The fine book under Review here is an orderly—and timely—collection of fourteen pieces focused on the jurisprudential work of Gerald Postema—it is 1 + 12 + 1. Postema himself has the lead piece and, in a concluding interview, he provides long answers to useful questions. Certainly, such a volume is richly deserved. And the collection is indeed timely as it deals with the threat to principles of fidelity, accountability, and trust central to his philosophy of law, the legitimated rule of law, and the social conditions needed for democracy itself.

The human world is organized pretty much into nation-states. These, being states, have governments affirmed and have therein an arrangement of affairs that identifies itself as a legal system. Since this system invariably claims practical authority over subjects, a question about the justification for this arrangement naturally arises. A nation captured in a power-grab is not understood to be justified, that is, have political or governmental legitimacy; indeed, insurrections often have overthrown the very thing. Yet violence may not be required. Hence, imagine that a man of profoundly amoral character is elected to the presidency of a large nation-state. This individual lacks any appreciation for the norms suited to democracy—the so-called ‘guard-rails’—and aspires to dictatorial self-serving governance. What is to be done?

A large part of blocking the arbitrary exercise of power and of establishing a claim of governmental legitimacy is the omnipresent judicial aspect. This exists where the system, in its own domain, aspires to avoid judgments determined by the purely subjective preferences of anyone, most especially a would-be dictator. A justice system’s existence makes room for this objectivity, for objective judgment. So, of special concern to a newly elected amoralist will be appointments and elections to the bench. He must seek to install for his use sycophantic copy machines who are equally indifferent or hostile to objectivity in judgment.

However, a new president with dictatorial goals, facing initially a judicial system aimed at objectivity, will find it necessary at once to fertilize the public fields with doubt. This man, as it were, seeks to secure convictions without evidence. ‘The truth is never what you see.’ This deception works best when one lies frequently in public and then meta-lies that one never lies. Domination requires building beliefs that are walled off from the incoming migrations of truth. Our man will be regularly dismissive of the views of scientists and government experts on relevant issues such as public health and foreign hostility; he has “heard otherwise”. While campaigning or while in presidential office he will declare that the main news media are almost entirely biased again him—‘fake’ will do it. He believes, in short, that all appeals to the objectivity that is sought through the rule of law are designed to frustrate his will, to curtail his freedom. The ultimate aim is to achieve what we might call—trading on connotations within the phrase—‘subject subjectivity’.

The title Philosophy of Law as an Integral Part of Philosophy might sound like the so-called ‘eliminativist’ approach where legal philosophy is seen merely to be an aspect of regular philosophy (ethics) and has no independent field status addressed to Law’s nature. So, the question could become whether jurisprudence within the general field of Philosophy is peripheral or paradigmatic—as one might choose to frame it. Of course, we see at once that it is possible to do philosophical work without ever giving the slightest thought to Law. So, the question, ‘Is jurisprudence paradigmatic within Philosophy?’ yields to an easy answer: ‘no way.’ But Postema observes equally that the philosophical works of most of the major figures from Plato and Aristotle onward had included serious prose about Law—Law understood as an aspect of the whole human experience that these thinkers had sought to explain and improve. Thus, one must say, given the issue, that legal philosophy is neither one nor the other—not on the edge, not at the centre. That said, to add in the title that legal philosophy is an ‘integral part’ of Philosophy suggests here that there is something more to prove.

Is it true that the good (not only the Great) jurisprudent will be an informed general philosopher even if such philosophers seem often to look at everything except Law? The right answer here is that the ‘something more to prove’ is addressed directly to the jurisprudent’s proper attention within its domain, not especially to others working in philosophy generally. One might have called the volume: Philosophy as an Integral Part of Legal Philosophy. Postema indeed states as much in the concluding Interview in this volume: “My view is that philosophy of law must be open to all dimensions of philosophy—metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, etc….” (306) (Though we might note the nice both-way ambiguity in the words ‘must be open to all.’)

We are talking here of legal philosophers becoming more integrated into general philosophy. One will perhaps agree as a consequence of Postema’s wide-angle lens that an exclusive focus by jurisprudents on ‘linguistic analysis’ has, in the words of the editors’ Introduction, “exhausted its capacity to offer enlightening explanations of the concept of law.” (22) The method of Legal Positivism is analysis and, while far from being irrelevant for explanation, analysis has simply fallen short of providing a full understanding of Law—although it is certainly true that one cannot give birth, as we might note, without conception first.

So, let us try a bit of conceptual or linguistic analysis right off on objectivity in legal judgment—it being, of course, far from the whole story on the nature of Law (though it will have to do for this Review). Nothing is more obvious than that a normative judgment is not a factual statement: the ‘truth conditions’ for the normative are not found merely by sifting among the facts present or predicted. This firm assertion does swing past (might one say ‘dodges’) the idea of a metaphysical kind of truth-status for moral judgments—one by which declarative moral sentences refer to (are in correspondence with) moral entities. Postema’s circumvention here is based on the view that employing such metaphysical entities is not what real-life participants in legal reasoning do/can rely upon or refer to in their law-relevant activities, unlike, say, being able to establish the legal import of ‘an acceptance expressed in writing’ in a contracts case.

