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A slightly radical neuron doctrine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Frank Jackson
Frank Jackson
Affiliation:
Philosophy Program, Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australiafrank.jackson@anu.edu.au coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/Rsss/Philosophy/People/Jackson/index.html
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Abstract

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The element of truth in behaviorism tells us that some versions of a radical neuron doctrine must be false. However, the representational nature of many mental states implies that neuroscience may well bear on some topics traditionally addressed by philosophers of mind. An example is the individuation of belief states.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 840 - 841
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press