The ḥadīth of the Mahdī
Perhaps the single most important contribution to the shaping of the Islamic (and in particular Shii) ideas of endtimes has been made by the following tradition, which was later taken to be a précis of the career of the Sufyānī and the Mahdī.Footnote 1 This widely attested tradition has been best preserved in Abū Dāwūd al-Sijistānī’s Kitāb al-Sunan:Footnote 2
Muḥammad ibn al-Muthannā < Muʿādh ibn Hishām < his father < Qatāda < Ṣāliḥ Abu'l-Khalīl < ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-ḤārithFootnote 3 < Umm Salama, the prophet's wife < the prophet
there will be a discord after the death of a caliph, then a man from the people of Medina will flee to Mecca, and a group of the inhabitants of Mecca will go to him and bring him out [of his place of residence] against his will and pledge allegiance to him between the Rukn and the Maqām (fa-yaʾtīhu nāsun min ahl Makka fa-yukhrijūnahu wa-huwa kārihun fa-yubāyiʿūnahu bayna ’l-rukn wa'l-maqām).Footnote 4 Then an expedition will be sent against him from (the people of)Footnote 5 Shām, but they will be swallowed up in the Baydāʾ between Mecca and Medina (wa-yubʿathu ilayhi baʿthun min (ahl) al-Shām fa-yukhsafu bihim bi'l-Baydāʾ bayna Makka wa'l-Madīna). When people see this, the righteous ones of al-Shām and the groups of Iraq will go to him (atāhu abdāl al-Shām wa-ʿaṣāʾib ahl al-ʿIrāq) and offer him their allegiance.Footnote 6 Afterwards, a Qurashī man will arise whose maternal uncles are from the tribe of Kalb. He will despatch an expedition against them, but they will triumph over them. That will be the expedition of the Kalb, and disappointment will be for those who do not share in the booty of the Kalb (wa'l-khayba li-man lam yashhad ghanīmat Kalb). He will distribute [equitably] the revenues (al-māl) and will act among the people according to the sunna of their prophet and Islam will be firmly established on earth (wa-yulqī al-Islām bi-jirānihi fi'l-arḍ Footnote 7 ). He will linger (fa-yalbathu) for seven years and then die and the Muslims will pray over him. Abū Dāwūd said, “some say, on the authority of Hishām, nine years, and some say seven years”.Footnote 8
This tradition was first brought to scholarly attention by Duncan B. MacDonald, who opined that it is “an echo of the early ʿAlid conflicts”.Footnote 9 But it was D.S. Attema who first noticed that the career of its protagonist bears striking affinities to that of ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr,Footnote 10 the Medinan Qurashī aristocrat and son of the famous companion al-Zubayr ibn al-ʿAwwām who refused to pledge allegiance to Yazīd I as caliph after the death of Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān in 60 ah and fled to Mecca to seek refuge in the Meccan sanctuary. There, in due course, he proclaimed himself caliph and fought a long and bloody civil war against various rival factions, of whom the most formidable were the Umayyads, first under Yazīd, then under Marwān I, and after him under his son and successor ʿAbd al-Malik. According to Attema, the tradition was first put into circulation some time between the death of Yazīd in 64 ah and al-Ḥajjāj's ultimate victory over Ibn al-Zubayr in 73 ah.Footnote 11
After Attema, Wilferd Madelung elucidated the intricacies of this tradition still further:Footnote 12 the tradition was “war propaganda”, Madelung avers, “in support of ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr”. He goes a step further than Attema and states that the first expedition “swallowed up” by the earth was none other than the historical expedition of Muslim ibn ʿUqba al-Murrī and al-Ḥuṣayn ibn Numayr al-Sakūnī, which the caliph Yazīd had sent to subdue Medina and Mecca. This expedition succeeded in bringing Medina back to the fold of Yazīd's caliphate after allegedly committing many atrocities in the battle of al-Ḥarra (63 ah) and went on to besiege Mecca, but, upon receiving the news of Yazīd's death, abandoned the siege and returned to Syria. The second expedition in this tradition is a genuine prophecy, Madelung states, which “must have been made public by [the governor of Basra] ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Ḥārith… on the very occasion of his accepting the Baṣrans’ oath of allegiance on behalf of