Ethicists and others grappling with biomedical and other ethical
issues often advocate or reject certain practices or actions on the
basis of the symbolic meanings associated with them. My project is to
call attention to the ubiquity of symbolic appeals and to initiate an
examination of their philosophical significance, moral authority, and
logical limitations. Are appeals to symbolic meanings of actions or
policies legitimate in ethical argumentation and discourse, or are they
emotive responses and indulgences lacking in moral significance? If
such appeals have moral weight, how is the symbolic value balanced with
other values? Why is it that some symbolic appeals are convincing, and
others not? What, if anything, validates or invalidates appeals?
To orient the reader properly to the project, a few preliminary
comments are in order. First, a thorough philosophical investigation of
the nature of symbols and symbolism is outside the scope of this paper,
as is an investigation of the precise relationship, should there be
one, between symbols and language, signs, or metaphors. However, the
use of the term “symbol” and its derivatives will be
uncontroversial. The arguments that are the focus of this paper are
arguments that the morality of certain actions and policies is
determined, at least in part, by the messages they are likely to
convey.1
Symbolic appeals can function in
other interesting ways. Sometimes it is argued that anencephalics or
the permanently comatose lack actual moral worth but have symbolic
worth. As such, they can be used instrumentally to save others. Such
arguments beg the question and hence are not convincing and will not be
examined further in this article.
The actions or policies are
thought to send messages because they are representative of, and thus
symbolize certain attitudes, values, or ideals.
Second, arguments that attribute symbolic (rather than actual) moral
worth to human beings such as embryos, anencephalics, or the
permanently comatose to justify using them for instrumental purposes,
such as stem cell research or organ transplantation, are also not under
consideration.2
See: Thomasma DC.
Anencephalics as organ donors. Biomedical Ethical Reviews
1989;25–54. See also: Robertson J. Ethics and policy in embryonic
stem cell research. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal
1999;9(2):109–36.
Given that either the assertion or
denial of actual moral significance without further argument inevitably
begs the question, and because the correct criterion for moral status
is such a contentious issue, such arguments fall beyond the scope of
this paper and cannot be addressed here.
Third, the “moral authority” of arguments based on
symbolic appeals refers here merely to prima facie moral weight.
Symbolic significance counts as one morally relevant consideration but
not necessarily an overriding one. The actual moral weight of the
symbolic appeal varies from argument to argument, as do the number and
weight of competing moral considerations.
Evidence of the Ubiquity of Symbolic
Appeals
Most appeals to symbolic meanings in the bioethical literature are
made with respect to controversial medical actions, either already
established or under consideration. The arguments I cite are random
representative examples of such symbolic appeals chosen to demonstrate
their prevalence. No assessment of their persuasive power will be given
at this point, though most people will find that they vary
significantly in their levels of cogency. The following arguments are
loosely organized here from beginning to end-of-life issues.
John Kass and others have argued against in vitro fertilization or
other forms of artificial reproductive technologies, including cloning,
because of the dehumanizing effects of such practices. The use of
artificial reproductive technologies, he argues, is symbolic of an
attitude toward children as property to be manufactured according to
one's specifications.3
Kass L, Wilson
J. The Ethics of Human Cloning. Washington, DC: AEI Press;
1998. See also: Kass L. “Making babies” revisited. The
Public Interest 1979;54:32–60. Also see chapter 4,
“The Meaning of Life—In the Laboratory,” in: Kass L.
Towards a More Natural Science. New York: Free Press;
1985.
Those worried about commercial surrogacy are worried not
just about commodification but about what message the surrogates'
own children receive when their biological mothers give away the
children they have been carrying for someone else.
4 Steinbock B. Surrogate motherhood as prenatal adoption.
Law, Medicine, and Health Care
1988;16(1):44–50.
James Burtchaell opposes fetal tissue experimentation when obtained
from elective abortions because it symbolically “places the
scientist in moral complicity with the abortionist.”5
Burtchaell J. University policy on
experimental use of aborted fetal tissue. IRB: A Review of Human
Subjects Research 1988;10(4):7–11.
David Ozar
argues that even those who deny that embryos have a right to life
nevertheless have a reason to refrain from the thawing and disposing of
unused embryos, given the possible symbolic impact such a practice
would have on “the community's valuing of human
life.”
