, we test whether the effects of anti-corruption actions on public perception and evaluations vary across multiple groups and time periods.

Subsamples with high versus low trust

Trust not only has a direct effect on political attitudesFootnote 86 but also interacts with these attitudes in evaluating the effectiveness of public policies and government.Footnote 87 This section examines the moderating effect of trust on the relationship between anti-corruption efforts and public perceptions of corruption.

Trust can be categorized into interpersonal trust and political trust, with ongoing debates about their relationship. Some argue that interpersonal trust fosters political trust,Footnote 88 while others believe it does not directly translate.Footnote 89 Political trust can be operationalized as trust in the political system, political parties and public officials.Footnote 90 In China, the term “cadres” refers to those who are working for the state in the CCP, public organizations and the military, so “trust in cadre” measures trust in public officials.

We categorized survey respondents into two different subsamples, based on their levels of interpersonal trust (Itrust) and political trust (Ptrust), respectively.Footnote 91 We adopted two measures for both Itrust and Ptrust. The first measure of Itrust came from a CFPS survey question asking if respondents believe that most people can be trusted (Itrust=1) or if they feel the need to be cautious (Itrust=0). The first measure of Ptrust was based on the “trust in cadre” question (0=distrust to 10=highly trust), which was then categorized into low (0–5) and high (6–10) political trust.Footnote 92 For the second measurement, we used principal component analysis (PCA) to create an interpersonal trust index from two questions: “trust in neighbour” and “trust in stranger” (0=highly distrust to 10=highly trust), and a political trust index from four questions about personal experiences with public officials (for example, conflicts, unfair treatment, unreasonable delay, charges). Respondents were divided into two groups based on whether their trust index was above or below the mean.

The results presented in the online Appendix, Table A11, show the impact of anti-corruption efforts on public perceptions of corruption across different levels of trust. Regardless of the level of interpersonal trust, anti-corruption efforts significantly reduced public perceptions of corruption. Moreover, when individuals have lower trust in cadres, anti-corruption efforts do not significantly influence the perception of corruption, but when trust is higher, the negative effects of anti-corruption efforts on the perceived level of corruption persist.

Subsamples with high and low pre-existing provincial- and individual-level perceptions of corruption

Since perceptions of existing corruption vary across provinces, reflecting regional differences in political and social conditions, we conducted a split sample analysis to examine how anti-corruption efforts influence evaluations of local government depending on pre-existing provincial and individual perceptions of corruption, respectively. We divided our respondents into two groups based on two criteria: one group was selected according to whether the 2012 level of perceived corruption in the respondents’ province was above or below the mean, and the other group was selected based on individual-level perceived corruption in 2012. The year 2012 was chosen because it is a key turning point in China's anti-corruption policies and the earliest year available for measuring corruption perceptions.Footnote 93

We found that individual-level perceptions did not significantly change the impact of anti-corruption efforts. However, in regions with higher average perceptions of corruption, anti-corruption efforts more effectively improved the evaluations of local government compared to regions with lower average perceptions of corruption (see Appendix V 5-2).

Dynamic effects of anti-corruption efforts

We are curious about whether time plays a role here (see online Appendix, Section V 5-3). Because 2012 was a pivotal year in China's anti-corruption efforts, marked by the 18th National Congress and the beginning of Xi Jinping's 习近平 leadership,Footnote 94 we split our samples into two time periods – years before and after 2012 – to conduct split sample analyses (see online Appendix, Table A14). After 2012, by examining different time periods – 2012 to 2014, 2012 to 2018, and extending to 2020Footnote 95 – we found that anti-corruption efforts can increase the public's evaluation of local government and lower the perceived level of existing corruption.

However, the effect size was greater in all periods after 2012 compared to before 2012, when the positive effect was not statistically significant. Therefore, while this result reinforces that continuing and long-term anti-corruption efforts can bring positive outcomes, the 18th National Congress in 2012 played a crucial role in amplifying such positive effects.

Discussions and Conclusions

This study examines the effects of anti-corruption efforts on public evaluation of local government performance using a panel survey spanning the years from 2010 to 2018. Relying on policy feedback research, we introduced the public perception of existing corruption as a mediator and find that anti-corruption efforts positively influence evaluations of local government performance by reducing the perceived corruption level. However, the impact of anti-corruption efforts on the public perception of corruption varies with the level of political trust, the provincial-level pre-existing public perceptions of corruption and the point in time, i.e. before or after 2012, underscoring the complexities of maintaining political legitimacy through anti-corruption policies under different conditions.Footnote 96

Long-standing anti-corruption efforts can lower the public perception of existing corruption and improve local government evaluation

Our results showing the positive impact of anti-corruption efforts on local government evaluations seem to be inconsistent with previous findings that anti-corruption campaigns have a negative impact on regime support.Footnote 97 We suggest these differences could result from the length of the data collection period, different focuses of independent variables – corruption information versus anti-corruption effort – and the different levels of government – local versus central governments.

