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Market Definition in the Platform Economy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2021

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Abstract

The article addresses the role market definition can play for EU competition practice in the platform economy. The focus is on intermediaries that bring together groups of users whose decisions are interdependent, which therefore are commonly referred to as ‘two-sided platforms’. We address challenges to market definition that accompany these cross-group network effects, assess current practice in a number of competition cases, and provide guidance for adapting practice to properly account for the economic forces shaping markets with two-sided platforms. We ask whether and when a single market can be defined that encompasses both sides. We advocate a multi-markets approach that takes account of cross-market linkages, acknowledges the existence of zero-price markets, and properly accounts for the homing behaviour of market participants.

JEL classification

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge

INTRODUCTION

Market definition belongs to the small group of concepts that are essential to all instruments of EU competition law:Footnote 1 the prohibition of anti-competitive coordinationFootnote 2 and abusive practices,Footnote 3 as well as merger control.Footnote 4 It is primarilyFootnote 5 employed as a first step to assess a firm's market power.Footnote 6 The definition of a market is meant to provide a framework to help identify the competitive constraints market players face. Thus, market definition is used to constrain the scope of the analysis of factors relevant for determining market power,Footnote 7 as well as to identify barriers to entry.Footnote 8

When, in 1997, the European Commission issued its current Market Definition Notice, the rise of the digital platform economy was still to come. Today, it is the digital platforms that appear to pose the greatest challenges to competition practice: search engines, social networks, online marketplaces, mobile operating systems and app stores, online travel agencies, video platforms, real-estate portals, and the like. What characterises these platforms is that they create and manage network effects,Footnote 9 particularlyFootnote 10 as they act as intermediaries between different user groups who are linked through cross-group network effects,Footnote 11 a feature commonly referred to as ‘two-sidedness’:Footnote 12 decisions of users in one group are materially dependent on the decisions of users in another group and the platform operator has the opportunity to significantly influence those decisions.

How these interdependencies between two or more user groups should be taken into account when defining markets raises a number of fundamental issues that were not addressed in the Market Definition Notice of 1997.Footnote 13 This is remarkable because two-sidedness is not a feature unique to digital platforms. Capturing the business models of newspapers, (ad-financed) TV, payment card systems, or shopping centres—to name but a few instances of ‘traditional’ two-sided platforms—poses essentially the same problems. However, digital platforms have increased the scale and scope of activities, and some control their own eco-systems. This has led to complaints by other market participants and become a general policy concern. It is against this background that, in the last two decades, the economic theory of two-sided markets has experienced considerable progress and its implications for competition policy have been widely discussed.

Adapting the Market Definition Notice to meet the realities and challenges posed by the rise of digital platforms will therefore be the central concern of the review of the Notice launched by the Commission in April 2020.Footnote 14 Thus, this evaluation must be seen as one of a series of measures by the Commission to adapt the EU competition law framework to cope with the (digital) platform economy. In this vein, the Commission has issued guidance on Article 22 of the EU Merger RegulationFootnote 15 and is considering further calibrations to the merger rules,Footnote 16 is also about to reform the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation,Footnote 17 and has proposed a ‘Digital Markets Act’.Footnote 18

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Part II we explain that the Commission, national competition authorities and courts are indeed well advised to pay attention to market definition precisely because, in the context of two-sided platforms, the concept is more cumbersome to implement. In Part III, we address fundamental challenges that come along with applying market definition on two-sided platforms. In Part IV, we consider two issues on the proper role of market definition that are conceptually intertwined and that underlie our position on the correct market definition in the context of two-sided platforms. First, we explain why in such a context the calculation of market shares is less informative as a proxy for market power. Second, we argue that market definition must not (conclusively) determine the scope of a competition analysis. In Part V we conclude.

I. WHY THE COMMISSION IS RIGHT TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO MARKET DEFINITION IN (DIGITAL) PLATFORM MARKETS

In their report on ‘Competition Policy for the Digital Era’, commissioned by Competition Commissioner Vestager, the authors Crémer, de Montjoye, and Schweitzer do not call into question the instrument of market definition as such but state that:

in the case of platforms, the interdependence of the markets becomes a crucial part of the analysis whereas the role of market definition traditionally has been to isolate problems. Therefore … less emphasis should be put on the market definition part of the analysis, and more importance attributed to the theories of harm and identification of anti-competitive strategies.Footnote 19

The premise of this statement should indeed not be controversial: how competition analysis can do justice to the interdependencies between the effects certain market conduct has on the different user groups of two-sided platforms is one of the key challenges the digital era poses to competition law. The questions, however, of how much emphasis should be placed on market definition and, particularly, how many resources should be devoted to it in competition enforcement by courts and authorities, has to be put in perspective.

First of all, as we will discuss more in detail in the next Part,Footnote 20 it is true that the established methodologies for defining markets need to be adapted when applied to two-sided platforms. Market definition in the context of two-sided platforms is more complex and cumbersome, and consumes more resources. Consequently, its results are more prone to error and, moreover, the simple statistics that are derived after defining the market become less informative for the competition analysis. In particular, market shares are less meaningful as an indicator of a two-sided platform's market power, the assessment of which is an essential element in merger control,Footnote 21 in abuse cases,Footnote 22 and when appraising the anti-competitive effects of an agreement.Footnote 23 This is because the said interdependencies between different user groups have to be taken into account and can, depending on the facts of the individual case, lead both to a situation where high market shares cannot be regarded as an indicator of a high degree of market power and to a situation where a platform should be regarded as having a high degree of market power even if it has only a relatively low market share on this ‘market side’.Footnote 24 These findings especially call into question intervention thresholds based on market share.

Furthermore, the rise of (two-sided) digital platforms poses the challenge for competition authorities of identifying cross-market anti-competitive strategies that are new or appear to be less relevant in other contexts. Just to name two examples: the Commission's Google Shopping decisionFootnote 25 could prove to be a catalyst for the development of a doctrine of abusive ‘self-preferencing’, the scope of which is mainly seen in the area of two-sided digital platforms. The concentration processes in the digital sector have fuelled the discussion over whether merger control should pay much closer attention to acquisitions that cut off potential competition.Footnote 26

Against this background it becomes clear that competition analysis in relation to two-sided (digital) platforms needs flexible thinking that must not be limited from the outset by conventional ideas of market definition and market power assessment. Thus, the introductory quote by Crémer, et al. is indeed convincing when taking the position of a competition authority that observes the potentially anti-competitive conduct of a platform or which has to assess a merger that involves one or several platforms. In such constellations, typically it does not seem reasonable to commence the investigation by devoting resources to a detailed and well-founded market definition. Market definition is inappropriate as a screening device or a first filter to identify competition problems with two-sided platforms. Instead, a competition authority is usually well advised to concentrate its resources on the analysis of theories of harm and an identification of possible anti-competitive strategies.

The picture changes, however, as soon as it is taken into account that market definition is in many cases mandatory for the application of EU competition law. Moreover, it is in particular the courts that are faced with competition cases—whether by way of judicial review of decisions of competition authorities or by way of private litigation—that benefit from a better transparency of the competition analysis and a clearer focus on the key arguments that go hand in hand with market definition. Viewed from this angle, the finding that market definition is more complex, error-prone and possibly less informative in the case of two-sided platforms may indeed lead to quite the opposite conclusion to the one stated above: the (correct) application and interpretation of market definition on two-sided platforms requires special diligence and attention.

A. The Positivist Angle: EU Competition Law Requires to Define Markets

A competition law system might entirely dispense with defining markets. In particular, economic instruments make it possible to measure market power directly. Whether such a system is preferable in terms of administrability, implementation costs, error costs, legal certainty, etc.Footnote 27 appears to be doubtful but may remain open at this point. The practical relevance of market definition as a concept of EU competition law becomes obvious by the fact that it is not only widely used by courts and authorities but considered practically mandatory in various contexts,Footnote 28 in particular where market power has to be measured in order to determine whether or not:

  • – agreements between undertakings give rise to restrictive effects on competition pursuant to Article 101(1) TFEU,Footnote 29 and whether these effects are appreciable;Footnote 30

  • – agreements between undertakings afford these undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the production in question and thus are prohibited even though they fulfil the other requirements of an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU;Footnote 31

  • – an undertaking is below the market-share thresholds that define the scope of application of block exemption regulations;Footnote 32

  • – an undertaking is market-dominant pursuant to Article 102 TFEU;Footnote 33

  • – a concentration would (not) significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or a strengthening of a dominant position pursuant to Article 2(2) and (3) EC Merger Regulation.Footnote 34

Even if market definition is more complex and less informative in cases involving two-sided platforms, it seems rather unlikely that the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) will shift away from requiring it where it considers it mandatory in non-platform cases. Thus, while defining relevant markets is for good reasons not at the beginning of an investigation that concerns a (digital) two-sided platform, to make a decision watertight, courts and authorities will ultimately have to define the relevant markets at least in those contexts in which the ECJ has repeatedly considered it a necessary element of a competition law analysis.Footnote 35

B. On the Jurisprudential Function of Market Definition and Why the Commission Should Be Concerned about It

Including market definition as a formal step in a competition analysis, thereby combining an approach structured and defined by law with economic methods, forces those who invoke and enforce competition law to carefully consider, interpret and (verbally) explain when and to what extent substitution may restrict a firm's market power. This not only disciplines competition authorities or parties that carry out and put forward a competition analysis before a court but makes their arguments more transparent to the parties affected by a decision, the opposing parties in private litigation and, last but not least, the courts that have to review an authority's decision or to judge in disputes between private parties.Footnote 36 Thus, not only can the requirement to define markets make competition practice more transparent and predictable to the firms concerned; it also facilitates the work of the courts and, consequently, may help to avoid judicial errors and improve the effectiveness of judicial redress.

This is not to say that the direct application of economic methods to substantiate a theory of harm would necessarily lead to greater legal uncertainty.Footnote 37 But including market definition in an analysis may help courts to review cases more efficiently, because it may limit from the start the theories of harm and countervailing efficiency effects that might be put forward by the parties. Consequently, one may indeed assume that, insofar as market definition was postulated by the courts as a necessary prerequisite for the application of EU competition law, this was done in order to guarantee legal certainty and to facilitate judicial review.Footnote 38 This rationale would be missed if there were no legal clarification of those (fundamental) issues that market definition raises in the case of two-sided platforms.

This leads to the question of why the Commission in particular should take on this task. Since, after all, while the Commission itself, when exercising its discretion, is bound by the rules it has laid down in the Market Definition Notice,Footnote 39 it is the ECJ that has the last word on the interpretation of the EU competition provisions. One could therefore assume that the clarification of legal issues regarding market definition lies in any event in the hands of the European courts or, indirectly, the national courts as they can initiate preliminary references to the ECJ.Footnote 40

Analysis of the European courts’ adjudication on market definition has revealed that the Court of Justice and the General Court tend to attach great importance to the Commission's statements in the Market Definition Notice.Footnote 41 There should be no doubt that, as a matter of principle, the rules on market definition as developed and applied by the Commission should be subject to full judicial review. It is otherwise only for their actual implementation, insofarFootnote 42 as it involves complex economic assessments.Footnote 43 Yet, as one observer noted, ‘[o]ne is hard pressed to find a case, since the [General Court] was created, with any level of substantial analysis of [market definition] by the ECJ’.Footnote 44 This indicates that the Commission's 1997 Notice was a truthful codification of the court's preceding adjudication and that the Commission's positions on the legal issuesFootnote 45 of market definition were barely challenged by the parties and, thus, seem to have been essentially undisputed. This leaves us with the—admittedly somewhat trivial—insight that a careful analysis of the questions of law involved with market definition on part of the Commission provides valuable guidance to the European courts and saves judicial resources.

