No other Avestan term is as enigmatic and as important to our understanding of the religious view of the Avesta as the notion of aṣ̌a-. The etymology and the form of the term enjoy scholarly consensus.Footnote 1 If the concept defies definition, it is because, in Nietzsche's words, “an entire process is semiotically concentrated” (Reference Nietzsche and Diethe1994: 53) in it, a process which is quite obscure. Basing themselves on the opposition of aṣ̌a- to druj- “lie”, and seemingly on its etymology, scholars have generally translated the term as “truth” or “order”: one or the other? – this has been the main focus of the debate on the matter.Footnote 2 More recently, a number of scholars have remarked that aṣ̌a- contains both of these meanings. After a brief review of earlier contributions to the topic, Hintze (Reference Hintze2007: 58) states: “the term denotes much more than the common contemporary understanding of ‘truth’ in the sense of conformity with fact. Aṣ̌a- applies on both the spiritual and material levels. On the latter, it denotes the laws of nature or ‘order’ by which the physical world functions well on the cosmic, ritual and social planes. With regard to the former, it refers to that way of thinking which is in conformity with the perfect spiritual and material worlds”. Kellens' preferred term “l'Agencement” (e.g. Kellens Reference Kellens, Huber, Volkart and Widmer2008) implies both of these ideas and points to the etymology of the Avestan term.
It is fair to assert, however, that the sense of the term in situ remains elusive. One may justifiably wonder, for instance, what is meant in Kellens and Pirart's translation of Y 34.12cc' sīšā nå aṣ̌ā paθō, vaŋhə̄uš x vaētəṇ̄g manaŋhō: “Enseigne-nous grâce à l'Harmonie les chemins aisés de la divine Pensée” (Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 128). Is the reference to aṣ̌a- meant to remind the god of an obligation? Is it meant to signal one's qualification for the god's instructions? In his lecture at the Collège de France (January 20, 2012), Kellens interprets the instrumental differently: “Enseigne-nous par l'Agencement les chemins faciles de la bonne Pensée”. It is hard to determine what “par l'Agencement” could mean in the phrase, since he seems to understand “l'Agencement” as the “principe régulateur de tout (Aṣ̌a)” (Reference Kellens, Huber, Volkart and Widmer2008: 509). Does “l'Agencement” here mean “ritual” perhaps (see below)? Lommel (Reference Lommel1971: 89) translates aṣ̌ā as “durch Wahrsein”, presumably as the instrumental of means or medium. Insler (Reference Insler1975: 57) chooses “in alliance with truth”, maintaining that it modifies the “paths” (Reference Insler1975: 226). The “paths” that are “in alliance with truth”: what could the phrase mean? Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 142) seems to interpret aṣ̌ā as an adverbial: “Show us with truth the paths of good thought, easy to travel”. Does Mazdā ever resort to deception or present things deceitfully? Or perhaps the instrumental is comitative, in which case “truth” would be one of the two topics for which revelation is sought. Humbach's translation of the imperative verb, however, is tendentiously vague. Elsewhere, the “paths” are the object of √sāh “instruct” (Y 43.3), whereas aṣ̌a- is the object of √dis “display” in Y 43.10 at̰ tū mōi dāiš aṣ̌əm, that is to say the object of a visual showing (cf. Mayrhofer Reference Mayrhofer1992–2001: 744–6). What, then, might aṣ̌a- be, in this phrase? In Y 34.12cc' we have the full range of the senses that scholars have given aṣ̌a-, but none really works.
In addition to the semantic there is the question of the religious meaning or, more broadly, ideational content of the term. According to Kellens (Reference Kellens and Skjærvø2000: 101–2), in the Avestan worldview sacrifice helps maintain the cosmic order: “The men reproduce symbolically the cosmogonic act of Ahura Mazdā by submitting the sacrifice to a perfect order. Aṣ̌a, like OInd. r̥tá-, is also a ritual allegory and even one of the possible names for the ritual, for the ritual is the foremost ordered human activity”. It is not clear what is meant by “ritual allegory”; the possibility that the term aṣ̌a- may denote ritual must be determined by investigating its discursive usage. It seems that “order” is understood here in an abstract sense. In any case, it makes a difference whether the ground for using the same term to refer to the cosmic order as well as ritual is their “perfect order”, or whether it is because the latter “imitates” the former. Thus, different meanings can be attributed to Kellens' assertion that performing the ritual is “to do what Ahura Mazdā did at the dawn of time: produce order” (Reference Kellens and Skjærvø2000: 101). In a similar vein, Skjærvø (Reference Skjærvø, Cereti and Vajifdar2003: 407 ff.) holds the view that in the Old Avestan context ritual seeks to “reproduce” the cosmic order, and functions as the “means of making Order and the sun reappear” (Reference Skjærvø, Cereti and Vajifdar2003: 411); “the ritual Order matches the divine Order” (Skjærvø Reference Skjærvø2002: 406). It is unclear whether the model of the ritual is the creative act or the cosmic order, and how one or the other is “emulated” in the ritual, if in fact “order” refers to a specific order and does not merely have an abstract sense. The alleged connection with the daily rise of the sun is yet to be substantiated.Footnote 3 According to Hintze (Reference Hintze2007: 57), the adjective aṣ̌a.nāsa-, used of nəmah- in the context of the hamaspaθmaēdaiia- festival, “suggests that aṣ̌a- is strengthened by means of the ritual”. She translates the compound as “order-obtaining”. The nəmah- strengthens the cosmic order and contributes to its maintenance. But √nas means attaining or reaching, e.g. a goal or destination (Mayrhofer Reference Mayrhofer1992–2001: II, 27–8). Thus the phrase aṣ̌a.nāsa- nəmah- means: the (ritual) homage that reaches aṣ̌a-, which would not make much sense should one insist on translating the term as “truth” or “order”.
The idea that the term aṣ̌a- has an abstract sense is a widespread assumption in the scholarship.Footnote 4 I cited Kellens above as suggesting that it is a “ritual allegory”, i.e. the cosmic transposition of the orderliness of ritual, “the foremost ordered human activity”. It is true that almost all the OAv gods seem to be allegorized ritual capacities or activities. Setting aside aṣ̌a-, the YAv aməṣ̌a- spəṇta- deities are personified abstract nouns, with the probable exception of Mazdā.Footnote 5 Perhaps this is why it is assumed that aṣ̌a- must belong with this list of abstract terms. Along with āramiti- (cf. Mayrhofer Reference Mayrhofer1992–2001: 110), unlike the other deified terms, aṣ̌a- has an Indo-Iranian lineage. The view that it is the generic name for ritual thus remains an assumption. More importantly, as I will argue, aṣ̌a- is not in its fundamental meaning a Zoroastrian conception but is inherited from pre-Gāthic tradition.