First, our research goes beyond previous research that solely focuses on anti-corruption information and associated short-term effects on public perceptions.Footnote 98 In survey experiments focusing on information, the impact of information on public attitudes often diminishes over time,Footnote 99 and the external validity of survey experiments typically faces many challenges such as the difference between experimental samples and the target population, variations in experimental and target treatments, and limited generalizability across contexts.Footnote 100 Our study addresses these challenges by combining objective measurements of anti-corruption efforts with national panel surveys and by controlling for anti-corruption information-related variables. More importantly, by examining a relatively long-term effect of objectively measured anti-corruption efforts from 2010 to 2018, our research implies that long-standing existing anti-corruption policies may increase political awareness and public knowledge.Footnote 101 For example, while Wang and Dickson analysed two surveys that were conducted before and during the anti-corruption campaign, our research covers the three years before and six years after the campaign.Footnote 102 Our results suggest that while short-term attitudes may be driven by impulsive emotional reactions, ongoing efforts may provide Chinese citizens with sufficient information about anti-corruption policies to rationalize their evaluations based on perceived policy performance and outputs, leading to a higher evaluation of government.

Second, while different types of anti-corruption media information and sources can generate different public reactions, policy feedback is much more than the reception and interpretation of information. Given the strict censorship and media control in China, the public is unlikely to be exposed to conflicting information about corruption that could trigger an “awakening of knowledge” and lead to the questioning of government officials’ integrity and a subsequent decline in government evaluations.Footnote 103

More importantly, this research introduces public perception of existing corruption as a mediator to test how the positive resource effects of anti-corruption efforts transform into a positive interpretation. After controlling for media environment, our results indicate that positive-interpretation feedback persists. Our findings suggest that the public does respond to policy performance and outcomes.Footnote 104 The number of corruption cases may serve as an indicator for the public of both the quality of anti-corruption efforts and the intention of resolute action.Footnote 105

Third, another possibility for our differing findings is that, in China, individuals may either attribute the achievements of anti-corruption efforts more to local government rather than to the central government or, conversely, place blame for corruption on the central government rather than local governments. The 18th National Congress intensified the anti-corruption campaign by targeting it at both high-level officials (“tigers”) and lower-ranking officials (“flies”). The focus on high-level officials may have diverted public attention away from corruption among grassroots officials. Wang and Dickson also found that the negative effect of anti-corruption campaigns on support for local parties and governments is less significant when compared to the negative effect it has on support for central government. Although the unique pattern of the hierarchical trust model where people trust central government more than they trust local government still dominates in China, there are cases where local governments might gain trust, especially if the local government quietly protects people from an ill-conceived central policy.Footnote 106

However, our research focuses on evaluations of local government performance and does not directly address the effects of anti-corruption efforts on public support for the central government. Previous studies have suggested that trust in the central government reflects public confidence in the centre's commitment, while trust in local governments reflects confidence in the centre's capacity to implement policies.Footnote 107 Therefore, it remains unclear whether our findings can also imply a positive long-term effect of anti-corruption efforts on public attitudes towards the central government, or if they reveal contrasting effects on attitudes towards the central versus local governments.

The effect of anti-corruption efforts on the public's perception of corruption and evaluations of local government varies according to political trust and provincial-level perceptions of corruption, not by time periods after 2012

First, our additional analyses imply a conditional feedback effect of anti-corruption efforts on public perceptions of corruption and public evaluations, contingent upon individuals’ subjective trust in public officials and their direct experiences with public officials. When people trust public officials and have positive experiences with them, they tend to view anti-corruption efforts more favourably as the number of filed and investigated corruption cases increases. Otherwise, the positive policy imagery may be tarnished. The result may also explain why, despite strong anti-corruption efforts, Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning provinces in north-east China experienced high levels of perceived corruption and lower local government evaluations. In addition to the lower economic development status, the persistent inefficiency of local governments in north-east China and their failure to transition to a service-oriented model may have resulted in lower trust in local officials, compared to other provinces, as shown in our data. Another survey also suggests that provinces in north-east China are perceived as being less efficient than coastal provinces, with 68.7 per cent of respondents citing low-efficiency government, 32.0 per cent pointing to corruption, and 21.5 per cent highlighting restrictive government policies and weak market vitality.Footnote 108

Second, we find that in regions with higher average perceptions of corruption, anti-corruption efforts more effectively improve evaluations of local government. This finding does not contradict the well-established notion of confirmation bias that individuals tend to reinforce their existing beliefs.Footnote 109 Rather, there are significant differences between individuals’ prior perceptions of corruption and the provincial-level perceptions of corruption in their area. Provincial-level perceptions of corruption reflect broader cultural and political conditions, which can, in turn, influence policy awareness and political attitudes.Footnote 110 Moreover, previous policy feedback research suggests that policy interventions can be especially impactful for regions or groups that are more affected by a specific public issue.Footnote 111 As a result, higher perceived corruption in a province may make the issue of corruption more salient in these areas, leading residents to be more responsive to policy changes.

Third, we further extended our research to examine the impact of anti-corruption efforts on public perception of existing corruption and evaluations of local government over four, six and eight years (using biennial data) following the 18th National Congress in 2012.Footnote 112 All models indicate that anti-corruption efforts have positively influenced mass politics, with this effect becoming more pronounced after 2012. This reinforces our suggestion that continuing long-term anti-corruption efforts can bring positive outcomes to mass politics. However, probably owing to its highly centralized political system and policy process, the central government plays a crucial role in amplifying and enhancing the impact of anti-corruption efforts on improving the public's evaluations of government.

Practical implications

Our research has three practical implications. First, despite the ongoing debate regarding the impact of anti-corruption efforts on the public's evaluation of government,Footnote 113 we suggest that practitioners aiming to improve the public's opinion of government should be aware that continually strengthening anti-corruption efforts and creating a long-term institutionalized policy environment for combating corruption are crucial, especially in provinces where the pre-existing perception of corruption is high.

