1. The BFBS, the ABS and the NBSS as the “Big Three” in Chinese Protestant Bible translation, publication and circulation

Bible work in late Qing and Republican China was almost monopolized by the BFBS, the ABS and the NBSS. These can be regarded as the three largest players (the “Big Three”) in the enterprise of translating, publishing and circulating the Bible in China. The BFBS was the first Bible society to enter China: it began its work in 1811 by granting 500 pounds sterling to Robert Morrison for his Bible translation work and the printing of his literary Chinese version.Footnote ³ Following in the BFBS's footsteps, the ABS made its first appropriation in 1833 to aid in Bible distribution in China.Footnote ⁴ The NBSS began its work in China in 1863 with the appointment of Alexander Williamson as its first agent.Footnote ⁵

Relying on missionaries' linguistic expertise and giving them freedom to choose the form of Chinese they deemed appropriate, the Big Three sponsored the translation and publication of the Bible not only in literary Chinese but also in Mandarin, the lingua franca in late imperial China that later became the national language of China. The BFBS and ABS also aided missionaries in translating and publishing the Bible in Chinese spoken languages such as Cantonese, Hakka, Shanghainese and the dialects of Fuzhou 福州, Xiamen 廈門, Ningbo 寧波, Shantou 汕頭 and Suzhou 蘇州.Footnote ⁶ Some Chinese Bible versions were sponsored by only one of the Big Three. For example, Griffith John's New Testament translations in simplified literary Chinese (1885) and Mandarin (1889) were published exclusively by the NBSS; however, some were products of joint patronage: the ABS and BFBS co-sponsored the translation and publication of the Mandarin New Testament known as the Peking Version (1872). The renowned Chinese Union Versions in literary Chinese, simplified literary Chinese and Mandarin (1919) were produced under the joint patronage of the Big Three.Footnote ⁷

As for Chinese Bible distribution, the BFBS established its permanent agency in Shanghai and appointed Alexander Wylie as its full-time agent in China (1863–77), “who shall traverse the country, wherever accessible, with a view of organizing a system of extensive Colportage, and initiating such other practicable schemes, as shall conduce to the circulation of the Scriptures on a far larger scale than has hitherto been attained”.Footnote ⁸ During the 1870s, the ABS and the NBSS expanded their work in China. In 1875 the ABS appointed L.H. Gulick as its first agent in China. The head office of its China agency was located in Shanghai.Footnote ⁹ After a short term of service for the NBSS in north China, John Archibald was in 1877 appointed its agent in Hankow (Hankou 漢口), which then became the location of the organization's headquarters in China.Footnote ¹⁰ In 1885, it set up its own printing establishment there, but this was sold in 1918. The Commercial Press (Shangwu Yinshuguan 商務印書館) then became the NBSS's printer and its headquarters in China transferred to Shanghai.Footnote ¹¹ As more systematic colportage work was organized by the ABS and the NBSS, the number of Chinese Bibles distributed increased rapidly. Between 1863 and 1875 the ABS circulated on average about 100,000 Chinese Bibles annually; the number increased to over 250,000 by 1887. The NBSS issued just over 400,000 Chinese Bibles during the period 1864–83, but within the following decade it issued about two million copies.Footnote ¹² After years of development the work of these Bible societies became comparable with that of the BFBS. In 1889, for instance, the BFBS, the ABS and the NBSS distributed respectively 224,807, 230,920 and 210,260 Chinese Bibles.Footnote ¹³ By 1921, they had distributed in total more than 110 million copies of the Bible in China (most of them were portions of the Bible).Footnote ¹⁴

2. Nationalism, the indigenization of the Protestant church in China during the 1920s and the South China Bible Society (1927)

During the early 1920s, under the influence of the New Culture Movement and Chinese nationalism, Protestantism came under intensifying attacks in Republican China. This required the Protestant church in China to review its over-emphasis on proselytization and to justify its presence by reaffirming itself as a useful participant in the nation-building of modern China. Regarding science and individual emancipation as vital to China's salvation, many Chinese intellectuals were determined to eliminate every form of superstition, in which civilized people in a modern society should not believe.Footnote ¹⁵ The attack was at first directed towards Chinese religious traditions, but Protestantism too came under attack. The main contention was that all religions were irrational and contrary to the laws of science.Footnote ¹⁶ According to Winfried Glüer, people “rid themselves of Christianity because it was irrelevant and scientifically outdated” in modern society.Footnote ¹⁷ Christianity was no longer seen as what John K. Fairbank called a major element “inspiring the regeneration of China”, even though “after 1900 missionary institutions began to nurture ‘Young China’, a new generation of patriots and reformers” and “contributed directly to the rise of China's modern nationalism”.Footnote ¹⁸

