Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-b95js Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-06T10:45:55.238Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Wanted: A reconciliation of rationality with determinism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

Joachim I. Krueger
Joachim I. Krueger*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Brown University, Providence, RI02912http://www.brown.edu/departments/psychology/faculty/krueger.html
*
joachim_krueger@brown.edu
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

In social dilemmas, expectations of reciprocity can lead to fully determined cooperation concurrent with the illusion of choice. The choice of the dominant alternative (i.e., defection) may be construed as being free and rational, but only at the cost of being incompatible with a behavioral science claiming to be deterministic.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , April 2003 , pp. 168 - 169
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

References

Note

1. In iterated PDGs, the assumption of determinism is more apparent than in one-shot games. Players’ choices are assumed to be controlled by the design of the game (i.e., the experimenters) and by each other's choices in preceding rounds (e.g., Rachlin 2002).