Ibn al-Zubayr” in 64 ah. It was, in his view, “meant to stir up support for Ibn al-Zubayr and to prepare his followers for a campaign of the Kalb in support of the caliphate of one of the sons of Yazīd” (Yazīd's mother, Maysūn bint Baḥdal ibn Unayf al-Kalbiyya, was from the tribe of Kalb, traditional allies of the Sufyānid caliphs). Hence, according to Madelung, the first part of the ḥadīth is historical, but it becomes prophecy where it begins to talk of the arrival of abdāl al-Shām and ʿaṣāʾib ahl al-ʿIrāq, as “Ibn al-Zubayr was no longer a mere seeker of asylum in the sanctuary but an open contender for the caliphate receiving homage from all parts of the Muslim world”.Footnote 13
Madelung thus appears to be basing his dissection of this ḥadīth on the well-established scholarly methods for treating apocalyptic material honed by Paul J. Alexander and others during the course of the twentieth century. By the specifications of these methods, “the latest historical element referred to in an apocalypse … precedes immediately a passage in which the author shifts from history to eschatology”.Footnote 14 However, the glaring fact remains that our ḥadīth is decidedly lacking in the eschatological dimension. It does not even allude to the eschaton, references no apocalyptic battles, and the era of equity and justice of which it speaks does not come across as the messianic era of bliss. In sum, there is nothing whatsoever in it to justify its classification under the rubric of “apocalypse”;Footnote 15 on the contrary, its matter-of-fact tone indicates that Madelung is right in identifying it as a piece of Zubayrid propaganda. It would thus seem legitimate to ask why a propagandist should have put a genuine prognostication in a piece of ex eventu prophecy whose sole aim was to furnish the prophesied event with an aura of prophetic legitimacy. What aim would such a prognostication serve? It is also unclear how the propagandist/apocalyptist who composed this piece intended to “stir up support” for its protagonist without appealing, in what Madelung claims to be the genuinely oracular part of the tradition, to what we may call the “latent apocalypticism of the human psyche”.Footnote 16
Even more startling is the titbit of trivia about the despatcher of the second expedition: he is a Qurashī with Kalbī lineage on his mother's side who dwells in Syria and whose army consists of Kalbīs – descriptions that all fit Yazīd very well. These details, taking Madelung's thesis to its logical conclusion, would show the Zubayrid propagandist to be preoccupied with a still-tangible threat from the Sufyānids. But why should supporters of Ibn al-Zubayr have thought of Yazīd's descendants as the real threat to the Zubayrid claim at a time (64 ah) when the Sufyānid cause seemed all but lost and the Umayyad family had unanimously recognized Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam – the eponymous progenitor of the Marwānid branch of the Umayyads – as caliph? One would have thought, therefore, that if either of these two expeditions is to be identified as historical, it has to be the second rather than the first. Furthermore, as noted by Michael Cook, the tradition's more likely nine-year time of lingering happens to be equal to “the duration of the historical caliphate of Ibn al-Zubayr … a fact hardly to be anticipated in 64/684”, thus making “the distinction between memory and fantasy… blurred”.Footnote 17 In the light of these problems, Cook has questioned the textual integrity of the tradition as we have it, but one may wonder whether the events alluded to in this ḥadīth have been correctly identified to begin with. Could it not be that the second expedition mentioned in the tradition was actually the expedition of Muslim ibn ʿUqba and the first one an earlier, lesser known engagement? By the time Yazīd sent Muslim at the head of an army to quell Ibn al-Zubayr's subversive activities he had been in Mecca, calling himself “a seeker of refuge in the sanctuary” (ʿāʾidhun bi'l-bayt), for some three years and had made no secret of his irreconcilable disagreement with Yazīd in particular and hereditary succession to the caliphate in general.Footnote 18 During these three years Yazīd did resort to whatever option he had to force Ibn al-Zubayr's hand.
