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Phenomenal consciousness and what it's like

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

David M. Rosenthal
David M. Rosenthal
Affiliation:
Ph.D. Program in Philosophy and Concentration in Cognitive Science, City University of New York, Graduate School, New York, NY 10036-8099 drosenth@broadway.gc.cuny.edu
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Abstract

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Even if A-consciousness and P-consciousness were conceptually distinct, it is no fallacy for researchers relying on a suitable theory to infer one from the other. But P-consciousness conceptually implies A-consciousness – unless one or the other is mere ersatz consciousness. And we can best explain mental states' being conscious, in any intuitively natural sense, by appeal to higher-order thoughts.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 156 - 157
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press