In 1972, the government of Lebanon decided to build two memorial monuments in honour of the Druze ruler Emir Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maʿnī II, Lebanon's greatest national hero. One was in the Druze town of Baʿqlīn, the other – an identical bronze statue – in the Christian town of Dāyr al-Qamar.Footnote ¹ In August 1975, at the height of the second civil war, these monuments were dedicated in the presence of President Sulaymān Franjīyah. However, Druze leader Kamāl Junblāṭ, who was not present at the ceremony, declared that the Lebanon of that day did not represent the authentic Lebanon of Fākhr al-Dīn II's time.Footnote ²

Eleven years later, the Druzes had still not found a way to demonstrate their historical victory over the Lebanese establishment other than to destroy the memorial statue to Fakhr al-Dīn.Footnote ³ To them, the monument reflected the Christian myth of Fakhr al-Dīn, or the myth of “deification” as Salibi called it.Footnote ⁴ They regarded the erecting of the monument by the Christian political entity as a physical display of the systematic falsification of Lebanese historiography by this ruling elite. For the Druzes, the portrait of Fakhr al-Dīn hanging in the al-Mukhtārah palace – a Druze palace – far better reflected the authentic historical memory of Fakhr al-Dīn etched into their collective consciousness.Footnote ⁵

The chain of events associated with the statue of Fakhr al-Dīn embodies a different war, waged in Lebanon alongside the civil war. A conflict without bloodshed, it became evident with the founding of Greater Lebanon in 1920, but had even preceded it. Since emerging as a national political entity, Lebanon has struggled with the challenge of its historiography. The battle has been about the national and cultural content of Lebanese nationalism. The Druzes, who consider themselves the founding fathers of the Lebanese state, have played an active role in this struggle.

Although a great deal has been said and written about the second Lebanese civil war, few studies exist on this more subtle war over Lebanon's history. In his book, A House of Many Mansions, the well-known Lebanese scholar Kamal Salibi devoted a whole chapter to this subject,Footnote ⁶ and in 1984 the Shiite historian Ahmad Beydoun published an impressive study that reviewed selected issues in Lebanon's various historical narratives. Beydoun also shed light on the dialectical connection between the different narratives and the sectarian affiliations of the intellectuals who shaped them.Footnote ⁷ Also, in his study on the Lebanese historiography of the Ottoman period, Shiite writer Wajīh Kawtharānī provided compelling examples of how Lebanese historiography became fragmented into different narratives based on sectarian lines.Footnote ⁸

Yet, sixty-five years after gaining independence, Lebanon still lacks an agreed, consensual, historical narrative. The absence of a unifying historical myth indicates a deep ideological crisis within the Lebanese collective. Christian historians (especially the Maronites) who were influenced by Lammens's concept of “L'Asile du Liban”, emphasize the country's isolationist and distinctive character and usually ignore the Islamic period. They bring out the pre-Islamic, Phoenician origins of Lebanese history, and from the second half of the nineteenth century a prominent intellectual and literary movement supporting the Phoenician myth appeared in the Maronite community.Footnote ⁹ On the other side of the divide, Muslim authors – especially the Sunnis – who identified with the Pan-Arab movement, emphasize the importance of the Islamic period in shaping Lebanon's history, and either wholly reject the Phoenician myth or revise it by claiming that the Phoenicians themselves came from the Arabian Peninsula.Footnote ¹⁰ Shiite historians make a strenuous effort to recount the history of Jabal ʿĀmil, described as their stronghold in southern Lebanon since the seventh century, and Shiite historical texts reflect a highly crystallized sectarian orientation that identifies part of Lebanon's territory with the Shia, rather than the Shia with Lebanon.Footnote ¹¹ The last three decades have witnessed an increase in major publications on the role of the Druzes in Lebanon's history. Since the early 1980s, the Druze intelligentsia has been assiduous in rewriting Lebanese history. Not only professional historians, but also intellectuals, journalists, freelance writers and political leaders have taken part.

From the social point of view, the vast majority of the Druze writers mentioned or quoted in this article descended from leading and well-known families that have either played important roles throughout Druze history or provided the community with intellectuals and state officials.Footnote ¹² This is not surprising, given both the relative educational advantages of the upper social classes and the deep changes that Mount Lebanon has undergone since the middle of the nineteenth century. Although the Druze community in general has been negatively affected by these changes, the leading families lost the most, since they were deprived of their economic and political privileges, as the Maronites became the dominant community in Lebanon. Hence it is important to focus on how the Druze authors have been homogeneously categorized on the basis of their sectarian affiliation in consideration of two facts. First, these authors were very conscious of Druze particularism, especially because of the community's unique historical background and the fact that most of them belonged to the social class that was negatively affected by this background. Second, as the following discussion will show, the homogeneous ideological orientation of Druze historiography results from the manipulation of Islam and Arabism on the one hand and ruthless polemics against the Maronites on the other. Beydoun went too far in assuming that this orientation was an outcome of what he calls the organic affiliation of the Druze writers with their community. Scheffler also used this model of homogeneous categorization; he was determined to show that the Druze writers demonstrated their cultural and ideological unity in publications that aimed at “expression, debate and political calculation” among other things.Footnote ¹³

Most prominent among these authors was Kamāl Junblāṭ (1917–77), the founder of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). He was at the forefront of a growing group of writers who expressed awareness of the importance of rewriting Lebanon's history and tried to promote this issue systematically. By the late 1950s he had published two important essays on Lebanese history and politics.Footnote ¹⁴ The phenomenon developed during the first decades of Lebanon's independence, and gained real momentum in the 1980s and 1990s. Druze cultural and community institutions have diligently published historical essays focusing on the era of the medieval Druze Emirate, a trend spearheaded by the Progressive Socialist Party's publishing house, al-Dār al-Taqaddumīya.Footnote ¹⁵ It is also worth mentioning al-Majlis al-Durzī Lil-Buḥūth wa-al-Inmā' (the Druze council for research and development), headed by Sāmī Makārim, professor of Arabic literature at the American University of Beirut. Druze academics apparently started this association in the early 1980s to encourage and support the publication of original manuscripts, chronicles and historical writings on the Druzes.Footnote ¹⁶ Despite the considerable increase in the number of historical essays authored by Druzes, the community is aware that their historiography nowhere approaches the volume of Maronite historical literature in recent decades. Druze intellectuals also admit to an institutional problem in their lack of initiative in writing the history of the Druzes in Lebanon.Footnote ¹⁷

Correspondingly, the present study draws upon sources that vary with the subject and the authors' interests. I examine all the accessible and relevant academic works by Druze writers, including monographs, polemical and apologetic literature on Lebanon's and Druze history produced since Lebanon's independence in 1943, and have combined it to illustrate the collective images of the Druze historical narrative. This work is also based upon al-Ḍuḥā, the official mouthpiece of the Druze spiritual leadership and the al-Mīthāq journal founded by the Druze intellectual ʿĀrif al-Nakadī. These two journals have given Druze authors the opportunity to present their views and critical observations on different aspects of their community's history and culture, and the complicated relations with the Lebanese state.

The wider subject of Lebanese historiography falls outside the realm of this article. Instead, I will discuss the attempts by the Druze intelligentsia to present a new historical narrative that is a real alternative to what they call the “Maronite narrative”. This discussion of the Druze historiography, inspired by Junblāṭ's writing, focuses on three themes:

1. 1. The controversy against the Maronite narrative regarding the establishment of the Lebanese historical polity.

2. 2. The rewriting of the Emirate's history by idealizing the socio-political regime during the Tanūkh-Maʿnī period, describing it as the original secular government of historic Lebanon and denying the transformations pursued under Shihābī rule.

3. 3. The real impetus behind the Druze tendency to emphasize the integration of the Emirate into the Arab–Islamic world through the Middle Ages.