Second, our findings regarding the mediating role of the public perception of corruption on the relationship between anti-corruption efforts and public evaluation of local government suggests that the government should be aware that how to lower the general public's perceived corruption level is important for maintaining the positive effects of anti-corruption efforts on public evaluations. To achieve this, government should consider better mass communication measures and publish more information showcasing daily anti-corruption efforts to inform individuals about the goals and nature of government.Footnote 114 Continually improving and expanding procedures and channels for public participation in anti-corruption policies and efforts may effectively reduce the public perception of corruption and thereby improve the public's evaluation of the government. However, the small indirect effect suggests that the practitioners should also be aware that the interpretation of anti-corruption efforts can be influenced by other factors such as the diversity of information and individual differences.

Third, maintaining a high level of public trust in public officials is crucial for governments aiming to implement anti-corruption efforts without hurting the public evaluation of governmental performance. In particular, the public trust in and positive experiences with local-level administrators and public service providers can magnify the positive outcomes from anti-corruption efforts, resulting in decreased perception of corruption and improved evaluations of local government. Therefore, it is essential to nurture the public service motivations of local officials, particularly those who have greater opportunities for direct interaction with the public.

Limitations

Our research has three limitations. This first is the mismatch between using provincial-level anti-corruption efforts as the independent variable and trust in local government as the dependent variable. However, owing to the Restrictive Data Instruction from CFPS, we can only match respondents to their provincial anti-corruption data, as detailed information below the provincial level is unavailable.Footnote 115 Moreover, previous research indicates that patterns of political trust are similar across subnational levels of government, including provincial, city, county and township governments.Footnote 116

Second, the effects of anti-corruption measures on evaluations of local government can be complex.Footnote 117 This study reveals how anti-corruption efforts influence public perceptions and evaluations, but it does not examine how changes in public evaluations of local governments might, in turn, affect subsequent anti-corruption policies. Future research could expand our research to answer whether anti-corruption efforts in China exhibit self-reinforcing or self-undermining dynamics by influencing public attitudes.

Third, since corruption is often hidden, its true extent is not fully represented by exposed cases.Footnote 118 Moreover, China's centralized political system and the state's tight control of the media can result in incomplete and biased information.Footnote 119 Future research needs more scientific indicators of corruption, such as objective data from increasingly accessible judicial documents.

Funding

This work was supported by Chongqing University Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [Grant No. 2023CDSKXYGG006].

Competing interests

None.

Supplementary material

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https//doi.org/10.1017/S030574102400167X.

Zhou ZHOU is an associate professor in the School of Public Policy and Administration at Chongqing University. Zhou's research uses theories and models from economics, management and public policy to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption public policies.

Yangxuan ZHOU is a graduate student in the School of Public Policy and Administration at Chongqing University. Her research combines theories and models from economics and public policy to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption public policies.

Meng YUAN is an associate professor in the School of Public Policy and Administration at Chongqing University. Meng's research uses theories and models from political science, psychology and public policy to answer how the public reacts to policies, risks, and policy information. Her work has been published in Political Psychology, Review of Policy Research, Journal of Public Policy, among others.

Anni TANG is a graduate student in the School of Public Policy and Administration at Chongqing University. Her research looks to theories and models from management and public policy to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption public policies.

Footnotes

1 Kim Reference Kim2010.

2 Chong, Alberto, et al. Reference Chong, De La O, Karlan and Wantchekon2015.

3 Chang and Chu Reference Chang and Chu2006.

4 Fu Reference Fu2016.

5 The index is based on a combination of 32 public opinion polls and expert reports from around the world to assess corruption levels in 215 countries. It was constructed as one of six composite World Governance Indicators to capture corruption on a scale of -2.5 to +2.5, where the higher the index, the less the corruption.

6 “Qingzhu Zhongguo gongchandang chengli 100 zhounian huadong Xinwen zhongxin” (News centre to celebrate 100 years of the CCP). Renmin wang, 28 June 2021, http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/67481/435238/437822/437824/.

7 Adelopo and Rufai Reference Adelopo and Rufai2018.

8 Zhang, Yahong, and Kim Reference Zhang and Kim2018.

9 Zhang, Hongxia, et al. Reference Zhang, Song, Tan, Xia, Zhang and Jiang2019.

10 Zhu, Lu and Shi Reference Zhu, Lu and Shi2013.

11 Zhu, Huang and Zhang Reference Zhu, Huang and Zhang2019.

12 Wang, Yuhua, and Dickson Reference Wang and Dickson2022.

13 Zhu, Huang and Zhang Reference Zhu, Huang and Zhang2019.

14 Adelopo and Rufai Reference Adelopo and Rufai2018.

15 Zhu, Huang and Zhang Reference Zhu, Huang and Zhang2019.

16 Schattschneider Reference Schattschneider1935; Pierson Reference Pierson1993; Campbell Reference Campbell2012.

17 Pacheco Reference Pacheco2013; Vannoni Reference Vannoni2019.

18 Baekkeskov and Rubin Reference Baekkeskov and Rubin2016.

19 Zhu, Lu and Shi Reference Zhu, Lu and Shi2013.

20 Li, Hui, and Meng Reference Li and Meng2020.

21 Seyd Reference Seyd2015.

22 Sears et al. Reference Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen Harris1980; Marcus and MacKuen Reference Marcus and MacKuen1993.