It is my contention that the incidents recounted in this tradition are all historical, and in the remainder of this article I shall take a closer look at ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr's career after Muʿāwiya's death to match up these allusions with historical events. To recapitulate, the tradition mentions two expeditions: the first is despatched from Syria (or, alternatively, consists of Syrians) which is “annihilated” (lit. “swallowed up, afflicted by khasf”) at the Baydāʾ between Mecca and Medina; the second expedition consists of Kalbī tribesmen and is despatched by a Qurashī with Kalbī lineage on his mother's side which is defeated by the tradition's hero and his partisans. These are the main clues provided by our ḥadīth which should be followed up in the course of its examination.
ʿAmr ibn al-Zubayr and the army of khasf
The chronology of events in the Ḥijāz following the death of Muʿāwiya is to some extent confused, but we may attempt a reconstruction based on what information the sources supply and with the help of some informed speculation. The sources agree that when Muʿāwiya died in Rajab of 60, al-Nuʿmān ibn Bashīr al-Anṣārī was governor in Kūfa, ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ziyād in Basra, ʿAmr ibn Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ “al-Ashdaq” in Mecca, and al-Walīd ibn ʿUtba ibn Abī Sufyān in Medina.Footnote 19 Yazīd dismissed al-Walīd shortly afterwards, presumably because of his failure to exact the oath of allegiance from al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī and Ibn al-Zubayr as he had required. He then appointed ʿAmr al-Ashdaq in his stead, while also retaining him in his position as governor of Mecca. ʿAmr arrived in Medina in Ramaḍān of 60 and remained in this position until the beginning of Dhu'l-Ḥijja, 61 ah.Footnote 20 In Iraq, when al-Ḥusayn's envoy to Kūfa, his cousin Muslim ibn ʿAqīl, effectively wrested the control of the town from al-Nuʿmān, Yazīd responded by dismissing the latter and appointing ʿUbayd Allāh over Kūfa while retaining him as governor of Basra.Footnote 21 This must have happened towards the end of 60, with al-Nuʿmān apparently departing for Syria immediately afterwards. Having dealt with al-Ḥusayn's abortive rebellion early in 61, Yazīd seems to have wasted no time in attending to the threat to his authority posed by Ibn al-Zubayr. He first reacted to the news of the latter's not-so-discreet activities by sending a delegation of ten notables – among them al-Nuʿmān ibn Bashīr and ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿIḍāh al-Ashʿarī – to Mecca to attempt a conciliation with Ibn al-Zubayr, first by offering material incentives and warning him against the dangers of internal division, and then, if this did not work, by reminding him of al-Ḥusayn's bloody end.Footnote 22 Not unexpectedly, Yazīd's envoys failed to convince Ibn al-Zubayr, who even refused to talk to them after an initial angry exchange with Ibn ʿIḍāh. Given that al-Nuʿmān is a member of the delegation in virtually all accounts that name some of its members, this event, too, must have taken place in 61 ah – that is, after al-Nuʿmān's departure from Kūfa at the end of 60.Footnote 23
Meanwhile in Medina, the new governor, ʿAmr ibn Saʿīd al-Ashdaq, had to find a replacement for his chief of shurṭa – the previous chief, Muṣʿab ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAwf, having resigned his post upon the former's arrival to join Ibn al-Zubayr in Mecca.Footnote 24 In his lieu al-Ashdaq appointed a half-brother of ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr, ʿAmr by name,Footnote 25 notorious for his violent and brusque manner and his antipathy to his brother.Footnote 26 His animosity towards ʿAbd Allāh was so strong that as ṣāḥib al-shurṭa he would arrest people on the slightest suspicion of harbouring Zubayrid sympathies and subject them to lashing – among them one of his own brothers, al-Mundhir, the latter's son Muḥammad, and ʿAbd Allāh's son Khubayb – leaving them with no alternative but to flee to Mecca.Footnote 27
When Yazīd's delegates returned to Shām and reported the situation in Mecca to him, he entrusted ʿAmr ibn Saʿīd with the task of arresting Ibn al-Zubayr and sending him to the caliphal court in Shām, in chains if need be.Footnote 28 The duty to arrest Ibn al-Zubayr fell to ʿAmr ibn al-Zubayr. Some sources inform us that he even volunteered for the task, citing the longstanding vendetta against his brother and reassuring ʿAmr ibn Saʿīd that “you would never find anyone who is more averse to him than me to send against him” (wa-lā tuwajjihu ilayhi rajulan abadan ankaʾa lahu minnī).Footnote 29 Having found a volunteer to command the expedition, ʿAmr al-Ashdaq was now looking for troops. But pro-Zubayrid sympathies ran high among the population of Medina and no one would have willingly served in this army. After his dismissal, al-Ashdaq would describe to the caliph the situation in the Ḥijāz and the strict measures to which he had to resort in revealing terms:
O, commander of the believers! The present sees things that the absent cannot see. The majority of the people of Mecca and Medina were inclined towards him [viz. Ibn al-Zubayr] and had given him their unanimous approval [for the caliphate] (wa-aʿṭawhu ’l-riḍā),Footnote 30 with some calling for others [to pledge allegiance to him] secretly and others openly. And I did not have troops at my disposal to overpower him if I were to fight him, while he avoided me and was watchful of me. So I tried to be lenient towards him and tolerate him in the hope of luring and overcoming him (wa-kuntu arfaqu bihi wa-udārīhi li-astamkira minhu fa-athiba ʿalayhi) – having already severely restricted him and deprived him of many things that would have otherwise ended up in his hands (wa-manaʿtuhu min ashyāʾa kathīratin law taraktuhu wa-iyyāhā mā kānat lahu illā maʿūnatan) – posting around Mecca and on the routes leading to it guards who would not allow anyone in without first reporting to me his name and that of his father, his city of residence, and the reason for his trip and what he was after. If he was one of his partisans or those who were inclined towards him I would send him back unachieved (radadtuhu ṣāghiran), but if cleared I would allow him in the town.Footnote 31
This being the situation, the governor and his chief-of-police had particular problems convincing the regulars from the army stipends (ahl al-dīwān) to join the expedition. Reports indicate that the majority of the ahl al-dīwān refused to join and hired men to go in their place (or they were forced by ʿAmr to send hired men instead).Footnote 32 Al-Ṭabarī further informs us that no more than a few dozen (ʿasharāt) of the ahl al-dīwān were present in this army.Footnote 33 Al-Ashdaq was thus left with no choice but to raise troops from among the considerable number of Umayyad mawālī present in Medina.Footnote 34 That the backbone of ʿAmr's one-thousand-strong army was comprised of Umayyad mawālī is indicated by a report produced by al-Balādhurī concerning the composition of ʿAmr's army. According to this report, ʿAmr left Medina “with four hundred soldiers, a group of Umayyad mawālī, and others not enrolled in the dīwān” (wa-kharaja fī arbaʿ miʾa min al-jund wa-qawmin min mawālī banī Umayya wa-qawmin min ghayr ahl al-dīwān).Footnote 35 Furthermore, al-Ṭabarī’s statement that “a large group” of mawālī ahl al-Madīna accompanied this army must probably be read as a reference to the mawālī of those Umayyads who were resident in Medina.Footnote 36 Piecing together all the accounts, we may conclude that ʿAmr had 400 men – apparently mostly from the dīwān or hired men – under his direct command, with some 700 more – apparently mostly Umayyad mawālī – in another contingent under the command of Unays ibn ʿAmr al-Aslamī.Footnote 37 This latter contingent of Umayyad mawālī was “completely routed” (huzima aqbaḥa hazīmatin)Footnote 38 in an ambush by ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ṣafwān ibn Umayya al-Jumaḥī and a ragtag band of Zubayrid sympathizers.Footnote 39
Still other reports assert that this army was a Syrian army (jaysh min ahl al-Shām).Footnote 40 This is quite significant inasmuch as the tradition's statement that its first army would be Syrian (min al-Shām) was the most important consideration in Madelung's identification of it with the expedition of al-Ḥuṣayn ibn Numayr.Footnote 41 Yet ʿAmr ibn al-Zubayr's army could hardly have been raised in Syria, for elsewhere we hear Yazīd reprimand ʿAmr al-Ashdaq for failing to ask for reinforcements to be sent from there.Footnote 42 This divergent report, nonetheless, is of some import for our analysis as it does not seem to be simply erroneous. Rather, it indicates that people thought of Umayyad mawālī as “Syrians”. In this connection it is also important to remember that, as Gerald Hawting observes, “the Umayyad armies are constantly referred to as ahl al-Shām while their opponents are usually called … ahl al-Ḥijāz” in the context of the Second Civil War, an observation seconded by John Haldon and Hugh Kennedy.Footnote 43 This brings us back to the minority variant min ahl al-Shām recorded for our tradition in some manuscripts of Abū Dāwūd's Sunan as well as in Ibn Abī Shayba's Muṣannaf Footnote 44 – a variant of which Madelung does not show awareness. In the light of these reports on the composition of ʿAmr's army, we can now safely give preference to this minority variant. To paraphrase, this army of Umayyad mawālī was probably referred to as “Syrian” by some,Footnote 45 as the testimony of several medieval historians suggests, and that is almost certainly why the ḥadīth describes it as “an expedition min ahl al-Shām”.