Avestan aṣ̌a- is a nominalized past participle (*Hr̥tá- → *árta-) derived from IE √*h 2er “to fit, join” and designates the result of the action denoted by the verb.Footnote 6 Whether the full grade Avestan noun dates back to the IE times, “ein morphologisches Relikt” (Tichy Reference Tichy1986: 95–6), or is a nominalization of the verbal adjective *r̥tá-, an Avestan innovation, “when vowel gradation caused by accent shift was still in operation” (Hintze Reference Hintze2007a: 56), there cannot be any question that aṣ̌a- is a substantive.Footnote 7 One may query the isolation of the Avestan noun in Iranian languages if Herrenschmidt's argument (Reference Herrenschmidt1993) for reading *artā hacā for OP artācā in XPh 41 (also in XPh 50–1, 53–4) is accepted.Footnote 8 The etymology and form of Avestan aṣ̌a- point to a concrete notion. This is an important consideration. Substantivized verbal adjectives in -ta generally have a concrete sense.Footnote 9 The conceptual domain of aṣ̌a- does not necessarily coincide with its Vedic cognate (contra, e.g., Kellens Reference Kellens and Skjærvø2000: 101–2). The Vedic adjective r̥tá- seems to be a qualification of speech where it particularly means “true”, in the sense of conformity with fact. This is perhaps why it is easily replaced in the later texts by satyá-, an adjective that alleges the “reality” of what it qualifies (Thompson Reference Thompson1998). In a significant context, the substantive r̥tá- shares with the Avestan term a set of features that points to a common conception (see Kuiper Reference Kuiper1964). Despite his translation of the term as “order” (seemingly) in an abstract sense, the specific usage of r̥tá- set out by Kuiper (Reference Kuiper1964) avers otherwise (see sections 2 and 3).Footnote 10 The case for the translation of aṣ̌a- as an abstract notion (such as “truth” or “agencement”) is yet to be made. It has to be demonstrated that it can have such a sense in usage.
1. Case usages of aṣ̌a- in Old Avestan
As we can see the usage of the noun, no less than its etymology, rules out the abstract sense. There are many occurrences where aṣ̌a- must be understood as a personified concept, i.e. a deity. Most if not all of its occurrences in the nominative, in the vocative, and many in the accusative, fall into this category. One may wonder what justification the translation of aṣ̌a- as “truth” can have in Y 51.10cc' maibiiō zbaiiā aṣ̌əm, vaŋhuiiā aṣ̌ī gat̰.tē.Footnote 11 In Y 29.2 aṣ̌a- is the interlocutor of gə̄uš tašan-, the “fashioner of the cow”: tašā gə̄uš pərəsat̰ aṣ̌əm. One might reply that in these instances “truth” is allegorized into a deity, as seems to be the procedure with the other aməṣ̌a- spəṇta- entities, which are “abstract notions” apparently designating ritual dispositions or capacities (cf. Thieme Reference Thieme and Schlerath1970). If so, the actual usage must indicate that the term can indeed have an abstract sense like “truth” or “agencement”. Where does “truth” simply mean truth? My point, in what follows, is that nowhere can it have that meaning.Footnote 12
The only grammatical case in which there may be grounds to believe that aṣ̌a- can have an abstract sense like truth or orderliness is the instrumental. This case alone counts for almost half of all the occurrences of aṣ̌a- (excluding the idiomatic aṣ̌āt̰ hacā) in the Gāthās and the Yasna Haptaŋhāiti – 76 out of 155.Footnote 13 The senses of (the noun in) the instrumental may be divided into three categories, leaving aside the obscure passages.Footnote 14 The first category is the comitative instances, where aṣ̌a- clearly has the sense of a divine person, such as in the following passages.
Y 28.8a–b vahištəm ..., yə̄m aṣ̌ā vahištā hazaošəm / ahurəm ... “the very good Ahura who is in accord with aṣ̌a-”. The instrumental is the complement of the adjective hazaoša- meaning like-minded (similarly in Y 29.7).
Y 34.2b' yehiiā uruuā aṣ̌ā hacaitē “whose soul is associated with aṣ̌a-”. The instrumental is governed by the verb.
Y 44.8d (uxδā frašī) yācā aṣ̌ā “and the words that I exchange with aṣ̌a-”. The instrumental is governed by the verb (similarly in, e.g., 51.11).Footnote 15
Y 49.5 yə̄ daēnąm ... sārəštā ... aṣ̌ā “who unites [his] vision-soul with aṣ̌a-”. The instrumental is governed by the verb.
Y 50.4a–c at̰ vå yazāi, stauuas mazdā ahurā / hadā aṣ̌ā, vahištācā manaŋhā / xšaθrācā... “I worship you while praising you, Mazdā Ahura, along with aṣ̌a-, very Good Thinking, and Power”. The instrumentals are governed by the preposition.
The second category is the instrumental that expresses the idea of conformity or adherence. It comprises the majority of the occurrences of aṣ̌a- in the instrumental.
Y 28.1 ahiiā yāsā ... / mainiiə̄uš mazdā paouruuīm, spəṇtahiiā aṣ̌ā vīspə̄ṇg š́iiaoθanā / vaŋhə̄uš xratūm manaŋhō, yā xšnəuuīšā gə̄ušcā uruuānəm “I ask all (of you) for the primordial (vision?) of the beneficent intuition with an action (that is) in accordance with aṣ̌a-, so that you may receive, O Mazdā, the efficacy of (my) good thinking and the soul of the cow”.Footnote 16 The optative xšnəuuīšā from √xšnu “receive, satisfy” must mean here “let it please you and thus achieve its purpose”. The poet acquires the vision of primordial creation from the beneficent intuition. The conformity of the action with aṣ̌a- secures the supreme god's favourable disposition. Insler's “the spirit virtuous through truth” (Reference Insler1975: 25) and Humbach's “the spirit, prosperous through truth” (Reference Humbach1991: I, 117) introduce an obscure idea (“the spirit being virtuous or prosperous through truth”). What is “truth”, by means of which the “spirit” may be prosperous?
Y 31.16a–b' ... huuō, yə̄ hudānuš dəmanahiiā xšaθrəm / šōiθrahiiā vā dax́iiə̄uš vā, aṣ̌ā fradaθāi aspərəzatā “the generous one who aspires to power over the house or the settlement or the country in order to make it prosper through adherence to aṣ̌a-”. The free instrumental cannot be that of the means, that of the reference, or that of the reason of the action. The translations given by scholars of this passage are vague or even unsinnig: “pour (les) prospérer par l'Harmonie” (Kellens and Pirart Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 116); “to prosper the rule of the house or of the district or the land with truth” (Insler Reference Insler1975: 41); “welcher als Wohlverständiger die Herrschaft des Hauses, Gaues, Landes mit Wahrsein zu fördern strebt” (Lommel Reference Lommel1971: 52); “a generous person ... who strives to promote, with truth, one's power over house, district and country” (Humbach Reference Humbach1991: I, 130). Does “truth” bind or otherwise condition the exercise of power, as Insler's and Lommel's translations might suggest? Or does it serve the promotion of (one's) power, as Humbach's seems to aver? In either case, what is “truth” that is capable of achieving the supposed goal?
