Thinking about local democracy

In its most basic form, deliberative democracy stresses the creation of institutions and practices that encourage collaboration between citizens and governments (Campbell and Marshall, Reference Campbell and Marshall2000; Kathi and Cooper, Reference Kathi and Cooper2005). These local institutions are premised on the idea that, in a democracy, citizens should have the primary say in placing value on the actions performed by government, including what government produces and delivers (Alford, Reference Alford2002). Such organizations are designed to allow citizens to create “bottom up” structures within a larger governmental framework (Kathi and Cooper, Reference Kathi and Cooper2005; Wagner, Reference Wagner2001). These institutional notions stem not only from a belief that existing central administrative and political structures are somehow deficient, but also that community difference is so significant it precludes some facets of centralized decision making. A form of neighbourhood or community governance, then, would enable citizens to participate and represent their interests in services delivered by city agencies and cater policy design to community preference (Kathi and Cooper, Reference Kathi and Cooper2005). A policy process stemming from co-operation rather than conflict is, therefore, intended to emerge.

Such local participatory bodies have found considerable support in past research (see, for example, Ball and Stobart, Reference Ball and Stobbart1996; Barber, Reference Barber1984; Monroe, Reference Monroe1990; Portney and Barry, Reference Portney and Barry2002; Thomas, Reference Thomas1986; Thomson, Reference Thomson2001). Advocates of greater local participation argue that democracy requires widespread contribution and that the expansion of local participatory institutions “nourishes the democratic spirit of individuals” and “builds community” (Berry et al., Reference Berry, Portney and Thomson1993). The scale of these operations matters; the notion of “face-to-face democracy” necessitates a smaller scale. Simply put, we can better understand collective challenges within smaller settings, which are, in turn, thought to promote collective behaviour and attract individuals toward “solutions that are best for the broader community rather than single-mindedly pursuing what is best for themselves” (Berry et al., Reference Berry, Portney and Thomson1993).

While participatory democracy, in its idealized state, is thought to hold the benefit of unleashing a new democratic ethos, others are less enthusiastic. Many refer to citizen participation and deliberative bodies as a “supplement” or “complement” in a representative democracy (Pratchett, Reference Pratchett1999). Others, of course, argue that the varieties of citizen participation can have negative consequences, especially when we more deeply consider structure of local bodies and the potential for participatory bias and domination of community agendas from wealthy property owners (Fagotto and Fung, Reference Fagotto and Fung2006; Wandersman et al., Reference Wandersman, Florin, Friedmann and Meier.1987).

Needless to say, institutional design matters, not only in producing effective councils but also in allowing us to evaluate outcomes. In this task, Archon Fung (Reference Fung2006) introduces us to what he calls “the Democracy cube,” a three dimensional space that maps key aspects of participatory democracy: participation, communication and decision making and authority and power. The categories—participation, communication and decision making and authority and power—can be arrayed on a spectrum. For example, participation, conceived broadly as the process of member selection, inclusion and contribution, may range from involving expert administrators at the more exclusive end of Fung's spectrum to open self-selection at the more inclusive end (2006: 68). As another example, authority and decision making can range from consultation and an expression of personal beliefs at the lower end of the spectrum to direct authority for community members at the higher end (70).

Fung's work is particularly helpful when we consider the range of institutional design options available to policy makers. Such bodies may be purely communicative, whereby participants have a venue to actively identify concerns with central decision makers, but would have no real expectation of influencing public action. Or these types of bodies could be significantly strengthened and provide local decision makers with an active say and control over civic affairs, a scenario that Fung refers to as a “cogoverning partnership” (69). As such, there are a variety of options available to policy makers.

Regardless of the form, community governance operates on the twin principles of stewardship and delegation. Stewardship allows a community to take responsibility for managing its own affairs and promoting its own well-being, providing a modicum of autonomy and potentially insulating certain areas from city-wide authority (Feldman et al., Reference Feldman, Graham and Phillips1997). In this, community councils provide recommendations to the city and consider initiatives that may have a local impact. In contrast, delegation sees a community council can take on certain, localized functions, such as minor planning, parking or zoning decisions. Community councils would be able to make decisions at a level more appropriate for very local issues, while also allowing city council to focus on larger, city-wide issues.

With this framework in mind, three factors, presented below in Table 1, help to determine the scope and function of community councils. Each category is a product of questions posed by Fung (Reference Fung2006) during his introduction of the democracy cube.Footnote ⁵

Table 1 Factors Influencing Authority and Efficiency of Community Councils

Composition refers to the structure of the community council and is concerned with the nature of participation. Capacity refers to resources that are available to members. Finally, authority examines the ability of the council to make binding decisions. Taken together, these factors consider who participates, with what resources they participate and how binding are their decisions.

