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Business Views on Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Regulation: A Comparative Analysis of Two Recent Studies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2020

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Abstract

Type
Developments in the Field
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

I. Introduction

During the past year there were widespread developments around mandatory human rights due diligence legislation across Europe. These range from the implementation of laws which have already been introduced, such as the French Duty of Vigilance LawFootnote 1 and the Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence law,Footnote 2 to legislative proposals at various stages of advancement, such as those in SwitzerlandFootnote 3 and Norway.Footnote 4 Some governments have committed to introducing laws, such as in FinlandFootnote 5 and Germany.Footnote 6 Civil society groups are calling for mandatory due diligence laws which cover human rights and environmental harms in Belgium,Footnote 7 Denmark,Footnote 8 Italy,Footnote 9 the UK,Footnote 10 and at European Union (EU) level.Footnote 11

All these developments in one way or another aim to establish legal liability for companies that fail to undertake due diligence to identify, prevent, mitigate and address adverse human rights impacts in their own operations and their supply or value chains. In this way, they aim to turn into ‘hard law’ the concept of human rights due diligence which was first introduced by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).Footnote 12

These most recent calls for legal reform have increasingly been accompanied by support from large multi-national companies. This has taken the form of public statements by individual companies,Footnote 13 and has been confirmed by studies setting out findings on the collective views of business.

This piece considers these business views on the introduction of mandatory human rights due diligence legislation with particular reference to findings from two recent studies led by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL). Both studies were published in February 2020 and included surveys with similar questions for business respondents:

  • One study was undertaken for the European Commission (EC) on regulatory options for mandatory due diligence for human rights and environmental harms (the EC study).Footnote 14

  • The other study, which was undertaken in conjunction with lawyers from the global law firm Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, considered the feasibility of introducing a statutory duty to prevent corporate human rights harms in the UK (the UK study).Footnote 15 It followed a 2017 recommendation by the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights that such a provision might be modelled on the equivalent failure to prevent mechanism in the UK Bribery Act.Footnote 16

The findings of these studies will be compared and analysed with respect to business’ views on the current legal landscape, the anticipated benefits of potential regulation, and the nuances within the business community – in particular, contradictions or alignments between the views of individual companies and industry organizations.

II. Business Views on Potential Regulation

A. Sample of Business Respondents

This piece uses the following findings as the basis for analysis of business views:

  • The EC study’s 334 individual company responses to the business survey across the EU, as well as the 65 industry organization responses to the general stakeholders survey (21.89 per cent of 297 general stakeholder respondents).Footnote 17 In addition, the views expressed in interview quotes and the analysis of the EC study will be taken into account where relevant.

  • The UK study’s 40 business survey responses from individual companies, as well as the analysis relating to the views expressed during roundtable consultations.Footnote 18 Just under two-thirds (62.5 per cent) of the business respondents in this survey were ‘primarily based or headquartered’ in the UK, with operations spanning all regions of the world.Footnote 19

In both studies, the majority of business survey respondents were from large multi-national companies.Footnote 20

B. Shortcomings of the Existing Legal Landscape

Business survey respondents in both studies were asked about their views on the existing legal landscape. In the EC study, the question was framed as to whether respondents viewed existing laws on due diligence requirements for human rights and the environment to be effective, efficient and coherent, which are criteria set out in the EU Better Regulation Guidelines.Footnote 21 The majority of business respondents (52.55 per cent) viewed existing laws as not being effective, efficient and coherent. Less than half of this number (25.55 per cent) were of the opinion that existing laws do meet these criteria.Footnote 22 Interviewees elaborated on these findings by stating that existing due diligence expectations are often fragmented according to certain issues, sectors or commodities,Footnote 23 which can create legal uncertainty for businesses having to comply with different standards.