This intellectual-literary effort concerns mainly the period of the Druze Emirate. The present article does not examine the historical authenticity of the myths or assertions in the Druze narrative, but analyses its basic elements and offers an explanation for the political worldview in which it originated. The discussion is not limited to a particular historical period, but relates to the entire body of historiographical literature published by the Druzes from 1943 to the present. This provides a wider perspective on Druze historical writing. To put this in context, a brief review of Druze history in Lebanon is necessary.

The Druzes in Lebanon: an overview

The Druze religion was founded in Egypt during the period of the sixth Fatimid Caliph al-Ḥākim (996–1021). Although rejected by Egypt's Sunni majority, the Druze doctrine had a beneficial effect on several Arab tribes in the mountains of Lebanon. The Druzes believed that these tribes had been sent there several hundred years ago by the Abbasid Empire to defend the Syrian coast against Byzantine and Crusader attacks. Moreover, the Druzes of Lebanon trace their ancestry back to twelve Arab tribes, the most prominent of which is the Banū Tanūkh.Footnote ¹⁸ A short time after they had converted to Druzism, the Banū Tanūkh succeeded in establishing a certain pattern of self-rule in Mount Lebanon that was known as “the Emirate” in Druze sources. In 1147 this entity was recognized as politically legitimate by Mujīr al-Dīn Ābaq (1140–54), the last Būrid ruler of Damascus. According to Druze sources, the Emirate was not an isolationist or separatist regime. On the contrary, it was integrated into the cultural and political space of the Islamic world, and its main function was to protect the Syrian coast.Footnote ¹⁹

The Ottoman occupation of the area in 1516 marked a new era in the Emirate's history. The Tanūkhis, who had supported the Mamluks, lost their leading position in the mountainous areas, and the Maʿnīs, another dominant Druze family, seized power. The ensuing period under the rule of Fakhr al-Dīn II (r. 1590–1635) is regarded by Lebanese historians as the golden age of the Lebanese Emirate. Fakhr al-Dīn was successful in expanding the Emirate's borders, as well as in creating certain patterns of co-operation and co-existence between Druzes and Maronites.Footnote ²⁰

Fakhr al-Dīn II was executed in 1635 by the Ottoman authorities because of suspicion about his relations with European powers. The Ottomans were convinced that the Druze prince was seeking to establish an independent state with European support. His execution did not end the autonomous Emirate, because soon afterwards the Sunni Shihābīs replaced the Druze Maʿnīs. The Shihābī family was chosen by the leading Druze feudal families for two reasons – their kinship to the house of Maʿn, and their association with the Qaysī faction, which was the dominant group at that time. Many scholars consider the Shihābī Emirate to have been a formative period in the modern political history of Lebanon.Footnote ²¹ Three important processes took place under Shihābī rule: the reorganization of the feudal system; the formation of a political elite based on land ownership; and the emergence of the Maronite Church as a new force in the Emirate.

From the Druze point of view, the Shihābī era was devastating and traumatic, especially the rule of Bashīr II (1789–1841). Indeed, the political, social and economic developments during this time brought about the collapse of Druze hegemony. A combination of factors – the exhausting competition between Druze feudal families for power and prestige; the depletion of the Druze population as a result of emigration to the Hūrān; the emergence of new economic patterns and increasing international involvement in Lebanese affairs – weakened the position of the Druzes and gradually transformed them from a dominant community into a secondary one. Ironically, the crushing political blow came a short time after the Druzes had achieved a decisive military victory against the Maronites in 1860.Footnote ²²

The following year, 1861, the European powers forced the Ottoman Empire to implement a new political order in Mount Lebanon, known as Le Reglement Organique.Footnote ²³ Its edicts secured the superiority of the Maronites in the reconstituted state. For the first time, Lebanon was recognized by the international community as a Christian entity, and the Maronites became its new lords. In addition, a confessional system became the basis of the political regime in “Petit Liban”. After a long period in which the Druzes had been the uncontested masters of Mount Lebanon, they became a minority group in their own stronghold. The arrangements of 1920 and 1943 did not improve their political position. On the contrary, the establishment of Grand Liban and the National Pact settlement officially institutionalized their peripheral role in Lebanese politics.Footnote ²⁴

Today, the Druzes constitute about 6 per cent of the Lebanese population and are found in the Shūf Mountains, ʿAlay, al-Matin and southern Lebanon.Footnote ²⁵ They are represented by eight deputies in the Parliament and two ministers in the central government. But it seems that the Druzes have never been reconciled to their marginal political position in the confessional system. They are firmly convinced that the part they played in Lebanon's early history has been misrepresented and even ignored. They also complain that the share of political power allocated to them was never congruent with their contribution to Lebanon's history, and with what they believe is their due.Footnote ²⁶

In the early 1940s, Kamāl Junblāṭ, the most prominent Druze leader of the twentieth century, began to denounce the confessional system and the Maronite–Sunni partnership of 1943, which excluded the Druzes from major public posts after they were categorized as the sixth community in Lebanon.Footnote ²⁷ In 1949 Junblāṭ established the PSP. Its manifesto called for secularization, moderate socialism and decentralization, but its main thrust was to present a revolutionary and progressive alternative to the Maronite–Sunni alliance. During the 1960s and 1970s, Junblāṭ became the most vocal opponent of the confessional system and forcefully demanded fundamental reforms. He was the only one of the Lebanese ZuʿamaFootnote ²⁸ to challenge the very foundations of Lebanese legitimacy.Footnote ²⁹ As mentioned previously, the revision of Lebanon's history was another expression of Junblāṭ's struggle against the confessional system. He was in the vanguard of an intellectual movement that strove to create a specific Druze narrative of Lebanon's history, and rejected the Maronite historical narrative as sectarian, tendentious and fabricated.

Confuting the Maronite narrative: the motif of falsification

The first claim common to Druze sources is that Lebanese historiography is fraudulent, including all history textbooks past and present. Druze writers accuse both the Lebanese establishment and Maronite historians of systematically and deliberately falsifying Lebanese historiography. The Druze historian, Amīn Abū ʿIzz al-Dīn, states that the basic flaw in Lebanese historiography is its political–sectarian orientation, because it was written by Christian historians who valued sectarian loyalty over national feeling, while ʿAfīf Farrāj has said that the scientific approach to the writing of history became the art of myth-making in the hands of Maronite historians;Footnote ³⁰ Nuwayhiḍ and Taqī al-Dīn put forward a sharper argument. According to these writers, Maronite historiography as a whole is nothing more than a mass of literature with a clear ideological and self-interested message: to justify the continued existence of the present Lebanese political entity in all its aspects. The founding of Greater Lebanon was the major circumstantial motive for the development of Lebanese historiography. Since that time, the dominant bourgeoisie – the Maronite community – has diligently nurtured the myth of an eternal historic Lebanese nation. To this end, its historians invented the “myth of Phoenician origins”. Outstanding representatives of Maronite historiography such as Jawād Būlus, Philip Hitti, Butrus Ḍaw, Kamal Salibi and Yūsuf al-Sawdā, have all been accused by Druze historians of falsifying Lebanese history and shaping it to their own ends and political outlook.Footnote ³¹ Despite philosophical differences among the various Maronite versions, it is apparent that their historical foundation is the successive attempt to invent ancient pre-Islamic roots for the Lebanese entity and to present the country's history as that of an ethnic group – a minority community living in the midst of a hostile Islamic environment – which developed a tradition of consistent struggle for independence. According to this narrative, the goal was fully achieved under the aegis of the present state and its confessional system of government.Footnote ³²