Further, it must not be ignored that the Commission enjoys a special position vis-à-vis the national courts and authorities: while the latter are not bound by guidelines, notices, and other soft law instruments,Footnote 46 they are bound by the Commission's decision-making practice in the circumstances covered by Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003. In fact, Member State courtsFootnote 47 and authoritiesFootnote 48 often seem to regard it as an obvious option to follow the Commission's view as expressed in its soft law instruments without further ado.Footnote 49 Thus, the distinguished position of the CommissionFootnote 50 should be seen also as entailing a particular responsibility to provide guidance on the legal rules that govern market definition in EU competition law.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that, comparatively, the Commission has great expertise and considerable resources at its disposal. Certainly, this also involves a wide range of tasks. But, when considering how to use its resources, it should not underestimate the crucial importance of the positive externalities it may create to the benefit of the national courts and authorities by elaborating and publishing its own legal position on market definition in the platform economy.

C. Interrelation with Pro-competitive Regulation of Digital Platforms

Uncertainties as to the scope of competition law has given rise to initiatives of regulating digital platforms. One aspect in this respect is the lack of clarity over market definition. For instance, in its initiative for a ‘Digital Markets Act’Footnote 51 the Commission expressed its belief that current EU competition law is inadequate to protect functioning competition in the era of large digital platforms acting as gatekeepers. This view was in part based on clear-cut limits to competition enforcement, but also on considerable uncertainties as to its actual scope and problems of implementation—including uncertainties concerning adequate application of the established methods of market definition.Footnote 52

Such uncertainties have also encouraged regulation at national level. Thus, for instance, the German legislature has established a right for payment service providers to access technical infrastructure that contributes to mobile and internet-based payment services (the so-called ‘Lex Apple Pay’).Footnote 53 One reason for this regulatory intervention—although certainly not the only oneFootnote 54—was that it appeared to be uncertain whether Apple, as the operator of mobile devices, could be regarded an addressee of Article 102 TFEU or the equivalent provision under German competition law. That depends in particular on the question of how the power that a platform derives in an environment with multi-homing on one side and single-homing on the other side (a ‘competitive bottleneck’Footnote 55) is considered within the market definition framework.Footnote 56

While new ex ante regulation may be necessary when current competition law fails to ensure competitive outcomes, this comes at a price. Apart from the immediate expenditure of legislation, it creates (new) legal uncertainty and is prone to error, in particular as it may overstep the mark. Moreover, when implemented at the national level such as in the case of the German ‘Lex Apple Pay’, regulation leads to fragmentation within the internal market and, therefore, will likely trigger a political debate on harmonising legislation at Union level.

By outlining how the concept of market definition has to be implemented on two-sided platforms, the Commission may contribute to clarifying the scope of EU competition law. This may help to tailor new ex ante regulation more precisely or, in exceptional cases, even to avoid it. Moreover, competition enforcement will maintain its significance alongside ex ante regulation only if the necessary adaptations of its essential concepts to the digital era have been clarified.

II. MAJOR CHALLENGES POSED BY THE TWO-SIDEDNESS OF PLATFORMS AND HOW TO COPE WITH THEM

To define markets, one has to identify the goods and services offered by an undertaking and to understand substitute offers. This is more challenging in the case of two-sided platforms as they typically offer complex and interrelated products. In the following, we address four key issues.

A. Single-Market Approach vs. Multi-Markets Approach

In the context of a two-sided platform, one approach is to define a market for each side. Consequently, each market can be analysed separately while taking into account that they are linked through cross-group network effects. This is referred to as the ‘multi-markets approach’. Alternatively, one may define a single market for an intermediation service offered to both sides of the market. This is referred to as the ‘single-market approach’.

1. Established EU Competition Practice: Multi-Markets Approach to Payment Card Systems

The Commission and the EU courts had to consider this issue with regard to payment card systems.Footnote 57 In the MasterCard case, the General Court rejected the applicants’ view that there was only one product market at issue, namely a market where the payment card systems provided a single service offered to both cardholders and merchants and where they competed against each other and against all other forms of payment. Thus, the General Court confirmed the Commission's view that the ‘issuing side’ and the ‘acquiring side’ should be considered separate marketsFootnote 58 and reinforced this position in a subsequent judgment involving the French payment card system Cartes Bancaires.Footnote 59

In Cartes Bancaires, the ECJ held that such a definition of separate issuing and acquiring markets must not, however, have the effect that interdependencies with the ‘acquiring side’ of the payment system had to be excluded from the analysis of agreements on the ‘issuer side’. The court stressed that network effects between the two user groups must be taken into account when assessing whether the payment system's restrictions on the issuing of cards should be regarded as a restriction of competition by object or effect under Article 101(1) TFEU.Footnote 60 To reach this conclusion, the ECJ did not take an explicit stand on the applicability of the multi-markets approach as such. The judgment is most crucial, however, because it clarifies in any case that doing justice to the interrelation between the different sides of a two-sided platform does not require adopting a single-market approach. Thus, the court implicitly accepted the multi-markets approach under the condition that cross-group network effects are considered for the definition of the markets on the two sides of the platform and at subsequent stages of a competition law analysis.

2. On the (In)Adequacy of a Single-Market Approach in the Case of Matching Platforms

While in recent years the Commission has dealt with quite a number of cases that involved two-sided digital platforms, it appears that in none of these cases did the Commission explicitly engage in a discussion on the question of the conditions under which a multi-markets approach or a single-market approach should be applied. Yet the Commission's practice indicates that it analyses these cases based on a multi-markets-approach throughout. First of all, in various cases the Commission defined separate markets for online advertising and user content.Footnote 61 In all those decisions, the application of a multi-markets approach does not seem to have been in dispute.Footnote 62 This approach is, however, considered more controversial for so-called ‘matching platforms’, ie platforms that facilitate transactions such as payment card systems, online marketplaces, hotel booking or real-estate platforms, or platforms that enable a different kind of interaction, for instance online dating platforms. Most prominently, the US Supreme Court in Ohio v American Express Co argued that ‘two-sided transaction platforms, like the credit-card market … facilitate a single, simultaneous transaction between parties’ and, consequently, adopted a single-market approach.Footnote 63 The UK's Competition and Markets Authority stipulated in a merger decision that involved two online food ordering platforms that ‘where the platform is “matching” or facilitating transactions … a single market definition is appropriate, which takes account of the competitive constraints on both sides of the market’.Footnote 64

The Commission has taken a different route in its practice on payment card systemsFootnote 65 and in particular its reasoning for the definition of a distinct market for comparison shopping services in Google Search (Shopping) also reveals the use of a multi-markets logic in the context of online platforms. Most notably, when separating comparison shopping services from merchant platforms from a demand-side perspective, the Commission did not presume a single intermediation service offered to two user groups but distinguished between the consumers’ perspective and the online retailers’ perspective, and gave separate reasons why it assumed that comparison shopping services and merchant platforms serve a different purpose.Footnote 66 Given this differentiated reasoning, it would have been desirable for the Commission to have also stated clearly that, correspondingly, two interrelated markets can be distinguished: one in which Google Shopping offers consumers a service to find products they may be interested in, and another one where it offers sellers a listing service that helps them to reach consumers.

A view on the practice of the Member States’ authorities and courts reveals a considerable heterogeneity as to the appropriate approach in case of matching platforms. After the Netherlands Competition Authority, in a 2007 merger case that involved two horticultural platforms, opted for a single-market approach,Footnote 67 it was most notably the Bundeskartellamt that explicitly considered the issue. As a matter of principle, the authority assumes that separate product markets for each side of a platform should be defined. However, in the case of matching platforms, the Bundeskartellamt regards a single-market approach as feasible if ‘user groups essentially have the same need for liaising with the respective other group, and therefore, the groups’ views regarding substitutability of function do not differ substantially’.Footnote 68 On that basis, the Bundeskartellamt assumed, for example, with a view on Amazon's online marketplace that the possibilities to substitute may be more limited for retailers than for consumers, who want to shop and who could switch to competing retailers (online and offline).Footnote 69 This suggests separate markets for the provision of online marketplace services to retailers and to consumers.Footnote 70 In the same vein, the National Commission of Markets and Competition (‘CNMC’) in Spain opted for a multi-markets approach in a merger case that involved online food ordering platforms. The CNMC assumed in particular different opportunities for consumers and restaurants to bypass the intermediation services offered by these platforms:Footnote 71 while the former could readily directly contact the restaurants that offered to deliver food, the latter were dependent on the intermediary services of the platforms to gain access to their customers. Consequently, the authority defined, first, a market where the online platforms offered their intermediation services to restaurants and, second, a market where consumers could order food with delivery service both via the ordering platforms and directly from restaurants.Footnote 72

Yet, the Bundeskartellamt either adopted a single-market approach or considered such an approach at least feasible in merger cases that involved online dating platforms,Footnote 73 online comparison platformsFootnote 74 and real-estate platforms.Footnote 75 The Autorité de la concurrence, the French competition authority, referred to this latter decision when it also applied a single-market approach in a merger decision that involved real-estate platforms.Footnote 76 It is remarkable that the adoption of a single-market approach in these cases does not seem to be the result of a differentiated analysis of potential substitutes on both sides of the platform.Footnote 77

Instead, the Bundeskartellamt took a shortcut: it put forward an ‘indivisibility’ argument, essentially claiming that an intermediation service offered to two (or more) ‘market sides’ could not be split up into two markets, as such a multi-markets approach could not fully do justice to the interdependencies of the ‘market sides’. Moreover, the authority referred to the nature of the ‘matching platform’ as it stipulated, for instance, in its decision involving online dating platforms, that the two user groups, ie men and women who are looking for a partner, would inevitably meet again if they switched to conceivable alternatives.Footnote 78 Such a shortcut in the reasoning, however, merely begs the question of the respective possibilities of men and women to do so without the use of an online dating platform. If, for example, men's and women's inclinations to use an online dating platform or user behaviour (eg the frequency of usage) is asymmetric, this will result in different possibilities of substitution. It is conceivable that there are specialised platforms where both groups are very asymmetrically distributed. Yet, when a user considers switching from a platform with an imbalanced gender ratio to one with a balanced gender ratio, this implies that the attractiveness of such a switch is likely to depend on the user's gender. Certainly, online dating platforms may have a self-interest in achieving a balanced gender ratio, and there are instruments available that may be used for this purpose, such as advertisements that specifically target one user group, or an adaptation of the price structure for using the service. But, then again, it seems rather doubtful to assume without hesitation that there are equal opportunities to substitute.

Furthermore, one must not ignore that different people may use a matching platform for different purposes and with different intensity; thus, a platform seen by some as a good substitute may be seen by others as a bad substitute and there may be systematic differences between the two sides. Also, users on one side may typically be active on multiple platforms, while users on the other side may be active only on one; this will affect substitution possibilities. The intermediary offers fundamentally different services to the two sides.Footnote 79 It would be quite a coincidence if the substitution patterns were symmetric on both sides of the platform.Footnote 80 Moreover, competition analyses often draw on market prices or price changes, such as in the case of merger control by means of pricing pressure tests. But, if the prices differ between the respective user groups (as apparently in the case of online dating platforms), it remains unclear which is the single price that should be relied upon following the single-market approach.

This shows that, with regard to platforms that aim at brokering transactions between two user groups and even in the case of online dating platforms—which seem to many an obvious candidate for a single-market approachFootnote 81—it cannot simply be assumed that the competitive situation of the platform is symmetrical in relation to both user groups. But, even if an investigation concluded that the two sides were symmetrical (in terms of characteristics and the way the platform sets prices), the single-market approach does not offer any benefits over the multi-markets approach because the economic analysis of the latter could simply consider two identical markets characterised by symmetric cross-group network effects. However, symmetry may be observed in the status quo and disappear in a counterfactual, eg when evaluating the competitive effect of contractual restrictions imposed on users on one side. To study such effects meaningfully, it would be necessary to use the multi-markets approach.

3. Conclusions

Competition authorities and courts are well advised to use uniformly a multi-markets approach when they define markets in the context of two-sided platforms.Footnote 82 It would be desirable for the Commission to make this explicit with the reform of the Market Definition Notice.

