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When is it good to believe bad things?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

Joshua M. Ackerman
Affiliation:
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02142. joshack@mit.eduhttp://web.mit.edu/joshack/www/
Jenessa R. Shapiro
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1563. jshapiro@psych.ucla.edu
Jon K. Maner
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-4301. maner@psy.fsu.eduhttp://www.psy.fsu.edu/faculty/maner.dp.html
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Abstract

Positive and negative misbeliefs both may have evolved to serve important adaptive functions. Here, we focus on the role of negative misbeliefs in promoting adaptive outcomes within the contexts of romantic relationships and intergroup interactions. Believing bad things can paradoxically encourage romantic fidelity, personal safety, competitive success, and group solidarity, among other positive outcomes.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

In their article, McKay & Dennett (M&D) define evolved misbeliefs, or illusions, as those that are adaptively superior to fully accurate beliefs. The authors focus their discussion on the value of positive misbeliefs, but there are also reasons to believe that negative misbeliefs can serve adaptive functions as well. In this commentary, we consider negative misbeliefs within two important social contexts: (1) close relationships and (2) intergroup interactions.

Misbeliefs related to close relationships

The formation and maintenance of close relationships are fundamental human pursuits (Ackerman & Kenrick Reference Ackerman and Kenrick2008; Kenrick et al., in press). Romantic relationships are particularly important because mating represents the sine qua non of evolutionary success. Positive misbeliefs may aid these romantic pursuits, as in M&D's example of the over-perception of positive spousal attributes. However, close relationships may also benefit from negative illusions. For example, women tend to believe that men are less interested in romantic commitment than those men actually are (Haselton & Buss Reference Haselton and Buss2000), especially prior to the onset of sexual activity in relationships (Ackerman et al., submitted). M&D suggest that, although the system that generates such misbeliefs is probably adaptive, the misbeliefs themselves are not (because accurate beliefs would be equally protective without suffering from false positive errors). However, underestimating male commitment could lead women to set higher thresholds for suitors to overcome, leading men to expend greater effort and investment in courtship (see Ackerman & Kenrick Reference Ackerman and Kenrick2009), and ultimately boosting the romantic returns that women receive (e.g., mate quality, economic resources, actual commitment). Comparatively, accurate beliefs about potential romantic partners might facilitate accurate decision making, but would be unlikely to garner these additional benefits.

Another example pertains to misbeliefs about alternative relationship partners. People in committed relationships tend to display cognitive biases that inhibit straying from those relationships (e.g., Maner et al. Reference Maner, Rouby and Gonzaga2008; Reference Maner, Gailliot and Miller2009), such as believing that attractive relationship alternatives are less appealing than they actually are (Johnson & Rusbult Reference Johnson and Rusbult1989; Simpson et al. Reference Simpson, Gangestad and Lerma1990). These negative illusions down-regulate threats posed by romantic alternatives, increasing the long-term success of one's current relationship. Long-term romantic relationships serve important functions linked to social affiliation and offspring care, as well as providing more obvious reproductive benefits, and thus negative misbeliefs about relationship alternatives can promote a range of adaptive outcomes. Accurate beliefs about attractive alternatives, however, could promote infidelity and destabilize one's relationship.

Misbeliefs related to intergroup interactions

In addition to romantic relationships, group-level relationships are also fundamental components of human evolutionary success (Kenrick et al., in press; Neuberg & Cottrell Reference Neuberg, Cottrell, Schaller, Simpson and Kenrick2006). Throughout human evolutionary history, hostile outgroups have posed threats to personal safety and group resources. Many of these threats were transient, with periods of conflict interspersed with periods of relative peace (e.g., Baer & McEachron Reference Baer and McEachron1982). Accurate beliefs acknowledging that outgroups were not always threatening could have supported increased intergroup contact. However, the potential for threat in intergroup interactions would likely remain high, as initially peaceful or cooperative encounters between unfamiliar parties can quickly turn dangerous (e.g., through simple misunderstandings or signals of vulnerability). Negative outgroup illusions could have enhanced fitness to the extent that they led people to be wary, reducing the probability of loss or harm from a hostile outgroup member (see Ackerman et al. Reference Ackerman, Shapiro, Neuberg, Kenrick, Becker, Griskevicius, Maner and Schaller2006; Reference Ackerman, Becker, Mortensen, Sasaki, Neuberg and Kenrick2009).

In fact, negative misbeliefs can strengthen the drive to compete with other groups for status and resources (Campbell Reference Campbell and Levine1965; Sherif et al. Reference Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood and Sherif1961). For example, sports teams may perform better because of the misbeliefs they hold about the motivation and skill of their rivals. Similarly, religions may facilitate conversion by asserting the falsity and profaneness of other gods. In the political realm, nations are frequently in conflict with one another over natural and social resources, and exhibit extreme ideological and ethnocentric beliefs as a result (Campbell Reference Campbell and Levine1965). Governments that construe other nations as “Evil Empires” may be more motivated to economically out-produce and even attack those nations (thereby attaining resources, if they win). In contrast, accurate beliefs about opposing groups would provide no extra incentive to compete and might even de-motivate groups with relatively lower standing and abilities.

Much of the work on negative misbeliefs and intergroup threat has explored the role of race as a heuristic cue to group membership. People tend to associate particular racial groups with specific threats (e.g., Black males with physical danger; Cottrell & Neuberg Reference Cottrell and Neuberg2005), and these biases become especially strong in the presence of other threat-relevant cues (e.g., angry expressions). For example, people believe that neutrally expressive outgroup men are more threatening when seen in the context of other, angry outgroup men (Shapiro et al. Reference Shapiro, Ackerman, Neuberg, Maner, Becker and Kenrick2009); frightened people believe that outgroup men are more angry than they truly are (Maner et al. Reference Maner, Kenrick, Neuberg, Becker, Robertson, Hofer, Delton, Butner and Schaller2005); and pregnant women, whose fetuses are especially vulnerable early in development, exhibit greater ethnocentric beliefs during their first trimester (Navarrete et al. Reference Navarrete, Fessler and Eng2007). Such negative illusions could promote outgroup avoidance (see also Mortensen et al., in press) which, in evolutionary contexts, could have served important self-protective functions.

Finally, misbeliefs about outgroup threat elicit not only outgroup avoidance, but also ingroup solidarity (Becker et al., submitted; Coser Reference Coser1956; Tajfel & Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Worchel and Austin1986). This solidarity provides a number of advantages. Consider that the pursuit of economic and physical resources is often a zero-sum game, and thus groups must manage their resources by discouraging exploitation from selfish members. Cooperation is one solution to potential intragroup conflict, and negative illusions about the dangers of other groups may improve cooperation by providing a common threat and promoting intragroup unity (e.g., Hammond & Axelrod Reference Hammond and Axelrod2006; Van Vugt et al. Reference Van Vugt, De Cremer and Janssen2007).

Conclusion

Many negative misbeliefs continue to provide adaptive benefits in modern times, and yet may also result in detrimental social outcomes such as the perpetration of problematic stereotypes and prejudices. Despite such modern troubles, there is reason to believe that, as with positive misbeliefs, negative misbeliefs evolved to meet recurrent challenges in the ancestral world.

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