Designing institutions

Within a theoretical sense, local participatory bodies appear to hold promise in allowing communities to maintain a sense of identity and some control over local affairs in the wake of amalgamation (LeSage and Garcea, Reference LeSage, Garcea, Garcea and LeSage2005; Slack and Bird, Reference Slack and Bird2013; Vojnovic, Reference Vojnovic2000). Designing the right institutions to harness this promise, however, is a challenging task.

Pendergrast and Farrow helpfully provide three models of community council usage: the local community of interest model, the amalgamated municipal federation model and the radical decentralization model (Reference Pentergrast and Farrow1997). The local community of interest model is based upon area-specific committees of council comprised of councillors from that community. In this case, communities would be included based upon shared interests and local identity, not current or former municipal boundaries (Church et al., Reference Church, Greenberg, McPhedran, N'Dow and Spengler1997; Pendergrast and Farrow, Reference Pentergrast and Farrow1997). Second, the amalgamated municipal federation model is established after consolidation around the boundaries of “old” lower-tier municipalities (Pendergrast and Farrow, Reference Pentergrast and Farrow1997). The third and final model is conceived as the “radical decentralization model” and involves the devolution of all functions that can be devolved without completely eliminating central control (Chruch et al., Reference Church, Greenberg, McPhedran, N'Dow and Spengler1997; Pendergrast and Farrow, Reference Pentergrast and Farrow1997).

Each proposed model would rest at different positions of Fung's spectrum and allow for a different balance of power within the community. Communities would receive either strong local institutions or weak central institutions or vice versa. The decision as to which model to adopt would carefully balance concepts such as efficiency or democracy and devolution or centralization, placing more or less power in the hands of local, as opposed to central, decision makers.

Toronto

Once the province's amalgamation programme began in earnest, the revised City of Toronto Act (1996) allowed for the establishment of “neighbourhood committees,” leaving the new council responsible for determining scope and function.Footnote ⁶ The establishment and structure of these committees fed into the purview of the Toronto Transition Team.

In a report to the Toronto Transition Team regarding the new city's governance structure, consultants Lionel Feldman, Katherine Graham and Susan Phillips argued that community councils would provide a “strong voice” for communities at City Council, while also balancing individual, community and city-wide interests (Reference Feldman, Graham and Phillips1997: 20). However, in order to reduce the potential for conflict between city-wide and local community interests, Feldman, Graham and Phillips argued that community councils should not be responsible for approving budgets, delivering services, amending the official plan or employing their own staff (23).Footnote ⁷

The greatest concern raised by Feldman, Graham and Phillips was the inequity in community council size. Some, such as the former City of Toronto represented a population of over 630,000, while others, such as East York, represented only 100,000. Feldman, Graham and Phillips argued that “such inequitable representation will harm the integrity of the councils as some may claim to have greater legitimacy or a stronger voice on council than others” (24).Footnote ⁸ To correct these imbalances, Feldman, Graham and Phillips recommended City Council examine the borders of community councils early in their first term and potentially replaced them on a “regional basis” (25).

TheToronto Transition Team accepted many of these recommendations and argued that community councils were essential for the city's operations, not only in providing a direct link to the community but also making City Council business more efficient (56). The team's final report recommended that community councils should 1) hold public hearings and make recommendations on development applications within their boundaries, 2) hear public deputations and make recommendations on matters requiring a municipal by-law or commitment of unbudgeted city funds 3) hear and decide appeals to staff decisions regarding construction-related permits, snow removals, clearing debris, encroachments on municipal property and tree removal, and 4) monitor the well-being of local neighbourhoods (66). City Council would have final approval over all matters arising from community councils (70). The final report also recommended that the city review the community council boundaries at a future date (70).