Several essays in this volume seek to defend, challenge, and elaborate the idea—explicitly or implicitly—that more than ‘metaphysical truth’ is required to understand Law’s nature and to attain insight into Law’s own special form (and forum) of true legitimacy. Now it does not follow in the least from this non-metaphysical approach that normative judgments must lack objectivity and always be subjective, out-of-this-world dalliances. Sorry, Wittgenstein: the world is not everything that is the case—not ‘just the facts, Ma’am’ (and the world most certainly is not everything that ought to be the case). Still, while it need not be the best of all possible worlds, it might become, or be at least arc-bent toward, the best one possible—in play with objective normative judgment.

One thing is true about what I just wrote, namely, that no human could make that kind of hopeful declaration about what is morally best while meaning it without being possessed of some commitment to normativity’s real presence—not to mention its hoped-for gifts. That is because, looking straight into your eyes, the claimer uses the idea (is not just reporting a personal feeling) of the ‘best.’ One might even dare speak—no, comfortably speak—objectively of one’s interest in seeing justice done or of bad actors being accountable for their conduct. After all, having ideal goals is part of being human—and we want them to be realized, viz., become factually referable, being not yet so positioned as to be seen. (I like the epistemological-ontological duality of the word ‘realized’ here.)

It is Postema’s thesis that for a start we must understand better the point of the practice of being ‘objective’ in ‘claims, assertions, and assessments’ as found in the domain of legal discourse. In words he would use, viz., objectivity targets a practical judgment worthy of acceptance or endorsement. Therefore, the question is, how does Postema explain normativity given that he refuses to be hollowed out by subjectivism or to bow down before the correspondence theory of truth for all things bright and beautiful? In words from the editors: “what we need, to vindicate a sensible conception of objectivity that makes sense of our moral and legal arguments, is not a metaphysical demonstration of moral realism or its refutation by their anti-realist opponents.” (19)

It would seem obvious that the truth being available objectively in the physical sciences will presuppose (or be directed to) a successful correspondence with the facts past, present, and (perhaps) future, whereas the legal enterprise must presuppose in both theory and practice something more than this as it manages how persons talk and walk as they wave and weave among those facts. Here central for any claim of ‘truth’ is what Postema calls ‘domain-objectivity’. One might even speak of the ‘moderate domain-specificity of objectivity’ when speaking of the differences and similarities among the truth-assessable—if one must.

One can think of many places on the social world—domains—where objectivity of judgment might reasonably be expected. Shall we say then that there are ‘objectivities’—standards of objectivity—suited to various but surely overlapping domains? In the editors’ fine-tuned words, “there are requirements and relevance conditions for the objectivity of an assertion that are internal to the domain at stake.” (21) Consider the following claim (I would think one would allow the following example): although the word ‘validity’ is preferred for the aim of the operations of mathematics and deductive logic, it is not nonsense to speak there of ‘truth’ (or ‘truth functions’) and simply use ‘objective’ to honour the relevant methods of deducing it. Yet this particular fact about math and logic is not known through empirical science. For objectivity, these methods have their own domain within the vistas of rational discourse. To keep going, one does not have to look at ‘1 + 1 = 2’ to understand this equation as such; it has its own domain-objectivity, as does separately G.E. Moore’s, ‘here is one hand’ and ‘here is another.’

Why exactly do we secure a domain ‘fit for’ the philosophy of law—a domain of objective normativity? Well, within law operations, if an adjudicative objectivity can be achieved (that is to say, sensibly understood in its own terms), then there is a possible grounding for the political legitimacy of Law. Law, as it were, claims this value for itself. Blanket subjectivity will not provide for allegiance despite the warm feelings. Raw power will not provide for allegiance despite the fear.

One needs to legitimate the claims for Law’s authority by finding grounds for compliance. Doing this requires the existence of adjudicative objectivity. Answering in action, Postema would have us consider the place of the practice wherein legal and moral judgment rolls up sleeves to vindicate a conception of normative truth and so secures on-site justification to people in a law-led community (one not command-led or command-laiden). Given this context, Postema honours the proper job of jurisprudence which is to engage in critical reflection on law’s practice from the internal point of view. This is the vision of the participants who really mean it when, upon hearing and believing the words ‘that’s the law,’ will reply ‘got it.’ One needs legitimacy secured objectively to justify compliance—necessarily if not sufficiently.