The multi-markets approach is a logical and consistent application of demand-side substitutability to two-sided platforms as it naturally accounts for different substitution possibilities by the user groups on both sides of a platform. It is based on the economic primitives of the market and not on derived constructs such as an overall demand for an intermediation service, which depends on demand substitutability on each side of the platform as well as on the cross-group network effects linking the two.Footnote 83

While one might think of conditions under which a single-market approach could theoretically be feasible, the necessary conditions are so severe that it would only be applicable under specific circumstances. Moreover, recognising that a single-market approach might be applicable under certain conditions would create substantial risks that an authority or a court would adopt it erroneously. This does not mean that the interactions between the different user groups that are served by a two-sided platform are to be neglected; quite the contrary: they must be considered for the definition of the (multiple) markets as they may be crucial to evaluating demand-side substitutability on each side of the platform.

B. Markets without a Price

It is a widespread phenomenon that operators of two-sided platforms do not charge prices vis-à-vis one group of their customers: viewers may use free, ad-financed TV, consumers are not charged a (visible) price using e-commerce platforms such as Amazon Marketplace or Booking, and Google charges no search fee for using its search engine and Facebook no membership or usage fee.Footnote 84

1. Why Do Zero-Price Markets Exist?

A number of economic considerations can explain why this is a rational and sustainable business strategy. First, it is important to see that, in the case of transaction platforms, the platform may decide to levy the fee entirely on the merchant side. Thus, while the consumers do not pay a visible fee, they bear part of the fee or even the entire fee as the merchant will pass it onto them through higher prices. Second, a platform may want to subsidise one side, which may lead to negative prices.Footnote 85 However, such prices may be self-defeating if they attract unwanted types of users or are simply not feasible. In particular, ‘zero’ prices are often a feature of two-sided platforms on the side that exerts a positive cross-group effect and experiences a negative from the other. Many ad-financed platforms such as commercial TV or internet news portals have this feature. In this case, consumers incur an opportunity cost in the form of their scarce attention, which is partly diverted to advertising. Another instance is that consumers ‘pay’ with their data and the platform can use this data to improve services (which may even be a prerequisite for it to succeed) or offer alternative services that the platform or third parties can monetise (possibly with different consumers); in such instances it is possible but not always the case that consumers incur an opportunity cost for providing their data. Many ad-financed digital platforms benefit from the attention and data that consumers provide. The data they receive allows them to provide better-targeted ads, which is in the interest of advertisers and, sometimes, also consumers. Furthermore, some platforms choose a ‘freemium’ strategy, offering menus of contracts that include a base offer at ‘zero price’, or they offer a ‘zero price’ as part of a dynamic pricing strategy that builds up a sufficiently large user base to convince late arrivals that it is worth paying. Finally, ‘zero prices’ may be forced by regulation. For example, net neutrality regulationFootnote 86 can effectively restrict the freedom of internet service providers (ISPs)—which operate as two-sided platforms, enabling transactions between content providers and consumers—to charge content providers for the delivery of content.Footnote 87

2. Past EU Competition Practice: (Unfounded) Reluctance to Define ‘Viewers’ Markets’

A view on past EU competition practice reveals a certain reluctance on part of the European Commission to acknowledge that there can be a ‘market’ that deserves consideration even if the observable transactions do not involve a monetary price. In some merger cases from the 1990s involving TV broadcasters, the Commission left open the question of whether there is a ‘broadcasting’ or ‘viewers’ market’, arguing that:

all TV broadcasters compete against each other for audience shares. However, in view of the fact that there is no direct trade relationship between broadcasters of ‘free’ tv channels, on the ‘supply side’ and, viewers on the ‘demand side’, it might be argued that tv broadcasting does not constitute a market in the strict economic sense of this notion.Footnote 88

The Commission suggested that it might not be necessary for the purposes of competition law to consider the ‘viewers’ market’ a ‘market’ because, ‘[i]n any event, the audience shares in the TV broadcasting are a determinant factor for the success of the broadcasters in the TV advertising market and have, therefore, to be assessed at least in the context of this market’.Footnote 89 Thus, the Commission essentially reasoned that, as high shares in the market for TV viewers would translate into higher shares in the TV advertising market, it would in all probability not be decisive for the outcome of a merger case if the existence of a market for TV viewers were denied.

The underlying policy argument to legitimise this approach would seem to be that the interests that competition law is meant to protect are properly taken care of by focusing on those ‘sides’ of a platform market where the monetisation takes place. However, if we assume that competition law aims at protecting the economic interests of the consumers, ignoring the unpaid side is typically inappropriate. This can easily be illustrated with a view on commercial TV financed through advertising: if viewers dislike TV advertising (as evidence suggests), viewer demand will respond to changes in the level of advertising. A merger analysis would thus need to take this directly into account if it cared not only about advertiser surplus but also about viewer surplus, because the merger of two TV broadcasters that are close competitors on the ‘viewers’ market’ would give them leeway to increase their advertising volumes. The most straightforward and indeed necessaryFootnote 90 way to appropriately protect the economic interests of the consumers as viewers against potential negative cross-group network effects is to acknowledge the existence of a viewer market. Even if one finds instead that the viewers are neutral to advertising, a merger between two ad-financed TV channels is likely to affect the profitability of each viewer. This change in profitability per viewer affects the incentives of the merged entity to attract additional viewers. Therefore, a merger is likely to affect the content choice of the TV channels, which is likely to impact consumer welfare. Thus, ignoring the unpaid side in any case amounts to ignoring the economic interests of viewers.

Even if the Commission has now clarified its position accordingly (as will be explained subsequently), the question of the existence of ‘viewers’ markets’, which has been kept open for quite a while, holds an important lesson: earlier clarification by the Commission, even if not strictly necessary in the context of the aforementioned merger decisions, could have prevented uncertainties among market operators and contributed to steer practice in the right direction at Member State level.Footnote 91

3. On the Acknowledgement of Zero-Price Markets in the World of Digital Platforms

With the advent of the digitised world, the European Commission did acknowledge without hesitation that a ‘market’ may also exist where a product is offered without monetary remuneration by the users. Thus, the EU Commission assumed, for example, in its abuse cases against Microsoft that there were markets for streaming media playersFootnote 92 and for web browsers,Footnote 93 even though these products were typically provided free of charge to final consumers. The (then) Court of First Instance confirmed this position.Footnote 94 In the same vein, the Commission subsequently took for granted in its merger decisions Microsoft/LinkedIn,Footnote 95 Microsoft/Skype,Footnote 96 and Facebook/WhatsApp Footnote 97 that remuneration is not an indispensable characteristic for the existence of a market. Moreover, in the Google Shopping case, the Commission concluded that the relevant product markets were the market for general search services and the market for comparison shopping services,Footnote 98 notwithstanding that the use of these services is offered free of charge to final consumers. Regardless of whether one finds the Commission's theory of harm in the Google Shopping decision convincing, the case nicely illustrates how certain conduct on a zero-price market might harm consumers in ‘paid markets’: if a search engine ‘manipulates’ its algorithm to give priority to its own affiliates, this may impede access to (paid-for) consumer markets and reduce the competitive pressure on those markets.

While the issue of zero-price markets on one side of a (digital) two-sided platformFootnote 99 has so far not been discussed by the ECJ in a competition case,Footnote 100 there should be no doubt that the court will approve the Commission's practice. Indeed, the court has acknowledged the economic rationalities of two-sided platforms that underly zero-price markets,Footnote 101 particularly as it considered the concept of a ‘service’ within the meaning of Article 57(1) TFEU, which explicitly requires that it is ‘normally provided for remuneration’. Thus, the court argued, for example, that amateur athletes who participate in sports events without being paid by the organisers receive consideration as their sponsors are provided with publicity.Footnote 102

4. Conclusions

To appreciate fully business activities in the context of two-sided platforms and to do justice to competition law's purpose of protecting consumer welfare, the legal concept of a ‘market’ should not be interpreted as requiring a (visible) price to be paid by one party to the other. It is not sufficient to consider the activities on the ‘unpaid side’ of the two-sided platform only by way of including them in the competition law analysis of the ‘paid side’ of the platform.Footnote 103 Such an approach would exclude certain activities and the ensuing positive or negative effects on consumer welfare altogether from the radar of competition law. Instead, competition practice should recognise straightforwardly that there can be ‘markets’ for products offered free of charge, ie without monetary consideration from those who receive the product. While it is well understood that the supply of personal data and/or the attention to the platform can be regarded as consideration because it can be monetised by the platform, it is neither necessaryFootnote 104 nor even beneficial to transform this insight into a legal concept of ‘remuneration’.Footnote 105

Consequently, a ‘market’ as a concept of competition law should be understood as consisting of transactions between two or more parties, of which at least one acts for economic purposes.Footnote 106 The latter is apparent in cases where a product is provided for remuneration. Moreover, where a product is offered free of charge, it suffices to demonstrate that the activity is part of a broad or a long-term strategy of the platform operator to generate revenue. This definition of a ‘market’ is meant to exclude essentially (only) activities that involve the exercise of power by public authorities and philanthropic activities. In the digital sphere, the latter category would include in particular Wikipedia, non-commercial blogs, and non-commercial donation-based crowdfunding platforms. The relevant provisions of EU competition law can straightforwardly be construed accordingly.Footnote 107 While this is in line with the Commission's current practice, it would be a helpful signal to firms, but also national authorities and courts, for the Commission to explain and refine its approach accordingly.

C. Market Delineation and Homing Decisions

If two-sided platforms offer intermediation services, it is important to take into account the users’ homing decision: if they make discrete choices between the offerings provided by platforms (and possibly non-platform providers of substitute services) they single-home, whereas they multi-home if they may decide to consume multiple offerings.Footnote 108 In a media context, viewers are single-homers if in the relevant period they pick one of the offerings. For example, a person may watch television only for the news and decide which news show to watch. Such a person is a single-homer.

Investigating whether and at which costs users may multi-home is essential for market definition and the assessment of market entry barriers in the context of two-sided platforms. This is above all because even strong positive network effects do not lead to consumer lock-ins on their own but only in conjunction with coordination problems.Footnote 109 However, the problem of miscoordination can be mitigated in the case of multi-homing because in this case there is no first-mover risk involved if a consumer uses a newly entered platform.Footnote 110

1. Identifying Homing Patterns

Taking a closer look at what counts as a single-homing and what as a multi-homing decision, consider platforms matching transport services to travellers. For example, if a traveller needs transport from an airport to the city centre, this is clearly a discrete-choice problem in terms of which product to consume. However, when we speak of single-homing versus multi-homing in a platform context, we ask whether a consumer has to decide on the particular platform or provider before actually choosing a particular consumption plan. If a traveller decides which mode of transport and associated provider of this transport to choose before deciding on the particular consumption, then we talk of a single-homing traveller. For example, if a traveller who has installed the Uber app takes Uber as the starting point of her transport decision and checks for available rides on Uber, but for alternative transport possibilities only if dissatisfied with the available offers, we may want to classify her as a single-homing user.Footnote 111 Correspondingly, somebody who first checks for the availability of a ride by local train and considers alternative means of transport only if dissatisfied with the local train offer is classified as a single-homer. By contrast, a traveller who checks offers, for instance on Uber and other transport platforms, before deciding what to do can be considered a multi-homer in the sense that she uses the information services by all information providers.

In our transport example, to the extent that individual providers of transportation services can list on alternative platforms, these transport providers can reach travellers through multiple channels (eg this holds if a van service can list on Uber as well as on other transport platforms). Hence, the degree of multi-homing by travellers affects the substitutability of platform listing services from the viewpoint of a provider of transport services and, as a consequence, also the latter's homing decision. It could be that a stable pattern of single-homing/multi-homing on the two sides emerges.Footnote 112

Moreover, a platform may affect the homing decision on one side through contractual clauses as, for example, in the case of exclusivity clauses that tie a seller to an e-commerce platform. If contracts enforce single-homing on one side, an immediate implication is that services provided by platforms (and other undertakings offering substitutes) to this group of users belong to one market.

Finally, it must not be overlooked that homing decisions on one side may to a great extent depend on homing decisions on the other side. Let us consider for illustration an area in which two rival ride-hailing apps are available. If most drivers offer their services at any point in time on both apps, there are likely to be few gains for travellers from using both apps simultaneously; thus, travellers have weak incentives to be multi-homers. By contrast, if most drivers single-home (in a given time interval), it is more beneficial for travellers to multi-home – that is, to check for availability and rates of transport offers on both apps. To acknowledge this interdependence is crucial as homing patterns on the two sides may change over time and, therefore, market delineations may have to respond.