6 Ozar D. The case against
thawing unused frozen embryos. Hastings Center Report
1985;15:7–12.
Meilaender and others have argued against
using embryos for stem cell research urging the same concern.
7 Meilaender G. The point of a ban: or, how to
think about stem cell research. Hastings Center Report
2001;31(1):9–16. For a counterargument, see: Robertson J. Ethics
and policy in embryonic stem cell research. Kennedy Institute of
Ethics Journal 1999;9(2):109–36.
Limitations have been suggested regarding physician practices on the
basis that they taint or undermine the symbolic meaning of the medical
profession as the patient's caring advocate. For this reason,
several bioethicists have argued against physicians acting as legal
executioners.8
Truog R, Brennan T.
Participation of physicians in capital punishment. New England
Journal of Medicine 1994;331:119–23; Loewy E. Healing and
killing, harming and not harming: physician participation in euthanasia
and capital punishment. Journal of Clinical Ethics
1992;3(1):29–34.
Norman Daniels has warned against
doctors functioning as gatekeepers to the access of medical services,
for fear that trust in doctors will be undermined, because if doctors
function as gatekeepers, the message will be sent that their
patients' health is not their primary concern.
9 Daniels N. The ideal advocate and limited resources.
Theoretical Medicine 1987;8:69–80.
Many have
argued against medical professionals participating in euthanasia or
even physician-assisted suicide because doing so undermines trust in
the medical profession by sending the message that physicians are
guided by concerns other than the continuation of life.
10 Kass L. Neither for love nor money: why
doctors must not kill. The Public Interest 1989;94:40. See
also: Gaylin W, Kass L, Pellegrino E, Siegler M. Doctors must not kill.
JAMA 1988;259:2139–40.
Mark Weitzman has argued against using Nazi research data even when
cost-effective or scientifically beneficial. He reports that many
Jewish people think that, in using Nazi data, medical researchers
become “accessories to the crime” and relativize “the
sense of absolute evil associated with Nazism.”11
Weitzman M. The ethics of using Nazi
medical data: a Jewish perspective. Second Opinion: Health, Faith,
and Ethics 1990;14:30–1.
A former supporter of the
use of such research, Robert Pozos later came to condemn it after
talking to concentration camp survivors. He states that using Nazi data
“sends a message” that supports the principle that
“the ends justify the means” and thus condones and
encourages scientists to engage in unethical practices to further the
ends of medicine.
12 Pozos RS. Scientific
inquiry and ethics: the Dachau data. In: Caplan A, ed. When
Medicine Went Mad: Bioethics and the Holocaust. Totow, NJ: Humana
Press; 1992:95–108.
At one point, Daniel Callahan argued against the withdrawal of
artificial nutrition and hydration of the permanently comatose or dying
because feeding, even artificially, is “the most perfect symbol
of the fact that human life is inescapably social and
communal.”13
Callahan D. On feeding
the dying. Hastings Center Report 1983;13:22.
Admitting the intrinsic “moral licitness” of the cessation
of artificial feeding in the cases sensibly and carefully outlined by
JoAnne Lynn and James Childress, Callahan nevertheless opposed the
cessation of artificial feeding even when futile, nonbeneficial, and
consistent with the patient's wishes, because doing so violates
the symbol of feeding as caring and threatens attendant emotions and
sentiments that Callahan deems “necessary social instincts”
for the survival of a social community.
14 Lynn J, Childress J. Must patients always be given food
and water? Hastings Center Report
1983;13:17–21.
Symbolic appeals have also been made regarding organ-transplantation
policies. Leon Kass has argued against the marketing of organs on the
grounds that it sends the false message that our bodies are our own
property and thus have the status of a commodity.15
Kass L. Organs for sale? propriety, property, and the
price of progress. The Public Interest
1992:65–84.
Renee Fox has severely criticized what has
been called the “two-minute protocol” in the use of
nonheartbeating cadavers, maintaining that the practice encourages an
impression of transplant surgeons as “ignoble
cannibals.”
16 Fox R. An ignoble
form of cannibalism: reflections on the University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center protocol for procuring organs from non-heart-beating
cadavers. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal
1993;3(2):231–9. See also: Fox R. Afterthoughts: continuing
reflections on organ transplantation. In: Youngner SJ, Fox RC,
O'Connell LJ, eds. Organ Transplantation: Meanings and
Realities. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press;
1996:252–72.