Y 33.10cc' vohū uxšiiā manaŋhā, xšaθrā aṣ̌ācā uštā tanūm “I thrive in body (or in person) by means of power (available) through good thinking, and in accordance with aṣ̌a-”. The sacrificer thrives by means of the “power” that is acquired through the “good thinking” of the sacrificer (see Ahmadi Reference Ahmadi2012b). This thriving takes place in accordance with aṣ̌a-. The sequence does not require or justify attributing the same sense to the instrumentals. One cannot dispense with the conceptual background of the terms. The instrumental of reference indicates compliance with an authoritative instance that must have more or less articulate features. That the instance has describable characteristics is implied in the idea of compliance. The usage, then, precludes attributing an abstract sense to aṣ̌a-. Again, the translations we have of the role of aṣ̌a- are vague, sometimes arbitrary and, in any case, meaningless. “(And) grow Thyself, in breath and body, through the rule of good thinking and of truth” (Insler Reference Insler1975: 53). What does the “rule of truth” mean? “Grow through good thought, power and truth as (Thou) desirest, in (Thy) body” (Humbach Reference Humbach1991: I, 138). What could “growing through truth” mean? In what sense is the instrumental understood? “Mon corps croît heureusement grâce à la divine Pensée, à l'emprise (rituelle) et à l'Harmonie” (Kellens and Pirart Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 124).
Y 34.4a–b' at̰ tōi ātrə̄m ahurā, aojōŋhuuaṇtəm aṣ̌ā usə̄mahī / asīštīm ə̄mauuaṇtəm, stōi rapaṇtē ciθrā.auuaŋhəm “And, Ahura, we wish your powerful (sacrificial) fire, mighty and supremely capable (or commanding)Footnote 17 in accordance with aṣ̌a-, to be a brilliant help for the supporters”. The functions and capacities of the sacrificial fire are determined in the primordial creation. “Thy fire, Lord, which possesses strength through truth, etc.” (Insler Reference Insler1975: 55); “ton feu puissant, instructeur et fort par l'Harmonie” (Kellens and Pirart Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 126); “dein Feuer, o Herr, durch Wahrsein kraftvoll” (Lommel Reference Lommel1971: 87); “Thy fire, O Ahura, [which is] strong through truth” (Humbach Reference Humbach1991: I, 140). The idea of “strength through truth” is quite obscure.
Y 44.2 huuō zī aṣ̌ā spəṇtō “because that one is a vitalizer through adherence to aṣ̌a-” (cf. Y 34.2). The instrumental is an attributive complement of the adjective spəṇta-. Adherence to aṣ̌a- empowers; in particular, it gives the capacity to vitalize existence (cf. Y 43.2–3). Insler (Reference Insler1975: 67) translates the phrase: “virtuous through truth”, Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 157): “prosperous through truth”. Truthfulness is normally considered a virtue; in being truthful, a person is virtuous. Let us grant that this conditional relation may be expressed in the instrumental: virtuous through truthfulness. But truthfulness is not the same thing as “truth”, e.g. the truth of a proposition.
Y 44.20ee' nōit̰ hīm +mizə̄n, aṣ̌ā vāstrəm frādaŋ́hē “they do not foster her (so that she would be able) to make the pasture thrive in accordance with aṣ̌a-” (cf. Y 43.6). The instrumental could also be comitative (cf. Y 44.10). Lommel (Reference Lommel1971: 114) renders the infinitive phrase: “durch Wahrsein die Weidewirtschaft zu fördern”, Insler (Reference Insler1975: 72): “to prosper her [i.e. the cow] and her pasturage with truth”, where the “cow” is a metaphor for the “good vision” (Insler Reference Insler1975: 73, n. 16), the daēnā. Truth is the means of making the “good vision” thrive. In what sense must “truth” be understood for such a proposition to have any meaning?
Y 45.6bb' stauuas aṣ̌ā, yə̄ hudå yōi həṇtī “praising the (most) benevolent of the gods in accordance with aṣ̌a-”. The instrumental is the complement of the present participle stauuat- describing the poet, and probably has a bearing on the fact that the poet is praising Mazdā. Compliance with aṣ̌a- requires that he praise Mazdā in particular as the most benevolent god. In view of the context, the instrumental could also be sociative: “praising, along with aṣ̌a-, the most benevolent of the gods”, thus Kellens and Pirart (Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 156) and Insler (Reference Insler1975: 264). Lommel (Reference Lommel1971: 125) translates the instrumental as “durch Wahrsein”, Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 165) “with truth”. If the qualification “with truth” bears on the praise, it can only mean “truthfully”. If the sense of “truthfully” is not admitted for “with truth”, one wonders what other meaning the phrase can have.
Y 46.2ee' āxsō vaŋhə̄uš, aṣ̌ā īštīm manaŋhō “Behold the control of good thinking thanks to (my) adherence to aṣ̌a-”. It means: behold the control I have over the power (xšaθra-) that you make available through good thinking, (the control) which I possess because of my adherence to aṣ̌a-.Footnote 18 The instrumental is an attributive complement of the action noun īšti- derived from √is “be capable”. Kellens and Pirart (Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 158) make the instrumental into a gerundive: “Scrute le rite de la divine Pensée en le mesurant à l'Harmonie”. Is the poet boasting to the god about his ritual or recalling the criterion to be used assessing it? What, in either case, could “Harmony” possibly mean other than the model, e.g., of the rite? Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 168) makes the instrumental the complement of good thinking: “Look upon the vigour of good thought, (inspired) by truth”. In Humbach's text, again, the only sense “truth” can have is “truthfulness”, i.e. good thought inspired, motivated, by wanting to be truthful. The meaning of Lommel's translation is completely obscure: “Lehre durch Wahrsein die Macht des Guten Denkens” (Reference Lommel1971: 132).
Y 46.12a–b' hiiat̰ us aṣ̌ā, naptiiaēšū nafšucā / tūrahiiā uzjə̄n, friiānahiiā aojiiaēšū “when he became ascendant among the praiseworthy descendants of the Tūranian Fryāna and their relatives because of (their adherence to) aṣ̌a-”. The instrumental explains the circumstance of the god's ascendency, namely the clan's adherence to aṣ̌a-.
Y 46.17d–e' yə̄ vīcinaot̰, dāθəmcā adāθəmcā / daṇgrā maṇtū, aṣ̌ā mazdå ahurō “who discerns the righteous and the unrighteous with extraordinary insight in accordance with aṣ̌a- (is) Ahura Mazdā”. The instrumental expresses the criterion of the discernment (cf. Kellens and Pirart Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 163); or, less likely, it is a comitative, so Insler (Reference Insler1975: 85) and seemingly Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 173).
Y 48.6cc' at̰ ax́iiāi aṣ̌ā, mazdå uruuarå vaxšat̰ “may Mazdā make plants grow for her [i.e. the cow] in accordance with aṣ̌a-!” The primordial arrangement requires the existence of plants for the cow. Kellens and Pirart translate the instrumental as “en raison de l'Harmonie” (Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 48). Insler (Reference Insler1975: 91) “through truth”, and Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 177) “with truth”, seem to give the value of the means to the instrumental. The idea of “making plants grow by means of truth” is quite incomprehensible. Again, one is left wondering what “truth” may be that it can serve such a purpose.Footnote 19
Y 50.6a–b' yə̄ mąθrā, vācəm mazdā baraitī / uruuaθō aṣ̌ā, nəmaŋhā zaraθuštrō “the bearer of divine visions who raises his voice in reverence, (he is) Zarathuštra (your) loyal ally because of (his adherence to) aṣ̌a-”. Kellens and Pirart (Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 176) seem to interpret the instrumental as an adverbial: “qui parle avec Harmonie et hommage”. If so, it is difficult to comprehend its meaning. Lommel's “Freund durch Wahrsein” (Reference Lommel1971: 169) and Humbach's “ally through truth” merely go through the motion of saying something meaningful.
