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Neither neural networks nor the language-of-thought alone make a complete game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2023

Iris Oved ,
Nikhil Krishnaswamy Open the ORCID record for Nikhil Krishnaswamy [Opens in a new window] ,
James Pustejovsky Open the ORCID record for James Pustejovsky [Opens in a new window]  and
Joshua K. Hartshorne Open the ORCID record for Joshua K. Hartshorne [Opens in a new window]
Iris Oved
Affiliation:
Independent Scholar, 911 Central Ave; San Francisco, CA, USA irisoved@gmail.com, irisoved@paradoxlab.org
Nikhil Krishnaswamy
Affiliation:
Department of Computer Science, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA nikhil.krishnaswamy@colostate.edu, https://www.nikhilkrishnaswamy.com/
James Pustejovsky
Affiliation:
Department of Computer Science, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA jamesp@cs.brandeis.edu, https://jamespusto.com/
Joshua K. Hartshorne
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA joshua.hartshorne@bc.edu, http://l3atbc.org/index.html
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Abstract

Cognitive science has evolved since early disputes between radical empiricism and radical nativism. The authors are reacting to the revival of radical empiricism spurred by recent successes in deep neural network (NN) models. We agree that language-like mental representations (language-of-thoughts [LoTs]) are part of the best game in town, but they cannot be understood independent of the other players.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e285
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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