During the city's 2003 governance review, it was recommended the number of community councils be reduced to four. It was argued community councils should be aligned with service districts to better provide continuity between planning, building, licensing and transportation functions while also providing a more even population distribution to each council (City of Toronto, 2003). Council accepted these recommendations. Since this change, Toronto's community councils have undergone only minor changes, none of which has been related to boundaries.Footnote ⁹

Hamilton

The creation of community councils in the other three case studies was afforded under the Municipal Act, 2001. In Hamilton's first election after amalgamation, Bob Wade, the last mayor of the pre-amalgamation municipality of Ancaster, campaigned on a promise to establish “community districts” that would “represent neighbourhood viewpoints” along the lines recommended by the Hamilton-Wentworth Constituent Assembly but did not specify the amount of responsibility these councils would hold, a pledge that partially accounted for his victory (Elliot, Reference Elliot2000; Spicer, Reference Spicer2012). Despite Wade's election, community councils were never implemented. In 2006, Hamilton's then mayor, Fred Eisenberger, established a citizen-led Community Councils Task Force in the hopes of reviving the issue. The task force recommended Hamilton take advantage of new delegation powers provided under the Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006—an act designed to harmonize many of the new powers afforded in the City of Toronto Act 2006 with the Municipal Act 2001 and specifically included new powers for delegation from municipal councils—and enact a formal system of community councils (City of Hamilton, 2007).Footnote ¹⁰

Specifically, the task force recommended that each ward have its own community council, with a minimum of seven and a maximum of eleven members and an elected chair and vice-chair. The ward councillor would be an ex-officio member. Each would have a selection committee who would interview and select members. Councils would have limited powers; each would be assembled to provide advice to the ward councillor (City of Hamilton 2007). The task force, however, did provide some possible delegated duties for community councils, namely, the ability to comment formally on all area planning activities, street naming, business license renewal, street lighting, snow removal, parking and traffic issues, and heritage permit applications and area recreation issues. Again, however, this system was never implemented, as Hamilton City Council dismissed the recommendations of the task force after its final report was submitted.

Sudbury

In Sudbury, community councils were a key recommendation from 2007's Greater Sudbury Community Solutions Team, which reviewed the city's governance structure after amalgamation. Sudbury initially introduced Community Action Networks (CANs) in 2001, following the recommendations of the Mayor's Task Force on Community Involvement and Volunteerism (City of Sudbury, 2007). After many years, however, attendance at most waned and many CANs stopped meeting entirely, leading the Community Solutions Team to describe them as “fledgling” (6). The team did, however, find a considerable amount of support for CANs, arguing that they possessed a “true grassroots nature” and were the “best options for community engagement and empowerment” (36).

The Community Solutions Team believed that while the CANs were beneficial, their authority needed to be enhanced, finding the network to be “loose” and responsibility ill-defined (36). The team feared the CANs would lose their grassroots nature if they were strengthened and formalized. As a result, the team sought a middle ground, recommending CANs be given responsibility for planning public consultations and local economic and community development initiatives, distributing municipal newsletters, holding pre-budget consultations, assisting with the utilization of community space and enhancing community policing efforts (37). The team also recommended the city designates an individual employee as a staff liaison and provide each CAN with a base annual budget (37).

Ottawa

In 1999, Glen Shortliffe was appointed by the province as a special advisor on restructuring. Shortliffe eventually produced a report calling for the region to be converted into a single-tier government. In it, Shortliffe described community councils as having a “certain appeal” but ultimately not “practicable or workable” (Reference Shortliffe1999: 10). Shortliffe argued that community councils would effectively re-create a two-tier government, lead to overlap and duplication and blur decision-making authority in the city (10).

After Shortliffe's recommendation, the restructuring process began in earnest, with a transition board tasked with implementation. Embedded within the transition board, a political infrastructure project team was responsible for establishing the new city's governance structure. This team also rejected the idea of community councils, arguing that community councils would distort lines of responsibility and did not have enough authority under the current provincial legislative framework (City of Ottawa, 2001: 8). Instead, they favoured voluntary, advisory ward councils that could be implemented at the discretion of individual councillors (City of Ottawa, 2001: 8). The team, however, did have concerns that these councils might become “a forum for complaints” and “create a de facto additional tier of government” (9).

The issue of community councils was raised again during the City of Ottawa's 2005 Rural Summit, which found a large and growing disconnect between urban and rural portions of the city (Ekos Research Associates, 2004). Stemming from these meetings, the city considered a “borough model” alongside a “ward council” model, the “borough model” possessing a degree of autonomy, limited taxing powers and local decision-making authority, while the “ward council” model would be largely advisory. Because the “borough model” would require significant legislative changes, it was abandoned, although some councillors did establish voluntary, advisory ward councils at this time (personal interview, 2014).

After the passage of Bill 130 (Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006), Ottawa examined the city's governance structure through a series of discussion papers. These discussion papers did not make any specific recommendations for council but did suggest that community councils play a positive role in other jurisdictions, most notably Toronto where, it is argued, they contribute greatly to the city's legislative efficiency (City of Ottawa, 2007). Very little came from these discussion and today Ottawa still does not have a system of community councils, only voluntary ward committees.