Protestantism was vulnerable to anti-imperialist attacks because of its links to Western imperial powers, which Latourette regarded as “a handicap to the missionary and to the Church”.Footnote ¹⁹ The major point of attack was that the right of Protestant missionaries to propagate the Christian faith, and the missionaries' claim to protection, originated from unequal treaties between China and foreign imperialist powers. The fact that some of the missionaries misused their favoured legal position to expand their work or protect native converts, together with the foreign domination of the Protestant church in China, reinforced in the minds of many Chinese the association between missions and imperialism.Footnote ²⁰

All of these attacks led to the Church's realization that the future of Protestant Christianity in China depended on aligning its efforts with Chinese nationalist aspirations.Footnote ²¹ Not only missionaries but also Chinese Protestants, “sought to win converts to the Kingdom of God without risking the integrity of the nation”.Footnote ²² Moreover, anti-Christian sentiments were translated into action by impatient student activists. The Anti-Christian Student Federation was formed in Shanghai in March 1922 to oppose the conference of the World Student Christian Federation to be held in April at Tsinghua College (now Tsinghua University in Beijing), which marked the beginning of the anti-Christian movement during 1922 and 1927.Footnote ²³

The National Christian Conference held in May 1922 was thus a timely opportunity for the Church to discuss how to “face squarely the present situation both within and without the Church”.Footnote ²⁴ “The Chinese Church” was chosen by the conference as the central theme of its discussion,Footnote ²⁵ which reflected the Church's determination to accelerate its indigenization as a response to the accusation that it was linked to imperialist powers. The goal of the indigenization of the Protestant church in China was to make it self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating. The growth of the spirit of independence from foreign control in Protestant churches in China was barely evident in the nineteenth century but became a prominent theme after 1900.Footnote ²⁶ The National Christian Conference in 1922 was a milestone for the indigenization movement, because it was the first time that Chinese Protestants and Western missionaries had equal representation in a general conference of Protestant churches in China.Footnote ²⁷ It was an arena in which Chinese Protestant leaders expressed their visions and agendas for the indigenization movement. Moreover, two Sino-foreign organizations with a significant degree of Chinese leadership and responsibility emerged out of the conference: the National Christian Council of China (Zhonghua Quanguo Jidujiao Xiejinhui 中華全國基督教協進會, 1922), a national co-ordinating and liaison body covering most of the denominations and mission groups in China; and the Church of Christ in China (Zhonghua Jidujiaohui 中華基督教會, 1927), which eventually had a membership of about a quarter of the Protestant community in China.Footnote ²⁸

The South China Bible Society (Huanan Shengshu Hui 華南聖書會), the first attempt by Chinese Protestants to run a Bible society, was established in Canton (Guangzhou 廣州) in 1927, when the city was in turmoil and experiencing periodic outbursts of violent strife. The anti-foreign feeling provoked by the Northern Expedition led many missionary organizations to warn their workers in the interior part of China to withdraw to the coast where evacuation could be more easily accomplished. Fearing that the presence of missionaries would serve only to provoke further anti-Christian attacks after the Nanjing incident in March 1927, foreign consuls insisted that missionaries should withdraw even if they wanted to remain in their positions. By June 1927, well over half of the foreign missionaries in China had left.Footnote ²⁹

Under such circumstances, H.O.T. Burkwall, who was entrusted by both the ABS and the BFBS to oversee the work of their sub-agencies in Canton,Footnote ³⁰ gathered a group of senior Chinese clergymen and laymen from local churches to fill the vacuum, drawing up plans to develop a Chinese Bible society for South China. On 10 December 1927, the South China Bible Society was formally established in Canton. Directed by a Chinese executive committee and funded by membership subscriptions, its work included the supervision and direction of colportage, and promoting Chinese interest in Bible work. It is noteworthy that the Chinese founders of the South China Bible Society regarded it as a non-independent, Sino-foreign collaborative enterprise. The South China Bible Society maintained a close relationship with the ABS-BFBS joint sub-agency in Canton, which under Burkwall's leadership supplied Chinese Bibles and provided guidance on Bible distribution work to the South China Bible Society. Donations collected on the South China Bible Society's annual Bible Sunday were contributed to the ABS and the BFBS for their worldwide Bible work.Footnote ³¹

As G.W. Sheppard, the general secretary for China of the BFBS (1923–36), recalled, the proposal to form a China Bible Society “eminated [sic] from conditions and developments in South China”.Footnote ³² The establishment of the South China Bible Society encouraged discussions among the Big Three about the possibility of uniting their agencies in China into one organization and handing over control of Bible work in China to Chinese Protestants. These were key issues in forming a national Bible society in China.