23 Chong, Alberto, et al. Reference Chong, De La O, Karlan and Wantchekon2015; Sun, Zhu and Ni Reference Sun, Zhu and Ni2022.

24 Wang, Yuhua, and Dickson Reference Wang and Dickson2022; Chu, Xie and Zhang Reference Chu, Xie and Zhang2023.

25 Mortensen Reference Mortensen2009.

26 Zhu, Huang and Zhang Reference Zhu, Huang and Zhang2019; Wang, Yuhua, and Dickson Reference Wang and Dickson2022; Yue and Liu Reference Yue and Liu2023.

27 Li, Lianjiang Reference Li2004; Reference Li2012; Lü Reference Lü2014; Yue and Liu Reference Yue and Liu2023.

28 Stockmann Reference Stockmann2012; Zhu, Lu and Shi Reference Zhu, Lu and Shi2013; Sun, Zhu and Ni Reference Sun, Zhu and Ni2022.

29 Larsen Reference Larsen2019; Jacobs, Lawrence, Mettler and Zhu Reference Jacobs, Mettler and Zhu2021.

30 Pacheco Reference Pacheco2013; Vannoni Reference Vannoni2019.

31 Fleming Reference Fleming2014; Jacobs, Lawrence, Mettler and Zhu Reference Jacobs, Mettler and Zhu2021. See also the review by Campbell Reference Campbell2012, 338.

32 Michener Reference Michener2017; Ziller and Helbling Reference Ziller and Helbling2019; Yuan et al. Reference Yuan, Mayorga, Johnson and Swedlow2024; Gregory Reference Gregory2024.

33 Sharafutdinova Reference Sharafutdinova2010; Zhu, Lu and Shi Reference Zhu, Lu and Shi2013.

34 Goel, Nelson and Naretta Reference Goel, Nelson and Naretta2012.

35 Li, Hui, and Meng Reference Li and Meng2020; Gutmann, Padovano and Voigt Reference Gutmann, Padovano and Voigt2020.

36 Sharafutdinova Reference Sharafutdinova2010.

37 Gutmann, Padovano and Voigt Reference Gutmann, Padovano and Voigt2020.

38 Caillier Reference Caillier2010.

39 Tanzi Reference Tanzi1998.

40 Zheng et al. Reference Zheng, Liu, Huang and Tan2017.

41 Moldogaziev and Liu Reference Moldogaziev and Liu2020.

42 Li, Hui, and Meng Reference Li and Meng2020.

43 Chang and Chu Reference Chang and Chu2006; Zhu, Huang and Zhang Reference Zhu, Huang and Zhang2019.

44 Campbell Reference Campbell2012; Larsen Reference Larsen2019.

45 Li, Hui, Gong and Xiao Reference Li, Gong and Xiao2016.

46 Sharafutdinova Reference Sharafutdinova2010; Li, Hui, and Meng Reference Li and Meng2020.

47 Fredriksson, Mani and Damania Reference Fredriksson, Mani and Damania2003.

48 Campbell Reference Campbell2012.

49 Campbell Reference Campbell2002; Mettler Reference Mettler2005.

50 Spence Reference Spence1973.

51 Stiglitz Reference Stiglitz2000.

52 Footnote Ibid.; Connelly et al. Reference Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel2011.

53 Jacobs, Lawrence, Mettler and Zhu Reference Jacobs, Mettler and Zhu2021.

54 Lorentzen Reference Lorentzen2014.

55 Sun, Zhu and Ni Reference Sun, Zhu and Ni2022; Zhu, Lu and Shi Reference Zhu, Lu and Shi2013.

56 Finkel and Gehlbach Reference Finkel and Gehlbach2020.

57 Wang, Zhengxu, and You Reference Wang and You2015.

58 Villoria, van Ryzin and Lavena Reference Villoria, van Ryzin and Lavena2013.

59 Andrain and Smith Reference Andrain and Smith2006.

60 Pierson Reference Pierson1994.

61 Jacobs, Alan, and Weaver Reference Jacobs and Weaver2015.

62 Stockmann and Gallagher Reference Stockmann and Gallagher2011; Stockmann Reference Stockmann2012; Huang Reference Huang2015.

63 Sun, Zhu and Ni Reference Sun, Zhu and Ni2022.

64 De Burgh Reference De Burgh2003; Stockmann Reference Stockmann2012; Sun, Zhu and Ni Reference Sun, Zhu and Ni2022.

65 Zhu, Lu and Shi Reference Zhu, Lu and Shi2013.

66 Brehm and Cohen Reference Brehm and Cohen1962; Frey and Wicklund Reference Frey and Wicklund1978; Frey Reference Frey and Berkowitz1986.

67 Stockmann Reference Stockmann2012.

68 Stockmann Reference Stockmann2012; Pan, Jennifer, Shao and Xu Reference Pan, Shao and Xu2022.

69 Lau and Heldman Reference Lau and Heldman2009; Seyd Reference Seyd2015.

70 Sears et al. Reference Sears, Lau, Tyler and Allen Harris1980; Marcus and MacKuen Reference Marcus and MacKuen1993.

71 The 25 provincial-level administrative units include Henan, Shanghai, Hubei, Guangdong, Beijing, Jiangsu, Tianjin, Hebei, Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Hunan, Jilin, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Zhejiang and Chongqing.

72 Abadie Reference Abadie2005.

73 Fisman and Gatti Reference Fisman and Gatti2002; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi Reference Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi2004.

