Our first point is that Schilbach et al. have neglected a relatively important part of the social neuroscience literature in which participants are actually involved in social interaction or exclusion/rejection with others. This major part of the literature shows that an overlap in neural activation exists between physical pain and social pain (following rejection). Studies that illustrate this point most commonly use the Cyberball paradigm, a computerized ball-tossing game eliciting feelings of social rejection and distress, which has previously been used in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies (e.g., Eisenberger & Lieberman Reference Eisenberger and Lieberman2004; Eisenberger et al. Reference Eisenberger, Lieberman and Williams2003). In this paradigm, participants who were first involved in a simulated ball-tossing game with two other players were then implicitly excluded from the game by the other two players who only passed the ball to each other, thereby socially rejecting the participant. Interestingly, the fMRI results showed that rejection produced brain activity in areas that are also activated when people experience physical pain.
We agree with Schilbach et al.'s claim that a second-person neuroscience would be particularly relevant to understanding mental or behavioral disorders. We have, in fact, recently examined social rejection (using Cyberball) in alcohol-dependent inpatients (Maurage et al. Reference Maurage, Joassin, Philippot, Heeren, Vermeulen, Mahau, Delperdande, Corneille, Luminet and De Timary2012). In this study, 22 abstinent alcohol-dependent participants and 22 paired controls played Cyberball during fMRI recording. Participants were first included by other players, then excluded and finally re-included (when the other two players resumed passing the ball to the participant). We found increased activation in brain areas typically associated with social-rejection feelings and with impaired ability to inhibit these feelings (as indexed by a reduction in frontal activation) in alcohol-dependent participants compared to matched controls. Reduced frontal regulation was suggested to be responsible for the interpersonal alterations observed in alcohol-dependence, which seems to be reinforced by impaired fronto-cingulate connectivity. As suggested by Schilbach et al., this very recent publication confirms the importance of second-person neuroscience studies as a dynamic tool for helping differential diagnosis in psychiatric disorders and also shows neglected studies related to second-person neuroscience.
Some other examples from this important field of literature may be found in studies investigating obedience to authority (such as the Milgram experiment). In a recent fMRI study, Cheetham et al. (Reference Cheetham, Pedroni, Antley, Slater and Jäncke2009) investigated the neural basis of obedience and empathy in participants who were instructed to punish a victim with electric shocks for every incorrect answer the victim gave. Other important examples of second-person social neuroscience come from studies on racism (Olsson et al. Reference Olsson, Ebert, Banaji and Phelps2005), out-group dehumanization (Hein et al. Reference Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson and Singer2010), and even cognitive dissonance (Kitayama et al. Reference Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus and Suzuki2004). These studies represent only a few examples among many others of second-person social neuroscience effects that deserve to be reported in the current article.
The second point we argue is that Schilbach et al. have neglected an important aspect of the Simulation of Smiles (SIMS) model. The SIMS model recently proposed by Niedenthal et al. (Reference Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer and Hess2010) does not only constitute a model of how involuntary mimicry occurs during social interactions (as discussed by Schilbach et al.), but also specifies the involvement of different neural areas (e.g., amygdala, somatosensory cortex) in the psychological understanding of others' feelings during second-person interactions. This model constitutes a theoretical model of second-person understanding of emotional states, which was applied to smiling only because this emotional expression constitutes one of the more complex and ambiguous expressions involved during social interaction. For instance, the SIMS model specifies the influence of different social contexts (e.g., cultural, affiliative) on the use of functional triggers (mainly eye contact) inducing subsequent embodied or grounded processes. As far as we understand, this SIMS model clearly fits with what Schilbach and colleagues have coined as second-person neuroscience “going social” and represents a direct and detailed second-person theoretical model of social interactions.
Finally, based on the findings from social psychology, we would like to stress the importance of taking into consideration, in future social neuroscience studies, the effect of being observed as well as the complexity of the task. Researchers have shown that performance may be impacted by the mere (or even imagined) presence of other people. More specifically, it has been claimed that in simple (well-learned) tasks, the presence of others leads to performance increments, whereas in complex (not well-learned) tasks performance is negatively influenced by the presence of others. This effect has been named the “activation theory model” by Zajonc (Reference Zajonc1965; see Strauss [Reference Strauss2001] for a review of this phenomenon). As well, many studies in nonhuman primates have also shown that these effects are not limited to humans but have been observed in other social species, such as Capuchin primates (Dindo et al. Reference Dindo, Whiten and de Waal2009). We believe it is important to consider this phenomenon in future social (e.g., second-person neuroscience) experimental situations because it implies that performance – in fMRI, for instance – does not rely solely on participants' abilities but also depends on the internal awareness of the presence (or envisaged presence) of others. In our opinion, this highlights the importance of better understanding whether (and how) activity in the neural network may be modulated by the feeling of being observed and/or evaluated. Moreover, such social neuroscience fMRI investigations may confirm (or disconfirm) the involvement of specific cognitive processes during social interactions (attention, short-term memory, etc.) (Muller et al. Reference Muller, Atzeni and Butera2004). This could be particularly important in psychopathology such as (social) anxiety disorders or alexithymia, as most of those disorders are known to be related to impaired attentional processes (Rossignol et al. Reference Rossignol, Anselme, Vermeulen, Philippot and Campanella2007; Vermeulen et al. Reference Vermeulen, Luminet, de Sousa and Campanella2008) or memory processes (Vermeulen & Luminet Reference Vermeulen and Luminet2009; Vermeulen et al. Reference Vermeulen, Toussaint and Luminet2010).