I have argued that anencephalics should not
be used as organ sources even though they will die shortly because the
policy of harvesting organs from anencephalics symbolically undermines
parental attachments to offspring, and threatens to diminish, through a
slippery slope effect, our respect for the intrinsic worth of
individuals.
17 Sytsma S. Anencephalics as
organ sources. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics: Philosophy of
Medicine 1996;17(1);19–32.
John Lanton, reflecting on his experiences administering
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and noting its disturbing aspects
that call into question its appropriateness and morality in certain
circumstances, concludes that CPR is morally justified.18
Lanton J. Bethann's death.
Hastings Center Report 1995;25(2):22–3.
He
argues that CPR fulfills a function even if not directly beneficial to
the endangered or dying person: it functions as a symbol of our respect
for persons. The flurry surrounding CPR, which he calls “our
culture's desperate dance around the bed of a dying loved
one” and “a ritual affirmation of our central beliefs about
the way people should be treated,” manifests how important a
person's life is, so that, even if not beneficial for that person,
others attending the endangered or dying are comforted by the fact that
everything possible was done to prevent a person's death. He
states: “Until we come up with alternative rituals, other ways of
dramatically affirming and valuing the lives of persons who are sick
and dying, we will need these rituals badly; even if (or especially
when) they are mostly symbolic.”
19 See note 18, Lanton 1995:23.
These examples should suffice to establish that symbolic appeals are
prevalent in the bioethical literature. Given their prevalence, it
behooves us to reflect on the reasons why they are so entrenched in our
moral deliberations and to determine whether or how their use should be
encouraged.
Significance of Symbolic Arguments
Ernst Cassirer claimed that the capacity for symbolism, rather than
for rationality, is the distinguishing feature of humankind.20
Cassirer E. Essay on Man. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 1944:27.
As
animal
symbolicum, humans transcend the realm of the practical and enter
a new form of discourse. Symbols are “a part of the human world
of meaning.”
21 See note 20,
Cassirer 1944:32.
Although certain animals possess a
remarkable degree of intelligence, only humans develop systems of
symbolism that are the basis for the development of culture as
expressed in art, music, religion, literature, science, and
mathematics. Alfred North Whitehead described symbolism as
“inherent in the very texture of human life” and as a
necessary means of human expression.
22 Whitehead AN. Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect.
New York: Capricorn Books; 1927:60–2.
He described
symbolism as “the enhancement of the importance of what is
symbolized” and that it “preserves society by adding
emotion to instinct.”
23 See note
22, Whitehead 1927:63, 70.
Anthropologists and sociologists
have long recognized the central role symbols play in expressing and
communicating ideals and values in social life.
24 See: Duncan HD. Symbols in Society. London:
Oxford University Press; 1968; Duncan HD. Symbols and Social
Theory. London: Oxford University Press; 1969. See also: Helle HJ.
Sociologie und Symbol: Vertstehende Theorie der Werte in Kulture
und Gesellschaft, 2nd ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot;
1980.
They have further recognized the power symbols have to
evoke and cultivate affective responses necessary for providing
cohesion and a sense of identity and meaning.
25 See: Lewis IM, ed. Symbols and Sentiments:
Cross-Cultural Studies in Symbolism. New York: Academic Press;
1977; Verkuyten M. Symbool en Samenleving [Symbol and
society]. Zeist, the Netherlands: Kerckebosch; 1990; Lewis IM.
Symbols and social representations. Journal for the Theory of
Social Behaviour 1995;25(3)263–84.
Some bioethicists have reflected on the role of symbols in a
meaningful life. Daniel Callahan, bemoaning the dearth of an adequate
symbolic understanding of death, said that “we come to feel part
of a community because we find its systems of symbols of interpretation
and of meaning plausible and satisfying.”26
Callahan D. The Troubled Dream of Life. New York:
Simon & Schuster; 1993:224.
He called symbols
“patterns of order and explanation.”