We must now turn to the last piece of information supplied by the ḥadīth concerning the first expedition – to wit, its location. According to most sources, upon his arrival in Mecca Unays stationed himself in Dhū Ṭawī while ʿAmr entered Mecca with some of his men to negotiate his brother's surrender. ʿAbd Allāh, who had no intention of giving himself up to be ignominiously hauled off to Damascus, tried to play for time and at the same time connived with ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ṣafwān to rid himself of his brother. ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ṣafwān then gathered Ibn al-Zubayr's supporters (and, of course, ʿAmr's enemies) and fell upon Unays and his men at Dhū Ṭawī.Footnote 46
This Dhū Tawī, according to Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, “is a well dug by ʿAbd Shams ibn ʿAbd Manāf, situated on the highest point of Mecca, near the Bayḍāʾ [adjacent to] the dwelling of Muḥammad ibn Sayf” (biʾrun ḥafarahā ʿAbd Shams ibn ʿAbd Manāf wa-hiya ’llatī bi-aʿlā Makka ʿinda ’l-Bayḍāʾ [sic] dār Muḥammad ibn Sayf).Footnote 47 Under “al-Bayḍāʾ”, he informs us that it is the same place as the pass (thaniyya) of Tanʿīm in Mecca,Footnote 48 and sub verbo “al-Thaniyya al-Bayḍāʾ” we read that “it is a pass near Mecca that leads down to Fakhkh when coming to Mecca from the direction of Medina; [it is] the lowest point of Mecca, overlooked by Dhū Ṭawī” (ʿaqabatun qurb Makka tahbaṭuka ilā Fakhkhin wa-anta muqbilun min al-Madīna turīdu Makka; asfal Makka min qibal Dhī Ṭawī).Footnote 49
Yāqūt thus implies that this Bayḍāʾ was not part of the town itself. This is corroborated by what we can glean from a ḥadīth on the authority of Nāfiʿ, the mawlā of ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar. According to Nāfiʿ, on trips to Mecca, Ibn ʿUmar “would always spend the night in Dhū Ṭawī, then ritually wash himself in the morning, and enter Mecca in the midday” (lā yaqdamu Makka illā bāta bi-Dhī Ṭawī ḥattā yuṣbiḥu wa-yaghtasila thumma yadkhulu Makka nahāran), purportedly following the example of the prophet.Footnote 50 Dhū Ṭawī thus seems to be the last stop outside the sacred precincts of the Meccan sanctuary. In the light of this tradition, ʿAmr's rationale for leaving Unays in Dhū Ṭawī and entering Mecca with only a handful of his men becomes evident: he wanted to avoid marching on the holy city and desecrating it as far as possible, and was therefore simply trying to threaten his brother by show of force. This is in harmony with the ḥadīth’s report that the place of the first engagement is “between Mecca and Medina”. Nonetheless, it records the name of this place as Baydāʾ and not Bayḍāʾ, but it is not hard to imagine how a tradent could have mistaken the two orthographically and metrically similar terms, especially given that there actually was a place called Baydāʾ located on the route connecting Medina to Mecca.Footnote 51 It must also be borne in mind that, semantically speaking, baydāʾ and bayḍāʾ could both signify the same thing, namely, “a barren piece of land”,Footnote 52 and this might have further helped with the confusion. It may, however, be objected that, if really so, at least one of the variants of this tradition must have recorded it as al-Bayḍāʾ, but it must be pointed out that the tradition has come down to us through a partially single chain of tradents. In such a case, an error committed by one of the single-chain tradents is the only thing that gets passed down the line of transmitters.Footnote 53 Finally, we must also take notice of Ibn Aʿtham's words which, revealingly, characterize the location of the incident as “between Mecca and Medina”, thereby putting to rest the (due) reservations expressed by Michael Cook.Footnote 54