Sudbury

Of the four case studies, Sudbury has the best-developed community council network. Sudbury's CANs are established to only provide advice to ward councillors and facilitate community meetings. Each has staff support and a modest annual budget to assist with administrative costs (personal interview, January 29, 2014).Footnote ¹¹ Each also elects a chair and assigns various other executive positions as it sees fit.

Those involved with Sudbury's CANs find them well attended. Participation from ward councillors can vary, however. The CANs are established independently from the ward councillor and can, therefore, operate in his or her absence. Some, in fact, do (personal interview, August 12, 2014). Certain councillors do not have any interaction with their ward CANs, while some will attend meetings but have very little other interaction with the executive. In fact, the participation from councillors tends to dictate the levels of participation from the community; CANs with more active councillors tend to have more participation from the public.

Toronto

Much like Sudbury, Toronto also has an established network of community councils. Those involved argue that community councils are largely in place to improve legislative efficiency, removing issues from the agenda of city council and addressing them at the local level. The most common issues to come before community councils in Toronto are property standards, business and event licensing and development applications (personal interview, August 12, 2014).

However, a major complaint of some involved with community councils is that issues approved at community council are still subject to decision at council of the whole. Decisions are frequently overturned, leading some to believe that this dissuades the public from bringing issues to community council (personal interview, July 18, 2014). Those involved with managing the city's network of community councils argue councillors from outside a given community council understand that if they overturn a decision, they could have a decision from their community council overturned as retribution (personal interview, August 12, 2014).

Hamilton

Unlike Sudbury and Toronto, Hamilton has a voluntary network of community councils. City Council rejected the notion of community councils, despite the mayor's taskforce finding widespread support amongst the public (personal interview, January 20, 2014). Three wards within the city have a community council: Ward 12 (Ancaster), Ward 13 (Dundas) and Ward 15 (Flamborough).Footnote ¹² While the city allows these councils, there are no formal rules to guide their operation. The three existing community councils do have some similarities, however. Each formally incorporates a set group of residents. Each is also purely advisory and meets at regular times of the year. The activity of the council is generally dictated by the ward councillor. Certain councils get the opportunity to interview developers and those hoping to build within the ward (personal interview, January 21, 2014[2]). City staff are often brought in to address questions of community councillors on certain issues (personal interview, February 12, 2014). As they are not formally recognized within the city's governance structure, they do not conform to the city's established practice of appointments of city committees (personal interview, January 28, 2014).Footnote ¹³

Ottawa

Ottawa, perhaps, has the weakest community council structure of the four cases. While the city did not formally adopt community councils, it left the matter open for ward councillors to address. The process is voluntary and ward councillors are free to establish community councils, dissolve them and set their terms of engagement and use. Very few councillors currently have community councils. Those that do are seen as little more than “re-election committees” and are not open to the public (personal interview, August 14, 2014).

Below, in Table 2, the four cases are evaluated using the criteria from the second section of the paper.

Table 2 Community Council Evaluation

When comparing cases, there is not much variation in authority or capacity. None of the cases examined has a powerful network of community councils. We do see some variation when it comes to composition, however. Toronto does not formally incorporate citizens into community councils. Sudbury has an open system where anyone can join a CAN if he or she shows interest. Finally, Ottawa and Hamilton have select participation, where councillors choose which residents sit on their individual community councils if they choose to establish them. Both operate outside the each city's established committee appointment structure.

Recreating a two-tier system

Officials in a number of cities feared that the introduction of community councils would effectively re-create the two-tier system they had just dismantled. Nowhere was this idea more prevalent than in Ottawa. Shortliffe argued that the two-tier system in Ottawa had been “deemed no longer viable” meaning community councils—regardless if they had a policy development or revenue raising capabilities—would create redundancy (Reference Shortliffe1999: 29).Footnote ¹⁴ Officials in Hamilton had similar reluctance to empower community councils to the point of recreating a two-tier system (personal interview, January 21, 2014[1]). There was a belief that focus had to be on making the new city work, rather than exploring decentralization.

Even in Sudbury, there was also concern a powerful set of community councils would draw from the authority of the city's government. The Community Solutions Team noted this in their final report, arguing “the team looked for a model of empowerment that would build pride in local communities and allow citizens to take an active role within certain issues, while also preserving the integrity of the city as a whole and ensuring that ultimate responsibility rests with the elected council” (City of Sudbury, 2007: 36). Those examining Sudbury's CANs felt that a purely advisory system would not undercut the authority of council or deconcentrate much power.