In his book, Ḥaqiqat al-Thawrah al-Lubnānīyah, Junblāṭ stated that “up to this [time] Lebanese historiography has been falsified, in the true sense of the word”. He accused “extremist isolationist” historians of twisting historical facts in order to make tendentious use of documentary literature. Furthermore, he pointed to the dialectical relationship between the falsified historiography and Lebanese politics. According to Junblāṭ, the falsified historiography brought about a distortion of Lebanon's authentic political expression. In other words, the current political regime, which perpetuates this distortion, derives its authority from this falsified historiography. Junblāṭ maintained that creating an accurate and unified version of history is a prerequisite to establishing a genuine civil society in Lebanon.Footnote ³³

His son, Walīd Junblāṭ, has demonstrated loyalty to his father's heritage. When recounting the “many sins” of the Maronites, he said that they wrote the history of Lebanon in an incorrect manner and that history textbooks are not factually accurate:

The criticism of Maronite historiography becomes more incisive for the period of the Druze Emirate. Druze sources often claim that Lebanese Christian historians have systematically attempted to diminish the role of the Druzes in Lebanon's history during the medieval era, and have ignored the evidence that from first settlement the Druzes have fought for the preservation of Lebanon's independence and for its Arab character. The Lebanese establishment has followed suit, and government textbooks fail to give proper credit to the major role of the Druzes in the country's founding. Apart from brief passages, these texts do not discuss the achievements of the Druze emirs who ruled Lebanon for a considerable time, and brought glory not only to Lebanese history but to Arab history. In Druze circles, the feeling prevails that neither the Druze contribution to Lebanon's independence in the modern era, nor the part this community played in the crisis of 1943, have been fairly treated by the state. While the state perpetuates the memory of the events of the Rāshayyā fortress as a symbol of surrender and defeat, it neglects the story of the Druze village of Bshāmūn, the symbol of Lebanese national pride.Footnote ³⁵

Abu Izzeddin sums up the polemics against Lebanese historiography by saying that the true history of Lebanon over the last six or seven centuries, in both general and particular issues, has not yet been properly researched. He asserts that the existing literature suffers from systematic fabrication and distortion, especially pertaining to the Druze role from when the Tanūkhs and Maʿnīs settled Lebanon through the first half of the nineteenth century. He spares no criticism of the Druzes themselves for neglecting their history, and makes some concrete suggestions, such as the establishment of a scientific commission for the advancement of historical research among the Druzes. Like Junblāṭ, Abu Izzeddin considers an impeccable rewriting of Lebanon's political history to be of paramount importance. At his claim, an authentic historiography is a basic condition for building a strong and sustainable civic sense among the Lebanese people as a whole.Footnote ³⁶

However, refuting the Phoenician myth is not always a top priority among Druze intellectuals. I did not detect any consistent effort to do so, though polemics do exist about this myth. The Druzes find no evidence of a longstanding drive for independence that began in the Phoenician era and continued during the Emirate period, but they do attempt to set the rule and deeds of the Druze emirs within their clearly Arab-Islamic context. Despite the lack of treatment in Druze sources of the Phoenician aspect of the Maronite narrative, a few intellectuals mounted a polemical counter-attack. However, this controversy has been sporadic, unsystematic and limited in scope.

Taqī al-Dīn has stated that Maronite historians have systematically attempted to separate Lebanon from its Arab environs, which is why they turned to the myth of Phoenician origins. They have developed ethnic theories and models aimed at separating the population of Lebanon from its surroundings.Footnote ³⁷ Abū ʿIzz al-Dīn does not deny Lebanon's connection to “Phoenicianism”, but the argument of primordial origins based on the concept of Phoenician origins becomes the object of his revisionism. He does not see this myth as proof of the cultural, national and ethnic uniqueness of Lebanon, but enlists it instead to prove the Arab origins of the Lebanese entity. In his view, the Phoenicians themselves were descendants of Canaanites who emigrated from the Arabian Peninsula, and were Arab in ethnic and cultural origin.Footnote ³⁸ Thus, the argument of primordial origins – the claim of first beginnings on which Maronite theoreticians have based their case for the non-Arab identity of Lebanon – serves to emphasize the population's Arab roots. Elsewhere, Abū ʿIzz al-Dīn renounces the apologetic revisionist approach and clearly states that the only ethnic group that dominates Lebanon today is the Semites, thus setting out his counter-claim to those who consider the present population of Lebanon to be the latest incarnation of the ancient Phoenicians.Footnote ³⁹

The Druze interpretation challenges the authority of the claim that the Phoenician era saw the establishment of Lebanon as a separate political entity. Nuwayhiḍ noted that the growth of Phoenician civilization was not limited territorially and geographically to the shores of Lebanon, and that Phoenician cities were established along the whole eastern Mediterranean coast. Moreover, there was never a single unified Phoenician state, since no centralized government developed for all the Phoenician cities.Footnote ⁴⁰ Emphasis on Lebanon's cultural pluralism, which is a characteristic motif of Maronite historians, arouses equally critical reaction among Druzes. For example, Abū ʿIzz al-Dīn stresses that Lebanon's cultural identity is homogeneous and not pluralistic, because from the time of the Arab conquest in the seventh century, Arabic became the dominant language in the region of Greater Syria. Moreover, Arabic culture assimilated the remnants of preceding cultures, such as the Egyptian, Phoenician, Greek and Byzantine.Footnote ⁴¹ The emphasis on the importance of Arabic culture in the Lebanese experience was intended to undermine Maronite efforts to point to the pre-Islamic cultural roots of Lebanon. The motif of cultural pluralism was perceived as part of a comprehensive attempt by Maronite theoreticians to establish that the pre-Islamic Phoenician era was the beginning of Lebanese history.

The Druze polemic against the myth of Phoenician origins does not arise from Pan-Arab ideology, but expresses the particularist struggle against Maronite hegemony. The conflict over the title of “founders” of Lebanon derives to a great degree from the Druzes' self-image, rooted in their collective consciousness as “Lebanon's first founders”. Acceptance of the Phoenician origin myth means moving the primordial phase of Lebanon's history from the time of the Druze Tanūkhs and the Maʿnī period to the pre-Islamic era, which serves the Maronite claim of continuity from the Phoenicians to the establishment of Greater Lebanon. Defending the original Arab identity of Lebanon is the central tenet of the Druze narrative: it asserts Druze exclusivity over the enterprise of founding the Lebanese polity in the Islamic era.

The Druze emirate: rewriting history in the name of Arabism and Islam

Discussion of the Tanūkh period focuses on two major areas: laying the initial foundations of the political and territorial entity of Lebanon, and defending this territory from foreign invasion, from Islam's classic foes. Over many years, Druze sources have stated that the Lebanese Druzes are descended from the Arab tribes sent by the Abbasid Caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr in the eighth century to settle the Lebanon area. The first settlers were the Lakhams and Arslāns from the tribal federation of Tanūkh. Their function was to protect the coastal region and outlying areas from Byzantine invaders and their local allies.Footnote ⁴² Despite the fact that the first immigrants were not Druze, since the Druze religion was not established until later, many Druze sources consider this settlement to be the beginnings of the “Arab principality” that ruled Lebanon for 800 years, until the end of the eighteenth century. The Tanūkhs, the rulers of the principality, accepted the new religion after the arrival of the Druze proselytizers in the eleventh century.Footnote ⁴³

The Tanūkh rulers provided a “melting pot” for the tribes, who blended into a single Arab–Lebanese national unit. They succeeded in preserving it under the overlordship of various dynasties, such as the Fatimids, Ayyubids and Mamluks, thus institutionalizing a certain tradition of government.Footnote ⁴⁴ This Lebanese political entity did not isolate itself from its Arab or Islamic milieu. Its very formation was a function of the continual struggle against Christian Byzantines and Crusaders.Footnote ⁴⁵ Indeed, the integration of the Tanūkh principality into the wider struggle against the enemies of Islam legitimized its continued existence and independence. The Tanūkh emirs were described as remaining faithful to the Islamic state in its different incarnations, and took an active part in the battles against the Byzantines, the Crusaders and even the Mongols. Druze historians emphasized the link between the Tanūkhs and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī to an extreme degree. The fact that the Druzes joined Ṣalāh al-Dīn's forces during the entry into Beirut transformed them into the natural ally of that historic figure. More than anyone, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn is the highest symbol in Islamic history of the recurrent fight against foreign invaders, and especially against the Christian world. Druze historians have also exaggerated the modest contribution of the Druzes to halting the advance of the Mongols in the Battle of ʿAyn Jālūt in 1260.Footnote ⁴⁶