2. The Multi-homing/Single-homing Framework

Where users on one side of competing two-sided platforms single-home, these platform services are substitutes belonging to the same market. If, however, users on the other side multi-home, each platform provides monopoly access to its set of users on the single-homing side. Thus, for given user behaviour on the single-homing side, each platform acts as a monopolist vis-à-vis users on the multi-homing side. This suggests that there is a market for each platform regarding the intermediation service provided to the multi-homing side.Footnote 113

Based on this consideration, the European Commission assumed the existence of a market for app stores available on the Android mobile operating system, which is dominated by Google's app store. This rests upon the assumption that consumers are single-homers as they make a discrete choice to use a device based on Android's, Apple's, or another firm's operating system, while app developers tend to be multi-homers.Footnote 114

It is important to see, however, that the monopoly power on each such market may be mitigated through interaction with the other user group.Footnote 115 More specifically, it may be the case that large parts of the revenues generated on the monopolised side are passed to the users on the other side.Footnote 116

Moreover, in the Commission's practice, the described multi-homing/single-homing framework has not always been considered in the context of market definition. In Travelport/Worldspan, the EU Commission recognised that platforms that offer electronic travel distribution services through a global distribution system (‘GDS’) to travel agents (‘TAs’) and travel service providers (‘TSPs’) typically face multi-homing on the side of the TSPs and single-homing on the side of the TAs.Footnote 117 The Commission stated this feature as part of its general description of the market for electronic travel distribution services through a GDS.Footnote 118 The Commission only referred to the multi-homing/single-homing frameworkFootnote 119 when discussing potential theories of harm through non-coordinated effects and, therefore, assessing inter alia whether ‘the merger would allow the merging undertakings to use their strong market position downstream vis à vis TAs in order to increase prices vis à vis TSPs upstream (“vertical cross market effects”)’.Footnote 120

This illustrates that it is (at least to some degree) functionally interchangeable whether the nature of the users’ homing decision is taken into account at the stage of market definition or (only) when considering the actual or potential effects on competition of a merger or any other relevant market conduct of the platform. In both ways, a competition analysis can consider that this framework enables a two-sided platform to exercise significant market power vis-à-vis the multi-homing side. While the former way, ie the recognition of a market for each platform, is a straightforward and consistent reaction to this framework, the latter approach is more flexible. Hence, it may be regarded as preferable in cases without a clear-cut multi-homing/single-homing setting but where the homing decisions of the different user groups are essentially in line with this scenario and therefore confer at least a significant degree of market power vis-à-vis the side on which multi-homing is prevalent. However, competition practice should not rashly discard the option of acknowledging a market for each platform to do justice to a multi-homing/single-homing framework, because otherwise there is a risk that this characteristic will not be given appropriate weight in the course of balancing the various factors.

D. The SSNIP Test

European competition authorities (among others) use the hypothetical monopolist test to identify the substitutes to a given product or service that are part of the relevant market. The General Court regarded the ‘small but significant and non-transitory increase in price’ (‘SSNIP’) test as ‘a recognized method for defining the market at issue’. Yet the court emphasised that the EU Commission may also rely on ‘other tools … such as market studies or an assessment of consumers’ and other competitors’ points of view’.Footnote 121 The Commission has to make an overall assessment of indicative factors without assuming a hierarchy between different types of available evidence. In particular, there is no requirement to prioritise technical evidence over non-technical evidence.Footnote 122

According to the SSNIP test, the relevant market is defined as the smallest product group such that a hypothetical monopolist in control of this product group could profitably sustain a small but significant non-transitory increase in price.Footnote 123 To answer the question of whether a hypothetical monopolist could impose a price increase, one needs to ask whether such a price increase would be profitable. Hence, the issue is whether selling a smaller quantity at a higher price would be more profitable than selling the initial quantity at the initial price. Whether this is the case depends on how sensitively demand reacts to a price change, ie on the elasticity of demand.Footnote 124

1. Implementation Challenges: Feedback Effects and Demand-Side Substitutability with Two-Sided Platforms

In its Booking.com decision, the French Autorité de la concurrence relied on the SSNIP testFootnote 125 to define the product market on the side of the platform where intermediation services are supplied to the hotels. The competition authority started with the hypothesis that the relevant product market comprises the reservation of overnight stays in French hotels via online reservation platforms and online travel agencies.Footnote 126 The authority then, first, argued that the hotel-keepers did not consider other distribution channels such as the hotels’ websites, meta-search engines (including hotel comparison sitesFootnote 127) and search engines to be substitutes for the use of an internet reservation platform.Footnote 128 Second, the authority referred to a statement by Booking.com, which had argued that most hotels would not have sufficient means to ensure their visibility on the internet through meta-search engines and search engines.Footnote 129 Based on these considerations by the hotels and Booking.com, the competition authority concluded that a small but significant increase of the commissions charged by a hypothetical monopolist platform would not result in such a significant shift of demand to other distribution channels as to make the price increase unprofitable.Footnote 130 Thus, the authority saw its hypothesis on the definition of the product market confirmed.

It is remarkable that the Autorité de la concurrence applied the SSNIP test to the market on one side of the platform without (explicitly) considering interrelations with the other side of the platform, ie the market for intermediation services offered to consumers looking for a hotel. Since consumers on Booking.com are not directly charged by the platform, their decision is only affected by the hotel prices that prevail on the different distribution channels (taking service provision by the platform as given). The question then is whether an increase in commissions affects consumer choice through prices charged by hotels. Under wide price parity clauses, hotels may increase their prices in response to commissions by some amount, but they have to do so on all distribution channels on which they are active. Thus, in the present case it is unlikely that consumers’ substitution patterns are affected significantly (there may be fewer total bookings but the relative shares of the distribution channels are unlikely to change much). While, therefore, for the application of the SSNIP test the interdependencies between price effects on the two sides of the platform actually appear negligible, it would be desirable for a competition authority to state such an assumption explicitly. Moreover, the case nicely illustrates that the relevance of the said interdependencies may be tied to the particular contracting environment:Footnote 131 absent price parity clauses, the market may have to be defined more widely as consumers may substitute away from higher prices on Booking.com after an increase of commissions. Thus, in general, when applying the SSNIP test, taking into account the interrelation with the other side may lead to a different definition of the market.

When applying the SSNIP test to two-sided platforms charging both user groups, different ways of increasing prices can be considered: the hypothetical monopoly intermediary could be thought of as raising (1) the sum of prices while optimally adjusting the price structure; (2) all prices together while keeping the price structure fixed; (3) each of the prices separately, allowing the other prices to be adjusted optimally; or (4) each of the various prices while keeping the other prices fixed.Footnote 132 Using (4) as the default option,Footnote 133 if there are mutual positive cross-group effects, then a drop in user participation as a result of a price increase on one side generates feedback that further reduces participation. To apply a one-sided SSNIP test without taking such feedback into account effects risks defining markets too narrowly.Footnote 134

When the Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf upheld a Bundeskartellamt decisionFootnote 135 to block a merger involving platforms for ticketing services, the court formulated a guiding principle that the SSNIP test was not ‘sufficiently conclusive in case of two-sided markets because it cannot adequately capture the feedback effects between different market sides’.Footnote 136 But this does not hit the nail on the head—the problem of capturing the cross-group network effects is not a problem specific to the application of the SSNIP test but arises in general when assessing demand-side substitutability in the context of two-sided platforms. While it is correct that the implementation of the SSNIP test needs adaptation and is significantly more difficult in the context of two-sided platforms, this is only an expression of the general challenges for an assessment of demand-side substitutability in the context of two-sided platforms.

The SSNIP test can be seen as a thought experimentFootnote 137 that helps to gain clarity in the application of demand-side substitutability; it may serve ‘as a framework … onto which qualitative evidence is applied (for example views on substitutability from consumer groups, industry analysts or firms that are informed by verified observations on previous experience)’.Footnote 138 Thus, the Bundeskartellamt concluded, with regard to the applicability of the SSNIP test to two-sided platforms, ‘[w]hat would be conceivable are surveys on the switching behaviour of platform users under certain modified overall conditions based on the SSNIP test's fundamental idea’.Footnote 139 In Facebook/WhatsApp, the Commission referred to a survey among advertisers, most of whom submitted that they were not likely to switch from search ads to non-search ads in the event of a 5 to 10 per cent price increase, and concluded that the market investigation supported a corresponding sub-segmentation of the online advertising market.Footnote 140

A look at the practical application of the SSNIP test logic by the European Commission demonstrates how it may be useful even without considering empirical evidence. In Visa International, the Commission defined the inter-system market based on an analysis of demand for payment instruments from both merchants and cardholders.Footnote 141 Thereafter, the Commission assumed, inter alia, that neither cash nor cheques should be considered substitutable for payment cards. To justify this assumption with regard to merchants, the Commission argued that:

such non-card payment instruments are not at all substitutable with cards, since the loss of revenue for merchants from ceasing to accept all cards would be far greater than the loss of revenue from increasing their general level of prices by the amount of any small but sustained increase in merchant fees for all cards.Footnote 142

This application of the SSNIP test logic shows, albeit only implicitly, the interrelation with the general considerations on demand-side substitutability in two-sided platforms and, more particularly, serves as an example of how demand-side substitutability may be asymmetric between two user groups of a (matching) platform.Footnote 143

2. Zero-Price Markets and Markets with Diverging Monetisation Models

Further considerations are needed in zero-price markets and in markets in which platforms employ different business models with respect to monetisation. If there is a zero price on one side of the market, the SSNIP test would need to consider an increase of the price in absolute terms (a percentage increase clearly will not do) or would require additional modifications according to which not price but product characteristics such as quality are varied to understand substitution patterns. In particular, if users are expected to react very sensitively to price, this does not necessarily imply that a broader market has to be defined. The reason is that a platform may not even consider charging consumers but rather aims at getting their attention by making attractive offers. Such a strategy may be highly profitable if a platform is able to convert attention into revenues made from a different user group.

Purely ad-financed platforms are a case in point. For example, applied to an ad-financed social network with an alleged dominant position, to understand substitution patterns the question is: by decreasing the quality of service offered by this social network, how much traffic would it lose (eg to other social networks or different offerings such as video streaming or online games)? Such an alternative test has been called SSNDQ (small but significant decreases in quality). In Google Android it was applied by the European Commission to consider the indirect constraint exercised by non-licensable smart mobile operating systems on Android and, therefore, to determine whether a separate market for licensable operating systems can be defined.Footnote 144 However, a quantification is challenging, as it is often unclear how to operationalise a certain quality reduction.Footnote 145

It also seems conceivable to substitute the relevant costs to be borne by the users (personal data and/or attention) for prices, an approach that has been referred to as SSNIC (small but significant non-transitory increase in (exchange) costs). Thus, with a view to ad-financed search platforms, it was suggested to consider ‘whether a market-wide five percent increase in the amount (or length, duration, etc.) of advertisements would cause search customers to substitute away to a different product’.Footnote 146 However, possible feedback on price and demand on the advertising market must not be ignored. A SSNIC test is therefore only meaningful without further complications if demand on the advertising market is almost perfectly elastic, ie if many customers on the advertising market are willing to buy advertising space at the same price.

Such implementation problems are arguably the reason why the Commission in the Google Shopping case did not consider the option to adapt the SSNIP test (at least not explicitly) but simply stated that ‘the SSNIP test would not have been appropriate in the present case because Google provides its search services for free to users’.Footnote 147 The Commission could rely in this matter on the General Court's adjudication since the latter had held that the ‘SSNIP test may also prove unsuitable in certain cases, for example … where there are free goods or goods the cost of which is not borne by those determining the demand’.Footnote 148 However, the SSNIP test applied to quality changes can be used as a thought experiment.