Y 50.8cc' at̰ vå aṣ̌ā, arədrax́iiācā nəmaŋhā “(serve) you with the reverence of an ardəra- and in accordance with aṣ̌a-”. Kellens and Pirart's “par l'Harmonie” (Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 176), Insler's “with truth” (Reference Insler1975: 101) and Lommel's “mit Wahrsein” (Reference Lommel1971: 169) are obscure.
Y 51.18a–b tąm cistīm də̄jāmāspō, huuō.guuō ištōiš x varənå / aṣ̌ā vərəṇtē... “that idea of control over the riches(?) Djāmāspa Huuoguua chooses in conformity with aṣ̌a-”. The instrumental may also be sociative (cf. Y 30.5) or indicate the reason for the action. The action noun išti- “control” can govern x varənah-, but this latter could also be the direct object of the verb. Lubotsky (Reference Lubotsky and Sims-Williams2002: 191–5) argues that x varənah- is the Avestan form of a postulated Scythian *farnah-, meaning something like “dominion”, the cognate of Vedic párīṇas-, from the IIr. √par “fill”. The initial fricative would mean that the term spread from Scythian to other Iranian languages. Did it not already exist in these languages? Despite historico-linguistic difficulties (see Hintze Reference Hintze2007b: 179–80), the phraseological similarities in the Vedic and Avestan passages where the word occurs are striking. “The formula rāyā parīṇasā is no doubt identical with the Avestan formula (ahe/mana/åŋhąm) raiia x varənaŋhaca and goes back to Indo-Iranian times” (Lubotsky Reference Lubotsky and Sims-Williams2002: 193). Kellens (Reference Kellens2012: 480–1) suggests that the word may represent “la transfiguration divine de l'aliment sacrificiel”.
The third category is the instrumental that expresses the reason for an action.
Y 28.6 vohū gaidī manaŋhā, dāidī aṣ̌ā då darəgāiiū / ... mazdā, zaraθuštrāi aojōŋhuuat̰ rafənō / ahmaibiiācā ahurā, yā daibišuuatō duuaēšå tauruuaiiāmā “Come thanks to (our) good thinking! Give by reason of aṣ̌a- O Mazdā! Grant (your) long-lasting powerful support, to Zarathuštra and to us, with which we may overcome the hostilities of the hostile one!” Insler associates aṣ̌a- with “support” as objects of “granting”: “Along with truth, grant ... the long-lived gift of strong support” (Reference Insler1975: 25); similarly Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 118). But what does “granting truth” mean? Reading aṣ̌ā as an adverbial modulating the imperative verb (i.e. give in compliance with aṣ̌a-!) makes for a rather tactless reminder of obligation (cf. Kellens and Pirart Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 106, “en raison de l'Harmonie”). Kellens and Pirart read (against othersFootnote 20) dåh as a second person sing. inj. aorist of √dā “give” instead of an accusative neuter of the noun dåh- (dā'ah-) “boon”, which would make the hemistich excessive by one syllable. The metric argument per se is not cogent, since the meter is not stable in 28.5–7 (see Kellens and Pirart Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 106). The formally identical series of the finite verbs in 28.6 and 7, however, make their reading convincing: 28.6 gaidī ... dāidī ... då; 28.7 dāidī ... dāidī ... dås o. Lommel seems to make aṣ̌a- the means by which Mazdā gives his gift: “gib durch Wahrsein die langwährende Gabe” (Reference Lommel1971: 20). What could such a qualification mean? What is “truth” that may be something given by the god to his worshippers or that may be the means by which the god gives something else? The request for long-lasting support, by the means of which one may overcome the hostilities of the hostile one, “by reason of aṣ̌a-” has an eschatological dimension. Here aṣ̌a- must refer to an object of longing.Footnote 21
Y 29.10a–b' yūžə̄m aēibiiō ahurā, aogō dātā aṣ̌ā xšaθrəmcā / auuat̰ vohū manaŋhā, yā hušəitīš rāmąmcā dāt̰ “Give, you (gods), to these (supporters) strength and power, O Ahura, by reason of aṣ̌a-, that (power which one can have) through good thinking, by which Ārmaiti may establish good dwellings and peace”. Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 122) has: “Grant You, O Ahura, strength through truth to those (present)”. Insler (Reference Insler1975: 31) has: “Lord, grant ye to these (mortals) strength and the rule of truth and of good thinking”. The “rule of truth and of good thinking”, however, is Insler's contribution to the religious thought of the Gāthās: he explains that the instrumentals “modify” xšaθra-, but this would only give “the rule characterized by truth and good thinking” (Insler Reference Insler1975: 156)Footnote 22 (whatever this would mean), and not “the rule of truth and of good thinking”. He believes that the dubious conception finds support in Y 30.7aa' ahmāicā xšaθrā jasat̰ manaŋhā vohū aṣ̌ācā, which he translates: “But to this world He came with the rule of good thinking and of truth” (Reference Insler1975: 35). His analysis of the syntax, however, is mistaken.Footnote 23
Y 31.5a–b' tat̰ mōi vīcidiiāi vaocā, hiiat̰ mōi aṣ̌ā dātā vahiiō / vīduiiē vohū manaŋhā, mə̄ṇcā daidiiāi yehiiā mā ərəšiš “Tell me so I may discern the better (stipulation) which you give me by reason of aṣ̌a-, so that I may know it through good thinking and be inspired by it (and become) its ərəši-”. If, as Kellens and Pirart (Reference Kellens and Pirart1991: 63) maintain, the elliptical object is uruuata- one may compare it with Y 30.11 “When, O mortals, you learn the stipulations in reference to which Mazdā establishes both easy access and ban on access (to the divine sphere), and that there will be a long withering for the followers of druj and vital energies for the aṣ̌auuans, then (by abiding) with these (rules), things will be according to (your) wish”. If aṣ̌a- is the reason for Mazdā's action, namely giving his law to the mortal,Footnote 24 it must be something that the mortal desires. Humbach's mechanical rendition of the instrumental, again, makes no sense: “that better (part), which You have assigned to me through truth” (Reference Kellens and Pirart1991: I, 127). What could “assigning something through truth” mean? Insler's creator (god) “truth” is ad hoc: “the very good thing which has been created for me by truth” (Reference Insler1975: 37).