In the UK study, survey respondents were asked whether existing law provides business with clarity and legal certainty about what corporate human rights obligations are. Over three-quarters of respondents (75.86 per cent) indicated that existing law does not provide clarity, and over two-thirds (68.97 per cent) that the law does not provide legal certainty in this respect. Only 13.79 per cent viewed existing law as providing clarity, and even fewer (6.9 per cent) that it provides legal certainty.Footnote 24

Sources: EC study Final Report at 94; UK study at 12.

Figure 1 Business views on existing legal landscape.

These findings were gathered before the UK Supreme Court’s judgement in Lungowe v Vedanta,Footnote 25 which held, without limitation to other circumstances, that a duty of care may arise, according to established principles of negligence, where: in published materials, a parent holds itself out as exercising a degree of supervision and control of its subsidiaries, even if it does not in fact do so; and, where a parent company takes active steps, by training, supervision and enforcement, to see that a group policy is implemented by subsidiaries. Insofar as this is being interpreted by some as meaning that public commitments towards meeting the expectations of the UNGPs may expose UK-domiciled companies to legal liability, this finding may have further contributed to the lack of legal certainty and clarity that multi-national UK companies reported in the study.Footnote 26

C. Incentives for Undertaking Due Diligence

In the EC study, survey respondents were asked what the primary incentives for undertaking human rights due diligence are, or have been in the past. Here, respondents from individual companies and industry organizations selected the same top three incentives in the same order: (i) reputational risks; (ii) investors requiring a high standard; and (iii) and consumers requiring a high standard.Footnote 27 The study concludes from this that ‘despite some divergence in views … between these two groups’ relating to other aspects of regulation, these responses seem to demonstrate that ‘industry organisations have a real understanding of the risks and incentives which drive business to undertake due diligence’.Footnote 28

Similarly, the least selected incentives by both groups are those related to legal requirements, including regulation which imposes sanctions or provides for judicial oversight, and risks of litigation. In contrast to these views, civil society respondents ranked regulatory and legal requirements as the highest incentives for business to undertake due diligence.

This contradiction may be explained by the way the question was phrased: ‘In your opinion, what are/will become [companies’] main incentives to conduct due diligence for these impacts through the supply chain?’.Footnote 29 Given the current lack of regulation or legal standard, business stakeholders may have responded with reference to current incentives. In turn, many civil society organizations are currently campaigning for mandatory due diligence laws and may have responded with reference to possible future incentives.Footnote 30

D. Benefits for Business of Potential Regulation

The findings from both studies demonstrate that business respondents foresee benefits from potential new regulation in the area. The majority of business respondents in both the EC study (66.42 per cent)Footnote 31 and the UK study (74.07 per cent)Footnote 32 anticipated that regulation in this area would benefit business through levelling the playing field.

Sources: EC study Final Report at 146; UK study at 14.

Figure 2 Anticipated benefits of regulation: Levelling the playing field

Survey respondents also indicated that regulation may benefit business by contributing to legal certainty. In the EC study, over two-thirds of business respondents (66.42 per cent) were of this view,Footnote 33 and in the UK study the vast majority (82.14 per cent)Footnote 34 anticipated that additional regulation would improve legal certainty.

Only half (50 per cent) of industry organization respondents in the EC study agreed about these benefits of legal certainty, with almost as many (45.83 per cent) disagreeing that regulation would improve legal certainty.Footnote 35 This suggests some disagreement within industry organizations about the potential impacts and benefits of new regulation, and how this would affect their business members.

Sources: EC study Final Report at 145; UK study at 14.

Figure 3 Anticipated benefits of regulation: Legal certainty

The majority of business respondents in both studies (61.19 per centFootnote 36 in the EC study and 75 per centFootnote 37 in the UK study) also agreed that the new regulation would improve or facilitate leverage with third parties by introducing a non-negotiable standard.

The EC study also revealed that industry organizations are generally less favourable to regulatory reforms than individual business respondents. For example, in contrast to business respondents, most industry organization respondents (45.83 per cent) were of the view that that new regulation would not be beneficial to business by introducing a non-negotiable standard. This number was followed, however, by almost as many (41.67 per cent) who did believe that a non-negotiable standard would be beneficial.Footnote 38

Sources: EC study Final Report at 148; UK study at 14.