Not only were the Tanūkh emirs the first to create a political-governmental framework in the Lebanon, but their history was characterized by warfare against foreign invaders. These two paradigms became deeply rooted in the Druzes' collective consciousness and are major components of their self-image. Emphasizing the motif of foundation, as well as the Arab and Islamic nature of the Emirate was intended to reinforce the Druzes' claim of exclusivity as founders of the Lebanese entity and with a primary right to rule. Beyond this, both themes serve as powerful instruments in the polemic against the Maronite narrative. The first challenge is to the “primordial” presence of the Maronites and their right to be called “founding fathers” on the basis of their alleged Phoenician descent. The second refutes the claim that the Lebanese principality was isolationist, by emphasizing its integration into the wider Islamic Arabic dominion.

In this context, it is important to note that the Druzes' pride is not only in their historical legacy dating back to the eleventh century, but in the deeds of the early settlers, with whom the Druzes have no religious or sectarian link whatsoever. In the absence of such a link, Druze historical sources focus on the ethnic-genealogical link with the early settlers, in a clear example of instrumental historiographical interpretation intended to advance a specific political or ideological theme. Druze sources consider the early Arab settlement in Lebanon to be the chronological origin of their narrative and point to the continuous link between these tribes and their Druze descendants. This historical position is diametrically opposed to the Maronite narrative, which claims pre-Islamic roots. Despite the paradox of these two aspects – institutionalization of the separate entity vs. integration into the region – we can see that Druze historiography describes the integration tendency as the source of legitimacy for the separate existence of the Lebanese entity, and emphasizes the correlation between the two aspects.

While the Tanūkhs were described as the first rulers of the Emirate, and those who having laid the early foundations of the Lebanese polity, Emir Fakhr al-Dīn II is considered in Druze historiography to be the real founding father of Lebanon's independence and who crystallized its political entity. The historical status of Emir Fakhr al-Dīn II from the Maʿn clan is one of the few issues in Lebanese history on which there is agreement between Druze and Maronite narratives. There is no disagreement as to this Emir's decisive influence and contribution to Lebanon's history, although interpretations differ. The two schools of thought agree that Fakhr al-Dīn played a major role in creating a politically independent Lebanon, although there is debate as to his real motives and the historical significance of his actions. On the whole, Druze historiography deals with three major aspects of Fakhr al-Dīn's life: his striving for independence and his policy towards the Ottoman Empire; the way in which he strengthened the internal front and his tolerance towards his Christian subjects, especially Maronites; and his ties with the West and the refutation of Maronite history in this regard.

Pertaining to the first aspect, Druze sources spare no effort, whether on the rhetorical-literary or ideational level, in glorifying Fakhr al-Dīn's importance. He is described as an exemplary ruler, the true founder of the Lebanese state (although he was not the first Maʿnī emir) and the symbol of its struggle for political independence. Fahkr al-Dīn strove to liberate his country from the Ottoman yoke and to establish a flourishing modern state based on strong internal national unity.Footnote ⁴⁷ Abū ʿIzz al-Dīn concluded that the Maʿnī emirate arose in the sixteenth century and reached the height of its power under Fakhr al-Dīn II, indicating the beginning of a separate historical development in Lebanon, which until then had been territorially and administratively joined to Syria.Footnote ⁴⁸

Despite the failure of Fakhr al-Dīn's political ambitions and his execution by Ottoman authorities in 1635, Druze sources repeatedly praise the Maʿnī ruler. First, he succeeded in unifying nineteen scattered emirates (?) into a single political entity, for the first time turning Lebanon's territorial unity into reality. Second, he created a national army, whose victories extended the borders of the principality to include all of present-day Lebanon, as well as Jordan, Palestine and parts of Syria. Third, he transformed the principality into a melting pot that blended all the religious communities into a single unit. Finally, he was the first to unify “Druzeland” and Kisrwān, the land of the Maronites.Footnote ⁴⁹

In contrast to the ambitious rulers who were his contemporaries, Fakhr al-Dīn is perceived as a statesman whose actions were guided by a national political vision. He was the first to conceive of an independent, sovereign Arab state in the al-Shām region.Footnote ⁵⁰ He envisaged a state based on the concept of nationalism in its modern sense, which would serve as a political envelope for a national, coherent Lebanese community drawing its inspiration from Lebanese Arab nationalism. Fakhr al-Dīn was also the first Arab ruler to fight against a foreign power and to challenge the Sublime Porte's authority. Even more, he was the first to conceive of liberating Arab lands from the Ottoman Empire.Footnote ⁵¹ The aggressive policy of the Ottoman authorities towards Fahkr al-Dīn derived from their fear that his “Druze country” was likely to lead a movement to liberate Arab countries from Ottoman control.Footnote ⁵²

With regard to the second claim by many Druze historians about the Maʿnī principality's socio-political regime, and especially Fakhr al-Dīn's attitude towards his Christian “subjects”, it seems clear that his main concern was to establish a strong domestic front that could withstand external threats. The most important institutional expression of this was the army, a supra-sectarian military force motivated by the principle of al-Wataniyya, which rallied Druzes, Christians, Shiites and Sunnis around the patriotic ideal.Footnote ⁵³ By using the term “Watani”, in the sense of the modern European notion of patriotism, to characterize Fakhr al-Dīn's army, Druze authors aimed to render his heritage a fundamental and modern component of national consciousness.Footnote ⁵⁴ Furthermore, although Fakhr al-Dīn's allegiance to the Lebanese patriotic cause was anchored within the wider struggle of the Arab national movement against the foreign rule of the Ottomans, it constitutes an exception to the Arab–Islamic paradigm that dominated Druze historiography.Footnote ⁵⁵ This exception might be ascribed to the Druzes' efforts to win the title of founders of the Lebanese polity and to the increasing legitimization of territorial nationalism, a process that has accelerated since the late 1960s.Footnote ⁵⁶

An additional instrument for nurturing national unity was Fakhr al-Dīn's tolerance of Christian sects. He succeeded in rising above sectarian and ethnic considerations and transformed his Emirate into a bastion of religious tolerance. He was the first Muslim ruler to implement the principle of full equality between Christians and Muslims. He nullified the institution of Ahl al-Dhimma, and extended full civil rights to all religions. He even accepted non-Muslims into his government as advisers, and successfully neutralized the influence of sectarian extremism in internal politics.Footnote ⁵⁷ Druze historical sources describe how Fakhr al-Dīn's tolerant policies encouraged many Melchites and Maronites to migrate south to Druze areas. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Druzes opened up their villages to Christians and allowed them to settle. The many churches and monasteries scattered around Druze country bear witness to this. However, according to Druze historians, this tolerance was repaid by ingratitude from the Maronites, who systematically tried to subvert their Druze hosts.Footnote ⁵⁸

The third issue discussed extensively in Druze historical literature are the ties Emir Fakhr al-Dīn developed with the West. His connection with European Christian states creates deep embarrassment among Druzes, as it undermines the claim of Druze integration into the Arab–Muslim world. On the whole, Druze sources minimize the importance of these ties or try to justify them with apologetics. They oppose any attempt to create an analogy between Fakhr al-Dīn's contacts with the West and the traditional connection of the Maronites with European powers, in particular France.