If undertakings with different business models offer substitute services, the application of the logic of the SSNIP test becomes particularly challenging. As an example, we consider dating apps for heterosexual users. These apps possibly offer substitute services (the degree of substitutability depends on user behaviour). Some platforms charge subscription prices for male and female users, while others offer matching services at zero prices and run an ad-financed business model with advertisers as the third side. Depending on the identity of the platform, a price increase or an increase of advertising volume for one group of users (male or female users) could be considered.

3. Conclusion

The SSNIP test serves conceptual clarity in the application of demand-side substitutability. Therefore, although it is often difficult to empirically implement the test in the context of two-sided platforms, it is a useful instrument for competition practice even if only applied as a thought experiment.

III. CONSIDERING CONCEPTUAL INTERDEPENDENCIES: MARKET DEFINITION, MARKET POWER AND CROSS-GROUP NETWORK EFFECTS

In order to assess the competitive position of two-sided (digital) platforms, the cross-group network effects between their different user groups must in particular be appreciated. Against this background, two aspects are especially significant to correctly understand and implement the role that market definition should play as an instrument to facilitate competition practice and, thus, were already assumed in the above analysis. First, market shares are less informative as a proxy for market power. Second, market definition must not conclusively determine the scope of a competition analysis.

A. Market Shares as a Proxy for Market Power: Mitigating and Aggravating Factors

With a view on two-sided platforms, market shares have a relatively low significance for the assessment of market power. Given a firm with a certain market share, network effects may aggravate or mitigate the market power that follows therefrom.Footnote 149

Network effects can mean that the ‘coordinated’ decisions of the economic agents have the consequence that it is not the platform with the highest-quality offer that dominates the market, but a different platform. If the latter is the incumbent platform and a higher-quality platform enters the market, the former may still prevail. As Shapiro and Varian nicely put it from the viewpoint of the incumbent platform, ‘[p]recisely because various users find it so difficult to coordinate to switch to an incompatible technology, control over a large installed base of users can be the greatest asset you can have’.Footnote 150

The entrant platform must overcome the problem that users have no incentive to switch if they expect most of the remaining users to remain on the established platform. If all users remain in the status quo unless unilateral switching to the new platform is more attractive, barriers to entry will arise owing to user miscoordination.Footnote 151 For one thing, a necessity for coordination may arise because users would otherwise forgo the strong positive direct network effects from which they want to benefit, for example when using social networking services. For another thing, the need for coordination may refer to the users on different sides of a two-sided platform who are linked through mutual positive cross-group network effects, as, for example, in the case of matching platforms. In order to convince users to switch in such a situation, the new platform may need to subsidise early users (in the case of a two-sided platform, on at least one side). The extent of such subsidisation represents the level of entry barriers.

If, on the other hand, a new platform (for example, based on its reputation acquired in other markets) influences users’ expectations in such a way that all potential users assume that the status quo will be replaced, there are no barriers to entry.Footnote 152 The challenge is, thus, to identify the cases where network effects work in favour of an incumbent firm (and thus constitute an entry barrier) and those cases where they work in favour of entrant firms.Footnote 153

Moreover, digital platforms frequently operate on emerging and dynamic markets characterised by rapid growth (in which many unattached users arrive) and short innovation cycles. As was acknowledged by the General Court in Cisco, in such contexts ‘high market shares are not necessarily indicative of market power’.Footnote 154 However, as this cautious statement rightly points out, one must beware of generalisations and cannot avoid a case-by-case analysis of whether the characteristics of a market such as new product developments, the presence of new consumers and the ‘timing’ of new product introductionFootnote 155 actually point to relatively low entry barriers.

Aggravating and mitigating factors can easily be taken into consideration where the law does not foresee specified thresholds of market shares that are meant to function as indicators for a certain degree of market power. Most prominently, Article 102 TFEU applies to ‘undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market’, and pursuant to Article 2(2) and (3) of the EU Merger Regulation the compatibility of a merger with the common market depends in particular on the question of whether the merger will result in the ‘creation or strengthening of a dominant position’. While market shares have for a long time been used by authorities and courts to implement the concept of ‘dominance’,Footnote 156 and the ECJ even established a presumption of dominance applicable to undertakings with a market share of 50 per cent or more,Footnote 157 it has always been clear that market shares are only one of a multitude of factors that have to be considered to substantiate that a firm dominates a market.Footnote 158

Where the law does, however, provide for specified thresholds of market shares that are used as an indicator of market power, the importance of cross-group network effects makes it clear once again that such provisions should not contain ‘hard’ thresholds. The law should always provide for ways—whether through the structuring of substantive law or through procedural rules—to prevent ‘false positives’ as well as ‘false negatives’.

The EU block exemption regulations are a case in point. Their application typically requires that the market share of an undertaking does not exceed a certain threshold.Footnote 159 But, for one thing, an undertaking that exceeds this threshold may still rely on an exemption pursuant to Article 101(3) TFEU, which, thus, functions as a catch-all provision for scenarios where the market share of a firm erroneously signals a certain degree of market power. For another thing, pursuant to Article 29 of Regulation 1/2003, the European Commission or the national competition authorities of the Member States may withdraw the benefit of an exemption regulation when they find that measures by undertakings that are covered by it have ‘certain effects which are incompatible’ with Article 101(3) TFEU. This, therefore, forms a procedural mechanism to remedy the over-inclusiveness of a market-share threshold.

Instead of a focus on market share, competition practice concerned about persistent market power should focus their efforts on detailed case-by-case analyses of current and future barriers to entry.Footnote 160

B. Market Definition Must Not (Conclusively) Determine the Scope of the Competition Analysis

In the application of EU competition law, no clear and consistent position has been evolved as to whether or to what extent EU competition law requires or allows the balancing of pro- and anti-competitive effects or the netting of welfare effects on different groups of market participants. The main underlying reason for this is arguably the difficulties—quantification problems and distributional appraisals—that come along with such balancing exercises and inter-group comparisons of welfare.Footnote 161 To give an illustrative example, in a leading decision concerning a system of collective resale price maintenance for the trade of books, the European Commission rejected the argument that those vertical restraints enabled the booksellers to provide ancillary services and, hence, benefitted the consumers. In its justification, the Commission argued that the system denied the consumer the chance to decide whether or not she liked to pay a ‘service charge’Footnote 162 and, thus, refused to engage in a discussion on the aggregate effects that such a coordination might have on consumer welfare. In line with this, the Commission also rejected the proposition that price maintenance would allow publishers to cross-subsidise books published in small print runs.Footnote 163

In the context of a competition analysis of two-sided platforms, the important point to note is that, when it is acknowledged that a weighing of different and diverging effects is allowed or even required where these effects relate to a single market, then it must be allowed or required in just the same way where it concerns cross-group network effects on different user sides of a two-sided platform that, following a multi-markets approach, belong to different markets. While it may in many instances be reasonable to focus an impact analysis on a defined market,Footnote 164 this does not mean that any effects outside the boundaries of a defined market must be ignored for the purposes of a competition analysis. Such an understanding would assign a legal meaning to market definition that is not appropriate to it. As mentioned above, the ECJ has stated this with desirable clarity in Cartes Bancaires, rejecting the General Court's view that the analysis of whether a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU had occurred were to be restricted to the market defined on the ‘issuing side’ of the payment card system, neglecting effects on the ‘acquiring side’.Footnote 165 Moreover, in its adjudications concerning both Article 101(3) TFEUFootnote 166 and Article 2 of the EC Merger Regulation,Footnote 167 the General Court took the view that market boundaries must not define the effects that may be taken into account for the necessary efficiency analysis.Footnote 168 This confirms that the appropriate consideration of cross-group network effects between the different sides of a two-sided platform does not require the (inadequate) adoption of a single-market approach.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The thinking and practice of EU competition law is at various points structured by defining the relevant market. The gist of the approach is to identify the products and services offered by an undertaking and to understand substitute offers. While the concept of market definition may, as a matter of principle, be transferred to competition analyses of two-sided platforms, it needs to be amended and extended. Since two-sided platforms offer interrelated and often complex products, and since the interdependencies between their different user groups have to be considered, market definition is more challenging and prone to error or even abuse.

Therefore, market definition in the context of competition practice on two-sided platforms must combine adequate economic reasoning with flexible legal thinking. It is crucial to understand in each case the nature of the offered products and services as well as the interrelations between the multiple connected sides and markets. These interrelations must, however, be considered not only for market definition but also for the analyses of the effects a certain practice may have on competition in the defined markets. Thus, competition practice in relation to two-sided platforms also requires understanding the specific limits to the significance of market definition. In this context, it is important to see that calculated market shares are less informative as an indicator of a two-sided platform's market power.

Because of the objective of market definition to structure and discipline competition analyses by authorities and courts, the true challenge is not only to adapt the conventional ideas and tools in a formally correct and consistent way but also to provide clear statements and practical guidance that makes market definition foreseeable and manageable also in the context of two-sided platforms. While one may argue about implementation details in individual cases, the Commission has so far found convincing answers to the conceptual challenges posed by the rise of digital platforms. However, it would help to see more explicit and clearer statements on the necessary conceptual adjustments. With the reform of the Market Definition Notice, the Commission has, first and foremost, the chance and the responsibility to provide market players with more legal certainty about its own thinking in this respect. In addition, the reform presents an opportunity to guide the Member States’ courts and competition authorities, and possibly even to influence the future case law of the ECJ.

Footnotes

*

Department of Law and MaCCI, University of Mannheim. The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC TR 224 (project B05).

**

Department of Economics and MaCCI, University of Mannheim.

The authors thank DG COMP for the opportunity to present their findings to the team dealing with the evaluation of the Market Definition Notice on 21 March 2021. See https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/system/files/2021-04/franck_and_peitz_march_2021.pdf. For insightful comments, suggestions, and advice, the authors are grateful to two anonymous reviewers. Parts of this article build on a report the authors prepared for the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) (‘Market Definition and Market Power in the Platform Economy’, May 2019). Authors’ note: This article was accepted for publication in July 2021; thus, any updates in case law or otherwise that occurred post-acceptance will not be discussed in this piece.

References

1 We do not include state aid law in our analysis. While market definition is also relevant to applying state aid law, the concept has not yet been developed and applied in an equally rigorous way as in cartel, abuse and merger cases. See Ferro, M Sousa, Market Definition in EU Competition Law (Elgar, 2019), pp 91–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’).

3 Article 102 TFEU.

4 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), [2004] OJ L 24/1.

5 On the objectives of market definition see Sousa Ferro, note 1 above, pp 29–36; Hahne, A, Das Erfordernis der Marktabgrenzung aus rechtlicher und ökonomischer Sicht (Nomos, 2016), pp 27–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, [1997] OJ C 372/5 (in the following referred to as ‘Market Definition Notice’), para 2.

7 It is important to note, however, that, in particular in the context of competition practice with two-sided platforms, effects analyses must not be restricted to the defined market. See Section I.B below.

8 OECD, ‘Market Definition, Policy Roundtables, Background Note by the Secretariat’, DAF/COMP(2012)19, pp 28–29.

9 For an introduction to the economics of network effects, see eg P Belleflamme and M Peitz, ‘Platforms and Network Effects’ in L C Corchon and M A Marini (eds), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Vol. II (Edward Elgar, 2018), pp 286–317.

10 ‘Two-sidedness’ is not a necessary precondition for the creation and management of network effects: a social network facilitates interaction between users on one side. An online shop that gives buyers the option to review, recommend or rate products available for sale allows for the creation of direct network effects across its customers. For that reason alone, it is reasonable with regard to many policy questions that arise due to digitisation to focus on these scenarios and conceptualize such market players as (digital) ‘platforms’. See, for instance, Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, [2019] OJ L 186/57. However, the main challenges with regard to the competition law concept of market definition are indeed based on the characteristic of ‘two-sidedness’.

11 We speak of a positive cross-group network effect that side A exerts on side B if a user on side B benefits if more users on side A participate (or if users on side A increase their usage volume). If these cross-group network effects operate in both directions, then there are indirect network effects on each side. For example, a user on side A indirectly benefits from more users on its own side because these users make it more attractive for users on side B to join; additional users on side B then benefit the user on side A.

