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Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Keith Gibbins
Keith Gibbins
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Murdoch University, Murdoch, Western Australia, 6155 Australiagibbons@socs.murdoch.edu.au
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Abstract

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A major worry in self-deception research has been the implication that people can hold a belief that something is true and false at the same time: a logical as well as a psychological impossibility. However, if beliefs are held with imperfect confidence, voluntary self-deception in the sense of seeking evidence to reject an unpleasant belief becomes entirely plausible and demonstrably real.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 115 - 116
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press