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Game theory need not abandon individual maximization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

John Monterosso  and
George Ainslie
John Monterosso*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, David Geffen School of Medicine, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA90024
George Ainslie*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry, Coatesville VA Medical Center, Coatesville, PA19320
*
jmont@ucla.edu
george.ainslie@med.va.gov
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Abstract:

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Colman proposes that the domain of interpersonal choice requires an alternative and nonindividualistic conception of rationality. However, the anomalies he catalogues can be accounted for with less radical departures from orthodox rational choice theory. In particular, we emphasize the need for descriptive and prescriptive rationality to incorporate recursive interplay between one's own choices and one's expectation regarding others' choices.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , April 2003 , pp. 171
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003