27 See note 26, Callahan 1993.
Robert Arnold and
Stuart Youngner call for further reflection on the issue of changing
the “dead donor rule” to increase the supply of organs for
transplantation by noting that the rule symbolizes our concern to
refrain from treating others as body parts. They state: “Symbols
keep us attuned to what is important. As such they shape our
self-conception and how we organize our communities.”
28 Arnold R, Youngner S. The dead donor rule:
should we stretch it, bend it, or abandon it? Kennedy Institute of
Ethics Journal 1993;3(2):272.
Renee Fox reports that her training in psychology, psychiatry,
sociology, and anthropology has long made her aware of the influence of
the symbolic in our lives. Her work in organ transplantation has only
“reinforced [her] conviction that scientific and
medical progress does not catapult us beyond the reach of those areas
of our being where nonlogical perceptions, compelling images, reified
symbols, and tenacious myths reside.”29
See note 16, Fox 1996:258.
In her
“Afterthoughts,” she speaks of the moral and spiritual ill
effects she sees resulting from our move away from the conception of
organ transplantation as a gift act. Losing the association with that
symbol has had a deleterious and dangerous effect on our attitudes
about the human body and psyche, regarding them with an
“economically deterministic, utilitarian, profit-oriented,
desacralized outlook.”
30 See note
16, Fox 1996:263.
She points to developments in the 1990s that
affirm her claims—the arguments for allowing the marketing of
organs, the movements toward the use of nonheartbeating cadavers, and
the practice of infusing the nearly dead with organ-sustaining fluids
without first securing informed consent from family members. The thrust
of her argument is to bring out the importance of awareness of our
symbolic natures as a key factor in our thinking about biomedical
policies. Without sufficient consideration of the symbolic elements of
our policies and practices, both past and future, we can lose control
of our intended goals.
Synthesizing these comments explains why symbols permeate our
existence and dominate our moral and aesthetic lives. Symbols
effectively express the values we find central to the meaning of our
existence. They also confer a sense of identity through the shared
values they represent. Because they both express values and confer a
sense of identity, symbols themselves can help to strengthen the values
they represent and in turn contribute to the quality of human life.
Thus, they have an important ethical role. In Kantian terms, they can
be used to further the ends of humanity; in Aristotelian terms, they
can contribute to human flourishing; or, in Utilitarian terms, they can
promote utility. The argument requires only two assumptions, whose
plausibility approaches self-evidence: (1) human beings by nature
desire a good life, and (2) a good life is precisely one we regard as
valuable and meaningful. Even though symbols can be harmful and promote
evil ends, and therefore must be subject to scrutiny, it cannot be
denied that they have a moral role. Therefore, we have a prima facie
obligation to respect, adhere to, and protect symbolic meaning, at
least when doing so contributes to a good life.
So far, it might appear that symbols have, or ought to have, a fixed
and static meaning. Although there is always a danger that symbolism
has the effect of suppressing creative endeavors and limiting our
freedom of thought, that is not how they ought to be viewed.
Cassirer's point is only that we are by nature symbolic beings,
not that symbolic meanings are fixed and unalterable. Rather, he
maintains, “A genuine human symbol is characterized not by its
uniformity but by its versatility. It is not rigid or inflexible but
mobile.”31
See note 20, Cassirer
1944:36.
It is our capacity for symbolism that makes it
possible to continually and creatively recreate our sphere of meaning.
Symbolism, then, has an evolutionary character and naturally responds
to new challenges and perceptions. So, although symbols can and often
do stagnate, corrupt, and enslave our thinking, our creativity
generates new symbols to accommodate the evolutionary development of
our linguistic, mathematical, religious, aesthetic, ethical, and
scientific thought.
Because symbols characteristically have motivating appeal, their
power for seduction is strong. The seductive influence can be either
beneficial or dangerous. For this reason, Whitehead stresses the
“necessary service” that persistent criticism has on the
well-being of culture. Symbolic elements in life, he says, “have
a tendency to run wild, like vegetation in a tropical forest. The life
of humanity can easily be overwhelmed by its symbolic
accessories.”32
See note 22,
Whitehead 1927:61.
Whitehead concludes: “The art of a
free society consists first in the maintenance of a symbolic code; and
secondly in fearlessness of revision, to secure that the code serves
those purposes which satisfy an enlightened reason.”