Druze historians say that contrary to claims by Maronite historians, Fakhr al-Dīn never adopted a pro-Western orientation, nor did he seek political or military alliances with Western powers. His connections with the West were strictly utilitarian, with no ideological motive. His political, military and economic links with Tuscany were first and foremost designed to strengthen his realm militarily and politically, especially against the Ottoman threat. His approach to Christian Europe was solely to obtain the support of foreign agencies to free his country from the yoke of a foreign power. The evidence is that he did not seek assistance from the great maritime powers, such as France or Spain, but instead approached a smaller power, Tuscany.Footnote ⁵⁹

Needless to say, these are apologia and their truth need not be examined, although they do reveal the scope of confusion among Druze authors. Indeed, the issue of Fakhr al-Dīn's ties with the West forms a weak chain in the pyramid of claims supporting the Druze narrative, and challenges the motif of integration into the Arab-Islamic world. This is why Druze sources emphasize the tactical usefulness of these ties, and vehemently deny any ideological dimension that might be noted by Maronite historians.

As we have seen, Druze historiography spares no effort in idealizing the era of Fakhr al-Dīn. First, the emphasis on the Arab nationalist dimension of his reign presents him as the pioneer of an Arab nationalist movement struggling against Ottoman rule. The motif of integration forms a large part of this discussion, although it now becomes limited to the Arab sphere instead of the Islamic sphere, in contrast to the Tanūkh period, where an inordinate emphasis is placed on the Islamic context and the motif of struggle against foreign invaders. Fakhr al-Dīn's battle against the Ottoman Empire, the supreme symbol of Islamic rule, limits the usefulness of the integration concept. In any case, the elaboration of the Arab link during Fakhr al-Dīn's rule, arising from the emphasis on Islam in the Tanūkh period, exposes a certain paradox and lack of consistency in the Druze narrative, although the basis of legitimacy of the autonomous entity in both cases remains unchanged – integration into the regional milieu.Footnote ⁶⁰ Druze sources of all kinds attempt to refute the Maronite claim of isolationism by focusing on the Arab nature of the Emir's various political projects, and on his drive for independence as the first Arab nationalist movement.Footnote ⁶¹

The second characteristic of this idealization relates to the principality's socio-political regime. Druze literature makes systematic use of terminology drawn from modern Western political culture. Concepts such as “national unity” and “civil rights” are arbitrarily displaced to the seventeenth century and made relevant to the pattern of rule established by Fakhr al-Dīn II.Footnote ⁶² Druze sources describe his government as ideal for a pluralistic, multi-sectarian Lebanon, a regime that encouraged “the creation of national unity”.Footnote ⁶³

Contrary to Emir Fakhr al-Dīn II, the historical role of Emir Bashīr II illustrates the crux of extreme controversy between Druzes and Maronites. While Maronite historiography views him as the natural successor of Fakhr al-Dīn II, and a ruler who contributed decisively to the founding of modern Lebanon, Druze historiography regards him as the antithesis of Fakhr al-Dīn, and the man who destroyed the secular regime of the “Arab Emirate”.

Even a survey of some of the literature reveals the negative attitude of Druze historians towards the Shihāb principality. The Shihābī emirs are described as failures in government, aliens, and inferior in status in comparison to their Tanūkh and Maʿnī predecessors.Footnote ⁶⁴ Against the general admiration for the Shihābī emirs in Maronite historiography and in light of their conversion to Christianity, Druze historiographers systematically try to nullify any connection between themselves and the Shihābīs. They claim that the Shihābī emirs never adopted the Druze faith, but remained Sunni Muslims when they settled in Mount Lebanon in the late seventeenth century following the death of Emir Aḥmad, the last Maʿnī ruler.Footnote ⁶⁵

Druze sources further note that the Shihābīs’ rise to power was not the result of consensus among feudal clans but of factional division between the Qaysī and the Yamanī camps. This split developed into an armed struggle at the Battle of ʿAyn-Dārā in 1711, when the Qaysīs (including the Shihābīs) finally defeated the Yamanīs. In spite of this, Abū Ṣāliḥ and Makārim make use of “these facts” to illustrate the secular, tolerant nature of Druze political tradition at that time. After all, the Qaysīs preferred a non-Druze Qaysī leader from outside Mount Lebanon to a local Druze emir from the Yamanīs. In this line of reasoning, political-factional affiliation was more important for the Druzes than sectarian-religious affiliation.Footnote ⁶⁶

The critique of Bashīr II's policies can be summarized in two major claims.Footnote ⁶⁷ First, that he systematically worked to abolish the political and economic power of the Druze feudal clans – the mainstay of the principality – while attempting to create an alternative Christian leadership. Second, that this policy created a new pattern of factionalism that would seriously undermine the harmony between Christians and Druzes and attracted more foreign intervention in domestic affairs, leading finally to Lebanon's loss of independence.Footnote ⁶⁸

Druze sources state that Emir Bashīr used all possible means to destroy the feudal leadership, from encouraging internal conflicts to physical killing. After inciting the Junblāṭs against the Nakads, the Emir attacked the latter and confiscated all their property. His alliance with Shaykh Bashīr Junblāṭ, leader of the Junblāṭs, helped him to strike hard at the ʿImād, ʿAbd al-Malik and Talḥūq clans one after the other, thus attacking the three main families of the Yazbiks. There was also the murder of al-Sit Ḥubūs Arslān (the Druze woman who was the leader of the Hasbayā region), explained by the Druzes as part of the Emir's “policy of repression”. Bashīr II's “liquidation” efforts reached their climax with his defeat of Shaykh Bashīr Junblāṭ, his former ally, in the battle of al-Samqānīyah in 1825. Later he was executed in Acre at the request of Emir Bashīr.Footnote ⁶⁹

The military defeat and execution of Shaykh Bashīr are considered by the Druzes as a turning point in their history. Anīs Yaḥyā has described its implications: “The way in which Shaykh Bashīr disappeared brought about a feeling of exhaustion and weakness among the Druzes, as if their homeland had been stolen from them, and they had lost the land that they had treasured for centuries”.Footnote ⁷⁰ The execution of their most important feudal leader struck a heavy blow to Druze political status and brought about a reorganization of the political forces in Lebanon. The destruction of the Junblāṭ family's position and influence was the death knell for Druze feudal economic–political hegemony. This prepared the way for the Maronites' rise to power as they began to fill the vacuum left by the Druzes.Footnote ⁷¹

Nevertheless, Druze historians do not regard Emir Bashīr's moves against the Druze feudal lords as part of his attempt to establish a centralized government and single political authority. Instead, they attribute his policies to personal or sectarian-religious motives. Abū Ṣāliḥ and Makārim – claiming objectivity – consider that the destruction of the Druze feudal leadership served Emir Bashīr's personal interests, as it was essential to firmly establishing his totalitarian regime and personal position. The disempowering of the feudal lords was not achieved through legislation or regulations limiting their authority, but through arbitrary and vengeful actions. The Emir also distributed their properties among the Christians close to him. His policies led to a regression in what was called “the natural development” of the principality, and were intended to create a new Christian feudal class to replace the Druze one.Footnote ⁷²

In the second claim put forward by Druze historiography, it is asserted that the rule of Emir Bashīr II brought an end to the secular regime of the Emirate and marked the onset of the era of confessionalism. In effect, Bashīr II's rule firmly established confessionalism as the central axis of internal politics in the principality.Footnote ⁷³ This is reinforced by a discussion of the Emir's policies under Egyptian domination (1832–40). Druze sources have focused on one specific historical event, perhaps marginal in importance, but perceived as the turning point in the history of inter-communal relations in Lebanon. The fateful moment was Emir Bashīr's decision in 1838 to respond to Ibrahim Pasha's request for Christian recruits to help suppress the Druze rebellion in southern Lebanon. About 4,000 Christian soldiers fought under the command of Bashīr's son Khalīl, alongside the “Egyptian army of conquest against their brothers the Druzes”. For the first time in the principality's history, Christians fought against Druzes. This had far-reaching effects on relations between Lebanon's two major communities. Abū Ṣāliḥ wrote that Emir Bashīr's decision struck a very painful blow to the traditional alliance between Druzes and Maronites, and for the first time brought about an institutionalization of political factionalism based on sectarian–religious origin. Furthermore, this incident sowed the seeds of the civil wars that broke out in 1841–60. Ghannām adds that Bashīr's “evil-minded, narrow policy” added a great deal of fuel to the hatred and hostility between the two groups.Footnote ⁷⁴