Y 34.12cc' sīšā nå aṣ̌ā paθō, vaŋhə̄uš x vaētə̄ṇg manaŋhō “teach us the easy paths of good thinking by reason of aṣ̌a-”. The genitive is subjective: the “paths” are made available by (way of) good thinking. The “paths” lead to aṣ̌a-, which is the reason for which the instruction is sought (see further under Y 34.13). Kellens' and Pirart's “grâce à l'Harmonie” (Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 128) is vague. One wonders what exactly is the role of “Harmony” in the request. Insler's translation is rather strange: “Instruct to us those paths of good thinking, easy to travel in alliance with truth”. What does Insler think the poet had in mind with “truth”, whose alliance makes the paths easy to travel? Humbach seems to make the instrumental into an adverbial, basically meaning truthfully: “Show us with truth the paths of good thought, easy to travel”. Is Mazdā prompted to speak truthfully?
Y 34.13a–b' tə̄m aduuānəm ahurā, yə̄m mōi mraoš vaŋhə̄uš manaŋhō / daēnå saošiiaṇtąm, yā hū.kərətā aṣ̌ācīt̰ uruuāxšat̰ “(show us) that road, O Ahura, which you tell me (is that) of good thinking, the well-made (road) along which the vision-souls of the soašiiaṇts proceed by reason of aṣ̌a-”. The image of the road travelled by the psychopompic daēnā- must belong to the funerary or ecstatic context.Footnote 25 Compare Y 51.13 tā drəguuatō marədaitī, daēnā ərəzaoš haiθīm / yehiiā uruuā xraodaitī, cinuuatō ×pərətāu ākå / x vāiš š́iiaoθanāiš hizuuascā, aṣ̌ahiiā nąsuuå paθō “Thus the vision-soul of the partisan of druj – (who) has disappeared from the path of aṣ̌a- because of his actions and (the actions) of his tongue and whose soul facing the Collector's Bridge is enraged – neglects the true (action) of the straight (path)”. Kellens and Pirart (Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 128), Insler (Reference Insler1975: 57), and Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 142) read Y 34.13 aṣ̌ācīt̰ as a sociative. Is the god “l'Harmonie” or “truth” a psychopomp? In Y 34.12cc' instruction is sought about the paths that lead to aṣ̌a- and in Y 34.13 it is stated that it is precisely for this purpose (aṣ̌ācīt̰) that the psychopompic daēnā- proceeds along those paths.
Y 43.2c–d' θβā ciciθβā, spə̄ništā mainiiū mazdā / yå då aṣ̌ā, vaŋhə̄uš māiiå manaŋhō “(who) perceives through your most vitalizing intuition, O Mazdā, the supernatural powers of good thinking by reason of aṣ̌a-”.Footnote 26 Insler (Reference Insler1975: 61) has: “Thou didst create the wondrous powers of good thinking allied with truth”. Are “good thinking” and “truth” deified entities here? Lommel (Reference Lommel1971: 97) makes “Wahrsein” a direct object of the verb, whose sense remains obscure: “du mit dem Wahrsein geben mögest die Wunderkräfte des Guten Denkens”. Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 151) makes “truth” the means by which the “blessings of good thought” are granted by the god – whatever this may mean.
Y 44.18b–e' kaθā aṣ̌ā, tat̰ mīždəm hanānī / ... / hiiat̰ mōi mazdā, apiuuaitī hauruuātā / amərətātā, yaθā hī taibiiō dåŋhā “how will I gain that reward, by reason of aṣ̌a-, which secures (?) for me integrity and immortality as you partake of these for yourself?” The form of apiuuaitī is unclear. Kellens and Pirart (Reference Kellens and Pirart1990: 296) analyse it as a third sing. inj. aorist of aipi + √vat “inspire”, but the ending and the lack of epenthesis in the verbal prefix rule it out (cf. Beekes Reference Beekes1988: 200, who maintains it is a first person middle inj. aorist of √vat). Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: II, 160) suggests the sense of “secures” for the verb based on the comparison with Yt 10.27 auuarəθå hīš apiuuaiti baēuuarə γənąnå nisirinaoiti “he seizes them, defenceless, he deals out ten thousand blows”. Insler (Reference Insler1975: 73) has: “How shall I win through truth this prize...”. Is the import of the question Zarathuštra asks of Mazdā: how do I win the prize truthfully as opposed to deceitfully? Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 162) has: “Shall I deserve that prize through truth...”. Is Zarathuštra asking whether “truth” (“truthfulness”?Footnote 27) entitles him to the prize?
Y 49.12 kat̰ tōi aṣ̌ā, zbaiieṇtē auuaŋhō / zaraθuštrāi, kat̰ tōi vohū manaŋhā / yə̄ və̄ staotāiš, mazdā frīnāi ahurā / auuat̰ yāsąs, hiiat̰ īštā vahištəm “What help do you offer to Zarathuštra who invokes you by reason of aṣ̌a-? What (help) do you make available through good thinking to (me) who cherishes you with praises, asking for that (help), which is (your) best, (to be) in (my) control?” The instrumental may be related either to the help sought or to the invocation. In the latter case, it must express the reason for the invocation: it is the object of Zarathuštra's concern, what motivates his request for help. It is not clear in what sense Lommel understands the instrumental: “Was hast du durch Wahrsein an Hilfe für Zarathuštra” (Reference Lommel1971: 162); similarly Humbach: “What (kind) of help dost Thou have through truth” (Reference Humbach1991: I, 182). Insler (Reference Insler1975: 97) has: “What help by truth hast Thou for Zarathustra who calls?”
Y 50.5 ārōi zī xšmā, mazdā aṣ̌ā ahurā / hiiat̰ yūšmākāi, mąθrānē vaorāzaθā / aibī.dərəštā, āuuīšiiā auuaŋhā / zastāištā, yā nå x vāθrē dāiiāt̰ “For (vitalization) is deployed by you (gods), O Mazdā Ahura, by reason of aṣ̌a-, when you (gods) will have regaled (me) the bearer of your conceptions with a spectacular, manifest help, set in motion by your hands, the kind which places us in well-being”.Footnote 28 Compare Y 34.3cc' ārōi zī hudåŋhō, vīspāiš mazdā xšmāuuasū sauuō “vitalization of the beneficent one is effected by all (of you), O Mazdā, in (the rite: vahma-) dedicated to you (gods)”. The genitive is objective, which means that sauuah- must have verbal force. The concept of “vitalization” in the Gāthās has an eschatological dimension (cf. Y 43.2–3). Humbach's reading mazdå against Geldner's mazdā, on the grounds that the latter is a lectio facilior (Reference Humbach1991: II, 216), is not cogent in the face of the syntactic problem it creates: “For (recompenses) have been allotted by You, O Ahura, wise through truth” (Humbach Reference Humbach1991: I, 184). The would-be relative clause is a stump that has nothing to do with the discursive context where the gods (not just Mazdā) are active; moreover, the supposed meaning of the phrase is specious.