3. Distrust and differences as obstacles to unity

Ever since the Big Three agencies entered China, they had worked all over the country together without a clear division of territory. This became problematic when the Protestant church in China was making the transition from a mission to an indigenous church. Unlike foreign missionaries, who usually supported a particular Bible society according to their nationalities, Chinese Protestants “do not care whether their books come from an American office or a British office”. If the status quo remained, the Big Three would be “forever stepping on each other's toes”.Footnote ³³ Nevertheless, no satisfactory line of division could be worked out along geographical or any other lines.Footnote ³⁴ It appeared that a united agency in China would be one way for the Big Three to accommodate the rise of native churches and to avoid the rivalry and competition that existed already.Footnote ³⁵ Indeed, among Chinese Protestants, there was strong deprecation of the nationalistic division in Bible work.Footnote ³⁶

While the South China Bible Society was an inspiring example to the Big Three of how a united agency could, with Chinese co-operation, succeed at a local level, achieving unity in Bible work on a national level was not an easy task, since the Big Three insisted on using their own very different practices of Bible distribution. In China, the BFBS maintained the employment of full-time colportage and 80 per cent of its circulation was through paid colporteurs. However, the ABS and the NBSS relied almost entirely on voluntary colportage, i.e. Bibles were supplied free to volunteers who kept the proceeds of sales in lieu of wages.Footnote ³⁷ The BFBS “felt that where they had a paid worker, it was not the right of other societies to enter with volunteer workers”.Footnote ³⁸

Certain Bible distribution practices introduced by the ABS and the BFBS were not accepted by the NBSS. For example, in 1930, the NBSS's board of directors declined the suggestion of G. Carleton Lacy, the agency secretary of the ABS's China agency (1921–37), that voluntary colporteurs be charged 20 per cent of the catalogue price for the portions they distributed. While the ABS and the BFBS, which agreed to follow Lacy's suggestion, argued that such a practice would help “prevent abuse and encourage the church to share the burden”, the NBSS believed that it “would probably prejudice” the NBSS's circulation of Chinese Bibles by its unpaid colporteurs.Footnote ³⁹ G.A. Frank Knight, the NBSS's general secretary, thought his society's decision was justified when he knew that an ABS voluntary colporteur turned to the NBSS for Chinese Bibles.Footnote ⁴⁰

The most problematic issue among the Big Three with regard to Bible work practices in China was the inclusion of annotations in the Chinese Bible. The NBSS had printed annotated portions of the Chinese Bible since the 1890s: the annotations provided “some explanations of words, terms and place-names which were completely unfamiliar to the non-Christian reader”.Footnote ⁴¹ However, the ABS and the BFBS argued that the NBSS was distributing Bibles with annotations precluded by the “without note or comment” principle upheld by Bible societies constitutionally. According to this principle, Bibles published or distributed by Bible societies should not include any note or comment, particularly of a doctrinal or sectarian character. It was believed that in so doing, Bible societies would solicit interdenominational support by avoiding disputes among their supporters who adopted different theological positions and interpretations of the Bible.Footnote ⁴²

Since the 1910s, the BFBS had also published annotated Chinese Gospels and Acts.Footnote ⁴³ The BFBS claimed that, unlike the NBSS, it did not infringe the “without note or comment” principle, because the BFBS's annotations were neither notes nor comments provoking disputes. They were simply “translational helps” which “may be needed to overcome certain classes of difficulties in a translation”.Footnote ⁴⁴ The BFBS emphasized that “nothing in the nature of interpretation to which anyone could object” ought to be included in its translational helps.Footnote ⁴⁵ The ABS insisted that its business was to “present the Scriptures, not an interpretation of them”.Footnote ⁴⁶ It did not publish any annotated Chinese Bibles under its own imprint. Nonetheless, to prepare for closer co-operation with the BFBS and the NBSS in China, in 1930 the ABS adopted the BFBS's rules concerning translational helps with certain amendments.Footnote ⁴⁷ In 1932, the ABS's translations committee approved the translational helps published in an edition of the Cantonese Gospels and Acts under a joint imprint of the ABS and the BFBS.Footnote ⁴⁸ In the early 1930s about 90 per cent of the Chinese Bibles circulated by the NBSS consisted of its annotated editions of the Gospels and the Acts.Footnote ⁴⁹ It was unlikely that the NBSS would give up its bestsellers in order to form a united agency in China with the ABS and the BFBS.