Abū Ṣāliḥ describes Bashīr II as the person who destroyed the secular principality's socio-political order and formalized Lebanon's internal politics along sectarian–religious lines. He writes that the overall political and socio-economic developments during the first half of the nineteenth century had the potential to establish a more modern national regime that would have progressed beyond the ancient feudal state. But Emir Bashīr's own policies and the Maronite Church's intervention in internal politics created the opposite result – a government along sectarian lines that was even more reactionary than its predecessor.Footnote ⁷⁵

The Emir is contrasted with the nationalistic Fakhr al-Dīn, and portrayed as a ruler who relinquished his country's independence and co-operated with the foreign conqueror in order to promote his personal interests. Druze literature rejects the claim that he did so in order to liberate his country from the Ottoman yoke, and treats him as an opportunist and a tool of the foreign regime. Accordingly, Druze historians are strongly opposed to any attempt to draw an analogy between Emir Bashīr II and their national hero, Fakhr al-Dīn II, who is a symbol of the struggle for independence. They deny that Emir Bashīr continued in the path taken by Fakhr al-Dīn, and they object to any suggestion that Bashīr's “contribution” was comparable to Fakhr al-Dīn's. On the contrary, they regard Emir Bashīr as the antithesis of Fakhr al-Dīn, with all that this implies.Footnote ⁷⁶

The Druzes, Arabism and Islam: Taqiyya, or the desire to integrate?

In many Western studies the TaqiyyaFootnote ⁷⁷ is described as the main element shaping Druze behavioural patterns. Variously translated as “concealment” or “dissimulation,” it has been described as the institution at the centre of the entire Druze socio-political experience.Footnote ⁷⁸ According to these theories, the Druze historiography emphasizing the Arab origins of the Lebanese Druzes and the Arab Islamic element in Emirate history is simply making instrumental use of the institution of al-Taqiyya.Footnote ⁷⁹ This claim is anchored in the broad definition that Western scholars tend to ascribe to the concept, making it a catch-all that includes the political dimension of Druze life. A classic example is a 1985 article by Aharon LayishFootnote ⁸⁰ that attempts to define Taqiyya and identifies four major elements:

1. 1. Concealment of the Druze faith and religion;

2. 2. The tendency to adopt the dominant religion of the immediate environment;

3. 3. Absolute submission to the government, no matter what type;

4. 4. “Fence sitting” – adopting a neutral stance whenever possible, and if not, supporting the stronger side.Footnote ⁸¹

There is no doubt that Taqiyya does constitute an objective and rational explanation of the political behaviour of heterodox minority groups in the region, including the Druzes, but it is not the only explanation. An examination of political trends among minority groups should be conducted in light of the political reality particular to each group, including their socio-economic background, the politico-cultural environment, the network of relations between them and the national-territorial state, and an understanding of how new ideological trends and movements such as nationalism, secularism and communism have affected the political and social life of the minority.Footnote ⁸² In a region in which religion pervades politics, it is reasonable to assume that Taqiyya will continue to have a certain socio-political function, although it is not the only explanation for the behaviour of heterodox minorities.

The Lebanese Druzes must be considered a minority group, in spite of their systematic and consistent claim that since the establishment of the Druze religion they have not acted as a separatist minority, but have integrated into the wider Arab and Islamic political and cultural world.Footnote ⁸³ At the centre of their ethno-religious experience the Druzes are a heterodox community distinct from their Islamic environment, and their legal and religious status has always been problematic in the eyes of orthodox Sunni Islam.

Yet there is no need for an apologetic attitude towards Islam, since this is a heterodox minority that developed its own centuries-old governmental and social tradition in a non-Muslim country. It might have been expected that the Druzes, given that they were such a heterodox minority, would cultivate a social and political separatism from their Islamic environment and a strong feeling of belonging to the non-Islamic Lebanese state, and would strive to preserve their independence and uniqueness. Instead, paradoxically, the Druzes developed a sense of alienation from the state, at the same time as identifying with the broader social and ideological fabric of Islam and Arabism.

The emphasis on the centrality of Arabism and Islam in Druze historiography is not a classic case of a heterodox minority making instrumental use of the Taqiyya; nor is it an act of submission to the dominant position of the Islamic-Arab culture from both normative and political perspectives. Such an interpretation is based on an examination of two behavioural patterns: the interaction between Druzes and Maronites on the one hand, and between Druzes and the Lebanese political establishment on the other. Three main facts must be kept in mind in this respect.

First, Lebanon cannot be categorized as a classic Muslim-Sunni state, either in demographical or political terms. Indeed, it is the only state in the Arab world whose heterodox minorities are not required to justify themselves to the Sunni majority or to the political establishment. Lebanon's political regime and ethnic-religious structure require no apologetics on Arab and Islamic grounds. Thus the Druzes do not have to contend with any crisis of legitimization of their separatist existence vis-à-vis a Muslim majority as it could be in a typical Muslim country. The case of the Druzes in Lebanon is therefore not an instrumental use of Taqiyya, since the motive for operating Taqiyya does not exist. Although there is a tendency to conceal the true doctrines and beliefs of the Druze community in a clear expression of Taqiyya, the significance of belonging to Arabism and to Islam is an additional step that is not necessary for protection, since Taqiyya is essentially a defensive practice. Furthermore, the emphasis on belonging to Arabism in its national and cultural sense, and to Islam as a civilization, results from the unique political circumstances of the Lebanese Druzes.

This brings us to the second reason for the integration process. Behind the systematic intellectual effort emphasizing the organic connection of the Druzes to Arabism and Islam is an act of co-optation, which was in essence a reaction to the alienation felt by the Druzes towards the Maronites and the political system. This alienation and their unwillingness to identify with its ideological implications led the Druzes to seek an alternative frame of identity from the national-Maronite identity from which the Lebanese state emanated. This tendency is firmly anchored in their unique historical background and in the far-reaching changes in their status in the nineteenth century, namely the transformation from a dominant community to a dominated group by the Maronites. With such a history, the Druzes have been unable to develop a sense of belonging to a national and historic narrative that is specific to the Maronites, who are their historical rivals and even their sworn enemies. They therefore saw Arabism and Islam, in their broader sense, as a legitimate framework of identification that offered an alternative. It is possible that the Druzes' sense of belonging might have been encouraged under a different ideology and national character, but their deep-rooted perception of how the present Lebanese state came into being has made this impossible.

Third, the way in which Druze historiography processes historical events in a clear Arab-Muslim context is an expression of the tendency to integrate that the Druzes, as a minority, have developed towards their environment. It is important to note that the tendency towards integration is characteristic not only of the Lebanese Druzes, but of other heterodox-peripheral minorities who have looked to Pan-Arabism and to secular parties and ideologies as an effective way of fitting into the political communities of their countries. The Druze scholar, Nejla Abu Izzeddin, adds that we cannot explain the emphasis on the ethnic Arab origins of the Druzes as an act of Taqiyya, since ethnicity was never an important issue in Islam.Footnote ⁸⁴

According to this view, to say that the emphasis on the link to Arabism and Islam expresses the apologia of a heterodox minority towards Islam is simplistic, essential and ignores the unique socio-political experience of the Druzes of Lebanon. It is true that Taqiyya continues to have an effect on the Druzes' relationship to their Islamic environment, although this is on the level of concealment or blurring of their esoteric religious doctrines. In addition, we have seen that the current trend in Druze historiography is to enhance their belonging to the “world of Islam” on political and cultural levels, rather than in doctrinal, dogmatic and abstract spheres. Thus, the trend is to demonstrate Druzes' integration into the political and cultural experience of Dār al-Islām, rather than to prove that they are an inseparable part of Sunni Islam. Clearly, the Taqiyya is not the only explanation for the Druzes' adopting Arabism and Islam as the two main pillars of their historical experience. In this sense, an Arab-Islamic identity offers an alternative to the dominant Maronite identity in Lebanon, at the same time as promoting the particularistic Druze struggle against the Maronites under the guise of Arabism and Islam.