33 See note 22, Whitehead 1927:88.
Limitations of Symbolic Arguments
Many symbolic arguments strike us as last-ditch, desperate efforts to
rescue an opinion, particularly if they support a position antithetical
to our own. However, even if one is not entirely convinced by any of
the arguments presented so far, most people will recognize that some of
the arguments are more plausible than others. The analysis of the
previous section has alerted us to the danger of becoming so entranced
by symbols that we become stifled and perhaps insensitive or oblivious
to the need for changing our habits of thought. Use of symbolic
appeals, then, must be carefully scrutinized in order that their
ability to comprehend the full range of meanings is preserved. To
borrow from Socrates, “an unexamined symbol is not worth
having.”
There are, and can be, no algorithms for the critical examination of
symbolic appeals in biomedical or other ethical issues, just as there
can be no algorithms for making moral judgments. Aristotle's
admonition that we should not expect total precision in ethics is
apt.34
Aristotle. Nichomachean
Ethics, 1094b21–15.
There are too many
contingencies, too many values, and too many confluences that all must
be balanced in unique situations. No list of rules can be provided that
would not compound the error of insensitivity to the particularity and
complexity of situations and events. But just as symbols have a
positive though not peremptory role, so can a provisional list of
critical questions and reminders. The following critical questions can
be recommended as at least a partial way of raising the issues to
another, higher and hopefully more fruitful plateau.
Does the Symbolic Appeal Ignore Particularities of the
Situation That Make the Appeal in that Case Inappropriate?
Symbolic appeals, like the applications of rules, ought to be
sensitive to special circumstances. Symbols and rules provide guidance
and order, but we ought not relinquish our autonomy to them. It may be
a good rule of thumb to initiate CPR in most emergency situations of
cardiac arrest, but if the patient has ceased breathing for so long
that brain damage is extensive and certain, CPR may only lead to a
vegetative state from which no recovery is possible. Likewise,
providing CPR to a fragile elderly person in the advanced stages of
Alzheimer's disease may be regarded as harmful rather than
beneficial. Symbols should aid and facilitate our moral
judgments—not prevent them from occurring.35
Ignoring these circumstances is to commit the Fallacy of
Accident—inappropriately applying a general rule to a situation
that constitutes a legitimate exception to the rule.
Does the Action or Policy Advocated Effectively
Symbolize What It Is Claimed to Symbolize?
Symbols evoke different responses from different people. A judgment
about the symbolic meaning of a policy requires an historical intimacy
with the society—an attunement with the “pulse” of
society. If a policy is to be defended based on its symbolic meaning,
the situations for which it is called must be such that the symbolic
meaning of that policy would not backfire by sending an undesirable
message. For example, in a case where artificial feeding causes nausea,
increases sensitivity to pain, fails to be beneficial, and prolongs
life meaninglessly, can its provision effectively convey a caring
attitude, as Callahan once suggested? Even for a person in a
permanently vegetative state, can artificial nutrition and hydration
symbolize a caring attitude, when almost no one would choose to persist
in such a state?36
Callahan's
argument also commits the Fallacy of Accident by applying a principle
that holds in general to a situation for which it is
unsuitable.
The symbolic meaning backfires because the message
sent is that healthcare providers are like robots in their insistence
on measures that really do not constitute genuine caring.
Does the Particular Symbolic Appeal Fail to Recognize
Other, Even More Plausible Symbolic Meanings That Might Be Conveyed by
the Action or Policy?
We ought not comfortably support a policy on the grounds that it
serves one symbolic value, without acknowledging that other values or
symbols are neglected or even violated.37
Omitting such information can be thought of as a variation
of the Fallacy of Suppressed Evidence—that is, of suppressing
information that is relevant for drawing the correct
inferences.
For instance, insisting on the gift model of organ
donation on the basis that that model symbolizes our respect for
personal autonomy neglects to consider that adopting a “routine
harvest” policy symbolizes solidarity with our fellow human
beings.
38 Loewy E. Of community, organs,
and obligations: routine salvage with a twist. Theoretical
Medicine 1996;17(1):61–74.
Or refraining from
administering euthanasia may, to some, be thought of as necessary in
order to symbolize a respect for life, but for the dying patient
wracked with pain, such restraint might be symbolic of abandonment.
