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Perception, inference, and the veridicality of natural constraints

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1999

Manish Singh
Affiliation:
Perceptual Science Group, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 manish@psyche.mit.edu www-bcs.mit.edu/~manish
Donald D. Hoffman
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-5100 ddhoff@uci.edu www.socsci.uci.edu/cogsci/personnel/hoffman/hoffman.html
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Abstract

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Pylyshyn's target article argues that perception is not inferential, but this is true only under a narrow construal of inference. A more general construal is possible, and has been used to provide formal theories of many visual capacities. This approach also makes clear that the evolution of natural constraints need not converge to the “veridical” state of the world.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press