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Predicates as cantilevers for the bridge between perception and knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2004

Gregory V. Jones
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom G.V.Jones@warwick.ac.uk http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/sci/Psychology/staff/academic.html#GJ
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Abstract

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The predicate-argument approach, focused on perception, is compared with the ease-of-predication (or predicability) approach, focused on encyclopedic knowledge. The latter offers functional prediction and implementation in connectionist models. However, the two approaches characterise predicates in different ways. They thus resemble predicational cantilevers built out from opposite sides of cognition, with a gap that is yet to be bridged.

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press