The argument that self-deception evolved in order to facilitate the deception of others relies on the assumption that, pace all empirical evidence, people really are good lie detectors. Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) claim that “despite what the research literature might appear to show, people are actually quite good at detecting deception. This possibility is central to our hypothesis regarding a co-evolutionary struggle and the subsequent origins of self-deception.” VH&T argue that empirical studies showing that people are poor lie detectors are fundamentally flawed. As such, the authors posit the opposite conclusion – that, in fact, people are very good at detecting lies, especially when they are properly motivated and dealing with close friends and family.
However, the problem is that if the hypothesis that people are good lie detectors is true, then the facility with which people are able to lie to themselves is undermined. In fact, one reason the authors offer to explain the misleading empirical results is that most studies of deception are conducted with strangers – VH&T say that we are much better at detecting the lies of people with whom we are close. But, and this is the kicker, if people get better at detecting lies as their relationship to the liar becomes closer and closer, then deceiving oneself should be hardest of all. After all, there is no one closer to us than ourselves. Thus, in trying to provide an evolutionary motive for viewing self-deception as a mechanism to facilitate other-deception, VH&T undermine the conditions required to make self-deception common and easy.
The relationship between skill in detecting lies and lying to oneself must be inversely proportional: The better one is at lie detection, the harder it will be to self-deceive. The fact remains that we must be fairly poor lie detectors if we are able to lie to ourselves with ease. Unfortunately, on the account that VH&T have forwarded, the commonness and facility of self-deception becomes difficult, if not impossible, to explain.
One of the virtues of VH&T's account of self-deception is that it moves away from the standard model of self-deception, which requires two simultaneous, contradictory representations of reality. VH&T highlight the fact that self-deception does not require one person to possess contradictory beliefs, but rather, self-deception can be the result of biases in information gathering, which reflect one's own goals or motives. As VH&T state, “if I can deceive you by avoiding a critical piece of information, then it stands to reason that I can deceive myself in the same manner.”
The problem, however, is that if one sincerely believes that p, then when one expresses that p to someone else, that expression is not an instance of deception, despite the fact that p is false. After all, if I sincerely believe that Canada is in Eastern Europe, and I communicate to you that Canada is in Eastern Europe, although I am wrong, I am not lying. In order to lie, I must know that what I am communicating is false.
So, arguably, we can get a real instance of other-deception on the classical view of self-deception. We can say that one knows that p is false somewhere in one's unconscious, and so, when one expresses that p is true, one is being deceptive. However, if a person never came to believe that p is false, even though she could have come to know that p is false (given more search, etc.), then when she communicates that p, she is not lying.
Given that in VH&T's view, the person who expresses falsehoods believes them to be truths, that person cannot be involved in other-deception. Again, other-deception requires knowledge of the falsity of what one is communicating. As such, self-deception could not have evolved to facilitate other-deception, because after one has successfully deceived oneself, what one communicates to others, though untrue, is not deceptive.
These points are not meant to show that VH&T's general orientation is misguided but rather that the language of self-deception has not done them any favors. VH&T have successfully illustrated that our beliefs often develop in ways that are relative to our motives and goals. Also, they have done well to argue that these biased beliefs result in a whole host of social gains.
Rather than pursue an evolutionary account of self-deception, however, it seems that the real revelation is in the following point that VH&T cite but do not develop: “Thus, the conventional view that natural selection favors nervous systems which produce ever more accurate images of the world must be a very naive view of mental evolution” (Trivers Reference Trivers and Dawkins1976/2006). For, it is this assumption that creates the dichotomy between “normal” beliefs that correspond to facts and “self-deceptive” beliefs that are the result of motivated biases. Rather than looking at these two kinds of practices as normal and abnormal, the real sea change would be to think of beliefs, in general, as developed in motivated settings, relative to an agent's abilities, goals, environmental conditions, and intersubjective situation. The real revelation would be to question the assumption that beliefs are most useful when true.
