With contemporary debates about the reasonable limits of freedom of speech raging across the academy and public sphere, Mary Kate McGowan's recent book, Just Words, is a timely intervention. Building upon previous feminist theories of speech and harm—the book's title is a nod to Catharine MacKinnon's Only Words (1993)—McGowan's primary task is “identifying a previously overlooked manner in which speech is harmful” (2). The book is sure to leave no assumption on this topic unquestioned, for both new audiences and those already well acquainted with McGowan's impressive contributions to theories of speech and harm.
Although firmly situated in philosophy, her work is more broadly associated with the (interdisciplinary) “linguistic approach to group-based injustice” (4). Thus, the book may appeal equally to those in philosophy, linguistics, political science, sociology and law. Scholars who use this approach are typically interested in highlighting the ways in which language is related to oppressive social structures. Rather than viewing language as a representation or expression of an oppressive structure, they instead conceptualize it as an important medium for enacting oppression (3). To put it simply, speech can act, and this has consequences for the latitude one might grant potentially harmful speech.
The book excels on two fronts, in particular. First, McGowan is careful to entertain reasonable objections along the way, providing the reader with a broad array of vantage points in relevant literature. Second, while much of the book is theoretically dense, particularly in its first half, the author admirably wades through the necessary foregrounding. Although some readers will find debates in the philosophy of language relatively remote, McGowan provides a concise introduction to foundational concepts. Important takeaways include: a) the concept of “conversational exercitives,” or speech acts that generate “permissibility facts” that then dictate conversational possibilities (18–21, 34); b) the distinction between standard exercitives (permissibility facts established through authority) and conversational exercitives (permissibility facts established through norm enactment) (51); and c) the concept of “covert exercitives,” a type of conversational exercitive that is more pervasive than assumed (100) and might enact prescriptive norms (83). Importantly, this third concept does not require authority or intention (70) and thus has lower conditions for “success” (71, 79). Because conversational contributions often alter the norms that govern specific contexts, they are actually a “ubiquitous” feature of everyday communication (75). Therefore, if one adopts this framework, “oppressive speech is rather widespread” and does not necessarily need to be consciously designed in order to cause or constitute harm (123).
Despite the theoretical density, the book's takeaway is a rather straightforward hypothesis: that speech can harm by altering conversational norms that prescribe oppression (112). In this sense, speech may constitute harm itself, a conceptualization of harm that is at odds with dominant understandings of harm accruing via clear cause and effect. The book gradually builds up to two illustrative case studies that directly apply the hypothesis: pornography (the hanging of a pornographic poster in a work environment) and hate speech expressed in public (an African American man accosted on a bus). On both fronts, she argues that expression is constitutive of harm when it triggers norms that prescribe oppression (based on group membership). In other words, if and when expression enacts a norm that would cause harm when followed, the former constitutes harm rather than causing it. In her words: “For an utterance to constitute harm then three conditions are required. The utterance enacts a norm; that norm is followed and harm results from following that norm” (24).
Where potential critics will surely disagree is the degree to which she links individual action and oppressive social structures, and particularly with her downplaying of authority and intention as preconditions for moral culpability. Regardless, her analysis is worthy of serious consideration, even if one thinks (as I do) that it risks positing an overly elastic conceptualization of harm. At least one remedy for this concern is to test the hypothesis in cases in which it would not hold, in order to better illuminate liminal cases. Although such tests are potentially beyond the scope of the present book, I hope subsequent work (from McGowan and others) will fill this lacuna.
The book's primary shortcoming is evident because it is a consistent caveat. Although the author argues that her analysis is relevant for law (3) and there is “sufficient theoretical justification” (6) to limit expression to minimize harm, she cautiously avoids any discussion of definitive limits in law or policy. Of course, there are “substantial practical challenges” (181) for speech regulation in an American socio-legal context, but more precision (not necessarily prescription) regarding the moral, legal and political imperatives associated with the analysis would be helpful. Instead, the book concludes with a modest call to challenge oppressive norms in “micro-context[s]” (184–89), one that is appreciated but still begs for further elaboration.
Overall, McGowan has crafted a compelling argument that promises readers a new look at a persistent question: the reasonable limits of speech when harm is properly construed. Her book has the added benefit of weaving together an entire subfield in an accessible manner, making it a valuable interdisciplinary resource. For those wanting to keep apprised of these theoretical developments, it is a mandatory read.