12 Certainly, many platforms cater to more than two groups that are linked through cross-group network effects and should therefore be called ‘multi-sided’. Since the term ‘two-sided platform’ is widely used, we follow this convention with the understanding that at least two groups are involved.

13 The Notice does discuss primary and secondary markets as an instance of (connected) markets where constraints on substitution imposed by conditions in one market have to be considered for the definition of the connected market definition. See Market Definition Notice, note 6 above, para 56. Given the complementarity of the products offered on the respective markets, the relationship between primary and secondary markets may appear similar to that of the markets to which two-sided platforms cater. Thus, an analogy to aftermarket delineation has been put forward by VHSE Robertson, ‘Antitrust Market Definition for Digital Ecosystems’ 2-2021 Concurrences Review 3, 7–8 (paras 27–28, 31). It should be emphasised, however, that the complementarity is of a different kind in both scenarios, in particular as two-sided platforms offer their services to different user groups that are linked through cross-group network effects. Therefore, the role of network effects is the key to understanding the market realities in the case of two-sided platforms. In light of this, questions of market definition also present themselves differently than in the context of primary and secondary markets.

14 On 3 April 2020, the Commission published an evaluation roadmap. See https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12325-Evaluation-of-the-Commission-Notice-on-market-definition-in-EU-competition-law. On 12 July 2021, the Commission published a Staff Working Document (SWD(2021) 199 final) that summarised the findings of the evaluation of the Market Definition Notice. See https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/system/files/2021-07/evaluation_market-definition-notice_en.pdf. In addition, the Commission requested an external ‘Support study accompanying the evaluation of the Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law’. See https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/system/files/2021-06/kd0221712enn_market_definition_notice_2021_1.pdf. The Commission plans to adopt a reformed Market Definition Notice in 2022. See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/timeline_table_M_AT_final.pdf.

15 C(2021) 1959 final, Commission Guidance on the application of the referral mechanism set out in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to certain categories of cases. The Commission has clarified that it will accept and indeed encourage referral requests by Member States even in cases in which the merger in question does not ‘meet the respective jurisdictional criteria of the referring Member States’ (para 6). This is meant to close gaps in the scope of merger control that relate in particular to digital platforms: ‘In recent years, however, market developments have resulted in a gradual increase of concentrations involving firms that play or may develop into playing a significant competitive role on the market(s) at stake despite generating little or no turnover at the moment of the concentration. These developments appear particularly significant in the digital economy, where services regularly launch with the aim of building up a significant user base and/or commercially valuable data inventories, before seeking to monetise the business’ (para 9). This new policy is being put to the test as the Commission announced on 20 April 2020 to have accepted a referral request by France and other Member States to assess the proposed acquisition of Grail, a US-based health care company, by Illumina, a US-based global genomics company. The proposed acquisition was not notified in any Member State. See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_21_1846. An appeal filed by Illumina against the Commission's decision is pending before the General Court (Case T-22721). The reactions of several Member States indicate that they do not support the Commission's new policy to expand the scope of EU merger control based on Article 22 of the Merger Regulation. See Volpe and Morey, The European Commission's new Article 22 Guidance on case referrals (3 June 2021), https://insights.ropesgray.com/post/102gzmm/the-european-commissions-new-article-22-guidance-on-case-referrals.

16 However, the merger policy package of 26 March 2021 is confined to procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control. See SWD(2021) 66 final, Commission Staff Working Document. Thus, for the moment the Commission seeks to address shortfalls of the existing merger thresholds through the encouragement of referral requests alone. As regards the substance of merger assessments, Commissioner Vestager remarked ‘So we're open to ideas, no matter where they come from. But we'll only take a decision when we've considered all the evidence. So we won't immediately be drafting new merger guidelines’. M Vestager, ‘The Future of EU Merger Control’, International Bar Association 24th Annual Competition Conference, 11 September 2020.

18 COM(2020) 842 final, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act).

19 J Crémer, Y-A de Montjoye, and H Schweitzer, Competition Policy for the Digital Era (European Commission 2019), p 46 (emphasis added).

20 See Part III below.

21 See Art 2(2) and (3) EC Merger Regulation.

22 See Article 102 TFEU, which applies to ‘undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market’.

23 See European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, [2011] OJ C 11/01, para 28. In contrast, competition authorities and plaintiff parties are spared from assessing market power if agreements can be regarded as having by their very nature the potential to restrict competition and, therefore, are categorised as restrictions of competition ‘by object’ pursuant to Article 101(1) TFEU. See eg Montecatini v Commission, C-235/92 P, EU:C:1999:362, para 132.

24 See Section I.A below.

25 Google Search (Shopping), AT.39740. An appeal is pending before the General Court (Google and Alphabet v Commission, T-612/17).

26 Motta, M and Peitz, M, ‘Removal of Potential Competitors – A Blind Spot of Merger Policy?’ (2020) 6 Competition Law & Policy Debate 19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 An abandonment of the concept of market definition has been suggested, in particular, by Kaplow, L, ‘Why (Ever) Define Markets?’ (2010) 124 Harvard Law Review 437Google Scholar; Kaplow, L, ‘Market Definition: Impossible and Counterproductive’ (2013) 79 Antitrust Law Journal 361Google Scholar; Markovits, R S, ‘Why One Should Never Define Markets or Use Market-Oriented Approaches to Analyze the Legality of Business Conduct under U.S. Antitrust Law: My Arguments and a Critique of Professor Kaplow's’ (2012) 57 Antitrust Bulletin 747CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a defence of the concept (though not necessarily as a mandatory element of competition analysis) see eg Cameron, D, Glick, M, and Mangum, D, ‘Good Riddance to Market Definition?’ (2012) 57 Antitrust Bulletin 719CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keyte, J A and Schwartz, K B, ‘“Tally-Ho!”: UPP and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ (2011) 77 Antitrust Law Journal 587Google Scholar; Nevo, H, Definition of the Relevant Market: (Lack of) Harmony between Industrial Economics and Competition Law (Intersentia, 2015), p 262Google Scholar; Hahne, note 5 above, pp 268–83.

28 For a detailed analysis, see Sousa Ferro, note 1 above, pp 56–91; Hahne, note 5 above, pp 61–66, 189–220.

29 See European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements. [2011] OJ C 11/01, para 28.

30 See European Commission, Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), [2014] OJ C 291/01, para 8.

31 See eg Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission, T-395/94, EU:T:2002:49, para 300.

32 See eg Art 3 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, [2010] OJ L 102/1.

33 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para 21; Volkswagen v Commission, T-62/98, para 230; Adriatica di Navigazione v Commission, T-61/99, EU:T:2003:335, para 27; European Commission, Dec 2005, DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary practices, para 11.

34 France and Société commerciale des potasses and de l'azote and Entreprise minière and chimique v Commission, C-68/94, EU:C:1998:148, para 143; Airtours v Commission, T-342/99, EU:T:2004:192, para 19; NVV and Others v Commission, T-151/05, EU:T:2009:144, para 51; CK Telecoms UK Investments v Commission, T-399/16, EU:T:2020:217, paras 144–45. See also European Commission, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, [2004] OJ C 31/5, para 10.

35 Certainly, an ultimate market definition must not be given where different (plausible) definitions lead to the same outcome. See eg Google/Doubleclick, M.4731, paras 44–56 (Commission left open whether search and non-search advertising have to be considered separate markets); Facebook/WhatsApp, M.7217, para 79 (Commission left open whether segments of the market for online advertising constituted relevant product markets in their own right).

36 See, in the context of US antitrust law, JB Baker and TF Bresnahan ‘Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power’ in P Buccirossi (ed), Handbook of Antitrust Economics (MIT Press, 2008), sub 1.2.2 (p 7) (‘Regardless of how market definition is understood, it is often a useful component of the way antitrust doctrine is implemented in court. It requires the plaintiff in the antitrust suit to state, with reasonable specificity, what competition might be harmed by the challenged practices—by a merger, by allegedly exclusionary acts and practices, by an agreement on practices said to facilitate coordination, etc. Indeed, market definition may be useful in this procedural sense even when market shares are not strongly probative of the magnitude of likely competitive harm. The market definition requirement also permits the defendant to rebut the idea that competition is fragile enough to be harmed, by attempting to establish a wider market’.).

37 See Hahne, note 5 above, pp 252–57.

38 See Sousa Ferro, note 1 above, p 30.

39 General Electric v Commission, T-210/01, EU:T:2005:456, para 516; Sousa Ferro, note 1 above, pp 51–52.

40 Article 267 TFEU.

41 See Sousa Ferro, note 1 above, pp 52–55.

42 See Ferro, M Sousa, ‘Judicial Review: Do European Courts Care about Market Definition?’ (2015) 6 Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 400, p 410Google Scholar (‘[W]hile market definition theory may be highly complex, its practical application and the specific issues raised before Courts usually do not require complex assessments of an economic nature. The majority of market definitions are not based on complex economic data, but are instead build on facts, opinions, and logic’.).

43 The ECJ traditionally exercises only a limited review with regard to complex economic appraisals. See eg Remia v Commission, C-42/84, EU:C:1985:327, para 34; BAT Reynolds v Commission, C-142/83, EU:C:1987:490, para 62.

44 Sousa Ferro, note 42 above, at 407.

45 The Commission's implementation of market definition, ie its fact-finding and interpretation of facts, has been challenged in various instances. See eg Ryanair v Commission, T-342/07, EU:T:2010:280, paras 95–117.

46 But note the Grimaldi doctrine, according to which the Member States’ courts when adjudicating on EU law must consider recommendations issued by the EU institutions ‘in particular … where they are designed to supplement binding Community provisions’. Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles, C-322/88, EU:C:1989:646, para 18. See on the development, scope and impact of the doctrine Korkea-aho, E, ‘National Courts and European Soft Law: Is Grimaldi Still Good Law?’ (2018) 37 Yearbook of European Law 470CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 There seems to be no research with a focus on the Market Definition Notice's impact on the jurisprudence of Member States’ courts. The reception of five other competition-related soft law instruments issued by the Commission is analysed in Georgieva, Z, ‘The Judicial Reception of Competition Soft Law in the Netherlands and the UK’ (2016) 12 European Competition Journal 54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 A certain reluctance on part of a national competition authority to develop its own position on market definition in the digitised economy has been noted, for instance, in H Kováčiková, ‘A Definition of Digital Markets by the Slovak Antimonopoly Office – Has the Boat to Digitalisation Already Sailed?’ (2020) 13(21) Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 247, p 256, which, after analysing market definition in three decisions by the Slovak Antimonopoly Office, concluded that ‘courage to launch an expert discussion and apply new tests to explore and assess the digital market is still lacking’.

49 Hence, one should only assume with caution that the use of EU soft law instruments would preserve Member States’ autonomy and guarantee flexibility and diversity of national regulatory approaches. See Korkea-aho, E, ‘EU Soft Law in Domestic Legal Systems: Flexibility and Diversity Guaranteed?’ (2009) 16 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 271CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50 See Ackermann, T, ‘European Competition Law’ in Riesenhuber, K (ed), European Legal Methodology (Intersentia, 2017), p 520Google Scholar (‘the Commission … has therefore grown into the role of an authentic interpreter of competition rules’).

51 Cited note 18 above.

52 See European Commission, ‘Digital Markets Act – Impact assessment support study’, executive summary and synthesis report (Dec 2020), p 17 (‘Meanwhile, competition law is not always an ideal solution due to challenges in applying the market definition concept in multi-sided markets’). See also, in view of potential advantages through remedies (including possibly market-wide rule making) by way of a (then) contemplated comprehensive market investigation instrument, H Schweitzer, ‘The New Competition Tool: Its Institutional Set-Up and Procedural Design’, expert report prepared for the European Commission (2020), pp 24–25.

53 Section 58a German Payment Services Supervisory Act (‘PSSA’). See J-U Franck and D Linardatos, ‘Germany's “Lex Apple Pay”: Payment Services Regulation Overtakes Competition Enforcement’ (2021) 12 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 68.

