In the last decade, scholarly perspectives on the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) have evolved. Whereas an earlier generation of historians—writing in the 1980s and 1990s—emphasized what they considered to be the success of the BRD from 1949 to 1989, a more recent generation has complicated this narrative and challenged whether the BRD was indeed “successful.” The latest political victories of nationalist movements in Europe and the United States have undoubtedly inspired some of this scholarship, as scholars interrogate the foundations of society in the BRD. Recently, for example, some historians have argued that a greater emphasis on race in the early history of the BRD might provide context for the present treatment of ethnic minorities in Germany (Frank Biess and Astrid Eckert, “Introduction: Why Do We Need New Narratives for the History of the Federal Republic,” Central European History, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2019]).
Frank Uekötter's book on the Elbe-Seitenkanal (Elbe Lateral Canal) fits within this growing body of scholarship. Uekötter explores the origins, construction, and operation of this 115-kilometer-long canal, built between 1968 and 1976. He argues that the conditions surrounding the planning and construction of this project represent a “microcosm” of German society under the so-called old BRD (7). Uekötter's insightful study of this expensive project sheds light on the “faceless administration [translation C.C.],” faith in economic growth, political intrigues, and other factors that discouraged anyone from taking responsibility for the project's failure (7–8).
A historian at the University of Birmingham, Frank Uekötter is a distinguished scholar with a long record of publication in the field of environmental history. He has also been willing to tackle subjects—like government institutions and bureaucracies—that other scholars might find daunting. He does just that in this well-researched monograph.
Uekötter organizes his book chronologically, although different themes emerge over the course of his discussion. In Chapter 1, Uekötter considers important myths of the BRD from the 1950s through the 1970s, arguing that only by unpacking such myths can one understand how they continue to shape decisions made today. He cites deeply ingrained beliefs in the strengths of Germany's federal system, in expert knowledge, and in the constitution, as important and persistent myths. By exploring the “organized failure” of the Elbe Lateral Canal, he intends to deconstruct such myths (29).
Chapter 2 explores the phenomenon of canal building, a useful discussion that places Germany's own dams and canals in the context of other twentieth-century infrastructure projects. A third chapter considers the role of Hamburg, a city-state whose wealth and prevailing mythology as a “Tor zur Welt” (door to the world) encouraged its own determined campaign for a canal (59–60). Their economy suffering after 1945, Hamburg's elites dreamed of a canal to restore the city's reputation as a great and prosperous city. As early as 1950, the Hamburg Senate commissioned the city's Authority for Economy and Transportation to study plans for improving roads, rails, and interior shipping, without consulting with democratic interest groups. Here, Uekötter draws upon the minutes and written opinions of officials in Hamburg and Lower Saxony to show that civil servants who promoted the canal did so with exaggerated projections of economic development and more efficient wastewater disposal.
Subsequent chapters consider such topics as “Plans and Rules,” the “Machinery of Federalism,” the “Divided Land,” and “Construction in a Time of Crisis.” In a chapter on planning, Uekötter explores the role of influential bureaucrats, men who exercised power behind the scenes as a result of their expertise and canny political skills. One such person, Hans Christoph Seebohm, was Federal Transportation Minister during the 1950s and early 1960s. Like several experts at the federal level, he opposed the construction of the canal on economic grounds. Yet, as Uekötter shows through reference to the Transportation Ministry's documents and expert opinions, Seebohm eventually changed his mind, capitulating to a network of experts and politicians who shaped crucial decisions about major infrastructure projects, often on dubious grounds. Despite well-informed opposition, the federal government reached an agreement in 1965 with Hamburg and Lower Saxony to build the Elbe Lateral Canal.
The subsequent history of the canal only confirmed what the critics had been saying all along. Despite exaggerated predictions that the canal would carry ten million tons of freight per year, it only reached that goal in 2014, thirty-eight years after the canal began operations. In fact, the canal struggled for years to compete for freight traffic with the German rail and highway systems, something which experts had predicted years earlier. Making matters worse, a breach in the canal opened in July 1976, allowing 3.6 million cubic meters of water to flood nearby towns and fields. Although this catastrophe cost nobody their life and few people were hurt, the damage was extensive. Uekötter draws upon documents from a Transportation Ministry research commission to show how government experts emphasized technical mistakes leading to the breach while avoiding questions about systematic failures in the design and construction process. Noting the parallels with expensive projects in today's BRD, Uekötter states, “One can easily draw a line from the Elbe Lateral Canal to unfortunate mass transit projects, to Stuttgart 21, and to the Berlin Airport” (15).
A few mild criticisms of this book are warranted. Public opinion plays little role in this story, but perhaps that is because the general public never thought much about the decision-making process for canals. Likewise, women barely register in his book, but Uekötter acknowledges that most of the key players in this story were men. That said, Uekötter's well-researched, thoughtfully organized study of the Elbe Lateral Canal is a valuable contribution to recent scholarship on the so-called old BRD.
