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Epiphanic Knowledge and Medicine
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 February 2005
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There are, broadly speaking, two kinds of knowledge—analytic and intuitive, explicit and tacit. Analytic knowledge is arrived at by logical deductive thinking, and is a sequential thought process in which each step can be explained and defended. Intuitive knowledge, in contrast, is frequently alogical or nonrational (though not illogical or irrational), and often involves nonconscious mental processes. Though intuitive ways of knowing are essential to both scientific research and scientific medicine, the culture of medicine celebrates only the analytic, evidentiary kind of knowledge, while eschewing intuition as being “nonscientific.” The popularity and prevalence of what is known as evidence-based medicine reflects this bias in favor of the analytic and the explicit. Though the evidence-based approach has contributed greatly to standardizing medical care, favoring treatments for which there is evidence of effectiveness, it has limitations. An overreliance on evidence-based medicine is problematic, because this approach leaves out important factors in the actual practice of clinical medicine such as diagnosis (pattern recognition, hunches), nonverbal cures provided by patients, and the way the doctor–patient relationship bears on patient management and compliance, and because it is not appropriate for dealing with medical conditions that do not lend themselves to study by controlled clinical trials.
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There are, broadly speaking, two kinds of knowledge—analytic and intuitive, explicit and tacit. Analytic knowledge is arrived at by logical deductive thinking, and is a sequential thought process in which each step can be explained and defended. Intuitive knowledge, in contrast, is frequently alogical or nonrational (though not illogical or irrational), and often involves nonconscious mental processes. Though intuitive ways of knowing are essential to both scientific research and scientific medicine,1
Greenhalgh T. Intuition and evidence—uneasy bedfellows? British Journal of General Practice 2002;52:395–400.
Not surprisingly, essays have been published in a variety of medical fields—anesthesiology,2
Pope C, Smith A, Goodwin D, Mort M. Passing on tacit knowledge in anaesthesia: A qualitative study. Medical Education 2003;37:650–5.
Salantera S, Eriksson E, Junnola T, Salminen EK, Lauri S. Clinical judgment and information seeking by nurses and physicians working with cancer patients. Psycho-Oncology 2003;12:280–90.
Laine L. Evidence-based medicine: Clinical judgment is required. Gastroenterology 2003;124:1726.
Goldman G. The tacit dimension of clinical judgment. Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine 1990;63:47–61.
Andre M, Borgquist L, Foldevi M, Molstad S. Asking for ‘rules of thumb’: A way to discover tacit knowledge in general. Family Practice 2002;19(6):617–22; Peters RM. The role of intuitive thinking in the diagnostic process. Archives of Family Medicine 1995;4: 939–41.
Evans JG. Evidence-based and evidence-biased medicine. Age and Ageing 1995;24:461–3.
Crook JA. How do expert mental health nurses make on-the-spot clinical decisions? A review of the literature. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 2001;8:1–5; Welsh I, Lyons CM. Evidence-based care and the case for intuition and tacit knowledge in clinical assessment and decision making in mental health nursing practice: An empirical contribution to the debate. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 2001;8:299–305.
Hilden J. Intuition and other soft modes of thought in surgery. Theoretical Medicine 1991;6:89–94; McPeek B. Intuition as a strategy of medical decision making. Theoretical Medicine 1991;6:83–4.
Polanyi M. Personal Knowledge—Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; 1962; Polanyi M. The Tacit Dimension. Garden City, New York: Doubleday; 1966; Polanyi M. Tacit Knowing. In: Knowing and Being. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1969:123–210.
The form of knowledge that is variously called tacit, intuitive, or inferential is poorly understood. With the exception of Schón's oft-cited The Reflective Practitioner,11
Schón DA. The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. San Francisco: Jossey Bass; 1983.
Klein G. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press; 1998.
See note 12, Klein 1998:259.
Epiphanic Thinking
There is a concept, which I call “epiphanic thinking,” that belongs in the same epistemological category as intuition and tacit knowledge. All three terms refer to a kind of knowing that is not arrived at by analytic reasoning, and that is often difficult to articulate or even to understand. Whereas intuition and tacit knowledge can be either gradual or sudden, epiphanic knowing is abrupt and total, a kind of awareness that is experienced as a flash of insight or a sudden recognition.14
Hawkins AH. Literature, medical ethics, and ‘epiphanic knowledge.’ Journal of Clinical Ethics 1994;5(4):283–94; Hawkins AH. Medical ethics and the epiphanic dimension of narrative. In: Nelson HL, ed. Stories and Their Limits: Narrative Approaches to Bioethics. New York: Routledge; 1997.
Wartofsky MW. Clinical judgment, expert programs, and cognitive style: A counter-essay in the logic of diagnosis. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1986;11:81–92.
Epiphanies in medical practice can range from an intuition about a specific patient to a general insight about death or birth or aging. Internist Rita Charon observes: “The hesitant glance, the inarticulate sigh, or, as William Carlos Williams says, ‘the hunted news I get from some obscure patients' eyes’ carry with them profound challenge about the meaning of lives and the meaning of deaths.”16
Charon R. To listen, to recognize. The Pharos 1986;49(4):10–3, at p. 12.