We, the jurisprudents, must want to present a truth that has practicable meaning in its own domain, where it does its work, and where it is put to action. So, legal legitimacy depends on recognizing the possibility of normative objectivity in judgment, notably within legal practice in a political community. This requires providing sound arguments that welcome good reasons for guiding human conduct this way and not that way. In Postema’s view and, of course, in the view of all those who live in law over time, these legitimating judgments are not handcrafted free from the norms of morality—alas, a conceptual severance required by standard or Exclusive Legal Positivism when setting out its own description of legal meaningfulness.

Further to seeking sufficiency, Postema calls jurisprudence a “sociable science” in so far as it seeks “neither to subordinate practice to theory nor theory to practice but to integrate them instead.” (2) Postema comments favourably on C.S. Peirce, who asked: “‘What is law like?’ and ‘How is this like law?’, rather than declaring ‘This is not like law, so it’s not law (properly speaking).’” (5) Peirce continues, one “seeks understanding by locating, relating, and integrating.” (5) In the midst of all this sociability, one learns that there are found, in Postema’s own office, windows open wide to the wonderous but woolly world of concepts. We above have just and justly shaken hands with objectivity, normativity, legitimacy, practice, and domains—with a pragmatic look at a telling-truth (and lying) within and about the nature of legal operations within the legitimate nation-state.

Further on within the Philosophy of Law as an Integral Part of Philosophy, the reader must, eyes right on contemporary political/legal issues, look upon the meaning of accountability, authority, interpretation, loyalty, methodology, power, rules, principles—not to mention commitment, consensus, conventions, coordination, custom, time, training, and trust. These concepts are but seeds in the ground. One might even venture that the fourteen pieces in this Festschrift are samplings, perhaps, or a test-crop, for the success of Postema’s plantings—ones grounded and raised in a field where legal philosophy, as the product of the contemporary jurisprudent, is but an integral part of Philosophy done right. Indeed, to that end, the editors declare, Postema has shown us a new future for jurisprudence.

About the contents of the volume: The initial article is a long Introduction by the editors, Thomas Bustamante and Thiago Lopes Decat. It is very well done in providing the context for the essays following. This editorial piece stresses Postema’s departure from 20th century analytical jurisprudence, a parting driven by its “lack of historical consciousness, political sensibility and empirical reflection.” (24)

The volume itself has five Parts. Part I has two essays under the heading ‘On the Value of the Rule of Law’ and consists in first a new essay by Gerald Postema, ‘Fidelity, Accountability and Trust’ (how the rule of law must provide protection and recourse against the arbitrary exercise of power) and one by Franklin M. Dutra on ‘Equal Concern and Respect,’ where he finds similarities between Postema and Dworkin.

Part II has four essays under ‘Legal Reasoning, Integrity and Protestant Interpretation’: Barbara Baum Levenbook, ‘Postema’s Account of Integrity’ (discusses integrity, fidelity, and regret, with attention to Dworkin); Thomas Bustamante, ‘Revisiting the Idea of Protestant Interpretation’ (offers optimism about the value of political integrity); Dennis Patterson, ‘Postema, Dworkin, and the Question of Meaning’ (regarding linkings with Postema, Dworkin’s account of interpretation should be replaced by Wittgenstein’s ideas found in Philosophical Investigations); Brian H. Bix, ‘Protestant Interpretation, Conventions, and Legal Truth’ (argues that in some legal structures interpretation is better understood as catholic than protestant).

Part III has two essays under ‘Analogical Reasoning in Law’: Thiago Lopes Decat, ‘Some Inferentialist Remarks….’ (discusses critically Postema’s understanding of common law’s view of analogy in opposition to particularism and rule rationalism) and Fábio Perin Shecaira, ‘Postema on Analogies in Law’ (supports criticism of Postema’s opposition to rule-rationalism’s interpretations of legal analogy).

Part IV is ‘Methodology and the Nature of Jurisprudence’. There are three authors: Margaret Martin, ‘Postema on Hart: The Illusion of Value-Neutrality’ (from Postema’s position, Hart has failed to show how law can be value-neutral); Dan Priel, ‘Analytic Jurisprudence in Time’ (analyses the relevance of time on three levels); Saulo de Matos, ‘How Postema’s Jurisprudence as Sociable Science is Like Dworkin’s Interpretivism’ (describes the difference between Postema and Dworkin, the former being more empirical).

Part V provides ‘Postema’s Analysis of Contemporary Legal Theories’: Andrea Faggion, ‘In Defence of a Thin Concept of Law’ (a defence of Hart here suggesting that Hart provided merely reasons for official action and not necessarily for the public); Guilherme da FCF de Almeida & Noel Struchiner, ‘Philosophical and Psychological Distinctions Between Presumptive Positivism and Rule-Sensitive Particularism’ (about a debate between Postema and Frederick Schauer suggesting they are both wrong); ‘Interview with Professor Gerald Postema’ by Thomas Bustamante, César Serbena and Natalina Stamile (Postema answers questions on a range of issues stressing that law is intensely practical and so it must be understood in the context within which it operates historically).