54 Further, it is unclear whether and under which conditions a doctrine of abusive ‘self-preferencing’ provides a right of access beyond the conventional ‘refusal to supply’ doctrine, which is characterised by a high intervention threshold, requiring in particular that a facility (such as a platform) be indispensable for entering a neighbouring market so that a refusal to grant access would be likely to eliminate all competition in this market. See from the EU adjudication, Bronner, C-7/97, EU:C:1998:569, para 41; RTE and ITP v Commission (‘Magill’), C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, EU:C:1995:98, para 56.

55 The term was coined by M Armstrong, ‘Competition in Two-Sided Markets’ (2006) 37 Rand Journal of Economics 668.

56 See Section II.A.2 below.

57 See Sousa Ferro, note 1 above, pp 252–55.

58 MasterCard, T-111/08, EU:T:2012:260, paras 174–77. On appeal, market definition was not challenged and, therefore, not addressed by the ECJ. MasterCard, C-382/12 P, EU:C:2014:2201, para 178.

59 RENV – CB v Commission, T-491/07, EU:T:2016:379, paras 79–80.

60 Groupement des cartes bancaires, C-67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, paras 77–79.

61 See eg Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, M.5727, paras 61–81 (online advertising), paras 85–86 (internet search); Facebook/WhatsApp, M.7217, para 34 (consumer communications services), para 61 (social networking services), para 79 (online advertising); Microsoft/LinkedIn, M.8124, paras 74–83 (enterprise communications services), paras 87–117 (professional social networks), paras 126–47 (online recruitment services), paras 152–161 (online advertising services).

62 But cf Broos, S and Ramos, J M, ‘Competing Business Models and Two-Sidedness: An Application to the Google Shopping Case’ (2017) 62 Antitrust Bulletin 382CrossRefGoogle Scholar; the authors argue that, in the case of Google, search market and advertising market should not be separated since Google charges neither the consumers for searching nor the advertisers for advertising per se but only for transactions (‘per click’). This claim is, however, dubious since it would mean that market definition was dependent on the used price instruments. Based on this concept, in the case of a platform such as Airbnb, which charges only for completed bookings, the single-market approach would also need to be followed. In contrast, a multi-markets approach is required in the case of a platform such as HomeAway, a competitor of Airbnb in many regional markets, which used to charge listing fees for short-term rental accommodation. Both firms could then apparently not be attributed to the same market. However, as a property can be rented out via HomeAway or via Airbnb, the market definition would then not adequately reflect demand-side substitutability and the competitive restraints a platform faces and, thus, would not fulfil its designated function as an instrument of competition law.

63 Ohio v American Express Co, 585 US __ (25 June 2018), slip opinion pp 13–15.

64 Competition and Markets Authority, 16 Nov 2017, Just Eat and Hungryhouse, para 4.11.

65 Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fees, COMP/29.373, para 43; MasterCard, COMP/34.579; EuroCommerce, COMP/36.518; Commercial Cards, COMP/38.580, paras 283–329.

66 Google Search (Shopping), AT.39740, paras 216–23.

67 Bloemenveiling Aaslmeer – Flora Holland, 5901/184 (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit).

68 Bundeskartellamt, Market power of platforms and networks (2016), Working Paper B6-113/15, p 28.

69 Ibid, pp 31–32.

70 The Bundeskartellamt closed its abuse proceedings after Amazon amended its terms of business for sellers on its European online marketplaces. In its case summary, the authority stated that it was ‘inclined to assume a product market for online marketplace services’, stressing that ‘Amazon's significance as a “gate-keeper” for customer access is high due to its large customer base, some of which use the Amazon marketplace either primarily or exclusively for their purchases’. B2-88/18, Case Summary (17 July 2019), p 10.

71 See, by contrast, the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets’ approach in a case that concerned the use of narrow price parity clauses imposed by the online food ordering platform ‘Thuisbezorgd.nl’ on the restaurants. Without taking an ultimate stand on market definition, the Dutch authority rejected ‘speak[ing] of “a possible market for online food ordering platforms”, because it is clear that online platforms compete with the direct sales channels of restaurants/restaurant chains’. Instead, the authority assumed that there ‘could be “a possible market for delivered meals” or “a possible market for delivered and takeaway meals”’. Case No 15.1073.53, ACM/DM/2016/207286 (18 November 2016), para 37 (references omitted). The authority thus suggested a symmetrical (relative) independence of both the restaurants and the consumers from the online food ordering platforms’ intermediation services.

72 Just Eat/La Nevera Roja, C/0730/16 (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia, 31 March 2016), paras 26–37.

73 Parship/Elitepartner, B6-57/15 (Bundeskartellamt, 22 October 2015), paras 71, 75–78; case summary, p 2.

74 Verivox/ProSiebenSat1, B8-76/15 (Bundeskartellamt, 24 July 2015), case summary, p 2.

75 Immonet/Immowelt, B6-39/15 (Bundeskartellamt, 20 April 2015), case summary, p 2.

76 SeLoger/Logic-Immo, Decision No 18-DCC-18 (Autorité de la concurrence, 1 February 2018), paras 20–29. Note, however, that the authority remarked (without further explanation) that ‘the delineation of separate markets for each of the sides of this market would not change the conclusions of the competitive analysis’. It is also noteworthy that in its recent merger guidelines, although the authority mentions the adoption of a single-market approach in this decision, the explanations appear remarkably cautious as the authority does not establish general rules as to whether and when it prefers to apply a single-market approach in the case of matching platforms. Lignes directrices de l'Autorité de la concurrence relatives au contrôle des concentrations (Autorité de la concurrence, 2020), para 599.

77 This appears to be different with the judgment of the Court of Amsterdam in an abuse case involving a real-estate platform. See VBO Makelaar v Funda en NVM, NL:RBAMAS:2018:1654 (Rechtbank Amsterdam, 21 March 2018). While the court's rhetoric indicates that it assumed a single-market approach (‘The experts defined the relevant market as the market for housing websites in the Netherlands’, ibid, para 2.6), one of the economists who acted as a court expert in the case stressed that ‘[a]s funda was a “two-sided platform” … the experts considered potential substitutes and competitive constraints on both sides’. See G Niels, ‘Fundamentals of Article 102: A Dominant Platform, but Not Abuse’ (Oxera Agenda, September 2018), p 2. On appeal, the Gerechtshof Amsterdam did not further elaborate on market definition and confirmed the first instance decision in this respect. NL:GHAMS:2019:772 (26 May 2020), para 3.6.

78 Parship/Elitepartner, B6-57/15 (Bundeskartellamt, 22 October 2015), para 78; Case Summary, p 2.

79 To make this explicit for the case of dating sites, heterosexual men are simply not interested in the intermediation service offered to women; correspondingly, in the case of heterosexual women.

80 Using the same web design and matching algorithm does not imply that substitution pattern is symmetric since, for example, the format chosen by the intermediary for how users of the two groups can exchange messages may be more attractive for members of one than for those of the other group.

81 See eg Crémer, de Montjoye, and Schweitzer, note 19 above, p 46.

82 In this respect, our view is in line with Katz, M and Sallet, J, ‘Multisided Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement’ (2018) 127 Yale Law Journal 2142, pp 2153–58Google Scholar; and G Niels and H Ralston, ‘Two-Sided Market Definition: Some Common Misunderstandings’ (2021) European Competition Journal, pp 10–11.

83 The latter would need to be derived from the demand functions of each of the two sides.

84 Business models may change over time. For instance, YouTube started as a ‘free’ ad-financed video streaming platform but recently added a subscription service.

85 This is a basic insight of the economic analysis of platform pricing. See Rochet, J-C and Tirole, J, ‘Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report’ (2006) 37 Rand Journal of Economics 645CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Armstrong, M, ‘Competition in Two-Sided Markets’ (2006) 37 Rand Journal of Economics 668CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

86 Under EU law, the principle of net neutrality is embodied in Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union, [2015] OJ L 310/1.

87 As a matter of principle, ISPs are allowed to offer ‘zero tariffs’ to end consumers pursuant to which the use of certain specific applications and services which are covered by the ‘zero tariff’ will not be deducted from the data volume to which the end consumer is entitled. However, as recently held by the ECJ, such ‘zero tariffs’ are incompatible with Article 3 of Regulation 2015/2120 if, once that data volume has been used up, end users may continue to use those specific applications and services without restriction, while other measures blocking or slowing down traffic are applied to the other applications and services available. Telenor Magyarország, C-807/18 and C-39/19, EU:C:2020:708. Yet, it appears that ISPs are otherwise indeed allowed to charge either the end consumers or the content providers to include specific applications and services in the ‘zero tariff’. Further clarification can be expected from the pending cases Vodafone, C-5/20 and Telekom Deutschland, C-34/20.

88 RTL/Veronica/Endemol, IV/M.553, para 17.

89 Kirch/Mediaset, IV/M.1574, para 11; Bertelsmann/CLT, IV/M.779, para 15.

90 Given the open wording of the significant impediment to effective competition (‘SIEC’) test and the substantive criteria laid down in Article 2(1)(b) of the EC Merger Regulation, which state that the ‘interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers’ have to be taken into account without specifying whether this relates only to the consumers in a given ‘market’ that can be assessed for the purposes of merger control, it appears at least conceivable that the Commission factors these concerns into its overall assessment of whether the merger will lead to a SIEC. Nevertheless, it seems logical to argue that if the ‘viewers’ market’ is not a ‘market’ for the purposes of merger control, then the viewers cannot be regarded as ‘consumers’ within the meaning of Article 2(1)(b) of the EC Merger Regulation. Therefore, to avoid such conclusion, it must be accepted from the outset that the ‘viewers’ market’ is a ‘market’ even if the viewers are not charged a fee.

91 Note that, eg, the German Bundeskartellamt still denied the existence of a viewers’ market for free (ad-financed) in 2006. Springer/Pro7Sat.1, B6-103/05, p 23.

92 Microsoft, COMP/C-3/37.792, paras 402–25.

93 Microsoft, COMP/C-3/39.530, paras 17–22.

94 Microsoft v Commission, T-201/44, EU:T:2007:289, paras 927–33.

95 Microsoft/LinkedIn, COMP/M.8124, para 87.

96 Microsoft/Skype, COMP/M.6281, paras 75, 101–09.

97 Facebook/WhatsApp, COMP/M.7217, paras 31, 34.

98 Google Search (Shopping), COMP/AT.39740, paras 154–250.

99 In the Microsoft case, the General Court held that ‘it does not follow from either Article [102d TFEU] or the case law on bundling that consumers must necessarily pay a certain price for the tied product’. Microsoft v Commission, T-201/04, EU:T:2007:289, para 969.

100 The ECJ's broad interpretation of the scope of EU competition law adopted in Höfner, according to which even a public employment agency might be considered an ‘undertaking’ as it pursues an activity that is ‘economic in nature’, is not conclusive for the recognition of zero-price markets. It is based on the consideration that ‘[e]mployment procurement has not always been, and is not necessarily, carried out by public entities’. Höfner and Elser v Macrotron, C-41/90, EU:C:1991:161, para 22; see also Aéroports de Paris v Commission, C-82/01 P, EU:C:2002:617, para 82 (on Article 107 TFEU). Thus, the wide concept of an economic activity adopted in Höfner is based on the premise that the activity in question could also be (and in fact was) provided by private recruitment consultancy companies that, however, charge their clients. Since this is the core idea of the court's reasoning, the ECJ's statement that ‘the application of Article [106] of the Treaty cannot obstruct the performance of the particular task assigned to that [public employment] agency in so far as the latter is manifestly not in a position to satisfy demand in that area of the market’ (ibid, para 25 (emphasis added)) is not based on the recognition of zero-price markets.

101 This rationality is also embodied in the concept of ‘information society services’, which is essential to Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), [2000] OJ L 178/1. While the concept only covers those services normally provided for remuneration, recital 18 of the Directive clarifies that ‘information society services are not solely restricted to services giving rise to on-line contracting but also, in so far as they represent an economic activity, extend to services which are not remunerated by those who receive them, such as those offering on-line information or commercial communications, or those providing tools allowing for search, access and retrieval of data’. See McFadden, C-484/14, EU:C:2016:689, paras 36–43.