Figure 4 Anticipated benefits of regulation: Facilitation of leverage through non-negotiable standard

In addition, a large majority (75.37 per cent) of business respondents in the EC study also indicated that any EU-level regulation would benefit business through providing a ‘single, harmonised EU-level standard (as opposed to a mosaic of different measures at domestic and industry level)’.Footnote 39

E. Lessons Learnt from Experiences with the UK Bribery Act

Respondents in the UK study were asked whether they have experience with the UK Bribery Act. Section 7 of this Act introduced a criminal offence for the failure to prevent bribery, accompanied by a defence of ‘adequate procedures’. Respondents with experience with this provision indicated that it had led to similar benefits as those anticipated from the introduction of human rights due diligence regulation:

  • Over two-thirds (64.71 per cent) indicated that this mechanism has provided legal certainty relating to corruption avoidance, and zero respondents disagreed with this proposition.Footnote 40

  • Half of respondents agreed that the Bribery Act has levelled the playing field by ‘holding competitors and suppliers to the same standards’.Footnote 41

  • More than half (52.94 per cent) indicated that the Bribery Act has facilitated leverage with third-party businesses by setting a non-negotiable standard.Footnote 42

  • The majority indicated that the Bribery Act has generally not impacted their companies’ decisions to invest in high-risk countries or sectors.Footnote 43

  • Three-quarters of respondents indicated that the Bribery Act has not impacted their competitiveness. A small number of respondents (12.5 per cent) felt that the Bribery Act has placed their company at a disadvantage to foreign competitors, while the same number (12.5 per cent) felt that it has instead given them a competitive advantage.Footnote 44

Insofar as the Bribery Act has already been in place for ten years, these findings are significant in that they suggest that the benefits expected by business stakeholders in connection with a potential statutory duty to prevent human rights are not unrealistic.

F. Legal Duty, Liability and Enforcement

The above findings highlight a broad dissatisfaction on the part of business with the current legal landscape with respect to business and human rights, and that business stakeholders recognize the potential of new regulation to close these gaps. The survey in the EC study presented respondents with a range of regulatory options, and found that amongst business there is a preference for the most robust option, namely mandatory due diligence as a legal standard of care. Interviewees expanded on this reasoning by indicating that there is already enough voluntary guidance, and that reporting requirements on their own have been ineffective in incentivizing substantive due diligence.

It was highlighted that any new legal duty should be a ‘general, context-specific’Footnote 45 standard of care rather than a ‘tick-box’ process.Footnote 46 The UK study, for this reason, concluded with a model legal provision which provides for a defence of having undertaken due diligence ‘reasonable in all the circumstances’:Footnote 47

It is accordingly clear that a pure procedural ‘check box’ or ‘safe harbour’ provision that would shield a company completely from liability if any kind of human rights due diligence was performed, would not be aligned with the concept of due diligence contained in the UNGPs. […] Rather than promote a ‘check box approach’, if businesses know that they will ultimately have to stand behind the quality of their due diligence in order to extinguish liability, this could encourage a much more meaningful and substantive engagement with human rights due diligence. This is an advantage over, for example, a mandatory due diligence mechanism where the quality of a statement must somehow be monitored and regulated in the abstract.

Nevertheless, both studies found that even those companies which generally support the introduction of new regulation, do not agree regarding the form which legal liability should take.Footnote 48

Moreover, whereas interviewees from individual companies in the EC study indicated that there is a need for mandatory regulation which imposes legal liability,Footnote 49 industry organization respondents seem generally opposed to any type of new regulation in the area. Unlike individual survey respondents, which were mostly from multi-national companies, industry organizations represent a large portion of business, including small- and medium-sized enterprises. Insofar as it can be assumed that many of the large companies that responded to the survey would also be members of industry organizations, these findings suggest some current incoherence within these organizations in terms of representing their broad membership base.Footnote 50

III. Conclusion

The above findings confirm that business stakeholders overall are dissatisfied with the existing legal landscape regarding their human rights due diligence obligations. They find that it is not efficient, effective and coherent, and that it lacks legal certainty and clarity.