The argument that self-deception evolved in order to facilitate the deception of others relies on the assumption that, pace all empirical evidence, people really are good lie detectors. Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) claim that “despite what the research literature might appear to show, people are actually quite good at detecting deception. This possibility is central to our hypothesis regarding a co-evolutionary struggle and the subsequent origins of self-deception.” VH&T argue that empirical studies showing that people are poor lie detectors are fundamentally flawed. As such, the authors posit the opposite conclusion – that, in fact, people are very good at detecting lies, especially when they are properly motivated and dealing with close friends and family.
However, the problem is that if the hypothesis that people are good lie detectors is true, then the facility with which people are able to lie to themselves is undermined. In fact, one reason the authors offer to explain the misleading empirical results is that most studies of deception are conducted with strangers – VH&T say that we are much better at detecting the lies of people with whom we are close. But, and this is the kicker, if people get better at detecting lies as their relationship to the liar becomes closer and closer, then deceiving oneself should be hardest of all. After all, there is no one closer to us than ourselves. Thus, in trying to provide an evolutionary motive for viewing self-deception as a mechanism to facilitate other-deception, VH&T undermine the conditions required to make self-deception common and easy.
The relationship between skill in detecting lies and lying to oneself must be inversely proportional: The better one is at lie detection, the harder it will be to self-deceive. The fact remains that we must be fairly poor lie detectors if we are able to lie to ourselves with ease. Unfortunately, on the account that VH&T have forwarded, the commonness and facility of self-deception becomes difficult, if not impossible, to explain.
One of the virtues of VH&T's account of self-deception is that it moves away from the standard model of self-deception, which requires two simultaneous, contradictory representations of reality. VH&T highlight the fact that self-deception does not require one person to possess contradictory beliefs, but rather, self-deception can be the result of biases in information gathering, which reflect one's own goals or motives. As VH&T state, “if I can deceive you by avoiding a critical piece of information, then it stands to reason that I can deceive myself in the same manner.”
The problem, however, is that if one sincerely believes that p, then when one expresses that p to someone else, that expression is not an instance of deception, despite the fact that p is false. After all, if I sincerely believe that Canada is in Eastern Europe, and I communicate to you that Canada is in Eastern Europe, although I am wrong, I am not lying. In order to lie, I must know that what I am communicating is false.
So, arguably, we can get a real instance of other-deception on the classical view of self-deception. We can say that one knows that p is false somewhere in one's unconscious, and so, when one expresses that p is true, one is being deceptive. However, if a person never came to believe that p is false, even though she could have come to know that p is false (given more search, etc.), then when she communicates that p, she is not lying.
Given that in VH&T's view, the person who expresses falsehoods believes them to be truths, that person cannot be involved in other-deception. Again, other-deception requires knowledge of the falsity of what one is communicating. As such, self-deception could not have evolved to facilitate other-deception, because after one has successfully deceived oneself, what one communicates to others, though untrue, is not deceptive.
These points are not meant to show that VH&T's general orientation is misguided but rather that the language of self-deception has not done them any favors. VH&T have successfully illustrated that our beliefs often develop in ways that are relative to our motives and goals. Also, they have done well to argue that these biased beliefs result in a whole host of social gains.
Rather than pursue an evolutionary account of self-deception, however, it seems that the real revelation is in the following point that VH&T cite but do not develop: “Thus, the conventional view that natural selection favors nervous systems which produce ever more accurate images of the world must be a very naive view of mental evolution” (Trivers Reference Trivers and Dawkins1976/2006). For, it is this assumption that creates the dichotomy between “normal” beliefs that correspond to facts and “self-deceptive” beliefs that are the result of motivated biases. Rather than looking at these two kinds of practices as normal and abnormal, the real sea change would be to think of beliefs, in general, as developed in motivated settings, relative to an agent's abilities, goals, environmental conditions, and intersubjective situation. The real revelation would be to question the assumption that beliefs are most useful when true.