Needless to say, the expedition of “Abū Yaksūm”Footnote 55 ended in disaster. Unays was killed along with, in Ibn Aʿtham's words, “a great number of his men” (fa-qutila min al-qawm maqtalatan ʿaẓīmatan),Footnote 56 and ʿAmr himself, deserted by those accompanying him, was taken captive. He was first sheltered by his other brother ʿUbayda, but ʿAbd Allāh handed him over to those who had suffered at his hands in Medina to exact their revenge on him. Al-Mundhir and his son forwent their right to revenge, so we are told, but others did not show much magnanimity towards him. He was beaten up and then thrown into a prison that came to bear the epithet of one of his own troops, a recalcitrant ghulām of the aforementioned Muṣʿab ibn ʿAbd al-RaḥmānFootnote 57 known as ʿĀrim – so called because of his wickedness in defecting to the side of his master's enemies – who was killed there in an ingenious manner.Footnote 58 Untreated, ʿAmr perished in prison as a result of his wounds, and his corpse was gibbeted on ʿAbd Allāh's orders.Footnote 59
Al-Ḥuṣayn ibn Numayr and the expedition of the Kalb
The second attempt by the Umayyads to quash Ibn al-Zubayr is very well known, but a few words about it are in order before closing our historical analysis. First, it is important to note that the mild tone of our ḥadīth when narrating this episode (fa-yaẓharūna ʿalayhim, “they will defeat them”) is a far cry from the triumphalist language it uses of the first expedition (fa-yukhsafu bihim; figuratively, “they will be wiped out”), in what seems to be an unmistakable allusion to the miserable fate of Unays’ detachment. This is consistent with what is reported for the expedition of al-Ḥuṣayn ibn Numayr: the Syrians had reduced Ibn al-Zubayr and his supporters to the Holy Sanctuary and its immediate environs by the time the news of Yazīd's sudden demise arrived, but with the death of their favoured contender there was no longer any point in fighting over the caliphate and they had to abandon the siege.Footnote 60 They were thus defeated in the strategic sense of the word, but far from wiped out.Footnote 61
Second, the ḥadīth boasts of the “booty of Kalb”. After hearing of Yazīd's death, al-Ḥuṣayn ordered a retreat towards Medina, but order in his army soon began to disintegrate and the stragglers were attacked and killed by bands of vengeful Ḥijāzīs.Footnote 62 Pseudo-Ibn Qutayba produces a report according to which the people of Medina took prisoner more than 400 men from this army. They were held captive in Medina until Muṣʿab ibn al-Zubayr arrived with orders from his brother ʿAbd Allāh to execute them all in al-Ḥarra, in an apparent retaliation for their sack of Medina in the aftermath of the battle of al-Ḥarra the previous year.Footnote 63 With morale at a low ebb, the breakdown of order in the retreating army was so complete that, as one eyewitness put it, “a baby girl could take away a horseman's belongings” (wa'llāhi in kānat al-walīda la-takhruju fa-taʾkhudhu al-fāris mā yamtaniʿu).Footnote 64 The Syrian army thus seems to have been not only raided, but also looted upon this retreat of 1812.