Conceptualizing community

Another problem with the implementation of community councils is conceptual murkiness. As Pendergrast and Farrow argue, the definition of a “community council” provided through the City of Toronto Act (Bill 103) is “virtually non-existent outside of Canada” (1997: 11). Largely due to the watered-down definition of a community council that was adopted from the Hamilton-Wentworth Constituent Assembly's work, there was very little understanding of what these councils were intended to do. In Toronto, for instance, each community council represents a population larger than most large Canadian cities, hardly fitting with our understanding of “community.” As they were conceived in Hamilton and Ottawa, and as they were originally implemented in Toronto, community councils were drawn along the lines of former lower-tier municipalities, indicating they were designed more to placate those angry about amalgamation than to genuinely empower communities.

Opposition from local councillors

In most communities, the largest roadblocks towards community council use have been city councillors. As originally envisioned through the Hamilton-Wentworth Constituent Assembly's 1996 report, “community committees” would include a mix of councillors and citizens. When the report was ratified by regional council and a memorandum of negotiations was signed by the lower-tier municipalities, the committees were to be populated entirely by councillors, essentially leaving citizens out of the formal institutional structure. A 1997 report by MPP Ernie Hardeman reinforced this councillor-centric notion, which eventually laid the basis for Toronto's community council network (Pendergrast and Farrow Reference Pentergrast and Farrow1997).

There has been concern that, if properly empowered, community councils could usurp the role of city council, perhaps even creating an alternate political base within the city that would not only shift policy and governance but also politics to a new scale. In Sudbury, councillors were concerned that others would have spending authority in their wards and supersede their own local spending priorities (personal interview, January 29, 2014). Councillors were also worried they were creating parallel councils that would become increasingly powerful and eventually duplicate much of the work done on city council. The same notions were present in Hamilton (personal interview, January 21, 2014[1]) and Ottawa (personal interview, August 14, 2014).

The second major concern was that community councils would become venues for potential political rivals to hone their skills and build a profile to one day challenge the incumbent councillor. Community councils provide an easy entry into community public policy issues, allowing potential rivals to better understand the intricacies of the area. It also puts potential rivals into frequent contact with the public, who are also potential voters, creating an opportunity to see them in a place of authority and provide them with civic experience to cite when running in a future election.

A restrictive legislative framework

The municipalities we have examined showed hesitancy and reluctance to embrace community councils, but part of this reaction is the legislative environment in which they were making decisions. The province provided a legislative opening for municipalities to establish community councils but was quite clear that a wholesale devolution of powers could not occur. The Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006 provided broader authority to delegate municipal powers and duties but not planning matters, taxes and personnel issues (see also Section 23.3[1] of the Municipal Act, 2001).

A similarly restrictive framework and the impression that community councils are powerless and lack any meaningful decision-making ability has been a concern in other cities as well, such as Winnipeg (Higgins, Reference Higgins1977; Axworthy, Reference Axworthy, Dickerson, Drabek and Woods1980). In Toronto, former mayor David Miller was critical of the authority provided to community councils, arguing that “basically, they were a cynical exercise by the provincial government because they were given no power” (Hall, Reference Hall2003: B4). Toronto City Council even voted to ask the province to expand the powers of the city's community councils. After the vote Councillor John Adams argued that “in order to make the megacity work for the people, we have to allow a lot of local decisions to be made at the local community council” (Spears, Reference Spears1998).

In Hamilton, some community council participants have become frustrated by their lack of authority and have elected to not spend their time simply discussing issues (personal interview, January 21, 2014[1]). Even in Sudbury, where the city has a long and more established history with community councils, participants have expressed concern about not being able to have a say in policy creation (personal interview, January 29, 2014). The lack of authority leads to less participation, which puts community councils into a further state of decay, while also reinforcing the notion that they are not a viable component of municipal governance.

If an opposite legislative framework were constructed to mandate community councils, the results would obviously be very different. In Quebec, Bill 170 mandated the creation of community councils, assigning a number of servicing responsibilities, such as local roads, garbage collection and recreation (Collin and Robertson, Reference Collin and Robertson2005). Montreal, therefore, has a much more robust network of community councils, although many have noted sharing service responsibilities between central and community interests has led to a great deal of duplication and waste (Meloche and Vaillancourt, Reference Meloche and Vaillancourt2013).