74 Fisman and Gatti Reference Fisman and Gatti2002; Zhu and Zhang Reference Zhu and Zhang2017; Zhang, Hongxia, et al. Reference Zhang, Song, Tan, Xia, Zhang and Jiang2019; Yang, Wang and Xu Reference Yang, Wang and Xu2021; Kang and Zhu Reference Kang and Zhu2021.

75 Wang, Yuhua, and Dickson Reference Wang and Dickson2022.

76 Wedeman Reference Wedeman2005.

77 Stockmann Reference Stockmann2012.

78 Kang and Zhu Reference Kang and Zhu2021.

79 The procuratorate is responsible for investigating and prosecuting corruption cases. Until 2018, the anti-graft and bribery bureaus under the procuratorates of each province were in charge of investigating and prosecuting corruption cases in their provinces in accordance with the principle of geographical jurisdiction.

80 Xin, Guo and Chang Reference Xin, Guo and Chang2022.

81 Li, Hui, Gong and Xiao Reference Li, Gong and Xiao2016; Lee Reference Lee2023.

82 Villoria, van Ryzin and Lavena Reference Villoria, van Ryzin and Lavena2013.

83 Sobel Reference Sobel1982.

84 Lee Reference Lee2023.

85 Michener Reference Michener2017; Ziller and Helbling Reference Ziller and Helbling2019; Yuan et al. Reference Yuan, Mayorga, Johnson and Swedlow2024; Lerman and McCabe Reference Lerman and McCabe2017.

86 Miller Reference Miller1974.

87 Adelopo and Rufai Reference Adelopo and Rufai2018.

88 Newton Reference Newton2001.

89 Kaase Reference Kaase1999; Yuan and Swedlow Reference Yuan and Swedlow2024.

90 Catterberg and Moreno Reference Catterberg and Moreno2006.

91 Villoria, van Ryzin and Lavena Reference Villoria, van Ryzin and Lavena2013.

92 Van der Meer and Hakhverdian Reference Van der Meer and Hakhverdian2016.

93 Zhang, Hongxia, et al. Reference Zhang, Song, Tan, Xia, Zhang and Jiang2019; Zhu, Huang and Zhang Reference Zhu, Huang and Zhang2019; Kang and Zhu Reference Kang and Zhu2021; Wang, Yuhua, and Dickson Reference Wang and Dickson2022.

94 See also Wang, Yuhua, and Dickson Reference Wang and Dickson2022, 36; Lee Reference Lee2020.

95 We collected additional data from the Supreme People's Court of China and Peking University websites to extend our research period to 2020. The results, presented in columns (5)–(6) of Appendix Table A14, demonstrate that extending the sample period confirms that anti-corruption efforts continue to render improved local government evaluations.

96 Zhu, Lu and Shi Reference Zhu, Lu and Shi2013; Zhu, Huang and Zhang Reference Zhu, Huang and Zhang2019; Zhang, Hongxia, et al. Reference Zhang, Song, Tan, Xia, Zhang and Jiang2019; Moldogaziev and Liu Reference Moldogaziev and Liu2020; Wang, Yuhua, and Dickson Reference Wang and Dickson2022.

97 Wang, Yuhua, and Dickson Reference Wang and Dickson2022.

98 Zhu, Lu and Shi Reference Zhu, Lu and Shi2013; Chong, Alberto, et al. Reference Chong, De La O, Karlan and Wantchekon2015; Sun, Zhu and Ni Reference Sun, Zhu and Ni2022; Chu, Xie and Zhang Reference Chu, Xie and Zhang2023.

99 Chong, Dennis, and Druckman Reference Chong, Druckman, Bucy and Holbert2010.

100 Egami and Hartman Reference Egami and Hartman2023.

101 See review by Campbell Reference Campbell2012, 340; Pan, Yating, Shu and Ye Reference Pan, Shu and Ye2023.

102 Wang, Yuhua, and Dickson Reference Wang and Dickson2022.

103 Zhu, Lu and Shi Reference Zhu, Lu and Shi2013.

104 Lau and Heldman Reference Lau and Heldman2009.

105 Stiglitz Reference Stiglitz2000.

106 Li, Lianjiang Reference Li2022.

107 Li, Lianjiang Reference Li2004; Reference Li2012.

108 The survey conducted by China Youth Daily Social Survey Center and Wenjuan.com in 2015.

109 Jenkins-Smith et al. Reference Jenkins-Smith, Silva, Gupta and Ripberger2014; Taber and Lodge Reference Taber and Lodge2016; Yuan and Swedlow Reference Yuan and Swedlow2024.

110 Melgar, Rossi and Smith, Reference Melgar, Rossi and Smith2010.

111 Michener Reference Michener2017; Ziller and Helbling Reference Ziller and Helbling2019; Yuan et al. Reference Yuan, Mayorga, Johnson and Swedlow2024.

112 Zhang, Hongxia, et al. Reference Zhang, Song, Tan, Xia, Zhang and Jiang2019; Zhu, Huang and Zhang Reference Zhu, Huang and Zhang2019; Kang and Zhu Reference Kang and Zhu2021; Wang, Yuhua, and Dickson Reference Wang and Dickson2022.

113 Zhang, Yahong, and Kim Reference Zhang and Kim2018; Zhang, Hongxia, et al. Reference Zhang, Song, Tan, Xia, Zhang and Jiang2019.