Y 53.5c–d” vaēdō.dūm daēnābīš, +aibiiascā ahūm yə,̄ vaŋhə̄uš manaŋhō / aṣ̌ā və̄ aniiō ainīm, +vīuuaŋhatū tat̰ zī hōi, hušə̄nem aŋhat̰ “find by (your) vision-souls ... the existence of good thinking. Let each of you try to win out over the other by reason of aṣ̌a-, for that will be a choice gain for him!” Attaining aṣ̌a- must be at stake here, represented as the choice prize of a race; aṣ̌ā means “in quest for aṣ̌a-”. Kellens and Pirart extend the marriage motif of the beginning of the strophe to the last verse line: “Charmez-vous l'un l'autre par l'Harmonie” (Kellens and Pirart Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 190). The extension is questionable, however. Aside from the fact that the statement does not make much sense, the context strongly suggests another interpretation. The preceding sentence neutralizes the interlocutors with respect to gender. The vision-soul (daēnā-) is a psychopomp. Although the form of +aibiiascā is a problem, making it difficult to know what to make of it,Footnote 29 and hence of the accusative phrase, we can at least be certain that the subject urged to “find by (way of your) daēnā-” is gender-neutral. The point is reinforced by the opening verse line of the following stanza, Y 53.6aa' iθā ī haiθiiā narō aθā jə̄naiiō “thus are true men, thus (true) women”.Footnote 30 The subject of Y 53.5 aṣ̌ā və̄ aniiō ainīm +vīuuaŋhatū may well be the uruuan- of each man and woman. Kellens and Pirart (Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 190) suppress the causal conjunctive zī in their translation of the last clause: “Que cela vous soit à chacun une (récompense) facile à gagner”. The adjective hušə̄na- cannot mean “facile à gagner” but “choice gain”. It is not clear what “cela” refers to in their text. If it refers to “Harmony”, what is the import of the wish that “Harmony” be “for each” a “reward easy to win”? According to Kellens and Pirart's scheme the meaning of the last two clauses is: “I wish that aṣ̌a- will be an easily attainable thing (or state?) for the men and women about to marry, so that each can charm his or her sexual partner by its means”. Further, since they maintain that at issue is a hierogamy, the divine male partner and the human female partner are invited to charm each other by means of aṣ̌a-. One must admit that this is a strange conception. At any rate, what is aṣ̌a- that may be an instrument of sexual charm between gods and women? Humbach (Reference Humbach1991: I, 193) translates the last two clauses of the strophe: “Let each of you try to surpass the other in truth, for this will be fruitful for him”. Is this an assertion about the pragmatic advantages of being truthful?
The instrumental use of aṣ̌a- in the Old Avestan texts suggests, then, the following meanings for the term. First, like the majority of the direct cases, aṣ̌a- is the name of a deity. One may plausibly think that the god emerged from the allegorical apotheosis of the eponymous concept. Second, the term designates in a large number of passages an authoritative instance, the compliance with which empowers one for a task, entitles one to a privileged position, qualifies one for making a request, or in reference to which a condition or a situation is justified. This usage rules out an abstract sense for the term. One cannot measure a specific state against “truth” or “order”. The authoritative instance must be the primordial cosmos created by the supreme god, whose norms have somehow been violated on earth.Footnote 31 Third, in the eschatological passages aṣ̌a- is used as a synecdoche for the celestial sphere, where the primordial conditions of existence are (still) in place. The domain of aṣ̌a- is in the supreme god's “house”, the object of eschatological longing. Hence, the term appears in the instrumental of cause, i.e. as the reason for an action. This constellation is reflected, for example, in Y 48.7b–d' yōi ā vaŋhə̄uš, manaŋhō dīdraγžō.duiiē / aṣ̌ā viiąm, yehiiā hiθāuš nā spəṇtō / at̰ hōi dāmąm, θβahmī ā dąm ahurā “(you) who want to secure the envelope of good thinking by reason of aṣ̌a- whose companion is the vitalizing man; now, its nets are in your house, O Ahura”.Footnote 32
2. Two idiomatic usages of aṣ̌a- in Old Avestan
The two idiomatic usages of aṣ̌a- in Old Avestan point to a single idea. In an earlier article I have argued that the expression aṣ̌āt̰ hacā indicates the eschatological dimension of what it qualifies (Ahmadi Reference Ahmadi2012b). The postposition hacā is formed from √hac “follow, associate (with)”; it is the cognate of Vedic sacā “zusammen, mit, zugleich, dabei, bei” (Mayrhofer Reference Mayrhofer1992–2001: II, 688). The supreme god is described as the companion of aṣ̌a- in Y 41.3 humāīm θβā īžīm yazatəm aṣ̌aŋhācim dadəmaidē “we regard you as the good-powered, invigorating venerable one, the companion of aṣ̌a-” (Hintze Reference Hintze2007a: 312, translation slightly altered). OP artācā from XPh (see above) must have been a technical term embedded in Iranian religious lore, since it is not translated either in Elamite (ir-ta-ha-ci) or in the Akkadian (arta-šá) version of Xerxes' text (see Schlerath and Skjærvø Reference Schlerath, Skjærvø and Yarshater1987). One may plausibly maintain that the conception behind it was untranslatable. OAv aṣ̌āt̰ hacā is generally understood to indicate an orientation to aṣ̌a- translated as “truth” (“according to truth”, “gemäß dem Wahrsein”), “Agencement” (“selon l'Agencement”), or “Order” (“in accordance with Order”). But, since all these are understood as abstract terms, the expression is devoid of sense (unsinnig). One can compare a phenomenon (a thing, a state, a constellation or an action) with another phenomenon, measure a phenomenon against a specific rule, but it is not possible to measure a phenomenon against orderliness or arrangement or truth. The noun in the other instances of the abl. + hacā points to a locale.Footnote 33 Y 37.2 yōi gə̄uš hacā š́iieiṇtī “who are on the side of the cow” (Hintze Reference Hintze2007a: 168) literally means “who reside at the cow's”. It is not hard to see how the “metaphorical” sense of standing by the cow could have developed for the spatial locution the abl. + hacā + √ši “reside”. Y 32.2 mazdå ahurō ... xšaθrāt̰ hacā paitī.mraot̰ can only mean “Mazdā Ahura responds at his kingdom or from out of his kingdom”. OAv xšaθra- is an abstract noun meaning “power”, secondarily developing the concrete sense of (divine) “kingdom” (e.g. Y 32.6). A translation like “the Wise Ahura ... answers in accordance with (His) power” (Humbach Reference Humbach1991: I, 132) is devoid of sense. Y 44.17 hacā xšmat̰ is an adnominal and means “auprès de vous”, not “in accordance with you”.Footnote 34 Y 53.6 drūjō hacā means “at or bound for (the house of) druj”, and not the senseless “in accordance with druj”. Y 31.14 išudō ... dāθranąm hacā aṣ̌āunō yåscā ... drəguuō.dəbiiō means “the refreshments that (mortals') gifts provide at the aṣ̌auuan's (rite) and those at the (rite of) drəguuaṇts”. The phrase hacā aṣ̌āunō (or its opposite) clearly describes dāθra-, the ritual gift to the gods. Kellens and Pirart's “à la manière du partisan de l'Harmonie” (Reference Kellens and Pirart1988: 116) certainly conveys the meaning; but, if in fact this was how it was understood by its users, this meaning must have developed from the primary sense of the abl. + hacā implying a locale. The meaning “in the manner of aṣ̌auuan” describing a type of ritual gift cannot be derived from something like “according to aṣ̌auuan”. Humbach's “from the truthful one” (Reference Humbach1991: I, 129), Insler's “from the truthful” (Reference Insler1975: 41), and Lommel's “von den Wahrhaftigen” (Reference Lommel1971: 52), are ad hoc and probably based in the later (e.g. YAv or OP) sense of the preposition hacă “(issue) from (place or person)” (see Bartholomae Reference Bartholomae1961, col. 1746–52).