Third, the tradition speaks of a Qurashī man with a Kalbī mother and an army comprised of the Kalb. That Yazīd's mother was the daughter of a powerful family of Kalbī kingmakers is a well-established fact,Footnote 65 neither is there any question as to the prominent role the Kalb played in Syrian politics and in the Syrian army at this time.Footnote 66
To sum up, our ḥadīth retails the saga of a Medinan who goes to Mecca after the death of a caliph and receives the allegiance of (some) Meccans, then has to face two expeditions sent against him – the first consisting of Syrians to be “swallowed up” in the Baydāʾ between Medina and Mecca, the second consisting of Kalbīs and sent by a Qurashī who is a Kalbī on his mother's side. The ḥadīth’s protagonist will receive support from Syrians and Iraqis alike, “linger” for nine years,Footnote 67 and die. On the other hand, as we know from narrative sources, Ibn al-Zubayr fled Medina for Mecca upon the death of Muʿāwiya and, received the allegiance of many Meccans, “some secretly and others openly”, around the same time.Footnote 68 Then his partisans “soundly routed” the army of Umayyad mawālī, called “Syrian” by some and led by his own brother, in Dhū Ṭawī, just outside Mecca, and later withstood the predominantly Kalbī army of al-Ḥuṣayn ibn Numayr sent by Yazīd – who was a Qurashī on his father's side and a Kalbī on his mother's. He was subsequently recognized as caliph in all Iraqi and most Syrian garrison towns.Footnote 69 ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr was eventually killed after nine years of openly contending for the caliphate in 73 ah. Therefore, it now seems safe to assume that the episodes recounted by our tradition are, pace Madelung, entirely historical.
Appendix I: The Zubayrid propagandist
Confident that the tradition stems from the Basran milieu of 64 ah, Madelung identified the ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Ḥārith in its isnād – who must have been its original disseminator – with ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Ḥārith ibn Nawfal ibn al-Ḥārith ibn ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib, the man who was elected as Basra's interim governor when ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ziyād had to flee the town after Yazīd's death.Footnote 70 In that capacity he recognized Ibn al-Zubayr as caliph and received the pledge of allegiance from the Basrans on his behalf in 64 ah. But now it seems indisputable that the tradition in its present form postdates Ibn al-Zubayr's demise, and this poses a problem for Madelung's identification: not only is this ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Ḥārith not known for having been an ardent supporter of Ibn al-Zubayr, having recognized him merely because he was the only contender left on the scene at the time, he was thrown into prison by his successor – Ibn al-Zubayr's appointee – and extorted of the money he had allegedly embezzled while governor.Footnote 71 This could hardly have made him daydream about his ephemeral and lukewarm association with the Zubayrid cause in later years and, therefore, we do not seem to stand on firm ground with regard to the identity of the propagandist responsible for the initial circulation of this tradition.Footnote 72
Be that as it may, a case could be made for another of Ibn al-Zubayr's governors of Basra, but this would require his given name and patronymic to have been transposed in the process of transmission. Al-Ḥārith ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Abī Rabīʿa al-Makhzūmī was among the very first to offer his allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr in the year 64Footnote 73 and remained one of his closest confidants throughout the duration of his reign. He was perhaps the only one in Ibn al-Zubayr's inner circle (setting aside his extended family) to survive the final Umayyad attack on Mecca in 73 ah.Footnote 74 In some reports, he is even said to have defended Ibn al-Zubayr against the charge of mendacity before ʿAbd al-Malik shortly after the latter's rebuilding of the KaʿbaFootnote 75 in 75 ah.Footnote 76 Above all, his name appears in compendia of apocalyptic aḥādīth, along with a number of prominent associates of Ibn al-Zubayr, in connection with traditions recounting the “swallowing up” of an army marching on the Meccan sanctuary.Footnote 77 In short, al-Ḥārith appears to have remained deeply committed to the memory of ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr and his own role in what later became known as the “second fitna” to the very end. By his last act of tribute to this memory he unintentionally cast the future Mahdī, the awaited redeemer of Islam, in the mould of the “pious” caliph Ibn al-Zubayr.Footnote 78