114 Soss Reference Soss1999.

115 See “CFPS xianzhi shuju shenqing zhinian” (CFPS restrictive data application guidelines), n.d., https://www.isss.pku.edu.cn/cfps/sjzx/xzsj/index.htm.

116 Li, Lianjiang Reference Li2004; Reference Li2012; Lü Reference Lü2014.

117 Zhang, Yahong, and Kim Reference Zhang and Kim2018.

118 Wedeman Reference Wedeman2012; Yue and Liu Reference Yue and Liu2023.

119 Zhu, Lu and Shi Reference Zhu, Lu and Shi2013.

References

Abadie, Alberto. 2005. “Semiparametric difference-in-differences estimators.” The Review of Economic Studies 72, 1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Adelopo, Ismail, and Rufai, Ibrahim. 2018. “Trust deficit and anti-corruption initiatives.” Journal of Business Ethics 163(3), 429–469.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andrain, Charles F., and Smith, James T.. 2006. Political Democracy, Trust, and Social Justice: A Comparative Overview. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England.Google Scholar
Baekkeskov, Erik, and Rubin, Olivier. 2016. “Information dilemmas and blame-avoidance strategies: from secrecy to lightning rods in Chinese health crises.” Governance 30(3), 425–443.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brehm, Jack Williams, and Cohen, Arthur Robert. 1962. Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance. New York: Wiley.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caillier, James. 2010. “Citizen trust, political corruption, and voting behavior: connecting the dots.” Politics and Policy 38(5), 1015–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, Andrea Louise. 2002. “Self-interest, social security, and the distinctive participation patterns of senior citizens.” American Political Science Review 96(3), 565–574.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, Andrea Louise. 2012. “Policy makes mass politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 15(1), 333–351.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Catterberg, Gabriela, and Moreno, Alejandro. 2006. “The individual bases of political trust: trends in new and established democracies.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18(1), 31–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chang, Eric C., and Chu, Yunhan. 2006. “Corruption and trust: exceptionalism in Asian democracies?” The Journal of Politics 68(2), 259–271.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chong, Alberto, De La O, Ana L., Karlan, Dean and Wantchekon, Leonard. 2015. “Does corruption information inspire the fight or quash the hope? A field experiment in Mexico on voter turnout, choice, and party identification.” The Journal of Politics 77(1), 55–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chong, Dennis, and Druckman, James N.. 2010. “Identifying frames in political news.” In Bucy, Erik P. and Holbert, R. Lance (eds.), Sourcebook for Political Communication Research: Methods, Measures, and Analytical Techniques. New York: Routledge, 238–267.Google Scholar
Chu, Pengfei, Xie, Guanxia and Zhang, YuXia. 2023. “Anti-corruption publicity and internal migrants in China.” Applied Economics 56(1), 117–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Connelly, Brian L., Certo, Samuel, Ireland, Duane R. and Reutzel, Christopher R.. 2011. “Signaling theory: a review and assessment.” Journal of Management 37(1), 39–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Burgh, Hugo. 2003. “Kings without crowns? The re-emergence of investigative journalism in China.” Media, Culture, and Society 25(6), 801–820.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Egami, Naoki, and Hartman, Erin. 2023. “Elements of external validity: framework, design, and analysis.” American Political Science Review 117(3), 1070–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finkel, Evgeny, and Gehlbach, Scott. 2020. Reform and Rebellion in Weak States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fisman, Raymond, and Gatti, Roberta. 2002. “Decentralization and corruption: evidence from US federal transfer programs.” Public Choice 113, 25–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fleming, David J. 2014. “Learning from schools: school choice, political learning, and policy feedback.” Policy Studies Journal 42(1), 55–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fredriksson, Per G., Mani, Mousami and Damania, Richard. 2003. “The persistence of corruption and regulatory compliance failures; theory and evidence.” Public Choice 121(3/4), 363–390.Google Scholar
Frey, Dieter. 1986. “Amount of available information and selective exposure.” Christian-Albrechts-University, Kiel. Cited in Dieter Frey. 1986. “Recent research on selective exposure to information.” In Berkowitz, L. (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Policy. New York: Academic Press, 41–80.Google Scholar
Frey, Dieter, and Wicklund, Robert A.. 1978. “A clarification of selective exposure: the impact of choice.” Journal of Experimental Psychology 14, 132–39.Google Scholar
Fu, Hualing. 2016. China's Striking Anti-corruption Adventure: A Political Journey towards the Rule of Law? New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Goel, Rajeev K., Nelson, Michael A. and Naretta, Michael A.. 2012. “The internet as an indicator of corruption awareness.” European Journal of Political Economy 28(1), 64–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gregory, S. Schober. 2024. “Resource effects, inhibitors, and mass political participation.” Paper presented at Midwest Political Science Association, US.Google Scholar
Gutmann, Jerg, Padovano, Fabio and Voigt, Stefan. 2020. “Perception vs experience: explaining differences in corruption measures using microdata.” European Journal of Political Economy 65, 101925.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huang, Haifeng. 2015. “Propaganda as signaling.” Comparative Politics 47(4), 419–437.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacobs, Alan M., and Weaver, R. Kent. 2015. “When policies undo themselves: self-undermining feedback as a source of policy change.” Governance 28(4), 441–457.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacobs, Lawrence R., Mettler, Suzanne and Zhu, Ling. 2021. “The pathways of policy feedback: how health reform influences political efficacy and participation.” Policy Studies Journal 50(3), 483–506.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jenkins-Smith, Hank C., Silva, Carol L., Gupta, Kuhika and Ripberger, Joseph T.. 2014. “Belief system continuity and change in policy advocacy coalitions: using cultural theory to specify belief systems, coalitions, and sources of change.” Policy Studies Journal 42(4), 484–508.