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Jackendoff's conceptualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2003

James Higginbotham*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0451
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Abstract:

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In this commentary, I concentrate upon Ray Jackendoff's view of the proper foundations for semantics within the context of generative grammar. Jackendoff (2002) favors a form of internalism that he calls “conceptualism.” I argue that a retreat from realism to conceptualism is not only unwarranted, but even self-defeating, in that the issues that prompt his view will inevitably reappear if the latter is adopted.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004
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