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Metacognition as evidence for explicit representation in nonhumans

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2004

Robert Russell Hampton
Affiliation:
Laboratory of Neuropsychology, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, MD 20892 robert@ln.nimh.nih.gov
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Abstract

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Metacognition is either direct, as when information is recalled before making a confidence judgment, or indirect, as when the probability of successful future retrieval is determined inferentially. Direct metacognition may require an explicit mental representation as its object and can only be demonstrated under specific experimental circumstances. Other forms of metacognition can be based on publicly observable stimuli rather than introspection.

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press