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaase, Max. 1999. “Interpersonal trust, political trust and non-institutionalized political participation in western Europe.” West European Politics 22(3), 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kang, Siqin, and Zhu, Jiangnan. 2021. “Do people trust the government more? Unpacking the distinct impacts of anticorruption policies on political trust.” Political Research Quarterly 74(2), 434–449.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo. 2004. “Governance matters iii: governance indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002.” World Bank Economic Review 18(2), 253–287.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, Soonhee. 2010. “Public trust in government in Japan and South Korea: does the rise of critical citizens matter?” Public Administration Review 70(5), 801–810.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larsen, Erik Gahner. 2019. “Policy feedback effects on mass publics: a quantitative review.” Policy Studies Journal 47(2), 372–394.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lau, Richard R., and Heldman, Caroline. 2009. “Self-interest, symbolic attitudes, and support for public policy: a multilevel analysis.” Political Psychology 30(4), 513–537.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, Youngjoon. 2020. “The rule of law, anti-corruption and land expropriation: evidence from China.” China: An International Journal 18(4), 85–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, Youngjoon. 2023. “Strategic fiscal spending: evidence from China.” Governance 36(2), 651–667.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lerman, Amy E., and McCabe, Katherine T.. 2017. “Personal experience and public opinion: a theory and test of conditional policy feedback.” Journal of Politics 79(2), 624–641.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Li, Hui, Gong, Ting and Xiao, Hanyu. 2016. “The perception of anti-corruption efficacy in China: an empirical analysis.” Social Indicators Research 125(3), 885–903.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Li, Hui, and Meng, Tianguang. 2020. “Corruption experience and public perceptions of anti-corruption crackdowns: experimental evidence from China.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 25(3), 431–456.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Li, Lianjiang. 2004. “Political trust in rural China.” Modern China 30(2), 228–258.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Li, Lianjiang. 2012. “The magnitude and resilience of trust in the center: evidence from interviews with petitioners in Beijing and a local survey in rural China.” Modern China 39, 3–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Li, Lianjiang. 2022. “Decoding political trust in China: a machine learning analysis.” The China Quarterly 249, 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lorentzen, Peter. 2014. “China's strategic censorship.” American Journal of Political Science 58(2), 402–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lü, Xiaobo. 2014. “Social policy and regime legitimacy: the effects of education reform in China.” American Political Science Review 108, 423–437.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marcus, George E., and MacKuen, Michael B.. 1993. “Anxiety, enthusiasm, and the vote: the emotional underpinnings of learning and involvement during presidential campaigns.” American Political Science Review 87(3), 672–685.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Melgar, Natalia, Rossi, Máximo and Smith, Tom W.. 2010. “The perception of corruption.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 22(1), 120–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mettler, Suzanne. 2005. Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Michener, Jamila D. 2017. “People, places, power: Medicaid concentration and local political participation.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 42(5), 865–900.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Miller, Arthur H. 1974. “Rejoinder to ‘comment’ by Jack Citrin: political discontent or ritualism?” American Political Science Review 68(3), 989–1001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moldogaziev, Tima T., and Liu, Choel. 2020. “Public sector corruption and perceived government performance in transition.” Governance 34(2), 475–504.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mortensen, Peter B. 2009. “Political attention and public spending in the United States.” Policy Studies Journal 37(3), 435–455.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Newton, Kenneth. 2001. “Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy.” International Political Science Review 22(2), 201–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pacheco, Julianna. 2013. “The thermostatic model of responsiveness in the American States.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 13(3), 306–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pan, Jennifer, Shao, Zijie and Xu, Yiqing. 2022. “How government-controlled media shifts policy attitudes through framing.” Political Science Research and Methods 10(2), 317–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pan, Yating, Shu, Zhan and Ye, Zhipeng. 2023. “Exploring the dynamics of corruption perceptions in sustained anti-corruption campaigns: a survey experiment in China.” Humanities and Social Science Communications 10, 570. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-02084-0.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pierson, Paul. 1993. “When effect becomes cause: policy feedback and political change.” World Politics 45(4), 595–628.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pierson, Paul. 1994. Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. 1935. Politics, Pressure, and the Tariff. New York: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Sears, David O., Lau, Richard R., Tyler, Tom R. and Allen Harris, M.. 1980. “Self-interest vs symbolic politics in policy attitudes and presidential voting.” The American Political Science Review 74(3), 670–684.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Seyd, Ben. 2015. “How do citizens evaluate public officials? The role of performance and expectations on political trust.” Political Studies 63, 73–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz. 2010. “What explains corruption perceptions? The dark side of political competition in Russia's regions.” Comparative Politics 42(2), 147–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sobel, Michael E. 1982. “Asymptotic intervals for indirect effects in structural equations models.” Sociological Methodology 13, 290–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soss, Joe. 1999. “Lessons of welfare: policy design, political learning, and political action.” American Political Science Review 93(2), 363–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spence, Michael. 1973. “Job market signaling.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3), 355–374.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2000. “The contributions of the economics of information to twentieth century economics.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(4), 1441–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stockmann, Daniela. 2012. Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stockmann, Daniela, and Gallagher, Mary E.. 2011. “Remote control: how the media sustain authoritarian rule in China.” Comparative Political Studies 44(4), 436–467.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sun, Zongfeng, Zhu, Lin and Ni, Xing. 2022. “How does anti-corruption information affect public perceptions of corruption in China?” China Review 22(2),113–143.Google Scholar