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Our first point is that Schilbach et al. have neglected a relatively important part of the social neuroscience literature in which participants are actually involved in social interaction or exclusion/rejection with others. This major part of the literature shows that an overlap in neural activation exists between physical pain and social pain (following rejection). Studies that illustrate this point most commonly use the Cyberball paradigm, a computerized ball-tossing game eliciting feelings of social rejection and distress, which has previously been used in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies (e.g., Eisenberger & Lieberman Reference Eisenberger and Lieberman2004; Eisenberger et al. Reference Eisenberger, Lieberman and Williams2003). In this paradigm, participants who were first involved in a simulated ball-tossing game with two other players were then implicitly excluded from the game by the other two players who only passed the ball to each other, thereby socially rejecting the participant. Interestingly, the fMRI results showed that rejection produced brain activity in areas that are also activated when people experience physical pain.
We agree with Schilbach et al.'s claim that a second-person neuroscience would be particularly relevant to understanding mental or behavioral disorders. We have, in fact, recently examined social rejection (using Cyberball) in alcohol-dependent inpatients (Maurage et al. Reference Maurage, Joassin, Philippot, Heeren, Vermeulen, Mahau, Delperdande, Corneille, Luminet and De Timary2012). In this study, 22 abstinent alcohol-dependent participants and 22 paired controls played Cyberball during fMRI recording. Participants were first included by other players, then excluded and finally re-included (when the other two players resumed passing the ball to the participant). We found increased activation in brain areas typically associated with social-rejection feelings and with impaired ability to inhibit these feelings (as indexed by a reduction in frontal activation) in alcohol-dependent participants compared to matched controls. Reduced frontal regulation was suggested to be responsible for the interpersonal alterations observed in alcohol-dependence, which seems to be reinforced by impaired fronto-cingulate connectivity. As suggested by Schilbach et al., this very recent publication confirms the importance of second-person neuroscience studies as a dynamic tool for helping differential diagnosis in psychiatric disorders and also shows neglected studies related to second-person neuroscience.
Some other examples from this important field of literature may be found in studies investigating obedience to authority (such as the Milgram experiment). In a recent fMRI study, Cheetham et al. (Reference Cheetham, Pedroni, Antley, Slater and Jäncke2009) investigated the neural basis of obedience and empathy in participants who were instructed to punish a victim with electric shocks for every incorrect answer the victim gave. Other important examples of second-person social neuroscience come from studies on racism (Olsson et al. Reference Olsson, Ebert, Banaji and Phelps2005), out-group dehumanization (Hein et al. Reference Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson and Singer2010), and even cognitive dissonance (Kitayama et al. Reference Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus and Suzuki2004). These studies represent only a few examples among many others of second-person social neuroscience effects that deserve to be reported in the current article.
The second point we argue is that Schilbach et al. have neglected an important aspect of the Simulation of Smiles (SIMS) model. The SIMS model recently proposed by Niedenthal et al. (Reference Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer and Hess2010) does not only constitute a model of how involuntary mimicry occurs during social interactions (as discussed by Schilbach et al.), but also specifies the involvement of different neural areas (e.g., amygdala, somatosensory cortex) in the psychological understanding of others' feelings during second-person interactions. This model constitutes a theoretical model of second-person understanding of emotional states, which was applied to smiling only because this emotional expression constitutes one of the more complex and ambiguous expressions involved during social interaction. For instance, the SIMS model specifies the influence of different social contexts (e.g., cultural, affiliative) on the use of functional triggers (mainly eye contact) inducing subsequent embodied or grounded processes. As far as we understand, this SIMS model clearly fits with what Schilbach and colleagues have coined as second-person neuroscience “going social” and represents a direct and detailed second-person theoretical model of social interactions.
Finally, based on the findings from social psychology, we would like to stress the importance of taking into consideration, in future social neuroscience studies, the effect of being observed as well as the complexity of the task. Researchers have shown that performance may be impacted by the mere (or even imagined) presence of other people. More specifically, it has been claimed that in simple (well-learned) tasks, the presence of others leads to performance increments, whereas in complex (not well-learned) tasks performance is negatively influenced by the presence of others. This effect has been named the “activation theory model” by Zajonc (Reference Zajonc1965; see Strauss [Reference Strauss2001] for a review of this phenomenon). As well, many studies in nonhuman primates have also shown that these effects are not limited to humans but have been observed in other social species, such as Capuchin primates (Dindo et al. Reference Dindo, Whiten and de Waal2009). We believe it is important to consider this phenomenon in future social (e.g., second-person neuroscience) experimental situations because it implies that performance – in fMRI, for instance – does not rely solely on participants' abilities but also depends on the internal awareness of the presence (or envisaged presence) of others. In our opinion, this highlights the importance of better understanding whether (and how) activity in the neural network may be modulated by the feeling of being observed and/or evaluated. Moreover, such social neuroscience fMRI investigations may confirm (or disconfirm) the involvement of specific cognitive processes during social interactions (attention, short-term memory, etc.) (Muller et al. Reference Muller, Atzeni and Butera2004). This could be particularly important in psychopathology such as (social) anxiety disorders or alexithymia, as most of those disorders are known to be related to impaired attentional processes (Rossignol et al. Reference Rossignol, Anselme, Vermeulen, Philippot and Campanella2007; Vermeulen et al. Reference Vermeulen, Luminet, de Sousa and Campanella2008) or memory processes (Vermeulen & Luminet Reference Vermeulen and Luminet2009; Vermeulen et al. Reference Vermeulen, Toussaint and Luminet2010).