The other idiomatic figure is the combination of aṣ̌a- and √sar “join (with)” (and the feminine sar- “company”):
Y 51.3 yōi ... sārəṇtē ... aṣ̌ā “those who join with aṣ̌a-”.
Y 32.2 mazdå ahurō sārəmnō vohū manaŋhā ... aṣ̌ā ... x və̄nuuātā “Mazdā Ahura, joined with good thinking and the sun-drenched aṣ̌a-”.
Y 49.5 huuō ... yə̄ daēnąm vohū sārəštā manaŋhā ... aṣ̌ā “he who has joined his vision-soul with aṣ̌a- through good thinking”.
Y 49.8 uruuāzištąm aṣ̌ahiiā ... sarə̄m “the most joyful company of aṣ̌a-”.Footnote 35
Y 53.3 aṣ̌ahiiā mazdåscā ... sarəm “the company of aṣ̌a- and Mazdā”.
Y 35.8 aṣ̌ahiiā ... sairī “in the company of aṣ̌a-”.
The collocation is certainly elective. There are only three other occurrences of sar- in the Gāthās: with vohu- manah- (Y 49.3), with hauruuatāt̰- and amərətatāt̰- (Y 44.17), and with the drəguuaṇt- (Y 49.9). The expression “joining with aṣ̌a-” describes the situation (or occasion) of being in the company of aṣ̌a-, i.e. being in the divine sphere where Mazdā is. Or, if it is the description of a mental state, it can be so only as a metaphorical expression. In other words, aṣ̌a- must be understood as a concrete entity (and not an abstract qualification such as “truth”). Further, the expression (and idea) “joining with aṣ̌a-” must be idiomatic, that is to say, drawn from the traditional religious discourse; it is not an invention of the poet. The adherents of the daēva cult, too, want to “see aṣ̌a-”.Footnote 36
3. Aṣ̌auuan-
The denominative adjective aṣ̌auuan- has been translated as “truthful” or “righteous” (Hintze Reference Hintze2007a: 332);Footnote 37 “qui met son activité rituelle en accord avec l'Harmonie, partisan de l'Harmonie” (Kellens and Pirart Reference Kellens and Pirart1990: 211); “der Aṣ̌aanhänger” (Tichy Reference Tichy1986: 103); “der zum Aša hält und gehört” (Bartholomae Reference Bartholomae1961: col. 246); “possessing truth (aša)” (Gnoli Reference Gnoli and Yarshater1987: 705); “who sustains Order” (Skjærvø Reference Skjærvø2002: 401); “qui soutient l'Agencement” (Kellens).Footnote 38 The Indo-Iranian suffix -van regularly forms adjectives (and nomen agentis) from either verbal roots or nouns (Wackernagel and Debrunner Reference Wackernagel and Debrunner1954: 894–902). In the latter case, “von Personen ausgesagt”, they have the sense of “mit dem Begriff des Grundworts versehen” or “etwas bringend, ausübend” (Wackernagel and Debrunner Reference Wackernagel and Debrunner1954: 900). If one were to give a general translation of the denominative adjective in -van, it would have to be: “possessed of the noun” whether the noun is concrete or abstract, such as magauuan- “Gaben besitzend” from maga- “Gabe”, or hazahuuan- “predator, bandit” from hazah- “(superior) power” (see Wackernagel and Debrunner Reference Wackernagel and Debrunner1954: 900–03). Much less frequently, the adjective in -van can have, like those in -vant and -mant, the sense of “being an exponent of” (see Wackernagel and Debrunner Reference Wackernagel and Debrunner1954: 871–94). Wackernagel and de Debrunner (Reference Wackernagel and Debrunner1954: 900) translate both r̥tā́van- and satyā́van- (“altes Ersatzwort für r̥tā́van-”) as “wahrhaft”. Tichy, as I pointed out, derives Vedic r̥tā́van- from a postulated collective noun r̥tā “das Geordnete (Richtige) in seiner Gesamtheit” and translates it as “der zur rechten Ordnung hält o. gehört” (1986: 92).
Therefore, if we allow ourselves to be guided by these observations, translations like Skjærvø's “who sustains Order” or Kellens' “qui soutient l'Agencement” immediately become suspect. This meaning quietly appeals to the dualist ideology of the Gāthās, which is clear in Kellens and Pirart's “partisan de l'Harmonie”. But the adjective clearly dates from before the Gāthās, and even if Gāthic aṣ̌auuan- has acquired the (dualist) agonistic sense, this sense cannot be probative for the original meaning of the adjective, nor for that of its noun component. Kellens and Pirart's alternative “qui met son activité rituelle en accord avec l'Harmonie” is based on their view that the presumed Gāthic ritual had a cosmological function. Note, in any case, that in this definition the term “l'Harmonie” must be understood to be describable in its features. One cannot put one's ritual activity in accord with “orderliness” or “arrangement” but with a specific order, a specific arrangement.Footnote 39 No more acceptable are the traditional translations of “truthful” and “righteous”. The English adjective “truthful” is used of speech, which implies some version of the correspondence theory of truth, or of a person, in which case truthfulness is more or less synonymous with sincere frankness. Now, neither of these would fit the catalogue of the senses of the adjectives in -van. As for the more literal “possessing truth”, it faces the formidable task of specifying what “truth” is that may be possessed. The statement “Zarathuštra possesses truth” is as nonsensical as (Wittgenstein's) “Socrates is identical”, since “truth” can only be ascribed or denied to an assertion, its conformity with “what the case is”, i.e. the world, or its consistency with the other constituents of a system. Broadly speaking, the claim that an assertion “possesses truth” means that it corresponds to a fact, or that it is verifiable under defined epistemic conditions, or that it is provisionally accepted as valid, or that it is consistent with other intra-systemic assertions. Obviously, a person cannot possess “truth” in any of these senses: only an assertion may be a possible truth-bearer. Hence, again, in what sense may Zarathuštra “possess truth”?