Moreover, it was difficult for the Big Three to unite their operations in China when distrust existed. The friction among them concerning Bible work in Manchuria illustrates well how this distrust grew. Although the NBSS was the first Bible society working in Manchuria, the BFBS, which also established its presence there, accused the NBSS of being an interloper. For example, in 1931, having known that the Canadian Presbyterian Mission requested the NBSS to be the Bible supplier to the T'ung-liao (Tongliao 通遼) region of its mission field, the BFBS's provincial secretary in Mukden (Shenyang 瀋陽) wrote to David McGavin, who was in charge of the NBSS's North China agency. McGavin was told that for the sake of comity the NBSS was expected to reject such a request.Footnote ⁵⁰ Knight described this as a “dog-in-the-manger policy” which he could not abide.Footnote ⁵¹ The BFBS treated the ABS similarly when they knew that churches in Manchuria would like to have connections with the ABS. In the late 1920s, Frank K. Jowe (Zhou Fugeng 周扶耕), the ABS's Chinese field secretary stationed in Peiping (Beiping 北平, now Beijing 北京), was invited by pastors and missionaries to visit. Sheppard protested against the visit, suggesting that the ABS should stay out “in the interest of comity”. Jowe did make the trip, but he met much opposition from some missionaries who dealt with the BFBS and who refused to allow him at their pulpits. After Jowe returned to Peiping following his disappointing trip, he found that steps were being taken to open a bookstore within half a mile of the ABS's sub-agency office: that bookstore would stock BFBS Chinese Bibles.Footnote ⁵²

4. The London Conference 1932 and the Advisory Council of the Bible Societies in China

Facing the new situation arising from the indigenization movement of Chinese Protestants, leading officers in the headquarters of the Big Three understood that they needed to discuss seriously and plan for their future in China (their biggest field overseas). An opportunity arose when A.H. Wilkinson and J.R. Temple, two former missionaries to China, were appointed as the BFBS's joint general secretaries in 1929 and 1931 respectively.Footnote ⁵³ Wilkinson was famous for his diplomatic strength, while Temple was known for his capacity for tact and patient negotiation. Under their influence, the BFBS expressed a greater willingness to improve inter-Bible society relationships and recognize that a new strategy was required for the relationship between the Big Three and indigenous Chinese churches.Footnote ⁵⁴

In July 1932, delegates of the Big Three met in London to discuss “how to reach fuller co-operation in view of the present position and problems in the world”.Footnote ⁵⁵ This conference resolved that the Big Three should work together to encourage the formation of a China Bible Society, “which, having the same basic principles as the co-operating Societies, shall share with them in the world-wide work of the distribution of the Scriptures”.Footnote ⁵⁶ This was agreed by their governing bodies, although the NBSS's board of directors emphasized that they did not contemplate the “immediate formation” of such an organization.Footnote ⁵⁷ Referring to themselves as “co-operating Societies”, the Big Three set a clear goal that the amalgamation of their agencies in China should result not only in their unity in China, but also in a China Bible Society with Chinese leadership.

As Lacy observed after his first few months at the ABS's China agency, the indigenization movement of Chinese Protestants gave rise to “a strong, insistent demand for a larger participation in Christian work by Chinese leadership”. Lacy recognized the significance of responding to such demand to the survival of the Big Three in China, writing to the ABS's headquarters in New York, “If we are not to be outlawed entirely as alien institutions, the Bible Societies must immediately enlist the co-operation of Chinese leadership in a much more adequate way”.Footnote ⁵⁸

