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Innateness, universality, and domain-specificity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 1998

Gregg E. A. Solomon
Gregg E. A. Solomon
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 geas@psyche.mit.edu
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Abstract

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There are problems with Atran's argument for an innate cognitive module for folk biology. He has been too quick to assume innate origins for what might plausibly be learned. Furthermore, in his characterization he includes aspects – essentialist reasoning and inductions from classes – that are not domain-specific. Finally, his characterization compromises his argument that the module is pretheoretical.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 4 , August 1998 , pp. 588 - 589
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press