Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) develop a complex picture of selective information, processing and present a wealth of different evidence concerning self-deception. This complexity is already one reason to doubt that self-deception is either a purely offensive or a defensive strategy. The evidence cited supports self-deception both enhancing and decreasing fitness. Examples for the latter are wrong body perceptions of anorexic people, denials of being addicted, or putting a gloss on violent relationships. Even if self-deception enhances fitness – as part of an offensive strategy – obvious costs arise. Therefore, the benefits have to be substantial to overcome this barrier.
One problem might be that self-deceptions are not just taken at face value by others but are verified. Therefore, follow-up costs are high. Take as an example self-assessment. If individuals overestimate their own capabilities in physical contexts, this will invariably lead to serious injuries or death. In social contexts, rivals and allies alike will frequently challenge these alleged qualities, which will then break down and produce negative consequences. In mating contexts, overestimating one's qualities and, as a result, courting superior mates will lead to rejections, given that discriminating abilities in mating contexts are highly developed (not only in humans, but also in many species).
For that reason, we would like to suggest a modification of self-deception as offensive strategy: Its continued use should depend on its success. If a particular deception is successful, then self-deception can be incorporated via the subconscious processes suggested by VH&T, because discrepancies to external perception are apparently not too large. If, on the other hand, such bluffs are called, self-deception should no longer be used in these kinds of situations making way again for an accurate self-perception.
Deception and self-deception are, furthermore, especially hard to keep up in stable groups over longer periods. Problems include intimate knowledge of others and high costs of discovered deception. However, there is an evolutionary mechanism for this problem: costly signals. They ensure that even in a world of egoistic individuals, honest and reliable communication can be effected (Zahavi & Zahavi Reference Zahavi and Zahavi1997). This implies, however, that each communication should be treated as possibly deceptive by default if not backed up by an honest signal.
Costly signaling weakens the argument that “Self-enhancement is useful only to the degree that it is self-deceptive, because only when it is believed by the self will others accept the enhanced self as genuine.” (sect. 8, para. 9). Because signals can and are indeed faked, it follows that individuals should and do in fact rely on their own knowledge to evaluate the truth of any signal. Genuine signals require at least agreement between the signal of the other individual and external cues, as well as the knowledge of the receiver. If there are discrepancies – which would often be the case if self-enhancement is faked – such signals should be discarded as dishonest or be inspected more closely.
Self-deception as defensive strategy is implausible, too. We completely agree with VH&T that self-deception as a means to cope with a threatening world confuses means with ends from an evolutionary perspective – hedonistic rewards per se are not the ultimate target of selection.
Given that the evidence presented does not favor self-deception as either a purely offensive or defensive strategy, we would like to put forward a third model. Here, self-deception is seen as incongruence between self-perception and perception by others. Selective information processing is then used as a strategy to keep that incongruence.
It is essential to keep in mind that children do not have autonomy when constructing their self-perception. Humans develop their self-perceptions in light of others, through a process of attribution primarily by members of the kin group and not through “objective” introspection (Carruthers Reference Carruthers2009b; Prinz Reference Prinz, Wachsmuth, Lenzen and Knoblich2008; Voland Reference Voland2007). Coupled with the fact that humans are “cooperative breeders” with all the corresponding strategies of cognitive networking in the group (Hrdy Reference Hrdy2009), it follows that selfishly motivated individuals may influence others. This is particular true for kin groups – for example, getting children to adapt certain roles like “the hero,” “the helper,” and so forth, to enhance the fitness of members of the kin group, irrespective of the fitness of the children themselves. This was first pointed out by Trivers (Reference Trivers1974) and labeled with the term “parent–offspring conflict.”
Kurland and Gaulin (Reference Kurland, Gaulin and Buss2005, p. 453) could be right when they point out that “some humanists have found in our peculiarly intensive family ecology the source of all neurosis, psychosis, and the world's troubles.” Implications of this family-conflict model include self-deception as well, because the parent–offspring conflict is not only an investment conflict (Salmon Reference Salmon, Salmon and Shackelford2007), but may also become a pronounced role conflict.
If role expectations are actually accepted by the persons concerned, this could mean that the parent–offspring conflict has been won by members of the kin group and explain why such “wrong” self-perceptions are not corrected, even if self-deception is costly. The obvious reason is that it is costly, too, to avoid self-deception. Such costs are attested by psychological studies. Evidence suggests that self-perception has to be without inner contradictions. Personality disorders like schizophrenia attest to this claim. Many biases ensure a whole personality (e.g., hindsight bias, confirmation bias, attributional biases, etc.; see Frey Reference Frey, Frey, Störmer and Willführ2010; Gilovich Reference Gilovich1991; Plous Reference Plous1993). Cognitive dissonance is stressful (Taylor Reference Taylor1989/1995), and correcting cognitive dissonance is also stressful because it means conflict with the manipulating party. Stress, however, is costly (Flinn Reference Flinn, Dunbar and Barrett2007). Self-representation, which includes questions of self-deception, therefore constitutes a typical trade-off problem. Thus, it may be fitness enhancing for individuals to let themselves be manipulated.
To conclude, our alternative answers the question posed by VH&T: “If self-deception evolved to deceive others, why is there so much evidence for self-deception that appears to be intended only for the self?” Other parties with different interests must be included in an analysis of self-deception.
Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) develop a complex picture of selective information, processing and present a wealth of different evidence concerning self-deception. This complexity is already one reason to doubt that self-deception is either a purely offensive or a defensive strategy. The evidence cited supports self-deception both enhancing and decreasing fitness. Examples for the latter are wrong body perceptions of anorexic people, denials of being addicted, or putting a gloss on violent relationships. Even if self-deception enhances fitness – as part of an offensive strategy – obvious costs arise. Therefore, the benefits have to be substantial to overcome this barrier.
One problem might be that self-deceptions are not just taken at face value by others but are verified. Therefore, follow-up costs are high. Take as an example self-assessment. If individuals overestimate their own capabilities in physical contexts, this will invariably lead to serious injuries or death. In social contexts, rivals and allies alike will frequently challenge these alleged qualities, which will then break down and produce negative consequences. In mating contexts, overestimating one's qualities and, as a result, courting superior mates will lead to rejections, given that discriminating abilities in mating contexts are highly developed (not only in humans, but also in many species).
For that reason, we would like to suggest a modification of self-deception as offensive strategy: Its continued use should depend on its success. If a particular deception is successful, then self-deception can be incorporated via the subconscious processes suggested by VH&T, because discrepancies to external perception are apparently not too large. If, on the other hand, such bluffs are called, self-deception should no longer be used in these kinds of situations making way again for an accurate self-perception.
Deception and self-deception are, furthermore, especially hard to keep up in stable groups over longer periods. Problems include intimate knowledge of others and high costs of discovered deception. However, there is an evolutionary mechanism for this problem: costly signals. They ensure that even in a world of egoistic individuals, honest and reliable communication can be effected (Zahavi & Zahavi Reference Zahavi and Zahavi1997). This implies, however, that each communication should be treated as possibly deceptive by default if not backed up by an honest signal.
Costly signaling weakens the argument that “Self-enhancement is useful only to the degree that it is self-deceptive, because only when it is believed by the self will others accept the enhanced self as genuine.” (sect. 8, para. 9). Because signals can and are indeed faked, it follows that individuals should and do in fact rely on their own knowledge to evaluate the truth of any signal. Genuine signals require at least agreement between the signal of the other individual and external cues, as well as the knowledge of the receiver. If there are discrepancies – which would often be the case if self-enhancement is faked – such signals should be discarded as dishonest or be inspected more closely.
Self-deception as defensive strategy is implausible, too. We completely agree with VH&T that self-deception as a means to cope with a threatening world confuses means with ends from an evolutionary perspective – hedonistic rewards per se are not the ultimate target of selection.
Given that the evidence presented does not favor self-deception as either a purely offensive or defensive strategy, we would like to put forward a third model. Here, self-deception is seen as incongruence between self-perception and perception by others. Selective information processing is then used as a strategy to keep that incongruence.
It is essential to keep in mind that children do not have autonomy when constructing their self-perception. Humans develop their self-perceptions in light of others, through a process of attribution primarily by members of the kin group and not through “objective” introspection (Carruthers Reference Carruthers2009b; Prinz Reference Prinz, Wachsmuth, Lenzen and Knoblich2008; Voland Reference Voland2007). Coupled with the fact that humans are “cooperative breeders” with all the corresponding strategies of cognitive networking in the group (Hrdy Reference Hrdy2009), it follows that selfishly motivated individuals may influence others. This is particular true for kin groups – for example, getting children to adapt certain roles like “the hero,” “the helper,” and so forth, to enhance the fitness of members of the kin group, irrespective of the fitness of the children themselves. This was first pointed out by Trivers (Reference Trivers1974) and labeled with the term “parent–offspring conflict.”
Kurland and Gaulin (Reference Kurland, Gaulin and Buss2005, p. 453) could be right when they point out that “some humanists have found in our peculiarly intensive family ecology the source of all neurosis, psychosis, and the world's troubles.” Implications of this family-conflict model include self-deception as well, because the parent–offspring conflict is not only an investment conflict (Salmon Reference Salmon, Salmon and Shackelford2007), but may also become a pronounced role conflict.
If role expectations are actually accepted by the persons concerned, this could mean that the parent–offspring conflict has been won by members of the kin group and explain why such “wrong” self-perceptions are not corrected, even if self-deception is costly. The obvious reason is that it is costly, too, to avoid self-deception. Such costs are attested by psychological studies. Evidence suggests that self-perception has to be without inner contradictions. Personality disorders like schizophrenia attest to this claim. Many biases ensure a whole personality (e.g., hindsight bias, confirmation bias, attributional biases, etc.; see Frey Reference Frey, Frey, Störmer and Willführ2010; Gilovich Reference Gilovich1991; Plous Reference Plous1993). Cognitive dissonance is stressful (Taylor Reference Taylor1989/1995), and correcting cognitive dissonance is also stressful because it means conflict with the manipulating party. Stress, however, is costly (Flinn Reference Flinn, Dunbar and Barrett2007). Self-representation, which includes questions of self-deception, therefore constitutes a typical trade-off problem. Thus, it may be fitness enhancing for individuals to let themselves be manipulated.
To conclude, our alternative answers the question posed by VH&T: “If self-deception evolved to deceive others, why is there so much evidence for self-deception that appears to be intended only for the self?” Other parties with different interests must be included in an analysis of self-deception.