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Article contents
Narrative thought and decision-making
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 May 2023
Abstract
A significant body of literature has identified how narrative provides a basis for perceiving and understanding human experience. In the target article, the authors arrive at the need for a form of narrative-based reasoning due to constraints that render probabilistic-based reasoning ineffective. This commentary attempts to bridge this gap and identify links between the proposed and existing theories.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Target article
Conviction Narrative Theory: A theory of choice under radical uncertainty
Related commentaries (27)
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Embodied choices bypass narratives under radical uncertainty
Epistemic trust and unchanging personal narratives
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Is Conviction Narrative Theory a theory of everything or nothing?
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Narrative thought and decision-making
Narratives need not end well; nor say it all
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Narratives, environments, and decision-making: A fascinating narrative, but one to be completed
Psychological frameworks augment even classical decision theories
Really radical?
Simulation does not just inform choice, it changes choice
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The small world's problem is everyone's problem, not a reason to favor CNT over probabilistic decision theory
The statistical mechanics of felt uncertainty under active inference
The wisdom in the story: Clarifying assumptions about radical uncertainty and reasonableness in narrative judgment
What makes narratives feel right? The role of metacognitive experiences
When radical uncertainty is too much: Clinical aspects of Conviction Narrative Theory
Author response
Narratives, probabilities, and the currency of thought