The Big Three took different attitudes to the issue. Thanks to Lacy's vision, during 1925 and 1928 the ABS appointed several Chinese field secretaries, who were responsible for the “cultivation and direction of interest and participation in Scripture distribution by the Chinese Church”.Footnote ⁵⁹ While the Western sub-agency secretaries managed their sub-agencies' business affairs, they worked with the Chinese field secretaries in planning and promotion. As they retired, the Chinese field secretaries gradually assumed sole charge of the sub-agencies.Footnote ⁶⁰ The BFBS hesitated to do the same and “found it difficult to face what was involved in a comprehensive delegation of authority”.Footnote ⁶¹ By 1929 the BFBS had appointed only five Chinese superintendents of colporteurs,Footnote ⁶² who were by no means “successors-elect” to their Western provincial secretaries (formerly known as sub-agents). To the BFBS, employing Chinese at managerial level with foreign money might tend to postpone the realization of getting Chinese churches into Bible work.Footnote ⁶³ By the mid-1930s the NBSS had not appointed any Chinese field secretaries or supervisors of colporteurs.Footnote ⁶⁴

As a first step towards a China Bible Society with Chinese leadership, a joint advisory committee on the Big Three's work in China, which included Chinese Protestants, was deemed acceptable to all three Bible societies.Footnote ⁶⁵ The Advisory Council of the Bible Societies in China (Shengjing Xiehui Guwen Weiyuanhui 聖經協會顧問委員會) was established as a Sino-foreign Protestant establishment in Shanghai in June 1933. In addition to the Big Three's China secretaries, the Advisory Council consisted of eighteen members, of whom one-third were appointed by each of the Big Three on the recommendation of its own China secretary. Chinese Protestants accounted for more than half of the council members excluding the Big Three's China secretaries. The appointment of Cheng Jingyi 誠靜怡 as the Advisory Council's chairman is not surprising, given his iconic status in the Chinese Protestant church as General Secretary of the National Christian Council of China and Moderator of the Church of Christ in China. Other Chinese council members were priests and laymen representing various denominations and organizations, including E.S. Yu (Yu Ensi 俞恩嗣) of the Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui (Zhonghua Shenggonghui 中華聖公會, i.e. the Anglican Church in China), Z.T. Kaung (Jiang Changchuan 江長川) of the Methodist Episcopal Church in China, Ting Shu-ching (Ding Shujing 丁淑靜) of the Young Women's Christian Association of China, Z.K. Zia (Xie Songgao 謝頌羔) of the Christian Literature Society, Fong Foo Sec (Kuang Fuzhuo 鄺富灼) and S.U. Zau (Zhao Jinqing 趙晉卿).Footnote ⁶⁶

As its name indicates, the Advisory Council was not a decision-making body, since its functions “shall be to consider and advise as to any questions of policy, method, or procedure” relevant to Bible work in China.Footnote ⁶⁷ Final decision making remained the remit of the Big Three's headquarters. This might suggest that the Big Three lacked confidence in their Chinese partners in the Advisory Council, fearing that the Advisory Council might “act upon those instructions in a way that may become embarrassing to the Home Boards”.Footnote ⁶⁸

A vivid example illustrating this point is the response of the ABS and the NBSS to the Advisory Council's sub-committee on annotated Chinese Bibles. It was understood that the ABS and the BFBS's disapproval of the NBSS's annotated Chinese Bibles was one of the major obstacles to the formation of a united China agency of the Big Three. After the London Conference, the NBSS expressed its willingness to negotiate with the BFBS in order to secure agreement in the matter,Footnote ⁶⁹ which offered an opportunity for a breakthrough. In 1934 the Advisory Council appointed a sub-committee to draft a new set of explanatory readings for the Chinese Gospels and Acts which might satisfy all of the Big Three.Footnote ⁷⁰ Fearing that the Advisory Council “might be getting ahead of the Home Committees”, Walter Milward of the NBSS suggested that the headquarters of the Big Three should appoint their own sub-committees to follow up the matter. Eric North, the ABS's general secretary, shared Milward's view. North expressed his frank opinion on the Advisory Council's action in his letter to Lacy:

The Chinese members of the Advisory Council were discontent with some of their foreign colleagues. On 30 September 1936, E.S. Yu, in his capacity as the Advisory Council's chairman, wrote a letter to Temple of the BFBS on the Advisory Council's work of that year. Yu told Temple that the “dictatorial air” assumed by certain foreign members of the Advisory Council drove many other members away from attending meetings. Yu also expressed his disappointment that the Advisory Council had not been able to make greater progress because the China secretaries of the Big Three “put difficulties on our way and called us to halt whenever they fancy it will require a surrender of individual ways and preferences”.Footnote ⁷²