This discussion of Druze historiography demonstrates how the Druzes' attitude to the Lebanese political establishment is reflected in their literature. There is no doubt that the striving to present an alternative historical narrative, especially in regard to the Emirate, derives from their present political experience and expresses their alienation from the confessional establishment. Despite the fact that Druze historiography mostly relates to the past, the overall body of literature is greatly concerned with modern political reality, and is, of course, a reflection of the Druze community's current circumstances.

In addition to reflecting Druzes political ambitions for the type of government they would like in their country, they idealized the Emirate in order to delegitimize the present regime by presenting it as the antithesis of the original, secular and non-confessional regime of Mount Lebanon. The governmental and social model of the Emirate is undergoing a “process of symbolization” in Druze historiography. It has been uprooted from its unique historical context to become a quintessential symbol relevant to present political needs, and is a clear attempt to structure a myth portraying the Emirate as a “golden age” in Lebanon's history.

The structuring of the myth surrounding the Druze Emirate takes place on three major levels. First, there is a selection of some historical fundamentals and an ignoring of others, or providing new interpretations of their essential nature. Second, an attempt to retell events that is veiled in the sacred and ideal. Third, a determined tendency to expand and sharpen the significance of certain events and phenomena.

Druze historiography places the utmost emphasis on the autonomous, secular and tolerant nature of the Emirate, while ignoring its function as part of the administrative configuration of the Ottoman Empire. Historiographical selectivity is also applied to the limits of the Emirate's activities. Druze sources pointedly ignore the question of the territorial boundaries of the “national enterprise” established by the Druze emirs. Any attempt to find references to the national significance attributed to the political or historical geography of the present Lebanese entity is in vain. Instead, Druze sources contain insubstantial concepts that lack concrete territorial or geopolitical definition, such as “the Lebanese Emirate” or “the Druze Emirate”.Footnote ⁸⁵

Furthermore, the tribal element – a fundamental of the Druze history of the Emirate – is reinterpreted in an extremely positive light. Druze historians attempt to conceal the primordial tribal-feudal motif, and represent it as a more progressive factor than the confessional system on which the contemporary Lebanese state is based. Although the Emirate is not given a divinely consecrated or mythological significance, it is always described in a clearly idealistic manner, and its political regime is portrayed as the most suitable type of government for Lebanon without any consideration of the motif of time. In addition, the Emirate is always conceptualized in a very positive way. For example, its government is described as secular and as being above ethnic–religious considerations and its rulers as showing tolerance to their subjects without discrimination. The Druze emirs did not abuse their dominant position to create a Druze sectarian entity; on the contrary, they remained loyal to the idea of a Lebanese national community.Footnote ⁸⁶

Functionality and relevance are the two outstanding characteristics of the restructuring of the myth of the Druze Emirate: they reveal its function and socio-political importance within the context of the present, and expose the inherent reasons behind the restructuring. In this sense, one can say that there is a dialectical relationship between myth and historical experience. The needs of the present have brought about a rewriting of the myth, and the myth itself shapes the perception of the present. Myth provides meaning to the present, but is also shaped by the needs of the present.

When applied to the Druzes of Lebanon, the need to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the present political regime naturally brings about a rewriting of Emirate history with a focus on the ideal, perfect essence of that regime. Likewise the myth that developed around the Emirate influences the attitude of the Druzes to the Lebanese establishment. The functionalism and relevance of this myth is derived from its origins in the Druze sense of alienation from the confessional system, while at the same time feeding this feeling. The importance of the Druze narrative lies in its bold link to the contemporary political reality of the Druzes. It is a genuine reflection of the conflictual state of affairs that has existed since the state of Lebanon was founded.

From the ideological and political viewpoint, the Druze historical narrative is a genuine attempt to provide an alternative to the Maronite narrative, or at least to challenge its familiar, institutionalized paradigms as the official version of Lebanese history. However, there are serious doubts about the outcome if this goal were to be fully achieved. The Druze narrative is in the early stages of becoming, and has not yet been sufficiently formulated to a point where it is able to compete with the Maronite narrative. A comparative look at both of them leads us to conclude that the Druze narrative, in content, scope, quantity and coherence, is not yet in a position to overcome the preferred position of its Maronite counterpart.

Beyond its intellectual dimension, the Druze narrative has found clear popular expression in the Zajal, the poetry of the masses.Footnote ⁸⁷ This is illustrated, for instance, in the poetry of Ṭalīʿ Ḥamdān, who is considered the greatest of the contemporary popular Lebanese Druze poets.Footnote ⁸⁸ Ḥamdān uses his poetic talent to present the Druze narrative as well as to create a polemic against the Maronite political establishment. Of course, his poetry helps to disseminate the Druze narrative among the masses, and simultaneously raise their political consciousness about the role their ancestors played in the country's history. The same leitmotifs that appear in Druze historiographical literature are frequently reiterated in Ḥamdān's work, but in popular variations that are very familiar to all social strata. Processing these motifs in a simple, widely understood vernacular proved a much more useful tool than using written texts to expose ordinary people to the Druze narrative and its images.

The imagery in the narrative thus forms an integral part of the collective memory of all Druzes, and not just of the intellectual elite. Although the Druze collective memory does not reflect objective historical truth, it does express the Druze interpretation of Lebanon's history. This is authentic, inherent, and strongly anchored in Druze public consciousness. The Druzes are convinced that their interpretation of Lebanon's history is the genuine version, which has been shunted aside by Maronite hegemony. It is also a means of coping with the traumatic change in status of the Druzes from rulers to marginal group. The Druze narrative sometimes verges on apologetics, in order to explain the essential change that took place in their socio-political existence over the past two centuries and turned them into an ever-smaller minority.

Historiography and nation building in the Middle East: a comparative perspective

To reiterate, the Druze narrative is based on three major elements. First, it elaborates the motif of the founding fathers, which refutes the Maronite dependence on the formative period of the Phoenicians – their reputed ancestors – and attributes the foundation and institutionalization of the Lebanese entity to the Druze emirs. Second, it emphasizes the Arab and Islamic aspects of Emirate history, which refute the Christian–Maronite allegation that the Druze Emirate was politically separate. Third, it idealizes the socio-political regime of the Emirate and describes it as an ideal governmental pattern for pluralist Lebanon.

The Druze historical narrative clearly shows that the Druzes have not developed a sense of belonging to Phoenician Lebanon, or to Lebanon as place of refuge of minorities – L'Asile du Liban as described by Lammens – and especially not to a Lebanon that represents the political and governmental legacy of Emir Bashīr II.Footnote ⁸⁹ They believe that present-day Lebanon is the antithesis of the original Lebanon, which until 1840 was even called Jabal al-Durūz – the Druzes' Mount – in official Ottoman documents.Footnote ⁹⁰ At the heart of Druze political theory lies the ambition to revive the “secular supra-sectarian” model of the medieval Emirate, and Druze texts show a nostalgia for that period.