Gill C. Types of interviews in general practice: The ‘flash.’ In: Balint E, Norrell JS, eds. Six Minutes for the Patient: Interactions in General Practice Consultation. London: Tavistock Publications; 1973:33–43.
Epiphanic knowledge can be thought of as an aspect, a dimension, of narrative knowledge.18
Bruner J. Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1986:13. See note 14, Hawkins 1997.
Why is the idea of epiphanic knowledge important? Because it focuses on a kind of thinking that occurs fairly often in clinical practice—especially in regard to diagnosis, to doctor–patient interactions, and to ethical decisionmaking. Skilled physicians are attentive not just to what a patient says, but also to tone of voice, body language, facial expression, and so forth. Such physicians know that the offhand phrase or the elliptical comment can yield knowledge as significant as the explicit narrative account that the patient constructs during the clinical interview. This attentiveness was studied in an essay by Branch and Malik about “windows of opportunities” in the clinical encounter,19
Branch WT, Malik TK. Using ‘windows of opportunities' in brief interviews to understand patients’ concerns. JAMA 1993;269(13):1667–8.
Levinson W, Gorawara-Bhat R, Lamb J. A study of patient clues and physician responses in primary care and surgical settings. JAMA 2000;284(8):1021–7.
Branch and Malik find that many patient interviews are punctuated with episodes of strong emotion on the part of the patient—these are the “windows of opportunities” that the physician either responds to or does not respond to. When the physician does respond, usually by attentive silence, there is an epiphanic moment between patient and doctor.21
See note 19, Branch and Malik 1993.
See note 20, Levinson et al. 2000.
The intuitive skills that are so obvious in diagnosis and in patient interaction also play a part in ethical decisionmaking. Bioethics is sometimes criticized for too narrow a focus on certain types of ethical problems—namely, problems that have solutions; problems that can be dealt with by analytic thinking. But ethical issues today are plentiful and widespread. Indeed, Rita Charon and Leon Kass declare that there are ethical issues embedded in every encounter between a doctor and a patient.23
Charon R. Narrative contributions to medical ethics: Recognition, formulation, interpretation, and validation in the practice of the ethicist. In: Dubose ER, Hamel RP, O'Connell LJ, eds., A Matter of Principles? Ferment in U.S. Bioethics. Valley Forge, Penn.: Trinity Press; 1994:260–83; Kass LR. Practicing ethics: Where's the action? Hastings Center Report 1990:20(1):5–12.
See note 23, Charon 1994.
Epiphanies in Literature
The word epiphany comes from the Greek epi, meaning on or above, and phainein, meaning to show or to manifest. An epiphany, then, is a showing forth of some kind. Its original usage in the English language referred to a Christian festival observed on January 6: the revelation of the infant Christ to the Magi for the Roman Church and the baptism of Jesus for the Orthodox Church. But during the 20th century the term underwent a rigorous secularization, becoming a widespread literary device.25
Beja M. Epiphany in the Modern Novel. Seattle: University of Washington Press; 1971.
Epiphanies of various sorts can be found in literary works from all eras. Because literary epiphanies occur in a wide range of literary genres from different cultures and different historical eras, it seems likely that epiphanic ways of knowing and perceiving are a part of the way the human mind works. The spectrum of epiphanies in literature ranges from recognition to revelation, from realizations that are human discoveries of self or other to occasions when life seems to reveal itself in some numinous moment. Perhaps an examination of particular literary works can help us better understand what epiphanic knowledge is, as well as clarify the relationship of the epiphanic both to tacit knowing and to narrative knowledge.
In ancient Greek literature, as in the Christian tradition, epiphany refers to manifestations of the divine. Thus, throughout Homer's Iliad, gods appear to mortals, often as epiphanic representations of the meaning and consequences of human actions. A good example of this kind of epiphany comes at the very beginning of the Iliad. Achilles becomes so angry at Agamemmnon that he begins to draw his sword, intending to run him through. Suddenly, though, the goddess Athena intervenes to stop him, coming out of nowhere to stand behind him and tugging at his hair so that he turns around, recognizes her, and thrusts his sword back into its scabbard.26
Homer. Iliad. Lattimore R, trans. Book I, lines 188–222. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1951:64.
Today, of course it is not likely that a divinity will appear (either in literature or in life) to resolve conflicts and show us the meaning of our intended actions. However, we have all experienced moments when we have a sudden feeling or monition about a person or an intended action that seems to come from nowhere. This kind of experience is mentioned on occasion by medical professionals. For example, Lisa Ruth-Sahd observes, in an essay in Nursing Education Perspectives: “Nurses often will report having an ‘uneasy, gut feeling’ about a patient, stating, for example, ‘I could tell he was going to code when he walked in the door’.”27
Ruth-Sahd LA. Intuition: A critical way of knowing in a multicultural nursing curriculum. Nursing Education Perspectives 2003;24(3):129–34, p. 130.