However, within the framework of the Advisory Council, the Big Three were able to achieve and important goal: a number of regional Bible societies were organized and run by Chinese Protestants in support of Bible work in their areas, based on the model of the South China Bible Society. The anti-Christian movement in the 1920s prompted Chinese Protestants to accelerate the process of indigenizing the Protestant church in China. Given the importance of the Bible in the Protestant church, self-support in Bible work was regarded as essential for the completion of the indigenization process. For example, after attending the celebration of the centennial of the ABS's work in China in Hankow, a Chinese Protestant wrote to Shengjing Gonghui Bao 聖經公會報 (Bible Society Magazine, a Chinese magazine published jointly by the Big Three about their work in China), “The Bible is the food of the Church. The Church has become indigenous, but it still relies on foreigners for food. What kind of self-support are we talking about?”Footnote ⁷³ Self-support was not only a matter of national esteem but also a way to prepare for uncertainty, because when “far-reaching international events take place”, the Big Three might be hindered from supporting Bible work in China.Footnote ⁷⁴

When the Advisory Council convened its first meeting in June 1933, Chinese Protestant organizations supporting Bible work existed already in Canton and Hong Kong, i.e. the South China Bible Society and its Hong Kong branch.Footnote ⁷⁵ A similar organization was formed in Wuhan 武漢 in December 1933.Footnote ⁷⁶ Although the East China Bible Society (Huadong Shengshu Hui 華東聖書會) was formally established in Shanghai in February 1934, its preparatory committee was organized in February 1933. It was reported that it recruited 613 members during 1933.Footnote ⁷⁷ In April 1934, the Advisory Council issued a circular letter to “Chinese Groups interested in Developing Bible Society Organizations” to encourage and welcome the formation of regional Bible societies, “with the hope that eventually they may all join to form the National Bible Society of China”.Footnote ⁷⁸ A further five regional Bible societies, with their own constitutions and membership, had been established by the end of 1935. These were based in Jinan 濟南, Peiping, Suzhou 蘇州, Taiyuan 太原 and Tianjin 天津.Footnote ⁷⁹

While the Chinese members of the Advisory Council were impressed by the development of regional Bible societies, they “felt the serious need of central correlation and a National Organization before these local groups get so strong that it will be impossible to bring them together”.Footnote ⁸⁰ According to the Advisory Council's plan, regional Bible societies should regard themselves as the constituent parts of the prospective national Bible society.Footnote ⁸¹ Not all Chinese leaders of regional Bible societies had such an idea as their ultimate goal. For instance, according to Sheppard's report to the Advisory Council at its meeting on 29 November 1935, when he and Temple visited the regional Bible society in Wuhan, its Chinese leaders were “taken [a]back” by the Advisory Council's circular letter presented to them, as they did not recognize the authority of the Advisory Council. They objected that their Bible Society was regarded as a branch society (fenhui 分會), as they perceived it as an independent organization serving Central China.Footnote ⁸² Thus, it is not surprising that in his letter to Lacy of 4 November 1935, North stressed the need for frequent personal contact with regional Bible societies, “educating them in the direction of sound understanding of the ‘basic principles' of Bible Society work”. Besides, “discrete and individualistic units” should be co-ordinated, so that they could be in harmony and share a “sound common policy”.Footnote ⁸³

5. Integrating the Big Three and regional Bible societies into a single Bible society for China

Against such a background the Advisory Council convened the Conference on Unification of Bible Society Work in China on 3 and 4 January 1936. Delegates from Canton, Hong Kong, Jinan, Tianjin, Peiping, Taiyuan, Suzhou and Shanghai were invited to report the latest activities of their regional societies. They also discussed how to proceed to establish a national Bible Society in China with members of the Advisory Council, the Big Three's China secretaries and Temple of the BFBS.

In his opening speech at the conference, E.S. Yu emphasized the need for China to have a united Bible society instead of independent regional Bible societies:

Yu also reassured the delegates representing regional Bible societies at the conference that:

Yu's speech seems to have succeeded in winning over the delegates from regional Bible societies, particularly those who were concerned to maintain local autonomy, because there would be room for negotiation. The conference recommended that regional Bible societies should be linked together in “one Bible Society in China” which shall include the Big Three's China agencies. To achieve this, the conference resolved that a further conference of members of the Advisory Council and delegates from regional Bible societies be held in autumn 1936 to determine the constitution of the prospective national Bible society and “to establish an Executive to direct the whole work in the country”.Footnote ⁸⁵

