Huang & Bargh (H&B) propose a metaphor whereby, just like genes, goals operate autonomously according to their own agenda even when doing so may not be in the overall interest of their host/individual. Although this metaphor is interesting and intriguing, we believe that the story of goal pursuit is more complicated than one goal selfishly pursuing its agenda at the expense of other goals. Goals do not come in isolation, but rather in configurations of multiple goals. They may become simultaneously active and may facilitate or inhibit each other, with different consequences for action, as well as for individuals' phenomenological experience (Kruglanski et al. Reference Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, Sleeth-Keppler and Zanna2002). Once a goal is selected, it may pursue its agenda selfishly. However, H&B's metaphor may result in an overly simplistic portrayal of human action without (1) specifying the principles and consequences (i.e., the experience of goal conflict) of goal selection and (2) acknowledging that sometimes people may pursue multiple goals simultaneously whereby no goal selection is needed.
Regarding the issue of goal selection, H&B argue that each and every goal may pursue its agenda selfishly. But, given that individuals have a multitude of goals that are often activated simultaneously, it is important to understand the principles through which a particular goal takes priority and gets to pursue its agenda. Although the criterion is very clear for genetic selection (i.e., survival), it is not as clear for goal selection. H&B propose that when more than one goal is currently active, “the most incentivized” (sect. 2.1, para. 5) of these wins. However, it remains unclear (1) how “incentivization” is defined and operationalized, (2) and what mechanisms are responsible for selecting the most incentivized goal. Without clarifying these issues, the argument becomes almost circular (the winning goal must have been the most incentivized one) and specific predictions about an individual's behavior can be neither made nor tested.
H&B do talk about unconscious inter-goal inhibition and introduce “the reconfiguration principle” (sect. 4.1, para. 1) to explain goal selection. However, such selection seems to be accounted for solely by goal activation. “The most motivating or ‘active’ goal should constrain … behavioral possibilities in a way that encourages achievement of the goal's end-state” (sect. 4.1, para.1). However, goal pursuit is not only a function of goal activation. The value attached to that particular end-state, as well as the expectancy of attaining it, determines goal-directed behavior, in addition to goal activation. More important, both the value and the expectancy of goal attainment, on a moment-to-moment basis, are relative to the other goals that may be currently active (Atkinson Reference Atkinson1964). For example, an active goal of smoking may lose its value and may not result in smoking behavior when the negative consequences of smoking (and presumably a health-related goal) become active. (Kober et al. Reference Kober, Kross, Mischel, Hart and Ochsner2010). Active goals may inhibit competing alternatives resulting in goal shielding (as acknowledged by H&B). But goal shielding is a function of goal value (i.e., importance), not only of goal activation (Shah et al. Reference Shah, Friedman and Kruglanski2002). Furthermore, goal shielding is not a necessary consequence of having multiple goals activated simultaneously. Indeed, goals may sometimes facilitate each other resulting in goal co-activation, rather than goal shielding (Shah et al. Reference Shah, Friedman and Kruglanski2002.). This raises the intriguing issue that, whereas goals may appear selfish when viewed in isolation, they may under certain conditions benefit associated, but distinct goals (e.g., the goal to eat healthily could activate the goal to exercise). The selfish goal account appears to neglect the possibility of mutually supporting goal architectures.
Secondly, the selfish goal metaphor fails to predict behavior in situations when multiple goals of equal importance are activated. In such situations, people will strive to pursue them simultaneously by finding multifinal means (Kopetz et al. Reference Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach and Kruglanski2011; Kruglanski et al. Reference Kruglanski, Kopetz, Belanger, Chun, Orehek and Fishbach2013). This may explain why someone who is hungry and therefore has the goal of eating, but who is also on a diet (pursues the goal of weight watching) may go for a salad rather than a double cheeseburger with fries. However, when the expectancy of finding multifinal means is low, individuals will engage in goal selection and pursue the goal of highest value (Kopetz et al. Reference Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach and Kruglanski2011).
Finally, the selfish gene approach has been criticized for failure to consider higher levels of selection (i.e., group level) (Goodwin Reference Goodwin2001). An analogous criticism may apply to the notion of selfish goals. Goals may selfishly pursue their agenda at the expense of other goals on a moment-to-moment basis. Furthermore, conscious choice or free will does not need to be invoked to explain behavior. However, such selfish pursuit may result (post hoc) in experienced goal conflict, which has known negative consequences (Emmons & King Reference Emmons and King1988). Such negative consequences, whether experienced or anticipated, may prompt people to develop strategies to avoid goal conflict (Fishbach et al. Reference Fishbach, Zhang and Koo2009; Kopetz et al. Reference Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach and Kruglanski2011). Individuals may differ with regard to how they balance, integrate, and make sense of their multiple selfish goals. Individuals with more balanced goals may have a selective advantage because they advance their goals in a better-coordinated manner on multiple domains in life (Bélanger et al. Reference Bélanger, Lafrenière, Vallerand and Kruglanski2013). In contrast, a poorly concerted set of selfish goals may lead to psychopathology. From this perspective, the metaphor of the selfish goal may be misleading and shortsighted insofar as it does not concern itself with aspects of higher-order integration.
To summarize, we believe that the selfish goal metaphor is interesting and intriguing. It acknowledges that people do what they do for a reason (an active goal) even if the momentary behavior may appear in contradiction with the persons' long-term best interest. In that, it explains many aspects of goal pursuit and accounts for the idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies in people's behavior without invoking free will, self-regulatory or self-control failures. However, given the multitude of goals that people pursue, sometimes simultaneously, the model may gain significant theoretical and practical value if the principles that account for goal selection and/or balancing on a moment-to moment basis are clearly specified and integrated with the notion of the selfish goal.
