For a country with a gross national product comparable to that of Maryland, Iran has occupied a remarkably important position on the US foreign policy agenda in recent years—even earning itself a place on the Bush administration's “axis of evil.” Part of this has to do, of course, with Iran's nuclear program, its support for Hizbullah and hostility to Israel, and the proximity of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much also has to do, however, with a longer historical legacy of US support for the Shah, the seizure of the US embassy during the Iranian Revolution, and the tensions between revolutionary Tehran and Washington's conservative allies in the Middle East.
In the first two sections of Engaging Iran, Nathan Gozalez offers a historical overview of Iranian political development, as well as an analysis of contemporary Iranian domestic politics and foreign policy. This is a fair and well-informed treatment, albeit one based largely based on secondary sources. Area specialists will not find anything new here. However, it does suffice to highlight a central theme in the author's analysis: namely, Iran's “trajectory of independence” from foreign influence and domination. He also suggests that Iran is also on a slow path of democratic reform. Finally, he argues that US-Iranian differences since 1979 have been more rooted in ideology and political leadership than in inherently opposed geostrategic interests.
All of this is preparation for the real focus of the book, the final section, devoted to future US-Iranian relations. Here, the author argues that the international community is unlikely to be able to halt Iran's eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons capability. He notes, however, that even if it acquires such capability, it does not mean that it will go the additional step of developing actual weapons. Were it to do so, he suggests, Tehran would itself be responsive to the normal dynamics and constraints of nuclear deterrence.
More provocatively, he argues that since the real challenge to American interests lies elsewhere—notably in a China that will inevitably rise to superpower status and challenge US interests—the US should make efforts to consolidate Gulf stability by forging a new and more co-operative relationship with Iran. Looking even further ahead, Gonzalez argues that a democratizing Iran could emerge as a key US ally in the region, a regional powerhouse upholding compatible Iranian and American interests under a new “Nixon doctrine.” To prepare the eventual ground for this, he suggests a broad policy of engagement with Iran and Iranian society, while maintaining an insistence on reform and human rights.
Despite occasional references to the international relations literature, this book is not an attempt to theorize Iranian foreign policy. Instead, it is very focused on policy prescription and practitioners. Much of its argument rests on an assertion of the likelihood of political reform in Iran. However, while it is true that Iranian politics is much more competitive and pluralistic than that of many other countries in the Middle East and that reform is a possibility, it is much less certain that the theocratic elements of the Iranian system (including the dominant role of the supreme religious leader, the entrenched power of religious hardliners, and the vetting of all political candidates) will fade any time soon. Given this, policymakers are likely to view Gonzalez's vision as far too contingent and remote to be of much immediate value.
Moreover, the issue of how external actors might encourage Iranian reform and foreign policy “moderation” in the short and medium term is only touched upon, with little detail. Had this aspect been further developed, the author might find a more receptive audience.
Despite these weaknesses, however, this book remains a well-informed contribution to the continuing policy debate on Iranian and American foreign policy.