For practical reasons, Chinese Protestants did not seek the future national Bible society's complete independence from the Big Three immediately after its establishment. As the situation of regional Bible societies indicated, Chinese Protestants were not yet able to finance Bible work in China fully. For example, whereas the total contribution to the Big Three from Protestants in China for the year 1932 amounted to 5,143.31 Chinese yuan 元 (approximately 320 pounds sterling),Footnote ⁸⁶ the NBSS's annual budgets for its work in China in 1931, 1932 and 1933 amounted to 9,500, 9,000, and 9,000 pounds sterling respectively.Footnote ⁸⁷ In his survey of regional Bible societies submitted to the Advisory Council in 1935, Sheppard also claimed that:

A lack of experience and expertise in organizing Bible work was another reason why Chinese Protestants felt the need to co-operate with the Big Three. As Mrs Zhang Zixiang 張子翔, who represented the regional Bible society in Tianjin, remarked at the January Conference 1936, Chinese Protestants looked to the Big Three as to “elder brothers” (lao da ge 老大哥) for help in Bible work. When they “face difficulties”, the elder brothers “should encourage and comfort” them.Footnote ⁸⁹

Moreover, the recognition of Bible work as a global enterprise drove Chinese Protestants to think that their national Bible society should work with the Big Three. Zhang Zushen 張祖紳 of the Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui, for example, claimed that “even though our Chinese Bible society will be able to take full responsibility [for Bible work in China] someday, it will never declare independence from its parent societies. We shall always work together and be with them in a spiritual fellowship”.Footnote ⁹⁰ Here, a dual identity of the future national Bible society was perceived: it would be not only a Bible society for the Chinese but also a member of the global network of Bible societies.

This understanding of Bible work in China was of course welcomed by the Big Three, particularly the BFBS. As J.H. Ritson, its former general secretary, said at a meeting of its China sub-committee in 1932, “We ought to rise above the whole national outlook. We have never yet succeeded with a National Bible Society anywhere, we do not want to nationalise our work”.Footnote ⁹¹ The emphasis on the global character of Bible work served the purpose of justifying the Big Three's continuing presence in China as foreign institutions. Indeed, it was the BFBS's concern that Chinese Protestants wanted to have an indigenous Bible society not because of religious convictions but because of their national pride and anti-foreign sentiments. The following account of the founding of the South China Bible Society in the BFBS's annual report is illustrative of the BFBS's concern:

Nevertheless, it was clear to Chinese Protestant leaders that their national Bible society would eventually become an autonomous organization run by Chinese Protestants. Their spirit of independence was expressed through, for instance, the open objection of T.C. Bau (Bao Zheqing 鮑哲慶), a Baptist member of the Advisory Council, against the designation of the Big Three as “three Parent Societies” at the January Conference 1936.Footnote ⁹³ In fact, Y.Y. Tsu (Zhu Youyu 朱友漁), an Anglican member of the Advisory Council, had given a fair view on the issue. At the meeting of the Advisory Council on 29 November 1935, Temple, who attended the meeting as guest of honour, cited the example of the BFBS's work in India and Australia to justify that the BFBS should have a lasting presence in China in the future. Tsu did not think Temple's argument was convincing, pointing out that Temple's analogy to India and Australia “does not apply to China because of the close political relationship which Great Britain sustains to these other countries”. Yet, while Tsu stressed that “eventually China may be independent of other Bible Societies”, he admitted “that cannot be for several decades”.Footnote ⁹⁴

6. The birth of the China Bible House

After the January Conference 1936, the ABS and the BFBS proceeded to form a joint executive committee to administer their work in China for the year 1937 and prepare for the integration of their agencies in China into the prospective China Bible Society.Footnote ⁹⁵ The NBSS at that moment decided not to join the union, mainly because it was unable to settle the issue of circulating annotated Bibles with the ABS and the BFBS.Footnote ⁹⁶

Eventually, the “further conference” proposed at the January Conference 1936 was convened in April 1937 as the first national representative convention of the Chung Hua Sheng Ching Hui (Zhonghua Shengjing Hui 中華聖經會, which literally means “China Bible Society” or “Chinese Bible Society”). This convention adopted a tentative constitution of the Chung Hua Sheng Ching Hui, which was then promulgated for a trial period of three years and was to be confirmed by its next national representative convention. The tentative constitution was to come into effect on the endorsement of at least two of the Big Three.Footnote ⁹⁷ The convention also adopted the by-laws (guizhang xize 規章細則) of the Chung Hua Sheng Ching Hui.Footnote ⁹⁸ As “the official Constitution of the Chung Hua Sheng Ching Hui is recorded only in the Chinese language”,Footnote ⁹⁹ the organization had no official English title. In practice, the Chung Hua Sheng Ching Hui was known in English as the China Bible House.Footnote ¹⁰⁰