Moreover, business seems to anticipate that the introduction of new legal duties relating to human rights due diligence could potentially be in their interests. Benefits cited include the potential for regulation to level the playing field; the leverage that a non-negotiable standard will afford companies in their global operations; the usefulness of a single harmonized standard (particularly at EU-level); and the power of the collective standard to address systemic issues that individual companies are unable to solve by themselves.

Experience with the UK Bribery Act shows that these benefits have indeed manifested themselves when a comparable due diligence standard (‘adequate procedures’) was introduced as a defence to a failure to prevent mechanism in the bribery context.

In the past, the corporate lobby has opposed comparable regulatory measures, such as the UK Bribery Act and the French Duty of Vigilance Law.Footnote 51 The fact that individual large companies are now supporting and even calling for such regulation, accompanied by lucid business-centred reasons, is a significant change. These voices will be increasingly important within industry organizations internally, as well as with regulators in consultations regarding the drafting of appropriate and smart regulation in the business and human rights field.

Footnotes

*

Lise Smit is Senior Research Fellow in Business and Human Rights at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, UK; Claire Bright is Assistant Professor at Nova School of Law in Lisbon, Portugal and Associate Research Fellow at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, UK; Irene Pietropaoli is Research Fellow in Business and Human Rights at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, UK; Julianne Hughes-Jennett is Partner at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, UK; Peter Hood is Consultant at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, UK. The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

References

1 Loi no. 2017-399 du 27 Mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre.

2 Kamerstukken I, 2016/17, 34 506, A.

3 Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice (SCCJ), ‘The Initiative Text with Explanations’, available at: https://corporatejustice.ch/wp-content/uploads//2018/06/KVI_Factsheet_5_E.pdf; SCCJ, ‘How Does the Parliamentary Counter-Proposal Differ from the Popular Initiative (RBI)?’, May 2018, available at: https://corporatejustice.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Comparision_RBI_counter-proposal_EN-1.pdf.

4 Report from the Ethics Information Committee, appointed by the Norwegian government on 1 June 2018. Report delivered on 28 November 2019, draft translation of Part I available at: https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Norway%20Draft%20Transparency%20Act%20-%20draft%20translation_0.pdf.

5 Ykkösketjuun official website, available at: https://ykkosketjuun.fi/en/.

6 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC), ‘German Development Ministry Drafts Law on Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence for German Companies’, available at: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/german-development-ministry-drafts-law-on-mandatory-human-rights-due-diligence-for-german-companies; German Federal Ministry for Industrial Cooperation and Development (BMZ) ‘Kein Entwurf für Lieferkettengesetz’, 29 November 2019, available at: https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/670510-670510; Manfred Shäfers ‘Regiering droht mit einem Lieferkettengesetz’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 11 December 2019; Caspar Dohmen, ‘Minister arbeiten an Lieferkettengesetz’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 December 2019.

7 Open letter by CSOs ‘Belgique: Des ONG demandent une loi qui oblige les entreprises à respecter les droits de l'homme et l'environnement’, 23 April 2019, available at: https://www.business-humanrights.org/fr/belgique-des-ong-demandent-une-loi-qui-oblige-les-entreprises-%C3%A0-respecter-les-droits-de-lhomme-et-lenvironnement.

8 Folketinget, ‘B 82 Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om at gøre det lovpligtigt for virksomheder at udøve nødvendig omhu på menneskerettighedsområdet og om indførelse af effektive retsmidler’, 24 January 2019, available at: https://www.ft.dk/samling/20181/beslutningsforslag/b82/20181_b82_som_fremsat.htm.

9 Open letter to the Italian institutions on the issue of Business and Human Rights, 11 November 2019, available at: https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/Open_letter_B%26HR_English.pdf.

