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Functionalism without multiple supervenience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 March 2005

Ausonio Marras*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, N6H 1T4, Canadahttp://publish.uwo.ca/~amarras
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Abstract:

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Multiple supervenience is a problematic notion whose role can well be served by a contextualized or properly restricted standard notion of supervenience. It is furthermore not needed to defend functionalism against Kim's charge that cross-classifying taxonomies imply a serious form of dualism; nor does Ross & Spurrett's (R&S's) Kitcherian account of the metaphysics of causation crucially depend on multiple supervenience.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004