Taber, Charles S., and Lodge, Milton. 2016. “The illusion of choice in democratic politics: the unconscious impact of motivated political reasoning.” Political Psychology 37(S1), 61–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tanzi, Vito. 1998. “Corruption around the world.” IMF Staff Papers 45(4), 559–594.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van der Meer, Tom, and Hakhverdian, Armen. 2016. “Political trust as the evaluation of process and performance: a cross-national study of 42 European countries.” Political Studies 65(1), 81–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vannoni, Matia. 2019. “A behavioral theory of policy feedback in tobacco control: evidence from a difference-in-difference-in-difference study.” Policy Studies Journal 47(2), 353–371.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Villoria, Manuel, van Ryzin, Gregg G. and Lavena, Cecilia F.. 2013. “Social and political consequences of administrative corruption: a study of public perceptions in Spain.” Public Administration Review 73(1), 85–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wang, Yuhua, and Dickson, Bruce. 2022. “How corruption investigations undermine regime support: evidence from China.” Political Science Research and Methods 10(1), 33–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wang, Zhengxu, and You, Yu. 2015. “The arrival of critical citizens: decline of political trust and shifting public priorities in China.” International Review of Sociology 26(1), 105–124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wedeman, Andrew. 2005. “Anticorruption campaigns and the intensification of corruption in China.” Journal of Contemporary China 14(42), 93–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wedeman, Andrew. 2012. Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Xin, Sheng, Guo, Songlin and Chang, Xiaochen. 2022. “Managerial myopia and firm productivity: evidence from China.” Finance Research Letters 49, 103083.Google Scholar
Yang, Yang, Wang, Caiping and Xu, Honggang. 2021. “Challenge or chance? Understanding the impact of anti-corruption campaign on China's hotel industry.” Tourism Economic 28(6), 135481662110015.Google ScholarPubMed
Yuan, Meng, Mayorga, Marcus, Johnson, Branden B. and Swedlow, Brendon. 2024. “Explaining compliance with COVID-19 regulation in China and the United States: cultural biases, political trust, and perceptions of risk and protective actions.” Journal of Public Policy 44(2), 284–326.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yuan, Meng, and Swedlow, Brendon. 2024. “Chinese cultural biases, value congruence, and support for and compliance with protective policies during the COVID-19 pandemic.” Review of Policy Research 41(3), 415–447.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yue, Lei, and Liu, Qian. 2023. “How anti-corruption actions win hearts: the evaluation of anti-corruption performance, social inequality and political trust. Evidence from the Asian Barometer Survey and the Latino Barometer Survey.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 65(5), 664–685.Google Scholar
Zhang, Hongxia, Song, Yan, Tan, Shukui, Xia, Shiping, Zhang, Haitao, Jiang, Chunhong et al. 2019. “Anti-corruption efforts, public perception of corruption, and government credibility in the field of real estate: an empirical analysis based on twelve provinces in China.” Cities 90, 64–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zhang, Yahong, and Kim, Min Hyu. 2018. “Do public corruption convictions influence citizens’ trust in government? The answer might not be a simple yes or no.” The American Review of Public Administration 48(7), 685–698.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zheng, Wenwen, Liu, Li, Huang, Zhenwei and Tan, Xuyun. 2017. “Life satisfaction as a buffer of the relationship between corruption perception and political participation.” Social Indicators Research 132(2), 907–923.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zhu, Jiangnan, Huang, Huang and Zhang, Dong. 2019. “‘Big tigers, big data’: learning social reactions to China's anticorruption campaign through online feedback.” Public Administration Review 79(4), 500–513.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zhu, Jiangnan, Lu, Jie and Shi, Tianjian. 2013. “When grapevine news meets mass media: different information sources and popular perceptions of government corruption in mainland China.” Social Science Electronic Publishing 46(8), 920–946.Google Scholar
Zhu, Jiangnan, and Zhang, Dong. 2017. “Weapons of the powerful: authoritarian elite competition and politicized anticorruption in China.” Comparative Political Studies 50(9), 1186–1220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ziller, Conrad, and Helbling, Marc. 2019. “Antidiscrimination laws, policy knowledge and political support.” British Journal of Political Science 49(3), 1027–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Figure 0

Figure 1. Spatiotemporal Evolution of Anti-corruption Efforts across Chinese Provinces, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018.

Figure 1

Figure 2. Spatiotemporal Evolution of Local Government Evaluation across Chinese Provinces, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018.

Figure 2

Figure 3. Spatiotemporal Evolution of Perception of Corruption in Chinese Provinces, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018.

Figure 3

Table 1. Regression of Public Evaluation of Local Government Performance on Anti-corruption Efforts

Figure 4

Figure 4. Mediating Effect of Perception of Corruption LevelNotes: Because there is no corruption perception data in the CFPS database for 2010, we excluded all samples in 2010 from the re-regression analysis. The conclusion remained largely unchanged. See Appendix Section IV for further details.

Supplementary material: File

Zhou et al. supplementary material

Zhou et al. supplementary material
Download Zhou et al. supplementary material(File)
File 228.4 KB