Above all, Druze historiography exhibits the dominant political trends across wide strata of the Druze community in Lebanon, while the creation of their narrative sheds light on the current conflict over the writing of Lebanon's history. This “battle for history” exposes the basic elements of what may be the country's most serious political crisis since its establishment in the 1920s. There is no doubt that shaping a historical narrative which has the consensus of all Lebanese nationals would pave the way for the creation of a solid national-political community and a unified national and cultural value system.Footnote ⁹¹ Emphasis on the Druzes' contribution to the creation of the Lebanese entity would undoubtedly counteract the trend of Druze alienation, but is unlikely to lessen the deep adherence to the land of Lebanon, which in their eyes is still the Druze Mountain.

The Druzes' commitment to their country stems from a deep-rooted, centuries-old historical experience, and is not necessarily associated with the power of central government or with the notion of the territorial state per se. Many Druzes, led by Kamāl Junblāṭ, believed that loyalty to their country did not contradict their struggle against the confessional system. On the contrary, the elimination of that system might not only strengthen the ties between the Druzes and their state, but also the internal bonds of Lebanese society. In other words, the Druzes were interested in maintaining Lebanon as a united political entity, but wanted to reshape its political system on principles of secularism and Arabism. Under Junblāṭ's leadership, the Druzes never struggled for the destruction of the Lebanese state, but fought tirelessly to change its ideological and political substance. The Druzes' attachment to Lebanon proves the indispensability and vitality of the Lebanese state, but their struggle against the political establishment illustrates three dimensions of the chronic crisis that has characterized the state since its inception: the lack of a coherent national community; the lack of an agreed foundational myth; and the lack of consensus about the most suitable political system for Lebanon.

The absence of a unifying myth is hardly unique to Lebanon; other Arab countries in the Middle East, such as Iraq and Egypt, have faced similar challenges.Footnote ⁹² It is no accident that these three countries have witnessed the emergence of counter-historical narratives: the Egyptian narrative, or Pharaonism as it is sometimes called in Egypt; Phoenicianism in Lebanon; and Mesopotamianism in Iraq. Although the latter was pursued consistently by the Baath regime, the counter-narratives in Egypt and Lebanon were formulated and disseminated by groups of intellectuals and writers.Footnote ⁹³ In their essence, these narratives aimed to counter the dominance of the Pan-Arab historical narrative and based their authority on the pre-Islamic cultural heritage as well as on the principle of territorial nationalism. The limited framework of the present article does not allow for a deep comparison between these three countries; still, a few words might be said here about the development of historiographical discourse in Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon.

During the eight decades of its existence, the Iraqi state has espoused the wider Pan-Arab narrative as its ideological foundation, thus excluding the Kurds, the country's largest ethnic minority group, from the national community. Nevertheless, in the course of the 1970s and early 1980s, the Baath regime (1968–2003) launched vigorous efforts to construct a unifying and harmonious territorial-national identity that relied on the ancient history of Iraq, principally on the Mesopotamian Myth. These efforts have involved a series of cultural and ideological activities, among them cultivation of local folklore, promotion of art inspired by the Mesopotamian heritage, archaeological excavations, reconstruction of Mesopotamia's ancient cities and, most importantly, a state-sponsored campaign aiming to make the Iraqi public aware of the relevance and importance of Mesopotamia's pre-Islamic culture and history. By claiming a historical continuity between the Iraqi population and the ancient Mesopotamian peoples, the regime was trying to inspire the different segments of Iraqi society with a sense of shared destiny and to emphasize Iraq's uniqueness and even superiority. After being alienated by the Pan-Arab narrative, the Kurds were also banished from the Mesopotamian-oriented narrative as a result of political circumstances revealed during the 1970s.Footnote ⁹⁴ But the exclusion of the Kurds was not the only serious shortcoming of the Mesopotamian narrative; from the very beginning, it ran into one difficulty after another because of its particular and pre-Islamic sources. First, unlike the Egyptian and Phoenician narratives, it was restricted to the cultural field, which made it less relevant and effective. Second, its authority as a founding narrative has always been questioned by the Pan-Arab ideology. Finally, it clashed with the Islamic tradition which saw the glorification of Mesopotamian-oriented culture as a revival and restoration of paganism.

In Egypt, since the rise of the modern national movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, Egyptian national historiography has been divided between two competing historical narratives: the Egyptian territorial narrative and the supra-Egyptian Islamic Arab narrative. The former, which dominated the intellectual and political discourse during the 1920s and 30s, contributed greatly to the development of Egyptian territorial nationalism. As a foundation of this narrative, the Egyptian intellectuals produced three main ideological arguments: the territorial and historical distinctiveness of the Nile Valley, the theory of the Pharaonic Myth, and Egypt's cultural separatism from the Arab and Muslim Legacy.Footnote ⁹⁵

In contrast, the supra-Egyptian narrative underscored Egypt's cultural and political bonds with the Islamic and Arab milieu and advocated an integrative approach. This narrative reached its zenith during Nasir's revolutionary regime, when Arabism became the hegemonic national orientation of the state, although its roots can be traced back to the early 1930s and 40s.Footnote ⁹⁶ Following the 1967 defeat and the decline of Arab nationalism, the supra-Egyptian narrative lost its impetus, paving the way for the resurgence of a new trend of Pharaonic discourse.Footnote ⁹⁷ It is not surprising that the Coptic community has always favoured the territorial narrative, given its secular identification and the Copts' fears of being assimilated into the Arab-Islamic world.Footnote ⁹⁸

Although Lebanese historiography has been dominated by myths and narratives set out by Christian and Maronite intellectuals, the state never attempted to use historiography to realize genuine national cohesion. Thus, even before independence in 1943, Lebanon has experienced clashes and competition between differing narratives, motivated by ideological and sectarian impulses. As shown by Salibi, Beydoun, Kawtharānī and this article, each community in Lebanon has been occupied with establishing its own historical narrative. Christian and Maronite intellectuals remain the staunch defenders of theories about Lebanon's historical and cultural distinctiveness; in contrast, the Sunni authors stressed Lebanon's attachment to its Arab surroundings. This vision is shared by the Druze writers who have manipulated Islam and Arabism to highlight their contribution to Lebanon's history. Unlike all the others, the Shiite writers, driven by deep feelings of marginalization and exclusion, have provided the Lebanese historiographical literature with another genre focused on their sectarian particularism.

This segmentation of Lebanese historiography exposes another aspect of the fragility that affects the Lebanese political and social fabric; more importantly, it sheds new light on the dynamics of modern Arab historiography. Two main points should be mentioned here. First, the preceding discussion of the Druze narrative of the Emirate indicates a growing consciousness among local societies that historiography is important in shaping the political culture in the modern Middle East. This consciousness has been widely expressed in the discipline of modern Middle Eastern studies; hence, the past two decades have seen growing interest in understanding and rethinking modern Middle Eastern historiography and various historiographical issues have been investigated in depth.Footnote ⁹⁹ Second, while some scholars of modern Middle Eastern historiography hold that the nation-state has promulgated most modern Arab historiography,Footnote ¹⁰⁰ others have focused on the basic, and continuing, tension between the territorial–national unit and supra-territorial nationalism, as the main factor motivating Arab nationalist historiography.Footnote ¹⁰¹ The discussion of the historiographical discourse promoted by the Druze community in Lebanon assumes that additional sub-national territorial units exist within modern Arab historiography. Borrowing images and motifs from the supra-territorial pan-Arab narrative (the Arab-Islamic orientation) does not diminish the fact that the main element driving the Druze historiographical discourse has been the sub-national motivations related to the Druze particularism in Lebanon. These motivations relate to the particular antagonism with the Maronites and the Druzes' stratification within the confessional system. Thus, Arab historiography should be examined in the light of this three-dimensional interaction between territorial-nationalism and the sub-national and supra-national units. By the same token, any investigation of the ways that minority elements have contributed to the elaboration of Arab historiography should not be limited to the contents and narratives they provided, but should also include the particular and sub-national motivations that might animate them.