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Is memory like understanding?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Gail Musen
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027-6598 gm30@columbia.edu
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Abstract

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There are three major weaknesses with Glenberg's theory. The first is that his theory makes assumptions about internal representations that cannot be adequately tested. The second is that he tries to accommodate data from three disparate domains: mental models, linguistics, and memory. The third is that he makes light of advances in cognitive neuroscience.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press