Huang & Bargh (H&B) propose a metaphor whereby, just like genes, goals operate autonomously according to their own agenda even when doing so may not be in the overall interest of their host/individual. Although this metaphor is interesting and intriguing, we believe that the story of goal pursuit is more complicated than one goal selfishly pursuing its agenda at the expense of other goals. Goals do not come in isolation, but rather in configurations of multiple goals. They may become simultaneously active and may facilitate or inhibit each other, with different consequences for action, as well as for individuals' phenomenological experience (Kruglanski et al. Reference Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, Sleeth-Keppler and Zanna2002). Once a goal is selected, it may pursue its agenda selfishly. However, H&B's metaphor may result in an overly simplistic portrayal of human action without (1) specifying the principles and consequences (i.e., the experience of goal conflict) of goal selection and (2) acknowledging that sometimes people may pursue multiple goals simultaneously whereby no goal selection is needed.
Regarding the issue of goal selection, H&B argue that each and every goal may pursue its agenda selfishly. But, given that individuals have a multitude of goals that are often activated simultaneously, it is important to understand the principles through which a particular goal takes priority and gets to pursue its agenda. Although the criterion is very clear for genetic selection (i.e., survival), it is not as clear for goal selection. H&B propose that when more than one goal is currently active, “the most incentivized” (sect. 2.1, para. 5) of these wins. However, it remains unclear (1) how “incentivization” is defined and operationalized, (2) and what mechanisms are responsible for selecting the most incentivized goal. Without clarifying these issues, the argument becomes almost circular (the winning goal must have been the most incentivized one) and specific predictions about an individual's behavior can be neither made nor tested.
H&B do talk about unconscious inter-goal inhibition and introduce “the reconfiguration principle” (sect. 4.1, para. 1) to explain goal selection. However, such selection seems to be accounted for solely by goal activation. “The most motivating or ‘active’ goal should constrain … behavioral possibilities in a way that encourages achievement of the goal's end-state” (sect. 4.1, para.1). However, goal pursuit is not only a function of goal activation. The value attached to that particular end-state, as well as the expectancy of attaining it, determines goal-directed behavior, in addition to goal activation. More important, both the value and the expectancy of goal attainment, on a moment-to-moment basis, are relative to the other goals that may be currently active (Atkinson Reference Atkinson1964). For example, an active goal of smoking may lose its value and may not result in smoking behavior when the negative consequences of smoking (and presumably a health-related goal) become active. (Kober et al. Reference Kober, Kross, Mischel, Hart and Ochsner2010). Active goals may inhibit competing alternatives resulting in goal shielding (as acknowledged by H&B). But goal shielding is a function of goal value (i.e., importance), not only of goal activation (Shah et al. Reference Shah, Friedman and Kruglanski2002). Furthermore, goal shielding is not a necessary consequence of having multiple goals activated simultaneously. Indeed, goals may sometimes facilitate each other resulting in goal co-activation, rather than goal shielding (Shah et al. Reference Shah, Friedman and Kruglanski2002.). This raises the intriguing issue that, whereas goals may appear selfish when viewed in isolation, they may under certain conditions benefit associated, but distinct goals (e.g., the goal to eat healthily could activate the goal to exercise). The selfish goal account appears to neglect the possibility of mutually supporting goal architectures.
Secondly, the selfish goal metaphor fails to predict behavior in situations when multiple goals of equal importance are activated. In such situations, people will strive to pursue them simultaneously by finding multifinal means (Kopetz et al. Reference Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach and Kruglanski2011; Kruglanski et al. Reference Kruglanski, Kopetz, Belanger, Chun, Orehek and Fishbach2013). This may explain why someone who is hungry and therefore has the goal of eating, but who is also on a diet (pursues the goal of weight watching) may go for a salad rather than a double cheeseburger with fries. However, when the expectancy of finding multifinal means is low, individuals will engage in goal selection and pursue the goal of highest value (Kopetz et al. Reference Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach and Kruglanski2011).
Finally, the selfish gene approach has been criticized for failure to consider higher levels of selection (i.e., group level) (Goodwin Reference Goodwin2001). An analogous criticism may apply to the notion of selfish goals. Goals may selfishly pursue their agenda at the expense of other goals on a moment-to-moment basis. Furthermore, conscious choice or free will does not need to be invoked to explain behavior. However, such selfish pursuit may result (post hoc) in experienced goal conflict, which has known negative consequences (Emmons & King Reference Emmons and King1988). Such negative consequences, whether experienced or anticipated, may prompt people to develop strategies to avoid goal conflict (Fishbach et al. Reference Fishbach, Zhang and Koo2009; Kopetz et al. Reference Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach and Kruglanski2011). Individuals may differ with regard to how they balance, integrate, and make sense of their multiple selfish goals. Individuals with more balanced goals may have a selective advantage because they advance their goals in a better-coordinated manner on multiple domains in life (Bélanger et al. Reference Bélanger, Lafrenière, Vallerand and Kruglanski2013). In contrast, a poorly concerted set of selfish goals may lead to psychopathology. From this perspective, the metaphor of the selfish goal may be misleading and shortsighted insofar as it does not concern itself with aspects of higher-order integration.
To summarize, we believe that the selfish goal metaphor is interesting and intriguing. It acknowledges that people do what they do for a reason (an active goal) even if the momentary behavior may appear in contradiction with the persons' long-term best interest. In that, it explains many aspects of goal pursuit and accounts for the idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies in people's behavior without invoking free will, self-regulatory or self-control failures. However, given the multitude of goals that people pursue, sometimes simultaneously, the model may gain significant theoretical and practical value if the principles that account for goal selection and/or balancing on a moment-to moment basis are clearly specified and integrated with the notion of the selfish goal.