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Cloning and Human Dignity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 1998

JOHN HARRIS
Affiliation:
The Center for Social Ethics & Policy, University of Manchester, and The Institute of Medicine, Law and Bioethics at the Universities of Manchester and Liverpool, England
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Abstract

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The panic occasioned by the birth of Dolly sent international and national bodies and their representatives scurrying for principles with which to allay imagined public anxiety. It is instructive to note that principles are things of which such people and bodies so often seem to be bereft. The search for appropriate principles turned out to be difficult since so many aspects of the Dolly case were unprecedented. In the end, some fascinating examples of more or less plausible candidates for the status of moral principles were identified; central to many of them is the idea of human dignity and how it might be affected by human mitotic reproduction.

Type
SPECIAL SECTION: CLONING: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND ETHICS
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press