Appendix II: The refugee at the sanctuary: a war of propaganda
In his analysis of this tradition, Madelung brought to light traditions of a similar texture which shared some basic elements with it. These traditions, which speak of the march of an army on the sanctuary in pursuit of a man of the Quraysh, an ʿāʾidh, who has sought refuge there, “were first put into circulation by ʿAbd Allah b. al-Zubayr and some of his most prominent backers at the time of the Syrian campaign against Medina and Mecca under Yazīd” and, Madelung argues, were incorporated by “ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Ḥārith … in his own ḥadīth”.Footnote 79 If we replace the words “the Syrian campaign against Medina and Mecca” with “the expedition of ʿAmr ibn al-Zubayr”, there will be nothing in Madelung's conclusion with which we may not agree. There is, nevertheless, one element common to most versions of these “prototype” traditions that merits our further attention, and that is a preoccupation with those in the “army of khasf” who are accompanying it “against their own will” (kārihan) and will be killed in the event. These traditions invariably end with the narrator enquiring about the fate of this group and the prophet replying that they too will be killed, “but will be resurrected in the hereafter [and judged] according to their intent” (ʿalā niyyatihi).Footnote 80 As we have seen, there were people in ʿAmr's army who sympathized with ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr and were forcibly recruited, and at least some of these must have also been killed in Dhū Ṭawī. This element of the khasf-narratives hence seems to be an attempt to absolve these “collateral casualties” of any wrongdoing in having unwillingly accompanied ʿAmr's army and violating Mecca's sanctity.
These pro-Zubayrid traditions find an exceptionally noteworthy Syrian counterpart in Nuʿaym ibn Ḥammād al-Marwazī’s collection which was undoubtedly put into circulation with the specific aim of nullifying their effect. It goes as follows:
al-Walīd ibn MuslimFootnote 81 < Ṣadaqa ibn KhālidFootnote 82 < ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ḤumaydFootnote 83 < MujāhidFootnote 84 < TubayʿFootnote 85
a seeker of refuge will take refuge in Mecca, but he will be killed. Then some time will pass until another one will [arise and] take refuge [there]. If you live until that time do not fight him, for it [viz., the army that fights him] will be the army of khasf (sa-yaʿūdhu bi-Makka ʿāʾidhun fa-yuqtalu; thumma yamkathu ’l-nās burhatan min dahrihim thumma yaʿūdhu ākharun, fa-in adraktahu fa-lā taghzuwannahu fa-innahu jaysh al-khasf).Footnote 86
This tradition, as we can gather from its chain of tradents, has its provenance in pro-Umayyad circles of Syria and would have done the Umayyads a twofold service, first by reassuring their supporters (as well as their enemies) that Ibn al-Zubayr would eventually be killed,Footnote 87 – a genuine prophecy which came to materialize over a decade later when al-Ḥajjāj's troops stormed the sacred precincts of the Kaʿba after a months-long siege – and then by proclaiming that the refugee at Mecca, predicted in the Zubayrid traditions, who would enjoy divine favour and whose enemies would be blotted out by divine wrath was not Ibn al-Zubayr, but another person, a second ʿāʾidh, who was yet to appear.Footnote 88 It was, in all likelihood, first propagated by Tubayʿ not long after the debacle of ʿAmr's expedition.Footnote 89 The testimony of pro-Syrian traditions related on his authority leaves little doubt as to where his sympathies lay.Footnote 90
The Second Civil War was not just about claims to the caliphate. It was also about claims to precedence in religion, closeness to the prophet, and ostentations of religious zeal. It was at this time that unequivocal professions of Islamic faith – including the name of Muḥammad – first appeared on a coinage, that of the Zubayrids.Footnote 91 Likewise, in our case it is only the Zubayrid tradition that attempts to include the prophet in its isnād, a pattern also to be observed in other Zubayrid propagandistic ḥadīthsFootnote 92 – though, of course, they were not the only, or even the first, group to do so.Footnote 93 The new paradigms thus brought about would remain in place for long after the close of the civil war, and the legacy of the Zubayrids thereby lingered on centuries after the defeat of their cause.Footnote 94