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Equality, Stuart White, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, pp. 197.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2008

Cristian Pérez Muñoz
Affiliation:
Universidad de la República
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Abstract

Type
RECENSIONS / REVIEWS
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 2008

In this accessible and interesting book, Stuart White provides a useful evaluation of the most important contemporary approaches to theorizing about the idea of equality. It pretends to be an accessible and concise introduction for a wide audience. As the author points out “the aim of this book is to unpack the complexity of the demand for equality, to clarify what motivates it, and, in the process, to explore some of the anxieties about liberty and other values that this demand provokes” (3).

The book is organized in seven chapters through which different faces of the idea of equality are discussed. These multiple aspects are summarized in the first chapter which serves as an introduction and a framework for the remainder of the book. White makes here two important distinctions. First, taking as a premise that demand for equality is not a demand for a concrete thing but a demand for many and controversial things, White distinguishes different forms of equality and the diverse ways in which one might think that these kinds of equality are valuable (4). Thus he differentiates among five categories of equality (legal, political, social, economic and moral equality) “all of which enter in more or less controversial ways into the demand for equality in modern politics” (4). Second, he examines the multiple values that may acquire these categories. Basically, the author argues that we might see a given type of equality as instrumentally valuable (when it serves to achieve another value), as intrinsically just (when that value is considered as substantively just) or as a supreme value (23).

The idea of political equality and the defensibility of the democratic ideal are discussed in the second chapter. Here White raises the question about how a society should distribute the power among the citizens to issue binding commands in the name of the state and to issue further commands to punish those who disobey; thus in this chapter the reader can find a discussion about the classical doctrines of natural aristocracy as well as the social theories of legitimate authority and their relationship with the democratic ideal. Equally important is the discussion about why and under what conditions political equality is a good idea, and how it can be achieved without compromising democracy in a fundamental way (26).

The third chapter is dedicated to examining the ideas of meritocracy and equality of opportunity. Among other things, in this chapter White elucidates those values usually used to support meritocracy (section 3.1); he distinguishes between weak and strong meritocracy (sections 3.2 and 3.3), analyzes to what extent our contemporary societies are meritocratic (section 3.4) and finally reviews the main criticism of the meritocratic ideal (sections 3.5 to 3.8).

In chapters 4 and 5 the author focuses on the ideal of “luck egalitarianism” which represents one of the dominant and most important developments of post-Rawlsian political philosophy. Introduced by Elizabeth Anderson some years ago, the term of “luck egalitarianism” has been used to characterize the theoretical approach of important egalitarians theorists such as Richard Arneson, Gerald Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, John Roemer, Eric Rakowski and Philippe Van Parijs. Roughly speaking, according to these authors, those inequalities that reflect brute luck, over which people have no control, can be considered unjust and the community should act to correct or prevent such inequalities. However, those inequalities that reflect the different choices people make should be considered just and for this reason ought to be respected (78). In this chapter, White outlines Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality of resources and the criticisms to this theory formulated by G.A. Cohen and Amartya Sen, then discusses two important objections made to luck egalitarianism approach. First, it constitutes a threat to individual freedom (because it demands a heavy taxation that is incompatible with respect for personal freedom) and second, luck egalitarianism “will give rise to objectionable inequalities in power and status, so undermining the goals of political and social equality” (79). In chapter 5, White addresses another popular argument against luck egalitarianism, that is, the idea that the application of luck egalitarianism would create unfavourable economic incentives that might undermine our economy and community. Basically, this chapter is devoted to the question about how much inequality we should permit. To examine this conflictive relationship between equality and incentives, White explores the John Rawls's proposal (especially the difference principle) and discusses some of the most important objections to Rawls's approach.

Chapter 6 is dedicated to the debate over group-differentiated citizenship. In this chapter the author essentially examines those theoretical postures that cast doubts on the link between equality and uniform citizenship. From these theoretical approaches, a real and not formal equality requires a model of group-differentiated and not uniform citizenship, in which citizen's rights and duties vary according to the group that to which each citizen belongs (20). Here White evaluates arguments for and against gender-, culture- and religion-specific rights (section 6.1, 6.3) and discusses how the claim for a differentiated citizenship impacts our conception and understanding of democracy.

Finally, in chapter 7 White focuses on some issues concerned to the future of equality. Fundamentally, he evaluates (from a pessimist and optimist perspective) how the demands for equality can be applied at a global level. Among other things, he discusses to what extent citizens of rich societies are obligated to act to reduce the inequality between them and people in poor societies and how those principles to regulate equality discussed in the previous chapters can be introduced to a global level.

In conclusion, it is possible to say that the purpose and task of this book is successfully achieved. Even though, the book has a few omissions (as, for example, it does not offer a detailed distinction between the principles of equality, priority and sufficiency) these are minor and perhaps, unavoidable, taking into consideration the ground covered in such a brief volume. It reviews, presents and critically evaluates this complex topic in a succinct way.