Perhaps it makes a difference whether Vedic r̥tā́van- was directly formed from the collective noun *r̥tā “das Geordnete (Richtige) in seiner Gesamtheit” or from the already substantivized “rechte Ordnung”.Footnote 40 In the former case, it is hard to imagine any other meaning for the adjective than being an exponent of the collective comprising the “adjusted” ones. If the adjective was formed from a substantive noun, it can, in principle, have either of the senses that we noted above for adjectives in -van. It may mean either belonging to r̥tā́- “rechte Ordnung” or possessed of r̥tā́-. But, in the latter case, what could the substantive refer to? The use of OP artāvan- in XPh 54–6 seems peculiar: utā jīva šiyāta bavatiy utā marta artāvā bavatiy “(while) alive becomes happy and (once) dead becomes artāvan-”.Footnote 41 Gnoli maintains that “there is no real divergence in meaning between Old Pers. artāvan and Av. ašavan; recent studies have shown that being šiyāta ‘happy’ in life and artāvan after death are both the results of one and the same mode of conduct during one's earthly existence” (Reference Gnoli and Yarshater1987: 705). Each of the two adjectives may equally describe in Zoroastrian lore the condition aspired to by the human being in both worlds.Footnote 42 Nonetheless, artāvan- is in fact used in Xerxes' inscription of the dead as a desirable postmortem status. This usage may reflect a traditional conception, especially when one considers that the formula occurs earlier in the inscription (XPh 47–8) in the first person: šiyāta ahaniy jīva utā marta artāvā ahaniy “may I be happy (while) alive and (once) dead may I be artāvan-”. The connection with the world of the dead seems to have been significant and even elective.Footnote 43 How else would one account for the formulaic distribution, other than explaining it away? Herrenschmidt's translation of OP artāvan- “participe du bon agencement” (Reference Herrenschmidt1993: 48) is in principle justified insofar as “pertaining to” is one of the two senses that is generally attested for adjectives in -van. But perhaps a better translation would be “partaking of”. This rendition captures both of the general senses of the suffix and does justice to the fact that artāvan- describes a blessed postmortem condition. “On ne peut nier que l'appartenance au parti d'Aṣ̌a représente, dans bon nombre de textes mazdéens, qu'ils soient vieux-perses, moyen-perses, voire avestiques, l'expression même du salut eschatologique” (Kellens Reference Kellens1995: 32). This is the most crucial point. What is it about aṣ̌a- that “partaking of” it can (come to) mean “eschatological salvation”? What would aṣ̌a- have to denote if it is to have such a semantic potential?
4. Conclusion
The conception of “sun-drenched or bathed-in-light aṣ̌a-” is pan-Iranian and probably Indo-Iranian.Footnote 44 It is attested in the Yasna Haptaŋhāiti (Y 37.4 aṣ̌a- vahišta- raocōŋhuuat-), in the Gāthas (Y 32.2 aṣ̌a- x və̄nuuat-) and in the YAv corpus (Y 16.7 x vanuuat- aṣ̌a-). In the last mentioned the phrase occurs in a very revealing context: x vanuuaitīš aṣ̌ahe vərəzō yazamaide yāhu iristanąm uruuąno šāiieṇti yå aṣ̌aonąm frauuaṣ̌aiiō vahištəm ahūm aṣ̌aonąm yazamaide raocaŋhəm vīspō.x vāθrəm “we make offerings to the sun-drenched domains of aṣ̌a- where the souls of the dead, which are the frauuaṣ̌is of the aṣ̌auuans, exist in blissful tranquillity (lit. rejoice); we make offerings to the best existence of the aṣ̌auuans, bathed in light (and providing) all manners of well-being”. The locative relative pronoun yāhu shows that at issue is a concrete place, if a linguistic proof were indeed needed. The “domains of aṣ̌a-” must be located in the heaven according to this image; the phrase vahišta- ahu- is the regular YAv designation of paradise.Footnote 45 I pointed out above the regular use of aṣ̌a- as a synecdoche for the divine sphere, permanently bathed in heavenly lights, in the OAv texts.Footnote 46
We must ask how the two senses of aṣ̌a-, namely the primal cosmos and the divine sphere, may be related. Another way of posing this question is: does aṣ̌a- exist in Mazdā's abode as a god or (also) as something else? Perhaps we can find in Y 28.11 a clue in this respect: yə̄ āiš aṣ̌əm nipåŋ́hē, manascā vohū yauuaētāitē / ... / ..., yāiš ā aŋhuš pouruiiō ×buuat̰ “(Mazdā, you) who protect (in your abodeFootnote 47) aṣ̌a- and good thinking thanks to these (hymns) ... by which the primordial existence will take place”. The hymns that the poet learns from Mazdā and by the means of which or with the help of which the god protects aṣ̌a- are the same hymns that will effect or, better, restore the original (conditions of) existence, presumably on earth. The dual potency of the hymns (preservation in the celestial sphere and restoration on earth) inclines one to think that aṣ̌a- and the “primordial existence” are intimately related. It is not likely that aṣ̌a- is understood as a deity in this passage. In Y 43.10 at̰ tū mōi dāiš aṣ̌əm the poet asks Mazdā to be shown aṣ̌a-.Footnote 48 It thus seems that aṣ̌a- is the original cosmos that continues as such in the celestial sphere under the protection of the gods, but which has been damaged by the forces of druj- on the earth, whose defeat and expulsion is the task of human beings, especially in their religious observances: Y 31.4 yadā aṣ̌əm zəuuīm, aŋhən mazdåscā ahuråŋhō / ..., vahištā išasā manaŋhā / maibiiō xšaθrəm aojōŋhuuat̰, yehiiā vərədā vanaēmā drujəm “when the gods are present, aṣ̌a- that one must invoke and Mazdā ... I would request, through good thinking, that I may possess the mighty power whose growth would allow us to defeat druj-” (cf. Y 44.13). If the proposed connection is right, it probably represents the Gāthic appropriation and inflection of an already existing conception of aṣ̌a- as a place of blissful existence after death.
In their understanding of aṣ̌a- as “truth” or “order”, scholars have generally taken their bearings from the notion of druj- “lie” or “deception”.Footnote 49 But the opposition to druj- is not important for the basic meaning of aṣ̌a- in the Gāthās. “Deception” (druj-) is ever an eristic imputation to one's opponent. The charge originates in ideological battle. Its dualistic (metaphysical) elevation must be placed in the context of the uncompromising denunciation of the daēva cult in Gāthic ideology. The concrete reality behind druj- is the cult of the daēvas, the source of whose perceived mischief is sought in the realm of the invisible.Footnote 50
According to the Gāthic ideology, human beings take part, by way of their religious observances, in the cosmic struggle against the destructive forces that have sickened the earthly existence. The two senses of aṣ̌a- that are evident in the OAv texts, i.e. the primal cosmos and (synecdoche for) the divine sphere, do not quite coincide with the basic cosmological division of corporeal and mental existences. The material world as it is now, is not as it ought to be; the “laws” operating in the “existence possessed of bone” (ahu- astuuaṇt-) do not embody the “existence of aṣ̌a-” (Y 46.3 ahu- aṣ̌ahiiā). The perceived “order” of the current world is deceptive; or more precisely, the forces of deception have sickened the world. Our earthly existence is in need of (eschatological) therapy.Footnote 51 Whether aṣ̌a- designates the primal world to be restored on the earth or signifies the divine sphere and a blissful mental state therein after death, it is clearly an object of longing for the mortal. The usage of the term shows that it denotes a concrete phenomenon, in agreement with its form and etymology: what is “put together” (by the creator god), the (properly) “arranged”. Concept defies definition, as Nietzsche tells us; and all the more it defies translation. If, nonetheless, one insisted on a translation, the best single term would probably be “cosmos” (kosmein means “arrange”), being understood that the primordial cosmos has in the meantime been compromised on the earth and is therefore operative (only) as a normative measure and an object of eschatological longing.