102 Deliège, C-51/96, EU:C:2000:199, paras 56–57.

103 But cf Sousa Ferro, note 1 above, pp 264–66.

104 This may be different if ‘remuneration’ is explicitly required as, for example, in the case of Article 57(1) TFEU.

105 But cf Newman, J MAntitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations’ (2015) 164 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 149, p 163Google Scholar.

106 A reference to the concept of an ‘economic activity’ as it has been developed in particular by the ECJ as an element of the EU competition law concept of an ‘undertaking’ would not be helpful to clarify the point because this concept for its part presupposes an idea of what constitutes a ‘market’. See Pavlov, C-180/98, EU:C:2000:428, para 75 (‘It has … been consistently held that any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market is an economic activity’; emphasis added). See also Advocate General Maduro, FENIN v Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2005:666, para 13.

107 Given the primary law character of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, a legislative intervention would in any case only be conceivable as an amendment of the EC Merger Regulation. The example of Germany, where the legislature inserted a provision that states that ‘[t]he assumption of a market shall not be invalidated by the fact that good or service is provides free of charge’ (Section 18(2a) of the Competition Act), teaches us that a legislative intervention does not end all legal uncertainty: While it has been clarified that a ‘market’ does not require an exchange that involves remuneration, the Bundeskartellamt considered that it has not yet been clarified whether or not a ‘market’ requires a contractual relationship or any other kind of (mutual) exchange between the platform and its users to be present. In Facebook, the authority left this question open, arguing that in any case there was a contract between Facebook and its private users. In addition, the authority stated that the transfer of data could also be regarded as part of an exchange between Facebook and its private users. Facebook, B6-22/16, para 244.

108 In the economic literature, this distinction between single- and multi-homing has been elaborated in particular by M Armstrong, ‘Competition in Two-Sided Markets’ (2006) 37 Rand Journal of Economics 668.

109 See note 151 below and accompanying text.

110 Therefore, despite the outstanding positive direct network effects among the users of its social networking services, it is not clear whether Facebook must be considered a separate market. This was considered but ultimately left open by the Bundeskartellamt in Facebook, B6-22/16, paras 272–76. See also S W Waller, ‘Antitrust and Social Networking’ (2011–12) 90 North Carolina Law Review 1771, p 1799 (‘If Facebook's market dominance remains durable, the question of market power becomes easier over time as network effects and data lock-in make it increasingly likely that Facebook is a market unto itself’.).

111 Bundeskartellamt, note 68 above, refers to this kind of user behaviour as ‘sequential multi-homing’. Similarly, a user who constantly uses one platform as default option but has, nevertheless, subscribed with a second platform in order to hedge against the risk of a system failure or the like (see eg Travelport/Worldspan, M.4523, note 15 above) should be considered a single-homer.

112 Further consequences of such a framework for market definition are discussed in Section II.C.2 below.

113 A comparable approach underlies the regulation of fixed and mobile termination rates: where consumers are subscribed to a network operator, only this operator may terminate calls made to these consumers. Hence, operators of a telecommunication networks are regarded as having a monopoly position in the market for the termination of calls on their own network. See Recital 3 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) …/… of 18.12.2020 supplementing Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council by setting a single maximum Union-wide mobile voice termination rate and a single maximum Unions-wide fixed voice termination rate.

114 Google Android, AT.40099, para 306. An appeal is pending before the General Court (Google and Alphabet v Commission, T-604/18).

115 See Section III.A below.

116 The conventional wisdom about pricing in such a situation has been taken up, for example, by the Bundeskartellamt, note 68 above, p 58: ‘this led to a monopolistic price on the multi-homing side, while the price on the single-homing side would be fairly low as a result of platforms competing for users on this side. In this respect, this may result in an inefficient price structure despite potentially intensive platform competition (on the single-homing side)’. This suggests that if the side that multi-homes were instead to single-home (eg because of contractual restrictions), while the single-homing side continues to do so for technological reasons, prices would rebalance and lead to lower prices on the side that initially was multi-homing. As Belleflamme, P and Peitz, M, ‘Platform Competition: Who Benefits from Multi-homing?’ (2019) 64 International Journal of Industrial Organization 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar show in a formal analysis, prices on the two sides indeed move in opposite directions. However, it is a priori not clear in which direction. The reason is that monopoly prices may actually be rather low as platforms may have an incentive to attract many users on the multi-homing side.

117 Travelport/Worldspan, M.4523, para 15.

118 Ibid, paras 13–21.

119 Ibid, para 81.

120 Ibid, para 72.

121 Topps Europe Ltd v Commission, T-699/14, EU:T:2017:2, para 82.

122 See Ryanair v Commission, T-342/07, EU:T:2010:280, para 136; Deutsche Börse v Commission, T-175/12, EU:T:2015:148, para 133.

123 Market Definition Notice, note 6 above, paras 15–19, 40. In its merger decisions, the Commission does regularly refer to the SSNIP test. See eg AstraZeneca/Novartis, M.1806, paras 35, 59; CVC/Lenzing, M.2187, paras 25–26; Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi, M.2420, para 11; Procter & Gamble/Wella, M.3149, para 38.

124 In its Market Definition Notice, note 6 above, paras 15–19, the European Commission refers to the SSNIP test only with regard to demand substitution. It is noteworthy that supply-side substitutability could be assessed correspondingly. See Mauro, L Di, ‘Refining the Retail Markets for Audiovisual Products’ (2003) 48 European Competition Law Review 384, p 385Google Scholar.

125 Booking.com, Décision no 15-D-06 (Autorité de la concurrence, 21 April 2015), para 99.

126 Ibid, para 100.

127 Ibid, para 45.

128 Ibid, para 100.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 Note the further complication that, in this case, it is precisely this contractual setting whose competitive assessment is at issue. We submit that when defining markets in such a context, as market definition is one of several steps to analyze the competitive situation without legal intervention, it must be presumed that the agreement or other practice under review is effective.

132 Belleflamme, P and Peitz, M, Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies, 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press, 2015), p 676CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

133 This stands in contrast to Crémer, de Montjoye, and Schweitzer, note 19 above, p 45. In line with our view, Katz and Sallet, note 82 above, at 2159, suggest ‘consider[ing] price changes on one side of the platform while holding prices on the other side constant and examining whether there are significant, plausible feedback effects. If there are no such effects, then focusing on a single side manifestly will give a clear overall picture. But if there are feedback effects, then they must be taken into account to avoid reaching misleading conclusions’.

134 L Filistrucchi, ‘Market Definition in Multi-sided Markets’ in OECD, Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms (2018), p 46.

135 CTS Eventim/Four Artists, B6-35/17 (Bundeskartellamt, 23 Nov. 2017).

136 Ticketvertrieb, VI-Kart 3/18(V) (OLG Düsseldorf, 5 December 2018), juris, principle 2.

137 See Market Definition Notice, note 6 above, para 15 (SSNIP test as a ‘speculative experiment’).

138 C Pike, ‘Introduction and Key Findings’ in OECD, Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms (2018), p 15.

139 Bundeskartellamt, note 68 above, p 41.

140 Facebook/Whatsapp, COMP/M.7217, para 76. Ultimately, the Commission left open whether segments of the online advertising market constituted relevant product markets in their own right. Ibid, para 79.

141 Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fees, COMP/29.373, para 46.

142 Ibid, para 48.

143 A consumer who wants to purchase a certain product may ask herself (1) which payment system she prefers (eg cash or payment card) and (2) from which merchant she would like to purchase the product. If there is a whole range of merchants that offer a comparable quality of customer service and if among those there are only some who do not accept the preferred payment system (eg a certain payment card), there will be no problem for a consumer to avoid that merchant and still purchase the product (including with the desired service quality). In contrast, in the same scenario, a merchant that does not accept the use of the payment system preferred by a certain group of potential customers will inevitably lose the option to do business with them.

144 Google Android, AT.40099,para 267.

145 See for a suggestion of how the SSNDQ test could be applied to Facebook's offering of social networking services Gebicka, A and Heinemann, A, ‘Social Media & Competition Law’ (2014) 37 World Competition 149, pp 158–59Google Scholar. See also the proposal by Hartman, R, Teece, D, Mitchell, W, and Jorde, T, ‘Assessing in Regimes of Rapid Technological Change’ (1993) 2 Industrial and Corporate Change 317, pp 339–41Google Scholar.

146 Newman, J M, ‘Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications’ (2016) 94 Washington University Law Review 49, p 66Google Scholar.

147 Google Search (Shopping), COMP/AT.39740, para 245.

148 Topps Europe Ltd v Commission, T-699/14, EU:T:2017:2, para 82.

149 The positive association between market share, price-cost margin, and profits within an industry that holds in many traditional economic models of oligopolistic competition is fragile in the context of two-sided platforms, as formally shown by P Belleflamme, M Peitz, and E Toulemonde, ‘The Tension between Market Shares and Profit under Platform Competition’ (2021), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 102807.

150 Shapiro, C and Varian, H, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), p 185Google Scholar.

151 The miscoordination problem is mitigated if user multi-homing is facilitated. G Biglaiser, E Calvano, and J Crémer, ‘Incumbency Advantage and Its Value’ (2019) 28 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 41, review economic mechanisms that lead to network effects-induced barriers to entry.

152 See eg Wismer, S, Bongard, C, and Rasek, A, ‘Multi-sided Market Economics in Competition Law Enforcement’ (2017) 8 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 257, p 261Google Scholar (‘Nevertheless, in some cases, network effects can also stimulate competition when possibly disruptive entrants or smaller merging firms benefit from network effects to catch up with large established firms’.).

153 Consumer switching costs can also be important source of barriers to entry. While the concepts of network effects and switching costs are different, there are situations in which network effects impact the level of switching costs a user is subjected to. Such an interaction of network effects and switching costs occurs when the level of switching costs also depends on the past decisions of other users. On two-sided platforms, switching cost may depend on the number of past users on the other side of the market. An example is a successful e-commerce seller that considers migrating from an incumbent to an entrant platform, but cannot carry the reviews posted by customers from the past. The more reviews there are for the particular seller on the incumbent platform the higher the opportunity cost of migrating from one platform to another, as a good track record affords a premium.

154 Cisco Systems Inc and Messagenet Spa v Commission, T-79/12, EU:T:2013:635, para 69.

155 Barriers to entry are lower in markets in which new generations of products have to arrive at given dates. See K Collyer, H Mullan, and N Timan, ‘Measuring Market Power in Multi-sided Markets’ in OECD, Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms (2018), p 73.

156 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, C-85/76, EU:C:1979:36, para 41.

157 AKZO v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286, para 60.

158 See eg European Commission, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, [2009] OJ C 45/7, pt 15.

159 See eg Article 3 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, [2010] OJ L102/1.

160 As was done, eg, in Parship/Elitepartner, B6-57/15 (Bundeskartellamt, 22 October 2015), paras 184–193.

161 Lianos, I, ‘Some Reflections on the Question of Goals of EU Competition Law’ in Lianos, I and Geradin, D (eds), Handbook on European Competition Law. Substantive Aspects (Edward Elgar, 2013), p 57Google Scholar.

162 VBBB/VBVB, IV/428, para 54.

163 Ibid, para 56.

164 See eg Delimitis v Henninger Bräu, C-234/89, EU:C:1991:91, paras 14–16.

165 See note 60 above.

166 Compagnie générale maritime and Others v Commission, T-86/95, EU:T:2002:50, para 343.

167 EDP - Energias de Portugal v Commission, T-87/05, EU:T:2005:333, paras 147, 236. But note that the court at the same time emphasised that the ‘Commission must prohibit a transaction provided that the criteria of Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation are satisfied, even in respect of only one of the relevant markets’. Ibid, para 145.

168 In its guidelines on Article 101(3) TFEU, the Commission put forward a more restrictive position, stating that it would only engage in a cross-markets efficiency-analysis under Article 101(3) TFEU ‘where two markets are related’ and ‘provided that the group of consumers affected by the restriction and benefiting from the efficiency gains are substantially the same’. Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) [now 101(3)] of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C 101/97, para 43; see also ibid, para 87; Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, [2004] OJ C 31/5, para 79.