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Towards an intuitionist account of moral development

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2005

Karen Bartsch*
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY82071-3415
Jennifer Cole Wright*
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY82071-3415
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Abstract

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Sunstein’s characterization of moral blunders jointly indicts an intuitive process and the structure of heuristics. But intuitions need not lead to error, and the problems with moral heuristics apply also to moral principles. Accordingly, moral development may well involve more, rather than less, intuitive responsiveness. This suggests a novel trajectory for future research into the development of appropriate moral judgments.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005
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