Forcing women to have prenatal surgeries for the protection of their
fetuses because of the symbolism of respect for life might at the same
time be interpreted as a lack of respect for women and the treatment of
them as mere “fetal containers.”
39 Annas G. Pregnant women as fetal containers. Hastings
Center Report 1986;13–4.
When the suggested
symbolic meanings are multiple, further arguments must be given to
support either line of approach, and the plausibility of the different
interpretations must be carefully examined.
Does the Symbolic Appeal Ignore Alternative Ways of
Respecting and Protecting the Values at Issue?
Some have argued against the use of unethically obtained research
data such as that gathered by the Nazis because it sends the message
that we condone such practices. However, if such data could be used for
significant life-preserving purposes, we could devise ways of doing so
that avoid this message, such as including statements of condemnation
of the previous research and dedicating one's research or profits
to Jewish families who have suffered persecution.40
To ignore possibilities in between a complete rejection or
acceptance is to commit the Black and White Fallacy, a form of the
Fallacy of False Bifurcation. The Fallacy of False Bifurcation involves
assuming that there are only two alternatives available and, given that
one is clearly objectionable, inferring that the other must be correct,
when in actuality, other alternatives are available and preferable to
the two identified. The Black and White Fallacy assumes that the two
alternatives include one that is morally wrong and infers that the
other opposite alternatives must be morally right.
Is the Symbolic Appeal Outdated Insofar as the Demands
of a New Era Call into Question the Adequacy of Previous Symbols?
Currently, allowing a patient or a proxy to refuse or terminate
treatment (called by some “passive euthanasia”) is
recognized as morally permissible and even as an individual right.
Previously, however, a notion persisted that doctors, as health and
life protectors, must always use any available technology to prolong
life. Medical advances have been such that we are all too capable of
prolonging biological existence—long past the time that life has
any meaning to its bearer. So now, in our new era, we have the burden
of choices never before shouldered.41
To
unquestioningly adhere to traditional policies when there is good
reason for change can be regarded as a fallacious appeal to
authority.
The slowness with which our legal and medical
institutions responded to the petition by Karen Ann Quinlan's
family to remove her respirator fails to manifest the
“fearlessness of revision” Whitehead identifies as a
necessary component of the “art of free society.”
42 See note 22, Whitehead 1927:88.
Does the Symbolic Appeal Justify the Sacrifice of
Actual Needs of Individuals?
This question specifically concerns the problem of how to weigh
appeals to symbolic value when they compete with the needs of
individuals. Should symbolic values ever take precedence over the needs
of actual individuals? To be sure, giving priority to a symbol over an
individual sometimes indicates a rigidity and lack of sensitivity
unbefitting good moral judgment. Allowing a person to die rather than
tearing up a flag to bind her wounds would be such an instance.
Arguments from Symbolic Appeals and
Slippery Slopes
Arguments against policies that are based on symbolic appeals often
proceed not by arguing that the actions or policies under consideration
are in themselves immoral but by projecting the deleterious
consequences that could follow as a chain effect from accepting or
rejecting them because of their symbolic value. As such, the symbolic
appeals take the form of slippery slope arguments. Given that slippery
slope arguments make claims about the future, they are at best
inductive arguments, and they are rarely universally convincing.
Attitudes toward slippery slope arguments vary considerably. Often,
logic textbooks portray slippery slope arguments as being always
fallacious.43
See: Vernon T, Lowell AN.
Reflective Thinking: The Fundamentals of Logic. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth; 1968; Fogelin RJ. Understanding Arguments: An
Introduction to Informal Logic, 2nd ed. New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich; 1982; Johnson RH, Blair JA. Logical Self-Defense.
Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson; 1977.
David White, on the other
hand, argues that slippery slope arguments are never fallacious, though
they might contain a false premise.
44 White D. Slippery slope arguments. Metaphilosophy
1985;16,206–13.
Others argue that slippery slope
arguments may or may not be logically fallacious.
45 Two recent works arguing for the cogency of slippery slope
arguments are: Walton D. Slippery Slope Arguments. London:
Oxford University Press; 1992; Whitman JP. The many guises of the
slippery slope arguments. Social Theory and Practice 1994:
29(1):85–97.
