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Let us keep our ontology and epistemology separate!

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

William R. Uttal
Affiliation:
Arizona State University, Department of Industrial and Management Systems Engineering, Tempe 85287-5906 aowru@asu.edu
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Abstract

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Gold & Stoljar are right in their thesis but incomplete in not pointing out that there are many other arguments from cognate sciences suggesting that a radical eliminativist neuroreductionism is unlikely to be achieved. The radical neuron doctrine they criticize is only a hoped for dogma that cannot be verified, whereas a constrained monistic materialism (with only partial reductionism) is subject to immediate test by applying such criteria as combinatorial complexity and thermodynamic irreversibility.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press