11 ECCJ, ‘ECCJ Legal Brief: EU Model Legislation on Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights and the Environment’, 26 February 2020, available at: https://corporatejustice.org/eccj-publications/16804-eccj-legal-brief-eu-model-legislation-on-corporate-responsibility-to-respect-human-rights-and-the-environment.

12 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011).

13 For example, Irene Pietropaoli, Lise Smit, Julianne Hughes-Jennett and Peter Hood, A UK Failure to Prevent Mechanism for Corporate Human Rights Harms, 11 February 2020, available at: https://www.biicl.org/publications/a-uk-failure-to-prevent-mechanism-for-corporate-human-rights-harms (UK study) at 19.

14 Lise Smit, Claire Bright, Robert McCorquodale, Matthias Bauer, Hanna Deringer, Daniela Baeza-Breinbauer, Francisca Torres-Cortés, Frank Alleweldt, Senda Kara, Camille Salinier and Héctor Tejero Tobed for the European Commission DG Justice and Consumers, Study on Due Diligence Requirements Through the Supply Chain, 24 February 2020, available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/8ba0a8fd-4c83-11ea-b8b7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en (EC study Final Report).

15 UK study above note 13.

16 UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), Human Rights and Business 2017: Promoting Responsibility and Ensuring Accountability, Sixth Report of Session 2016-17, 5 April 2017, available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtrights/443/443.pdf.

17 EC study above note 14, Annexures, Part II: Survey Results Statistics, available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5bd8a55a-4c84-11ea-b8b7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en at 16–17.

18 UK study at 10.

19 Ibid at 11.

20 In the EC study, 65.9 per cent of business survey respondents have over 1000 employees (EC study Final Report at 45). In the UK study, 66.5 per cent of respondents were from large multi-national companies (UK study at 11).

21 European Commission Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD (2017) 350, 7 July 2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-guidelines.pdf at 28.

22 EC study Final Report at 94. The remaining 21.9 per cent selected ‘Do not know’, Final Report at 95.

23 Ibid at 95.

24 UK study at 12.

25 Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc [2019] UKSC 20.

26 UK study at 12.

27 EC study Final Report at 153.

28 Ibid.

29 EC study Part II: Survey Results Statistics above note 17 at 28, italics added.

30 EC study Final Report at 90–91.

31 Ibid at 146.

32 UK study at 14.

33 EC study Final Report at 145.

34 UK study at 14.

35 EC study Final Report at 144.

36 EC study Final Report at 148.

37 UK study at 14.

38 EC study Final Report at 148.

39 Ibid at 142. Only 9.7 per cent of business respondents disagreed with this proposition.

40 UK study at 16.

43 Ibid at 17.

45 EC study Final Report at 108.

46 Ibid at 107.

47 UK study at 52.

48 EC study Final Report at 105.

50 Anne Duthilleul and Matthias de Jouvenel, ‘Evaluation de la mise en oeuvre de la loi no. 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre’, Report to the French Minister of Economy and Foreign Affairs, January 2020, available at: https://www.economie.gouv.fr/cge/devoir-vigilances-entreprises, at 38.

51 Carl Mortished, ‘Bribery or Seduction?’, Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2011, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703296604576005062575694024; Sandra Cossart, Jérôme Chaplier and Tiphaine Beau de Loménie, ‘The French Law on Duty of Care: a Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All’ (2017) 2(2) Business and Human Rights Journal 317.

Figure 0

Figure 1 Business views on existing legal landscape.

Sources: EC study Final Report at 94; UK study at 12.
Figure 1

Figure 2 Anticipated benefits of regulation: Levelling the playing field

Sources: EC study Final Report at 146; UK study at 14.
Figure 2

Figure 3 Anticipated benefits of regulation: Legal certainty

Sources: EC study Final Report at 145; UK study at 14.
Figure 3

Figure 4 Anticipated benefits of regulation: Facilitation of leverage through non-negotiable standard

Sources: EC study Final Report at 148; UK study at 14.