Sanders L. Diagnosis; Severely painful ankles; Bruiselike lumps. The way we live now. The New York Times Magazine 2003; July 20, sect. 6:11–4, at p. 14.
Though epiphanies recur throughout literature from all eras, it was James Joyce who first articulated (and secularized) the concept of the literary epiphany. By epiphany, he meant a sudden revelation of a person's true character or the sudden understanding of the meaning of an event.29
Scholes R, Litz AW. Epiphanies and epicleti. In: Scholes R, Litz AW, eds. James Joyce, Dubliners. New York: Viking Penguin; 1969:253.
The Joycean epiphany can be positive or negative, and can be about oneself, about another person, or about an event. The stories in his collection, Dubliners, are thought by literary critics to be organized around one or more epiphanies. In “Araby,” a young boy comes too late to the bazaar of which he has dreamt all day and finds the big hall nearly empty: “Gazing up into the darkness I saw myself as a creature driven and derided by vanity; and my eyes burned with anguish and anger.”30
Joyce J. Araby. In: Scholes R, Litz AW, eds. James Joyce, Dubliners. New York: Viking Penguin; 1969:29–35, at p. 35.
Joyce J. Clay. In: Scholes R, Litz AW, eds. James Joyce, Dubliners. Viking Penguin; 1969:99–106.
Joyce J. The dead. In: Scholes R, Litz AW, eds. James Joyce, Dubliners. Viking Penguin; 1969:175–224, at p. 210.
See note 32, Joyce 1969.
William Carlos Williams transposes the Joycean epiphany to a medical context in stories where his fictive counterpart—the testy and irascible Dr. Williams—suddenly understands a child's condition or family background. One thinks of his epiphanic understanding of the overly attentive immigrant mother and her husband near the end of his story, “A Face of Stone,” where Williams observes: “Suddenly I understood his half shameful love for the woman and at the same time the extent of her reliance on him. I was touched.”34
Williams WC. A face of stone. In: The Doctor Stories. New York: New Directions; 1984:78–87, at p. 87.
Williams WC. The Autobiography. New York: New Directions; 1948, pp. 359–60.
A third and strikingly different literary example of the epiphanic is haiku—a brief, unrhymed verse form that originated in 17th-century Japan. Because of its brevity and the fact that it focuses on a single image, any given haiku must be perceived and understood all at once, immediately and totally, without analytic, discursive mental processing. Like other forms of epiphany, haiku do not lend themselves well to paraphrase or analysis—they are understood subceptively, to use Polanyi's term.36
See note 10, Polanyi 1969 at p. 143.
Stryk L. Introduction. In: On Love and Barley: Haiku of Basho. Stryk L., trans. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press; 1985:16.
See note 10, Polanyi 1966:181–2; see note 10, Polanyi, 1969:140–8.
The state of mind required to write as well as read haiku with full understanding is often referred to as a “haiku moment”—an immediate, epiphanic apprehension of some particular aspect of experience that is felt to be deeply true; a peculiar kind of clarity that some call “ah-ness,” because the experience or poem evokes the response, “Ah, now I see.” The following two examples are both about the season of autumn: The author of the first is the late 17th-century Japanese poet known as Basho; the second is by Buson, who flourished in the mid-18th century.
Autumn moonlight—
A worm digs silently
Into the chestnut39
Hass R, ed. The Essential Haiku: Versions of Basho, Buson, and Issa. Hopewell, New Jersey: Ecco Press; 1994:12.
Autumn evening—
There's joy also
In loneliness40
See note 39, Hass 1994 at p. 91.
The act of reading the poem fully conveys its meaning: No subsequent act of interpretation or analysis is required.
Reading and writing haiku offers a way to train the intuitive mind. I have found that haiku is useful in teaching medical students how to recognize tacit knowledge and even how to produce the state of mind that facilitates intuitive thinking and tacit knowing. Students find that reading and writing haiku hones their listening skills, making them not only more comfortable with being silent, but also more appreciative of the deep communication that can occur during times of silence.
Conclusion
The literary epiphanies I have instanced—Achilles' sudden sense of divine prohibition, the commonplace detail that radiates meaning in a story by Joyce or Williams, the heightening of apprehension prompted by the single image of a haiku—all have their counterparts in the real-life world of medicine: the moment of instinctive ethical decision, the detection of some crucial diagnostic clue, the heightened awareness that a doctor and patient may silently share. But let me emphasize again that such tacit ways of knowing cannot and should not stand alone, independent of other forms of knowledge. The doctor validates her intuitive diagnosis with objective tests; the ethicist supports his moral intuition with reasoned arguments. On the other hand, if decisions arrived at by tacit, intuitive, epiphanic knowledge need to be corroborated by other forms of knowing, it is also true that decisions arrived at by deductive, analytic thought processes should be checked by tacit, intuitive, and epiphanic forms of awareness. Physicians should cultivate an appreciation for the way both mental processes, both kinds of knowledge, work in concert to provide the best approach to clinical decisionmaking.
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