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Probabilistic equilibria for evolutionarily stable strategies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2007

Roger A. McCain
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and International Business, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104. mccainra@drexel.eduhttp://william-king.www.drexel.edu/
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Abstract

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This commentary suggests that an equilibrium framework may be retained, in an evolutionary model such as Gintis's and with more satisfactory results, if rationality is relaxed in a slightly different way than he proposes: that is, if decisions are assumed to be related to rewards probabilistically, rather than with certainty. This relaxed concept of rationality gives rise to probabilistic equilibria.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
2007 Cambridge University Press