According to its tentative constitution and by-laws, the China Bible House was a national, hierarchical organization overseeing Bible work in China.Footnote ¹⁰¹ Regional Bible societies were named “Branch Societies”, which implied their subordination to the headquarters in Shanghai. Their establishment and annual budgets had to be approved by the Board of Managers appointed by the National Representative Convention.Footnote ¹⁰² Moreover, each Branch Society was to give at least 10 per cent of its regular income to the headquarters for the China Bible House's general work.Footnote ¹⁰³ Nonetheless, the power of the Board of Managers in fact came from the Branch Societies themselves, because subject to its membership size, each Branch Society was entitled to send one to four representatives to the National Representative Convention. Such an arrangement fulfilled the vision of North that regional Bible societies should be “represented in the council of the whole”.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ A certain autonomy was ensured, as officers and executive committees of Branch Societies were elected by their own annual meetings instead of either the Board of Managers or the National Representative Convention.

As “co-operating Bible societies”, the ABS and the BFBS were involved in the governance of the China Bible House, even though they were in the minority, as the Board of Managers consisted of one member nominated by each of the co-operating Bible societies and nine members elected by the National Representative Convention, together with the China secretaries of the co-operating Bible societies and the general secretary of the China Bible House as advisory members. Each co-operating Bible society was also entitled to appoint two representatives to attend the National Representative Convention. After the establishment of the China Bible House, the ABS and the BFBS continued to persuade the NBSS to integrate its work in China into the China Bible House. In 1942, the NBSS agreed to unite with the China Bible House to carry out Bible work in Free China temporarily.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ The NBSS officially became the third co-operating Bible society of the China Bible House in 1946.Footnote ¹⁰⁶

It appears that, according to the tentative constitution and by-laws adopted in 1937, the China Bible House was a Chinese national Bible society assisted by co-operating foreign Bible societies. In reality, until 1951 the China Bible House was a Sino-foreign Protestant establishment through which foreign Bible societies maintained their presence in China, working with China and for China. The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War and then the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party prevented the China Bible House from being a truly self-supporting and self-governing Chinese Protestant organization. The China Bible House relied heavily on funding from its co-operating foreign Bible societies.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ Its executive leaders were foreigners representing the co-operating Bible societies, except during the period 1942–45, when the work of the China Bible House in Occupied China was directed first by E.S. Yu and later Chester S. Miao (Miao Qiusheng 繆秋笙). In 1942, Yu was appointed honorary general secretary of the China Bible House, since the Japanese authorities in Occupied China insisted that foreigners should not be appointed executive leaders of China Bible House. After Yu's death in 1944, Miao served as the acting executive secretary on a voluntary basis until the end of 1945. Nevertheless, during the same period, Bible work in Free China was under the supervision of the Big Three's foreign staff members in Chongqing 重慶 and Chengdu 成都.Footnote ¹⁰⁸

Moreover, the aforesaid constitution and by-laws were not implemented as planned. Although the ABS endorsed the tentative constitution and by-laws in November 1937, the BFBS's China sub-committee concluded in 1938 that it was best not to proceed with the adoption of the constitution at the moment.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ The BFBS eventually endorsed the tentative constitution in April 1939.Footnote ¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, as North told Lacy in January 1939, the wartime situation meant that “it would be very difficult to get your personnel all together. It would be very difficult to stimulate the interest of local communities all across the country”.Footnote ¹¹¹ In 1948, plans were being made for the China Bible House's second national representative convention, which was to be held in Shanghai in May 1950, so that the tentative constitution adopted in 1937 could be confirmed with necessary amendments.Footnote ¹¹² However, it is uncertain whether that convention really took place.

Changes only happened after the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Baen Lee (Li Peien 李培恩) was appointed the first full-time Chinese general secretary in December 1950, which ended a five-year search for a qualified Chinese to fill the position.Footnote ¹¹³ Besides, the outbreak of the Korean War drove the Communist Government to accelerate the implementation of its policy aimed at purging foreign influences from within Christianity itself.Footnote ¹¹⁴ The China Bible House was taken over by a Chinese Board of Directors (Lishihui 理事會) in early 1951. All foreign members of staff had been withdrawn by the spring of that year.Footnote ¹¹⁵ Subsequently the China Bible House severed its relationship with the Big Three and no longer received foreign financial assistance.Footnote ¹¹⁶