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Theory-testing experiments in the economics laboratory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2001

Anthony S. Gillies
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Program in Cognitive Science, The University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 agillies@u.arizona.edu www.u.arizona.edu/~agillies
Mary Rigdon
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Economic Science Laboratory, The University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 rigdon@econlab.arizona.edu www.u.arizona.edu/~mlrigdon
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Abstract

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Features of experimental design impose auxiliary hypotheses on experimenters. Hertwig & Ortmann rightly argue that the ways some variables are implemented in psychology cloud results, whereas the different implementations in economics provide for more robust results. However, not all design variables support this general conclusion. The repetition of trials may confuse results depending on what theory is being tested. We explore this in the case of simple bargaining games.

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press