Given the broad range of persuasiveness
exemplified in slippery slope arguments, this latter view seems to be
most reasonable. Slippery slope arguments should be considered
fallacious only when there is no good reason to think that the
degenerative chain reaction of bad effects will occur. In nonfallacious
slippery slope arguments the predicted chain effect is not merely
logically possible but plausible. The more probable it is, the more
convincing the argument will be.
Symbolic appeals have emotive force because they express values. The
cogency of slippery slope arguments based on symbolic appeals depends
on two factors relative to their social contexts: (1) the degree of the
emotive force carried by the symbol, and (2) the degree of shared
meaning the symbol has. Judging cogency then requires having sufficient
familiarity with the society and its values and other symbols. Some
slippery slope arguments (logical versions) predict morally
objectionable future consequences on the basis that the logical
justification of the original act or policy under consideration is
actually applicable to a wide range of actions or policies, including
some that are clearly morally disturbing. Other slippery slope
arguments (causal versions) predict moral decline as a result of
psychological or causal factors of human nature. Slippery slope
arguments based on symbolic appeals rely primarily on the psychological
and emotive effects of the symbolic appeals and therefore fall into the
category of causal slippery slope arguments.
Even though causal slippery slope arguments are not completely
convincing, they do serve important functions. Jeffrey Whitman has
suggested that slippery slope arguments serve as “flags or
markers that indicate important values are at stake.”46
See note 45, Whitman 1994:91.
They
urge prudence at the onset of a slippery slope and suggest strategies
for preventing them. Sometimes the appropriate response to causal
slippery slope arguments is to educate people about important moral
distinctions that can be made between the suggested policy and the
envisioned consequential ones, to assure them that the downward slide
need not take place. Other times, preventative strategies such as the
implementation of laws or regulative procedures that can serve as steps
or landings are the best response. These general tactics for
confronting slippery slope arguments in general are perfectly
applicable to the subset of those arguments based on symbolic
appeals.
Sensitivity to the possibility that our suggested actions or policies
might have symbolic significance in the minds of other people or other
nations can be tremendously helpful, especially when we are also aware
of what the symbolic meanings might be. First, it can help us to avoid
implementing policies that unnecessarily arouse suspicion, distrust, or
any other negative reaction that could motivate an undesirable sequence
of events when there are alternative policies available. Second, when
no alternative routes are available to a policy that could be
significantly beneficial even when there is a tendency for it to send
negative messages, sensitivity to symbolic significance can help us
find ways by which the risks of those negative messages might be
minimized. We could frame those policies in ways that will less likely
evoke negative images or meanings or, if those are inevitable, at least
in ways by which those unavoidable negative meanings are diffused,
supplanted, or counterbalanced. Creating and implementing new symbols
or policies may be necessary to highlight the values that the policies
are implemented to realize. Educational programs may be needed to raise
public consciousness concerning the actual value of current policies
compared to new ones. Otherwise, unforeseen or recalcitrant symbolic
meanings might hinder a policy that would be far more beneficial than
current ones. Indeed, sometimes the negative emotive power of a
symbolic meaning can be underestimated and can necessitate either a
temporary suspension or permanent reversal of our policies.
Symbolic appeals that have been shown to be inadequate by the
critical questions identified in the previous section would at the very
least suffer in cogency and will likely yield fallacious arguments
because of the factors left out of consideration that would bear on the
foreseen chain of events. However, whether they actually do yield
fallacious arguments cannot be decided simply by subjecting them to the
scrutiny of those questions. There may be other reasons why the
symbolic effect fails. Despite certain flaws in slippery slope
arguments, the predicted chain effect can remain plausible because of
the sheer emotive power that the symbolic appeal has in its particular
setting.
In conclusion, symbolic appeals in bioethics are natural byproducts
of our human makeup. They do have at least prima facie moral authority,
but that authority must be balanced by other symbolic meanings and
moral factors. Symbolic appeals are often made in the form of slippery
slope arguments. Evaluating symbolic appeals, whether or not they
feature in slippery slope arguments, can be facilitated by examination
in terms of the criteria outlined here, although they may not be
resolved on this basis alone. Critical evaluation is crucial, given
that symbolic appeals are effective because they are
affective—that is, they have emotive appeal. As such, they can
also be an effective means to mobilize new attitudes and evoke subtle,
but nevertheless important, values.
