Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-cphqk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-06T11:29:15.506Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

How to play if you must

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

Hans Haller*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA24061
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Beyond what Colman is suggesting, some residual indeterminacy of Nash equilibrium may remain even after individual rationality is amended. Although alternative solution concepts can expand the positive scope (explanatory power) of game theory, they tend to reduce its accuracy of predictions (predictive power). Moreover, the appeal of alternative solutions may be context-specific, as illustrated by the Stackelberg solution.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003